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From Germany and the Second World War, Volume VIII: The Eastern Front, 1943-1944 by Karl Heinz Frieser, Pages 599 to 600:
Further, on Page 601:
The Soviet operation in Belorussia doubtless achieved a great deal, but it did not do what appears to have been possible with hindsight, that is, bring about the collapse of the German eastern front with a single mighty blow. In the spring of 1944 the war was not only lost for Germany, but was already almost over. The situation was particularly critical in the east, where the Wehrmacht's inferiority had attained dramatic proportions.
In those circumstances the OKH feared the Soviet command would exploit Germany's acute vulnerability at the beginning of the invasion in the west to launch an offensive that would decide the war. It was believed that the Russians would concentrate all available forces in one place to deliver a death blow to the German eastern army. Foreign Armies East, under Maj.-Gen. Gehlen, had long since located the Archimedean point at which the German front could be operationally dislodged. That point was the Kovel salient, from which Red Army armoured units could rapidly advance to the Baltic via Warsaw and enclose two German army groups. Then the whole eastern front would collapse and the road to Berlin would be open.
In retrospect it seems highly likely that such an encirclement attack would have succeeded. Today, unlike the Soviet leadership in the early summer of 1944, we possess precise information as to the real relative strength of the two sides and the subsequent course of events. At all events, in the summer of 1944 the Red Army rapidly achieved an operational breakthrough in every offensive. On 18 July, 1st Belorussian Front began a secondary offensive at Kovel and, although only its left wing took part in the attack, the German defenders were simply swept away. Only a few days later there was a gap almost 100 kilometres wide in the German front.
It is therefore easy to imagine the avalanche that would have been set in motion if Operation BAGRATION had been carried out from Kovel in the direction of Warsaw, rather than from the Belorussian balcony in the direction of Minsk. It was, after all, the greatest mass of forces ever deployed in an offensive till that time. The Red Army command nevertheless made the mistake of dispersing its strategic potential at operational level. The glorificatory Soviet historiography repeatedly invoked Stalin's 'ten blows' (offensives) of 1944, but close examination shows that they were several blows too many. The fact is that in the summer of 1944 the Soviet command did not risk mustering its forces for the decisive death blow, but contented itself with inflicting a multitude of wounds on the enemy. Instead of a decisive strategic offensive in a single sector, it conducted a series of operational strikes along the whole front. Operation BAGRATION against Army Group Centre was only the main blow of the summer of 1944. It was followed by other major offensives, staggered from the outset, with the result that all four German army groups on the eastern front were attacked simultaneously.
Further, on Page 601:
During the ongoing offensive there was nevertheless a second chance to put that idea into practice. On 8 July, given the surprisingly favourable course of the operation, Zhukov called for the establishment of a new point of concentration. The plan which the German general staff so feared was now on the table. The Soviet attacking forces concentrated near Kovel were to turn north towards Warsaw, and from there advance on East Prussia in a bold manoeuvre that would have cut off the whole north wing of the German eastern front. But Stalin refused. Not until 27 July did he instruct Rokossovsky to turn a section of his troops north towards Warsaw. It was too late, however, since Field Marshal Model had meanwhile brought up his last armoured reserves, with which he was able to stop the advance on Warsaw at the last moment. The result was a second 'miracle on the Vistula'. Having lost the first battle by risking too much, Stalin lost the second by risking too little. Thus, the end of the war was needlessly postponed. Hitler and his regime were granted another stay of execution, and the bloody battles ended only in 1945.
What if Stalin had been less cautious in early July and approved of Zhukov's suggestion for a deep strike? Army Group Center would unquestionably be encircled and destroyed in its entirety and quite probably Army Group North too, given the inability of the Germans to launch Operation Doppelkopf as per OTL in August of 1944; even in a best case scenario, the most AGN could do is withdraw into East Prussia, which is likewised encircled by the Soviet strike to the mouth of the Vistula. On the whole, this seems to me to be the type of PoD that could actually end the war by Christmas, as the Germans would likely be forced to pull everything they can from other fronts to screen Berlin. IOTL, the Western Allies very nearly broke into the Po Valley in August and Operation Luttich probably delayed things in France by two to three weeks. Likely the Anglo-Americans will meet the Soviets further West than they did historically.