History Learner
Well-known member
With the 160th Anniversary of the most famous battle in the American Civil War having recently passed, I thought it worthwhile to create a thread looking at one of the overlooked PoDs of the Battle. Over the last decade, Pickett's Charge has been somewhat reassessed, moving from an unworkable scheme to one that was plausible, but badly mismanaged with the end result being rather infamous. Michael J. Armstrong of Brock University and Steven E. Sodergren of Norwich University conducted a study on the matter in 2015, which stated that:
As the study further points out, the brigades were available and actually did move forward until Longstreet cancelled their movement:
Another missed chance is further elucidated upon later on:
So let's say Longstreet doesn't fumble that much on Day 3; as a result, Wilcox and Land have their brigades sent in while Longstreet is able to prevent Pendleton from moving the artillery reserve thanks to having fewer operational concerns. The attack thus successfully breaches the Federal line and Lee is able to commit the second wave to the attack:
2nd and 1st Corps get encircled and destroyed, but the rest of the Army of the Potomac is able to retreat though at the cost of much of their equipment and baggage. Lee is too damaged and low on ammunition to force the issue, so Meade is able to withdraw to the Pipe Creek Line, and thus the campaign comes to an end. Total casualties are around 23,000 for the Confederates to 36,000 Federals (An extra 14,000+ losses from the destruction of the aforementioned Corps), leaving the Army of the Potomac extremely battered and likely necessitating pulling forces from the Western Theater, where Vicksburg is concluded as historically. Perhaps Grant comes East with the 13th, 15th and 17th Corps to revive the Army of the Potomac?
Objective. We model Pickett’s Charge at the Battle of Gettysburg to see whether the Confederates could have achieved victory by committing more infantry, executing a better barrage, or facing a weaker defense. Methods. Our mathematical modeling is based on Lanchester equations, calibrated using historical army strengths. We weight the Union artillery and infantry two different ways using two sources of data, and so have four versions of the model. Results. The models estimate that a successful Confederate charge would have required at least 1 to 3 additional brigades. An improved artillery barrage would have reduced these needs by about 1 brigade. A weaker Union defense could have allowed the charge to succeed as executed. Conclusions. The Confederates plausibly had enough troops to take the Union position and alter the battle’s outcome, but likely too few to further exploit such a success.
As the study further points out, the brigades were available and actually did move forward until Longstreet cancelled their movement:
The Confederate assault did not occur in a vacuum; additional units stood by ready, though many had seen high casualties in the previous days of the battle and thus were not assigned to the initial attack. The brigades of Cadmus Wilcox and David Lang were in support on the right and actually advanced later to reinforce the assault, bringing an additional 1400- 1600 men towards the Union line (Stewart, 1959: 172-3 & Sears, 2003: 454). They went in too late to properly support the assault, however, and suffered 360 casualties from Union artillery fire before retreating (Sears, 2003: 454-55).
According to Sears, three additional brigades from Anderson’s division under Wright, Posey and Mahone were “loosely designated” as support on the left for the attack, but never engaged. They contained approximately 3350 men (Sears, 2003: 392). Stewart notes that at least Wright’s brigade was briefly moved forward, but Longstreet recalled it to defend against a potential counterattack (1959: 237). The remainder of Longstreet’s corps also stood in the area, and thus Coddington notes that Lee “anticipated throwing another 10,000 or so infantry into the breach he expected to be made by the assaulting column” (Coddington, 1983: 462).
Another missed chance is further elucidated upon later on:
Alexander had originally intended to fire a longer initial barrage, and also make use of several guns from the army’s artillery reserve. Unfortunately, General Pendleton, the Confederate Chief of Artillery, repositioned both the reserve and the ammunition train during the barrage (Sears, 2003: 407), making them unavailable. In his memoirs, Alexander remembers Longstreet’s dismay when told that the barrage would be shorter than planned, even going so far as to suggest that it was doomed to fail as a result (Gallagher, 1989: 261)
So let's say Longstreet doesn't fumble that much on Day 3; as a result, Wilcox and Land have their brigades sent in while Longstreet is able to prevent Pendleton from moving the artillery reserve thanks to having fewer operational concerns. The attack thus successfully breaches the Federal line and Lee is able to commit the second wave to the attack:
2nd and 1st Corps get encircled and destroyed, but the rest of the Army of the Potomac is able to retreat though at the cost of much of their equipment and baggage. Lee is too damaged and low on ammunition to force the issue, so Meade is able to withdraw to the Pipe Creek Line, and thus the campaign comes to an end. Total casualties are around 23,000 for the Confederates to 36,000 Federals (An extra 14,000+ losses from the destruction of the aforementioned Corps), leaving the Army of the Potomac extremely battered and likely necessitating pulling forces from the Western Theater, where Vicksburg is concluded as historically. Perhaps Grant comes East with the 13th, 15th and 17th Corps to revive the Army of the Potomac?