President Burton K. Wheeler

[Catalunya]

What if Roosevelt lost in 1928, and as a result Wheeler becomes the candidate of the Democrats? How would he have handled domestic affairs, and the war in Europe?

 

[napoleon IV]

I can't imagine a man who lives in a trashcan would make a good President.

 

[Catalunya]

I can't imagine a man who lives in a trashcan would make a good President.

I meant the Montana senator, but fair enough.

 

[Venocara]

What if Roosevelt lost in 1928, and as a result Wheeler becomes the candidate of the Democrats? How would he have handled domestic affairs, and the war in Europe?

When it’s time for the war, it’s likely that Lend-Lease won’t be a thing and the Battle of the Atlantic might just be avoided. I’ve heard that one of the reasons we got into Greece was to sway American public opinion, and if it’s clear that they won’t be helping us avoiding an intervention in Greece could enable us to finish Operation Compass and clear the Italians from North Africa. Assuming Wheeler’s reluctance to go to war with Japan doesn’t stop them from going to war with Britain the naval capacity freed up by victory in North Africa would be critical in stopping Japan from taking Singapore, and as a result we might just have them beaten (for all intents and purposes outside of China) by 1943. We wouldn’t be sharing Tube Alloys information with the Americans and so we probably don’t have the bomb until 1947 at the earliest. As such, depending on how badly the lack of American aid affects the Soviets, the war could end by 1946/47 with the Soviets controlling all of Germany and Austria, or in the best case scenario Mussolini is deposed in the aftermath of his failures in the Med, we don’t go to war with Japan and we might somehow get a situation better than OTL.

 

[History Learner]

If there is no Lend Lease, the British either seek terms in 1940 or surrender outright in 1941. Thereafter, the Germans will sweep away the Soviets and divide Eurasia between themselves and the Japanese for the most part. You then get a three way Cold War between Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the United States.

 

[Time Enough]

Thereafter, the Germans will sweep away the Soviets and divide Eurasia between themselves and the Japanese for the most part.

The Japanese are unlikely to invade the Soviets, they tried it and buggered up, so the Strike South lot will be in charge. So America is likely to come into the War eventually due to the actions of the Japanese.

Additionally the Germans and Soviets will at most either have to end in some form of peace agreement or the German’s bleeding themselves out on the Ural's.

 

[History Learner]

The Japanese are unlikely to invade the Soviets, they tried it and buggered up, so the Strike South lot will be in charge. So America is likely to come into the War eventually due to the actions of the Japanese.

Additionally the Germans and Soviets will at most either have to end in some form of peace agreement or the German’s bleeding themselves out on the Ural's.

Japan never did try to invade the Soviets; I'm presuming you are referring to the draw that was the border skirmishes along the Manchuria-Mongolian border in 1939? The actual Japanese invasion plans for the USSR continued to be developed and were nearly implemented in 1941, until the U.S. oil embargo hit; given what we know of Wheeler, it strikes me as unlikely for this trigger event to occur. Likewise, the collapse of the USSR in its heartland will be too enticing for the Japanese to not take advantage of.

As for the Germans, once they take the A-A Line, nevermind the Ural Line, there is no possible of them being bled out by the Soviet remnants; there simply isn't enough manpower, resources, or industry to sustain such a struggle. Realistically, taking Leningrad, Moscow and the Kuban/Caucasus alone is a knock out blow even with Lend Lease, but without it it's assured.

 

[Venocara]

Japan never did try to invade the Soviets; I'm presuming you are referring to the draw that was the border skirmishes along the Manchuria-Mongolian border in 1939? The actual Japanese invasion plans for the USSR continued to be developed and were nearly implemented in 1941, until the U.S. oil embargo hit; given what we know of Wheeler, it strikes me as unlikely for this trigger event to occur. Likewise, the collapse of the USSR in its heartland will be too enticing for the Japanese to not take advantage of.

As for the Germans, once they take the A-A Line, nevermind the Ural Line, there is no possible of them being bled out by the Soviet remnants; there simply isn't enough manpower, resources, or industry to sustain such a struggle. Realistically, taking Leningrad, Moscow and the Kuban/Caucasus alone is a knock out blow even with Lend Lease, but without it it's assured.

And of course, once the Germans sweep through North Africa, the Middle East and Persia and the Japanese succeed where so many failed and conquer both China and India in their entirety (along with South America and Australia because why not) they’ll meet at the 70th meridian and that’ll be all, right?

I’m sorry but this simply isn’t the reality of the situation.

The fact of the matter is that the Axis, even if they worked totally in concert, could never force either the United Kingdom of the Soviet Union out of the war without breaking both their political and popular will to fight on, and seeing as this didn’t happen in OTL it is unlikely to happen in TTL. The Germans do not have the capacity to pull off Sea Lion or Barbarossa or a conquest of Egypt with a 1939 POD nor do the Japanese have the capacity to totally subdue all of China and Siberia, let alone India. And even in the worst case scenario where by 1944 the UK have agreed to a temporary settlement and the USSR’s leadership breaks and agrees to withdraw behind the Urals the Americans will probably elect someone who wants do something about this, and especially with a British nuclear program working at full steam, they will do.

 

[History Learner]

And of course, once the Germans sweep through North Africa, the Middle East and Persia and the Japanese succeed where so many failed and conquer both China and India in their entirety (along with South America and Australia because why not) they’ll meet at the 70th meridian and that’ll be all, right?

Probably not, no, because there was no real interest in such in their respective centers of power.

I’m sorry but this simply isn’t the reality of the situation.

The fact of the matter is that the Axis, even if they worked totally in concert, could never force either the United Kingdom of the Soviet Union out of the war without breaking both their political and popular will to fight on, and seeing as this didn’t happen in OTL it is unlikely to happen in TTL. The Germans do not have the capacity to pull off Sea Lion or Barbarossa or a conquest of Egypt with a 1939 POD nor do the Japanese have the capacity to totally subdue all of China and Siberia, let alone India. And even in the worst case scenario where by 1944 the UK have agreed to a temporary settlement and the USSR’s leadership breaks and agrees to withdraw behind the Urals the Americans will probably elect someone who wants do something about this, and especially with a British nuclear program working at full steam, they will do.

This only holds true if ASBs grant the British and Soviets the ability to survive without food and to make weapons appear out of thin air.

In the absence of Lend Lease, the Germans absolutely have the ability to force the UK into favorable terms-even with American support this nearly occurred OTL-and, likewise IOTL, had the ability to defeat the USSR but here their capability to do such cannot be questioned. I cite from Denis Havlat (2017) Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part I, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies:

With the Battle of Britain raging in the summer and autumn of 1940, British demand for aircraft reached new heights as well. By 1 December 1940, Britain had ordered a staggering 23,000 aircraft from the American industry, of which only 2,100 had been delivered to the beleaguered island.28 Domestic production of aircraft for that year had been 15,049 aircraft.29 While these shipments were invaluable for Britain’s survival, they came at great financial cost. In order to purchase the 50 destroyers offered by the United States, the British had to sell their possessions in the West Indies and Newfoundland, leasing them to the Americans for 99 years.30 Even then, the strains of war were too great a burden for the British economy:​

​

British industry was incapable of producing the range and quantity of armaments required to win the war. Even those items that could be manufactured domestically were heavily dependent on imports of raw materials and products such as steel. Most of these imports came from the United States and had to be paid for either in gold or dollars… . The day of reckoning was rapidly approaching. From a total of £775 million at the beginning of 1940, Britain’s gold and dollar reserves … had fallen [by August 1940] by over a third to £490 million… . They would last another three to four months at most. By the end of 1940, therefore, Britain would be unable to carry on the war by its own efforts.31 ​

​

By September 1940, British orders in the United States amounted to 10 billion dollars, of which only a fraction could be paid for.32 The country was nearing financial collapse: ‘ … by the beginning of 1941 it had less than £3 million left in its gold and dollar reserves. This was as near to bankruptcy as it was possible to go without actual default’. 33 Realizing that without American aid Britain would have to surrender or negotiate with Germany, Roosevelt devised the so-called Lend-Lease law, which took effect on 11 March 1941. This law gave the President the authority to supply any country that was considered vital for the defense of the United States.34 For the duration of the war, Britain would receive supplies free of charge, which would be handed back or repaid once the war had ended.​

Further on:

Even with the deliveries received from the United States, Britain’s military position in 1941 was close to hopeless. During the first half of this year the Luftwaffe continued its bombing raids against the island, Rommel’s forces were steadily advancing in North Africa, British forces sustained yet again humiliating defeats in Greece and Crete, and the German U-boats were sinking ever more British ships. Luckily, the Americans were now supplying Britain for free. In 1941 the United States delivered 4,473 aircraft either directly to Britain, to British overseas commands, or to British colonies and dominions.35 British production of aircraft in 1941 had been 20,094 units; whereas the colonies and dominions produced around 15 percent of this number.36 Other substantial military deliveries were tanks and trucks. Around 13,000 trucks and 1,390 tanks were shipped to Britain and its overseas forces before the end of 1941.37 Domestic production in 1941 had manufactured 4,841 tanks and 88,161 military trucks.38 Food represented the most crucial non-military supply. Before the war Britain had to import twice as many tons of food from overseas sources as raised on her own land.39 However, by the summer of 1940 Britain could no longer import food from continental Europe and had to cut down its food imports from other parts of the world in order to free shipping capacity for military supplies and resources. In combination with the many shiploads of food lost to the German U-boats, this created a situation where the British nation was close to starvation. Between the fall of France and the passing of the Lend-Lease act, the average British adult lost around 4.5 kilogram of weight due to the rapidly shrinking diet.40 Between 16 April and 25 December 1941, the Americans supplied Britain with over one million tons of food, including millions of concentrated vitamin tablets to counter a vitamin shortage caused by strict rationing.41 Shipments continued to increase, delivering 1.427 million tons in 1942, 1.705 million tons in 1943, 1.28 million in 1944, and 709,000 tons in 1945.42 On average, this amount of food was sufficient to feed over 4 million people during the years 1941–1945, around 10 percent of the British population.43​

​

Besides the deliveries sustaining the British population and industry, American aid contributed decisively in stopping Rommel’s advance in North Africa. By 24 October 1942, American deliveries to North Africa and the Middle East amounted to 900 medium tanks, including 300 Sherman tanks that were of better quality than anything the British had before, as well as ninety 105 mm self-propelled anti-tank guns, 800 light tanks, 25,000 trucks and jeeps, over 700 twin-engine medium bombers, and nearly 1,100 fighters.44 The percentage of military equipment supplied to the British armed forces from American sources was 11.5 percent in 1941, 16.9 percent in 1942, 26.9 percent in 1943, and 28.7 percent in 1944.45 Even these figures understate the full magnitude of American aid to the British Empire. In 1942 the United States supplied 9,253 tanks and 5,898 aircraft, while British industry had turned out just 8,611 tanks and 23,672 aircraft.46 In 1943 American supplies had increased to 15,933 tanks and 6,710 aircraft, while British manufacture of tanks had decreased to 7,476 and aircraft production increased only modestly to 26,263 machines.47 In 1944, at the height of these deliveries, the United States supplied the British Empire with a staggering 11,414 aircraft, while the British produced 26,461 during that year.48 Total US deliveries of aircraft to the British Commonwealth amounted to nearly 34,000 units.49 Throughout the years 1941–1944 the United States delivered between one-fifth and one-third of total British Empire aircraft production. The share of American tanks was even greater; it increased from approximately 20 percent in 1941, to 100 percent in 1942, and to 200 percent of the total British Empire production in 1943. During the last two years of the war, Britain alone received, among other things, 76,737 Jeeps, 98,207 trucks, 12,431 tanks, and 6,715 000 tons of steel and iron.50 By 1944 around two-thirds of the tanks and trucks in the British army came from the United States.51 The total value of the aid delivered to the British Empire amounted to slightly more than 30 billion dollars.52​

​

By the summer of 1941, the island nation was fully dependent on American deliveries, having been transformed into a giant unsinkable aircraft carrier similar to the ‘Airstrip One’ described in George Orwell’s novel 1984. Without American deliveries, Britain would either have been starved into submission or collapsed financially. Even if these two scenarios could somehow have been avoided, British industry would have produced fewer weapons than historically, since it was dependent on overseas deliveries of resources from the United States. The absence of these resources, combined with the lack of Lend-Lease tanks, aircraft, motor vehicles, small arms, and artillery, would have meant a far weaker and far worse-equipped British army, navy, and air force. British victory in North Africa would have thus become unlikely, a successful Bomber Offensive improbable, and an invasion of continental Europe impossible.​

Without American aid, the UK would've thus been compelled to seek a peace deal with the Germans no later than early 1941. How about the Soviets?

Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part II by Denis Havlat:

During World War II the Soviet Union received large amounts of aid from the Western world in the form of supplies and military intervention, both of which were declared to have been irrelevant for the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany by Soviet historians. This article examines the claim made by Soviet historiography, and it comes to the conclusion that both Western supplies and military intervention were far more helpful than claimed by the Soviets. Without this aid the Red Army would not have been able to perform as well as it did historically, tilting the balance in Germany’s favor. Soviet claims about the irrelevance of Western aid can thus be dismissed as propaganda and inaccurate.​

Havlat also goes further, noting how the lack of the U.S. would have further effects:

Overall, the Western Allies were responsible only for a small fraction of the losses sustained by German infantry and armor between 1941 and 1943 (around 10 percent); however, their contribution in the destruction and occupation of the Luftwaffe was overwhelming. The same applies to their contribution in forcing the Germans to leave most heavy artillery in the Reich as anti-aircraft weapons, preventing them from being used as anti-tank weapons in the East. Without Allied military intervention, the Germans could have sent at least 2,000 additional tanks, some 5,000 additional 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, around 15,000 additional aircraft, tens of thousands of additional motor vehicles, and up to half a million additional soldiers to the Eastern Front in the years 1941–1943, which would have shifted the balance in their favor.​

Further on:

Without the need to fight in the Atlantic; to transport large amounts of troops, equipment, and supplies across the entire continent; and the necessity to defend against Allied bombing, Germany could have massively reduced its U-boat, locomotive, and anti-aircraft gun and ammunition production and converted at least part of these capacities into the production of more aircraft and equipment for land warfare. Additionally, without bombing, and the need to maintain a large enough army to fight on several fronts, there would have been less need to use forced labor in the factories, thus boosting production. Historically, Germany already outproduced the USSR in certain areas like locomotives, trucks, and even bombers, with 12,664 produced by Germany in the years 1941–1943 as compared to 11,359 built by the USSR.170 Without Allied intervention and Lend-Lease, Soviet margins in these areas would most likely have widened, while margins in areas such as tanks would have shrunk significantly. If Germany and its industry could have concentrated on one single front from 1941 onwards, it most likely would have vastly changed the outcome of the war in the East.​

The USSR and Total War: Why Didn’t the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942? by Mark Harrison:

Roosevelt also contributed to Soviet stabilization. The first installment of wartime Allied aid that reached the Soviet Union in 1942, although small by later standards, amounted to some 5 per cent of Soviet GNP in that year. Although Allied aid was used directly to supply the armed forces with both durable goods and consumables, indirectly it probably released resources to households. By improving the balance of overall resources it brought about a ceteris paribus increase in the payoff to patriotic citizens. In other words, Lend-Lease was stabilizing. We cannot measure the distance of the Soviet economy from the point of collapse in 1942, but it seems beyond doubt that collapse was near. Without Lend-Lease it would have been nearer. Stalin himself recognized this, although he expressed himself more directly. He told Khrushchev several times that the Soviet Union had suffered such heavy losses that without Allied aid it would have lost the war.19​

Boris V. Sokolov (2007). The role of lend‐lease in Soviet military efforts, 1941–1945, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies: Vol. 7, issue 3, pages 567-586:

In general, we can conclude that without Western supplies, the Soviet Union not only could not have won the Great Patriotic War, but was not even able to resist the German invasion, not being able to produce a sufficient amount of weapons and military equipment and provide it with fuel and ammunition. This dependence was well understood by the Soviet leadership at the beginning of the war. For example, the special envoy of President F.D. Roosevelt, G. Hopkins, reported in a message dated July 31, 1941, that Stalin believed it was impossible without American assistance from Great Britain and the USSR to resist the material might of Germany, which had the resources of occupied Europe. {70}Roosevelt, back in October 1940, announcing his decision to allow the military department to provide weapons and equipment that are surplus for the needs of the American armed forces, as well as strategic materials and industrial equipment to those countries that could protect American national interests, allowed the inclusion of these countries and Russia. {71} Without such an attitude on the part of the president, the pre-war placement in the United States of Soviet orders for equipment important for the production of weapons and military equipment would hardly have been possible.​

Now, you've suggested the British atomic bomb project as a solution to the above issues; how exactly is the UK able to afford and sustain such a project with widespread starvation, being broke and without the ability to sustain its conventional forces? Indeed, even with American aid Tube Alloys was turned over to the Americans because of the British industry not being up to the task, at least not on a reasonable timescale and this was born out by the British not developing their first nuclear weapon until the 1950s. Nazi Germany fought on until physically overran, how exactly is its willpower going to break but the British-an actual Democracy with leaders beholden to the people-won't despite being in a much worse situation? It simple has no basis in reality and we already know IOTL 1940 the British were willing to accept terms and get out of the conflict.

As for the U.S. somehow getting into the conflict after 1944, again, we know that's not going to happen because even staunch German-hawks like FDR ruled such out in the eventuality the Germans defeated the USSR. See Mark Stoler's Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II, because in it the author reveals the planning of the JCS as it concerns the war and situational contingencies therein.

From Page 72:

Eisenhower and his subordinates were far from alone or original in perceiving the overriding importance of continued Soviet participation in the war. As previously noted, in the summer and fall of 1941 Roosevelt and army planners had begun to recognize that victory over Germany might not be possible unless the Red Army continued to tie down the bulk of the Wehrmacht, and they consequently had made assistance to Russia a focal point of their global strategy. The JB had forcefully reiterated this conclusion by informing Roosevelt on December 21 that ‘‘Russia alone possesses the manpower potentially able to defeat Germany in Europe.’’ 26 The Soviets’ late 1941 success in stopping the German advance on Moscow and launching a counteroffensive, occurring at a time when Axis forces were everywhere else successful, further reinforced this belief.
As a result virtually all Allied planning papers in late 1941– early 1942 stressed the critical importance of aiding the Russians so that they could survive a renewed German onslaught. Roosevelt agreed. ‘‘Nothing would be worse than to have the Russians collapse,’’ he told Treasury secretary Henry Morgenthau on March 11. ‘‘I would rather lose New Zealand, Australia, or anything else than have the Russians collapse.’’ Five days earlier the JUSSC had bluntly stated that ‘‘Russia must be supported now by every possible means’’ because the absence of a Russian front would postpone ‘‘indefinitely’’ the end of the war.27 And as army planners realized, such postponement would only increase public and naval pressure to turn away completely from the indecisive European theater in favor of the Pacific.

Page 80:

Marshall’s reasoning was based not only on Eisenhower’s February–March presentations but also on military and political events since then which had heavily reinforced the OPD’s original conclusions. Once again the focal point was the Soviet Union. ‘‘The retention of Russia in the war as an active participant is vital to Allied victory,’’ now acting chief of staff McNarney had emphasized on April 12; if German armies were allowed to turn west, ‘‘any opportunity for a successful offensive against the European Axis would be virtually eliminated.’’ 56 In mid June the staff again warned that Russian collapse would necessitate a strategic reassessment, ‘‘possibly with the result of directing our main effort to the Pacific rather than the Atlantic.’’ 57

Page 93:

As early as April–May, OPD, g-2, and the joint committees had begun to explore the appropriate response should this ‘‘desperate situation’’ result in a Soviet collapse, and in early August the JUSSC completed and forwarded to the JPS a massive study of such a contingency. This study indicated that Russian collapse would be a ‘‘catastrophe’’ of such magnitude as to put the United States in a ‘‘desperate’’ situation too, **one in which it ‘‘would be forced to consider courses of action which would primarily benefit the United States rather than the United Nations.’’**
Indeed, it might be the only remaining major member of the United Nations, because the British Commonwealth might collapse and the British public react to Soviet defeat by overthrowing Churchill and agreeing to a negotiated peace that would leave Hitler in control of Eurasia. A revival of isolationism and an ‘‘increase in defeatism’’ within the country were also possible in this scenario. Even without British withdrawal, however, the only sound U.S. response to a Soviet collapse would be to ‘‘adopt the strategic defensive in the European Theater of War and to conduct the strategic offensive in the Japanese theater.’’ On August 19 the JPS the great strategic debate 93 approved this report, forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs as JCS 85, and ordered the preparation of a strategic plan for the defeat of Japan.40
Click to expand...

Concurrent to these concerns, the following documents were prepared:

"Conditions under Which an Armistice Might Be Negotiated between the United Nations and the European Powers", on June 11, 1942 by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong (S Document 22)

Col. Nevins, ‘‘Courses of Action Open to the United States in the Event the Prospective 1942 German Offensive Forces Russia to Capitulate,’’ memo, Apr. 1942, and unsigned memo to Nevins, Apr. 25, 1942, Wedemeyer Papers, box 76, folder 2, HI

 

[Kimkatya]

Probably not, no, because there was no real interest in such in their respective centers of power.



This only holds true if ASBs grant the British and Soviets the ability to survive without food and to make weapons appear out of thin air.

In the absence of Lend Lease, the Germans absolutely have the ability to force the UK into favorable terms-even with American support this nearly occurred OTL-and, likewise IOTL, had the ability to defeat the USSR but here their capability to do such cannot be questioned. I cite from Denis Havlat (2017) Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part I, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies:

With the Battle of Britain raging in the summer and autumn of 1940, British demand for aircraft reached new heights as well. By 1 December 1940, Britain had ordered a staggering 23,000 aircraft from the American industry, of which only 2,100 had been delivered to the beleaguered island.28 Domestic production of aircraft for that year had been 15,049 aircraft.29 While these shipments were invaluable for Britain’s survival, they came at great financial cost. In order to purchase the 50 destroyers offered by the United States, the British had to sell their possessions in the West Indies and Newfoundland, leasing them to the Americans for 99 years.30 Even then, the strains of war were too great a burden for the British economy:​

​

British industry was incapable of producing the range and quantity of armaments required to win the war. Even those items that could be manufactured domestically were heavily dependent on imports of raw materials and products such as steel. Most of these imports came from the United States and had to be paid for either in gold or dollars… . The day of reckoning was rapidly approaching. From a total of £775 million at the beginning of 1940, Britain’s gold and dollar reserves … had fallen [by August 1940] by over a third to £490 million… . They would last another three to four months at most. By the end of 1940, therefore, Britain would be unable to carry on the war by its own efforts.31 ​

​

By September 1940, British orders in the United States amounted to 10 billion dollars, of which only a fraction could be paid for.32 The country was nearing financial collapse: ‘ … by the beginning of 1941 it had less than £3 million left in its gold and dollar reserves. This was as near to bankruptcy as it was possible to go without actual default’. 33 Realizing that without American aid Britain would have to surrender or negotiate with Germany, Roosevelt devised the so-called Lend-Lease law, which took effect on 11 March 1941. This law gave the President the authority to supply any country that was considered vital for the defense of the United States.34 For the duration of the war, Britain would receive supplies free of charge, which would be handed back or repaid once the war had ended.​

Further on:

Even with the deliveries received from the United States, Britain’s military position in 1941 was close to hopeless. During the first half of this year the Luftwaffe continued its bombing raids against the island, Rommel’s forces were steadily advancing in North Africa, British forces sustained yet again humiliating defeats in Greece and Crete, and the German U-boats were sinking ever more British ships. Luckily, the Americans were now supplying Britain for free. In 1941 the United States delivered 4,473 aircraft either directly to Britain, to British overseas commands, or to British colonies and dominions.35 British production of aircraft in 1941 had been 20,094 units; whereas the colonies and dominions produced around 15 percent of this number.36 Other substantial military deliveries were tanks and trucks. Around 13,000 trucks and 1,390 tanks were shipped to Britain and its overseas forces before the end of 1941.37 Domestic production in 1941 had manufactured 4,841 tanks and 88,161 military trucks.38 Food represented the most crucial non-military supply. Before the war Britain had to import twice as many tons of food from overseas sources as raised on her own land.39 However, by the summer of 1940 Britain could no longer import food from continental Europe and had to cut down its food imports from other parts of the world in order to free shipping capacity for military supplies and resources. In combination with the many shiploads of food lost to the German U-boats, this created a situation where the British nation was close to starvation. Between the fall of France and the passing of the Lend-Lease act, the average British adult lost around 4.5 kilogram of weight due to the rapidly shrinking diet.40 Between 16 April and 25 December 1941, the Americans supplied Britain with over one million tons of food, including millions of concentrated vitamin tablets to counter a vitamin shortage caused by strict rationing.41 Shipments continued to increase, delivering 1.427 million tons in 1942, 1.705 million tons in 1943, 1.28 million in 1944, and 709,000 tons in 1945.42 On average, this amount of food was sufficient to feed over 4 million people during the years 1941–1945, around 10 percent of the British population.43​

​

Besides the deliveries sustaining the British population and industry, American aid contributed decisively in stopping Rommel’s advance in North Africa. By 24 October 1942, American deliveries to North Africa and the Middle East amounted to 900 medium tanks, including 300 Sherman tanks that were of better quality than anything the British had before, as well as ninety 105 mm self-propelled anti-tank guns, 800 light tanks, 25,000 trucks and jeeps, over 700 twin-engine medium bombers, and nearly 1,100 fighters.44 The percentage of military equipment supplied to the British armed forces from American sources was 11.5 percent in 1941, 16.9 percent in 1942, 26.9 percent in 1943, and 28.7 percent in 1944.45 Even these figures understate the full magnitude of American aid to the British Empire. In 1942 the United States supplied 9,253 tanks and 5,898 aircraft, while British industry had turned out just 8,611 tanks and 23,672 aircraft.46 In 1943 American supplies had increased to 15,933 tanks and 6,710 aircraft, while British manufacture of tanks had decreased to 7,476 and aircraft production increased only modestly to 26,263 machines.47 In 1944, at the height of these deliveries, the United States supplied the British Empire with a staggering 11,414 aircraft, while the British produced 26,461 during that year.48 Total US deliveries of aircraft to the British Commonwealth amounted to nearly 34,000 units.49 Throughout the years 1941–1944 the United States delivered between one-fifth and one-third of total British Empire aircraft production. The share of American tanks was even greater; it increased from approximately 20 percent in 1941, to 100 percent in 1942, and to 200 percent of the total British Empire production in 1943. During the last two years of the war, Britain alone received, among other things, 76,737 Jeeps, 98,207 trucks, 12,431 tanks, and 6,715 000 tons of steel and iron.50 By 1944 around two-thirds of the tanks and trucks in the British army came from the United States.51 The total value of the aid delivered to the British Empire amounted to slightly more than 30 billion dollars.52​

​

By the summer of 1941, the island nation was fully dependent on American deliveries, having been transformed into a giant unsinkable aircraft carrier similar to the ‘Airstrip One’ described in George Orwell’s novel 1984. Without American deliveries, Britain would either have been starved into submission or collapsed financially. Even if these two scenarios could somehow have been avoided, British industry would have produced fewer weapons than historically, since it was dependent on overseas deliveries of resources from the United States. The absence of these resources, combined with the lack of Lend-Lease tanks, aircraft, motor vehicles, small arms, and artillery, would have meant a far weaker and far worse-equipped British army, navy, and air force. British victory in North Africa would have thus become unlikely, a successful Bomber Offensive improbable, and an invasion of continental Europe impossible.​

Without American aid, the UK would've thus been compelled to seek a peace deal with the Germans no later than early 1941. How about the Soviets?

Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part II by Denis Havlat:

During World War II the Soviet Union received large amounts of aid from the Western world in the form of supplies and military intervention, both of which were declared to have been irrelevant for the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany by Soviet historians. This article examines the claim made by Soviet historiography, and it comes to the conclusion that both Western supplies and military intervention were far more helpful than claimed by the Soviets. Without this aid the Red Army would not have been able to perform as well as it did historically, tilting the balance in Germany’s favor. Soviet claims about the irrelevance of Western aid can thus be dismissed as propaganda and inaccurate.​

Havlat also goes further, noting how the lack of the U.S. would have further effects:

Overall, the Western Allies were responsible only for a small fraction of the losses sustained by German infantry and armor between 1941 and 1943 (around 10 percent); however, their contribution in the destruction and occupation of the Luftwaffe was overwhelming. The same applies to their contribution in forcing the Germans to leave most heavy artillery in the Reich as anti-aircraft weapons, preventing them from being used as anti-tank weapons in the East. Without Allied military intervention, the Germans could have sent at least 2,000 additional tanks, some 5,000 additional 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, around 15,000 additional aircraft, tens of thousands of additional motor vehicles, and up to half a million additional soldiers to the Eastern Front in the years 1941–1943, which would have shifted the balance in their favor.​

Further on:

Without the need to fight in the Atlantic; to transport large amounts of troops, equipment, and supplies across the entire continent; and the necessity to defend against Allied bombing, Germany could have massively reduced its U-boat, locomotive, and anti-aircraft gun and ammunition production and converted at least part of these capacities into the production of more aircraft and equipment for land warfare. Additionally, without bombing, and the need to maintain a large enough army to fight on several fronts, there would have been less need to use forced labor in the factories, thus boosting production. Historically, Germany already outproduced the USSR in certain areas like locomotives, trucks, and even bombers, with 12,664 produced by Germany in the years 1941–1943 as compared to 11,359 built by the USSR.170 Without Allied intervention and Lend-Lease, Soviet margins in these areas would most likely have widened, while margins in areas such as tanks would have shrunk significantly. If Germany and its industry could have concentrated on one single front from 1941 onwards, it most likely would have vastly changed the outcome of the war in the East.​

The USSR and Total War: Why Didn’t the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942? by Mark Harrison:

Roosevelt also contributed to Soviet stabilization. The first installment of wartime Allied aid that reached the Soviet Union in 1942, although small by later standards, amounted to some 5 per cent of Soviet GNP in that year. Although Allied aid was used directly to supply the armed forces with both durable goods and consumables, indirectly it probably released resources to households. By improving the balance of overall resources it brought about a ceteris paribus increase in the payoff to patriotic citizens. In other words, Lend-Lease was stabilizing. We cannot measure the distance of the Soviet economy from the point of collapse in 1942, but it seems beyond doubt that collapse was near. Without Lend-Lease it would have been nearer. Stalin himself recognized this, although he expressed himself more directly. He told Khrushchev several times that the Soviet Union had suffered such heavy losses that without Allied aid it would have lost the war.19​

Boris V. Sokolov (2007). The role of lend‐lease in Soviet military efforts, 1941–1945, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies: Vol. 7, issue 3, pages 567-586:

In general, we can conclude that without Western supplies, the Soviet Union not only could not have won the Great Patriotic War, but was not even able to resist the German invasion, not being able to produce a sufficient amount of weapons and military equipment and provide it with fuel and ammunition. This dependence was well understood by the Soviet leadership at the beginning of the war. For example, the special envoy of President F.D. Roosevelt, G. Hopkins, reported in a message dated July 31, 1941, that Stalin believed it was impossible without American assistance from Great Britain and the USSR to resist the material might of Germany, which had the resources of occupied Europe. {70}Roosevelt, back in October 1940, announcing his decision to allow the military department to provide weapons and equipment that are surplus for the needs of the American armed forces, as well as strategic materials and industrial equipment to those countries that could protect American national interests, allowed the inclusion of these countries and Russia. {71} Without such an attitude on the part of the president, the pre-war placement in the United States of Soviet orders for equipment important for the production of weapons and military equipment would hardly have been possible.​

Now, you've suggested the British atomic bomb project as a solution to the above issues; how exactly is the UK able to afford and sustain such a project with widespread starvation, being broke and without the ability to sustain its conventional forces? Indeed, even with American aid Tube Alloys was turned over to the Americans because of the British industry not being up to the task, at least not on a reasonable timescale and this was born out by the British not developing their first nuclear weapon until the 1950s. Nazi Germany fought on until physically overran, how exactly is its willpower going to break but the British-an actual Democracy with leaders beholden to the people-won't despite being in a much worse situation? It simple has no basis in reality and we already know IOTL 1940 the British were willing to accept terms and get out of the conflict.

As for the U.S. somehow getting into the conflict after 1944, again, we know that's not going to happen because even staunch German-hawks like FDR ruled such out in the eventuality the Germans defeated the USSR. See Mark Stoler's Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II, because in it the author reveals the planning of the JCS as it concerns the war and situational contingencies therein.

From Page 72:

Page 80:

Page 93:

Concurrent to these concerns, the following documents were prepared:

"Conditions under Which an Armistice Might Be Negotiated between the United Nations and the European Powers", on June 11, 1942 by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong (S Document 22)

Col. Nevins, ‘‘Courses of Action Open to the United States in the Event the Prospective 1942 German Offensive Forces Russia to Capitulate,’’ memo, Apr. 1942, and unsigned memo to Nevins, Apr. 25, 1942, Wedemeyer Papers, box 76, folder 2, HI

i think it's fair for you to change your username to "history knower"

 

[Ricardolindo]

i think it's fair for you to change your username to "history knower"

There is always more to learn.

 

[Venocara]

In order to purchase the 50 destroyers offered by the United States, the British had to sell their possessions in the West Indies and Newfoundland, leasing them to the Americans for 99 years.

You’ve quoted a lot here but I immediately doubt the veracity of your sources when I see things like this. There’s a huge difference between leasing land in a colony to leasing the colony itself. One sees Newfoundland host a military base (which isn‘t too improbable in any post-WW1 TL with a non-isolationist US), the other turns it into Canada’s own Hong Kong. There are numerous other mistakes and exaggerations littered throughout your sources.

Up until 1941 the Royal Navy is still the most powerful in the world. The U-boats were making it difficult to import supplies from the US but with the convoy system we managed. In 1941 the Royal Air Force has licked the Luftwaffe and forced Hitler to abandon any plans to even attempt Sea Lion. Britain very much still has the capacity to fight on at this point.

Britain’s military position in 1941 was close to hopeless. During the first half of this year the Luftwaffe continued its bombing raids against the island, Rommel’s forces were steadily advancing in North Africa, British forces sustained yet again humiliating defeats in Greece and Crete, and the German U-boats were sinking ever more British ships. Luckily, the Americans were now supplying Britain for free.

As late as February 1941 Britain may have had the chance to shorten the war by up to two years. If we avoid Greece and finish Operation Compass we may secure North Africa and the Med in its entirety, which could make Mussolini vulnerable to dismissal after a year of total failure, potentially giving us a way back on to the continent. Additionally, it frees up the naval capacity to stop the Japanese in their tracks if they try to make a move as per OTL. If without Lend-Lease Barbarossa manages to be more of a success than OTL, it simply stretches the German supply lines further and makes them more vulnerable to a devastating counter attack. And the Germans wouldn’t be able to sink American ships as freely as in OTL it was largely considered as a matter of time before the Americans entered the war, this wouldn’t be the case in TTL and so they would be eager to avoid giving interventionists a bloody shirt to wave around.

One thing I would like to point out though just to inform you is that Britain out-produced Germany at least in terms of aircraft (and definitely in other sectors too) in every year of the war.

Probably not, no, because there was no real interest in such in their respective centers of power.

Well, there were discussions…

 

[History Learner]

You’ve quoted a lot here but I immediately doubt the veracity of your sources when I see things like this. There’s a huge difference between leasing land in a colony to leasing the colony itself. One sees Newfoundland host a military base (which isn‘t too improbable in any post-WW1 TL with a non-isolationist US), the other turns it into Canada’s own Hong Kong. There are numerous other mistakes and exaggerations littered throughout your sources.

Which is what the source is talking about? I think you're taking it in the sense he is talking about the colonies as a whole instead of the explicitly named Destroyers for Bases deal. As it were, though, I quoted from multiple different sources so if you have issues with one, there are several others to go through.

Up until 1941 the Royal Navy is still the most powerful in the world. The U-boats were making it difficult to import supplies from the US but with the convoy system we managed. In 1941 the Royal Air Force has licked the Luftwaffe and forced Hitler to abandon any plans to even attempt Sea Lion. Britain very much still has the capacity to fight on at this point.

I don't agree with this on any points-the Luftwaffe being defeated would be a shock to RAF fighter command, for example, which lost the 1942 air campaign over France and repeatedly lost around Malta that same year-but focusing in on 1941 ignores that you have changes starting in 1940 here; how exactly is the RAF winning in ATL 1941 without the materials to build planes from 1940 on? How is the British public fighting on as it dies from starvation?

As late as February 1941 Britain may have had the chance to shorten the war by up to two years. If we avoid Greece and finish Operation Compass we may secure North Africa and the Med in its entirety, which could make Mussolini vulnerable to dismissal after a year of total failure, potentially giving us a way back on to the continent. Additionally, it frees up the naval capacity to stop the Japanese in their tracks if they try to make a move as per OTL. If without Lend-Lease Barbarossa manages to be more of a success than OTL, it simply stretches the German supply lines further and makes them more vulnerable to a devastating counter attack. And the Germans wouldn’t be able to sink American ships as freely as in OTL it was largely considered as a matter of time before the Americans entered the war, this wouldn’t be the case in TTL and so they would be eager to avoid giving interventionists a bloody shirt to wave around.

With what materials, manpower and weapons are the UK to do such? Same goes for the Soviets; if the A-A Line is achieved by 1942, they have lost over 90% of their oil, industry and essentially all of their manpower sources. Central Asia and Siberia is not the base to launch a successful counter-attack.

One thing I would like to point out though just to inform you is that Britain out-produced Germany at least in terms of aircraft (and definitely in other sectors too) in every year of the war.

Well, there were discussions…

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_powers_negotiations_on_the_division_of_Asia

Yes they did, but using American credit and materials to do so which does not exist here. Lend Lease came into existence because the UK was broke by early 1941 and could no longer sustain its war effort.

 

[Venocara]

Which is what the source is talking about? I think you're taking it in the sense he is talking about the colonies as a whole instead of the explicitly named Destroyers for Bases deal. As it were, though, I quoted from multiple different sources so if you have issues with one, there are several others to go through.

But it doesn’t mention destroyers or bases though, it says that the possessions were “sold” and “leased for 99 years”. As I said, the distinction is huge and very important.

I don't agree with this on any points-the Luftwaffe being defeated would be a shock to RAF fighter command, for example, which lost the 1942 air campaign over France and repeatedly lost around Malta that same year-but focusing in on 1941 ignores that you have changes starting in 1940 here; how exactly is the RAF winning in ATL 1941 without the materials to build planes from 1940 on? How is the British public fighting on as it dies from starvation?

Have you ever heard of the Battle of Britain? And how exactly is the country being forced into starvation when it has control of the air and the sea?

With what materials, manpower and weapons are the UK to do such? Same goes for the Soviets; if the A-A Line is achieved by 1942, they have lost over 90% of their oil, industry and essentially all of their manpower sources. Central Asia and Siberia is not the base to launch a successful counter-attack.

The same materials, manpower and weapons that had General Wavell convinced he could the job, and this was before Lend-Lease, as was the Greek campaign. In the East, the Germans haven’t got a chance of taking the A-A line before facing a winter counteroffensive that will push them back. The Russians lost Moscow in 1812 and won the war, they can survive a loss of Moscow in 1941 as well, and with over-extended German supply lines a counteroffensive might just be a greater success than it was in OTL.

 

[History Learner]

But it doesn’t mention destroyers or bases though, it says that the possessions were “sold” and “leased for 99 years”. As I said, the distinction is huge and very important.

It does mention destroyers:

With the Battle of Britain raging in the summer and autumn of 1940, British demand for aircraft reached new heights as well. By 1 December 1940, Britain had ordered a staggering 23,000 aircraft from the American industry, of which only 2,100 had been delivered to the beleaguered island.28 Domestic production of aircraft for that year had been 15,049 aircraft.29 While these shipments were invaluable for Britain’s survival, they came at great financial cost. In order to purchase the 50 destroyers offered by the United States, the British had to sell their possessions in the West Indies and Newfoundland, leasing them to the Americans for 99 years.30 Even then, the strains of war were too great a burden for the British economy:​

Ultimately, however, it's a bit of cherry pick to latch onto the precise language being used in order to reject the whole thing, especially given, again, I've quoted far more citations than just Havlat.

Have you ever heard of the Battle of Britain? And how exactly is the country being forced into starvation when it has control of the air and the sea?

The same country that was starving despite winning the Battle of Britain historically:

However, by the summer of 1940 Britain could no longer import food from continental Europe and had to cut down its food imports from other parts of the world in order to free shipping capacity for military supplies and resources. In combination with the many shiploads of food lost to the German U-boats, this created a situation where the British nation was close to starvation. Between the fall of France and the passing of the Lend-Lease act, the average British adult lost around 4.5 kilogram of weight due to the rapidly shrinking diet.40 Between 16 April and 25 December 1941, the Americans supplied Britain with over one million tons of food, including millions of concentrated vitamin tablets to counter a vitamin shortage caused by strict rationing.41 Shipments continued to increase, delivering 1.427 million tons in 1942, 1.705 million tons in 1943, 1.28 million in 1944, and 709,000 tons in 1945.42 On average, this amount of food was sufficient to feed over 4 million people during the years 1941–1945, around 10 percent of the British population.43​

​

Can you explain how the situation would not get worse when the British no longer have the money to finance their purchases of American goods, such as oil, food and steel, which are critical to their war effort?

The same materials, manpower and weapons that had General Wavell convinced he could the job, and this was before Lend-Lease, as was the Greek campaign.

And said tools don't exist here. Beyond that, however, the basis of your argument is that not sending the roughly three divisions to Greece somehow wins the North Africa Front for the Commonwealth despite the fact the Germans were moving in an entire Armor Corps while the Italians were shuttling in tens of thousands too, while the British logistics were over-extended and coming into fortified lines held by the Axis. Even ignoring all of that, how exactly is the loss of North Africa for the Axis supposed to do anything? Refer any talk of landing in France or Italy to the OTL disaster that Dieppe, and that's ignoring the inability of the Royal Navy to provide the necessary landing craft or the RAF to establish air superiority.

In the East, the Germans haven’t got a chance of taking the A-A line before facing a winter counteroffensive that will push them back. The Russians lost Moscow in 1812 and won the war, they can survive a loss of Moscow in 1941 as well, and with over-extended German supply lines a counteroffensive might just be a greater success than it was in OTL.

You're right in that they won't take the A-A Line in 1941, which is why I said 1942. However, they will take it and no Winter Counter-Offensives are viable here given you've changed the entire dynamic of the campaign with your Pre-Invasion PoDs. Any allusions to 1812 ignore that Moscow was not the capitol and that was Pre-Industrial Warfare where max army size was less than 200,000 on average; by 1941, we are talking multi-million man armies which require extensive logistical networks and industries to support them, to the tune of tens of thousands of locomotives, hundreds of thousands of trucks, etc. Without Lend Lease, the Soviet war effort collapses no later than 1943, but most likely in 1942; the Soviets themselves admitted such and all modern research generally concurs with this.

The Soviets aren't supermen, without weapons, food, fuel or, literally, bodies to utilize them in this case, they will collapse. The Germans can and will extend their logistics to accommodate; they basically had by 1942 OTL anyway.