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Red Europe: The Kovel Option, July 1944

History Learner

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From Germany and the Second World War, Volume VIII: The Eastern Front, 1943-1944 by Karl Heinz Frieser, Pages 599 to 600:

The Soviet operation in Belorussia doubtless achieved a great deal, but it did not do what appears to have been possible with hindsight, that is, bring about the collapse of the German eastern front with a single mighty blow. In the spring of 1944 the war was not only lost for Germany, but was already almost over. The situation was particularly critical in the east, where the Wehrmacht's inferiority had attained dramatic proportions.​
In those circumstances the OKH feared the Soviet command would exploit Germany's acute vulnerability at the beginning of the invasion in the west to launch an offensive that would decide the war. It was believed that the Russians would concentrate all available forces in one place to deliver a death blow to the German eastern army. Foreign Armies East, under Maj.-Gen. Gehlen, had long since located the Archimedean point at which the German front could be operationally dislodged. That point was the Kovel salient, from which Red Army armoured units could rapidly advance to the Baltic via Warsaw and enclose two German army groups. Then the whole eastern front would collapse and the road to Berlin would be open.
In retrospect it seems highly likely that such an encirclement attack would have succeeded. Today, unlike the Soviet leadership in the early summer of 1944, we possess precise information as to the real relative strength of the two sides and the subsequent course of events. At all events, in the summer of 1944 the Red Army rapidly achieved an operational breakthrough in every offensive. On 18 July, 1st Belorussian Front began a secondary offensive at Kovel and, although only its left wing took part in the attack, the German defenders were simply swept away. Only a few days later there was a gap almost 100 kilometres wide in the German front.​
It is therefore easy to imagine the avalanche that would have been set in motion if Operation BAGRATION had been carried out from Kovel in the direction of Warsaw, rather than from the Belorussian balcony in the direction of Minsk. It was, after all, the greatest mass of forces ever deployed in an offensive till that time. The Red Army command nevertheless made the mistake of dispersing its strategic potential at operational level. The glorificatory Soviet historiography repeatedly invoked Stalin's 'ten blows' (offensives) of 1944, but close examination shows that they were several blows too many. The fact is that in the summer of 1944 the Soviet command did not risk mustering its forces for the decisive death blow, but contented itself with inflicting a multitude of wounds on the enemy. Instead of a decisive strategic offensive in a single sector, it conducted a series of operational strikes along the whole front. Operation BAGRATION against Army Group Centre was only the main blow of the summer of 1944. It was followed by other major offensives, staggered from the outset, with the result that all four German army groups on the eastern front were attacked simultaneously.​

Further, on Page 601:

During the ongoing offensive there was nevertheless a second chance to put that idea into practice. On 8 July, given the surprisingly favourable course of the operation, Zhukov called for the establishment of a new point of concentration. The plan which the German general staff so feared was now on the table. The Soviet attacking forces concentrated near Kovel were to turn north towards Warsaw, and from there advance on East Prussia in a bold manoeuvre that would have cut off the whole north wing of the German eastern front. But Stalin refused. Not until 27 July did he instruct Rokossovsky to turn a section of his troops north towards Warsaw. It was too late, however, since Field Marshal Model had meanwhile brought up his last armoured reserves, with which he was able to stop the advance on Warsaw at the last moment. The result was a second 'miracle on the Vistula'. Having lost the first battle by risking too much, Stalin lost the second by risking too little. Thus, the end of the war was needlessly postponed. Hitler and his regime were granted another stay of execution, and the bloody battles ended only in 1945.​
What if Stalin had been less cautious in early July and approved of Zhukov's suggestion for a deep strike? Army Group Center would unquestionably be encircled and destroyed in its entirety and quite probably Army Group North too, given the inability of the Germans to launch Operation Doppelkopf as per OTL in August of 1944; even in a best case scenario, the most AGN could do is withdraw into East Prussia, which is likewised encircled by the Soviet strike to the mouth of the Vistula. On the whole, this seems to me to be the type of PoD that could actually end the war by Christmas, as the Germans would likely be forced to pull everything they can from other fronts to screen Berlin. IOTL, the Western Allies very nearly broke into the Po Valley in August and Operation Luttich probably delayed things in France by two to three weeks. Likely the Anglo-Americans will meet the Soviets further West than they did historically.
 
So let's say the Soviets do this, advancing rapidly through Poland until reaching Danzig in August, effectively cutting off both Army Groups North and Center; the scattered survivors withdraw into East Prussia, which becomes the Courland analogue in this ATL. The Soviets on the North European Plain thereafter take time to rest and rebuild their supply lines, while the focus shifts South to where the Germans are collapsing as the Romanians, Hungarians and Bulgarians flip sides or outright collapse. Army Group South basically disintegrates and German resistance only really congeals in Western Hungary and Slovenia, with the Partisans liberating most of Yugoslavia with Soviet aid. The grand finale for the Soviets comes in December, with their "Oder Offensive" overrunning everything up to the Elbe, encircling Berlin and in the Balkans they advance upon Vienna.

In the West, Operation Luttich still happens but is less powerful; some of the SS Divisions have been stripped to fight in the East and that enables the Allies to close off the Falaise Gap entirely. The Western Allies liberate Paris ahead of schedule and cut off the 15th Army in early September, which surrenders and enables the opening of Antwerp by the start of October. ATL Market Garden still happens but here the German forces are in no position to resist. With Antwerp open, Patton can also advance into and clear the Rhineland in October, crossing the Rhine in tandem with Dever's 6th Army to the South in November while the British do the same in the North via the Netherlands.

The Western Allies and and Soviets meet somewhere between the Wesser and Elbe in late December, possibly around Christmas time, but maybe as late as January. Regardless, WWII has ended several months ahead of schedule, with resulting effects on casualties and battle damage to all involved parties. The Soviets have vastly more prestige, and their further advance has given them an advantage in future reparations claims and securing German tech; more than likely, a lot of scientists, data, etc that went West in Operation Paperclip will be going Eastwards here.
 
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I think Stalin would refuse to concede much in the way of territory if he takes (and has to fight for) Germany, even to the point of keeping OTL West Germany under his thumb too. (This does raise the spectre of a reunited Germany, even under communist rule, posing a potential threat to Russia further down the line.) Without the A-Bomb, the West would either have to accept it or fight a conventional war to drive out the Russians. No one would be very happy about the Russians being so close to Britain and France, but they might have to put up with it or continue the war indefinitely.

The Russians being close to France means they can and probably will support the French Communists, as the post-liberation government was still taking shape. The French might wind up in a civil war, or split into two factions, neither of which would amuse anyone outside Moscow. The Russians would also have a chance to invade Manchuria earlier, perhaps taking all of Korea before anyone else can get involved (unless they thought they had to keep large forces in post-war Germany, to keep the boot on the Germans and the Allies out.) In the short term, the Russians would be riding high.

Longer-term, things would be a lot less smooth. The Russians would be a bigger threat to France and Britain, and Italy, so I think we’d see NATO earlier. A lot of the ‘useful idiot’ pro-USSR propaganda wouldn’t take root in this TL, as France would get a lot more exiles from Germany who’d bring tales of Russian atrocities and, of course, they’d see the Russian army on the far side of the border. Given time, the Russians would find it harder and harder to govern their occupied and/or puppet territories; the locals will be trying to get more space for themselves, as well as their economies dying under communist mismanagement. I think the USSR would break up by the 70s, perhaps earlier.

Chris
 
I think Stalin would refuse to concede much in the way of territory if he takes (and has to fight for) Germany, even to the point of keeping OTL West Germany under his thumb too. (This does raise the spectre of a reunited Germany, even under communist rule, posing a potential threat to Russia further down the line.) Without the A-Bomb, the West would either have to accept it or fight a conventional war to drive out the Russians. No one would be very happy about the Russians being so close to Britain and France, but they might have to put up with it or continue the war indefinitely.

The Russians being close to France means they can and probably will support the French Communists, as the post-liberation government was still taking shape. The French might wind up in a civil war, or split into two factions, neither of which would amuse anyone outside Moscow. The Russians would also have a chance to invade Manchuria earlier, perhaps taking all of Korea before anyone else can get involved (unless they thought they had to keep large forces in post-war Germany, to keep the boot on the Germans and the Allies out.) In the short term, the Russians would be riding high.

Longer-term, things would be a lot less smooth. The Russians would be a bigger threat to France and Britain, and Italy, so I think we’d see NATO earlier. A lot of the ‘useful idiot’ pro-USSR propaganda wouldn’t take root in this TL, as France would get a lot more exiles from Germany who’d bring tales of Russian atrocities and, of course, they’d see the Russian army on the far side of the border. Given time, the Russians would find it harder and harder to govern their occupied and/or puppet territories; the locals will be trying to get more space for themselves, as well as their economies dying under communist mismanagement. I think the USSR would break up by the 70s, perhaps earlier.

Chris

I could see a neutral Germany serving as a buffer here; the Soviets did make real offers to this effect outside of the more famous Stalin Note of 1952. Failing that, yeah, I see it as likely we get Italian and French Civil Wars. On the other hand, the Americans will have the bomb and their combined economic might with the UK is something Stalin always wanted to tread lightly with. I don't see the Soviets collapsing any earlier though; IOTL it was a very random thing it happened, and the underlying economic and political conditions were not there by the 1970s.
 
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