Options for a Parliamentary United States

[RyanF]

Seemingly one of those cliches-but-not alternate history ideas is the United States developing a political system with the head of government and the democratic legitimacy of at least part of the executive arising from the command and confidence of its legislature. Standing in contrast to the executive being wholly invested in the Presidency as OTL.

There is not really a single POD that could lead to the establishment of such a system (well, maybe one...) but there have been eras where the motions could have been started that would lead the country down a path to a strong legislature instead of the elected monarchy it has been so far in its history.

1. The Constitutional Option - There are varying stages along the development of the US constitution where Congress could have wound up more powerful than it actually did. The Virginia Plan would have seen the lower house "popularly" elected and representatives apportioned by their number of free inhabitants or taxes contributed*; the upper house would have been similarly apportioned and its members nominated by the state legislatures and and elected by the lower house; both houses would elect the executive. This was supported by larger states with growing populations and opposed by the smaller states, who drafted the New Jersey Plan in response which had a unicameral legislature composed of equal representatives from each state. The Connecticut Compromise broadly gave us the system eventually adopted, with the lower house popularly elected and apportioned by population and the upper house having two members for every state** and appointed by the state legislatures. Even with this its possible a strong legislature could have developed under a Vice President other than John Adams, who as Presiding Officer proceeded to turn the upper house into a joke - the House passed the form of address of the President as simply 'George Washington, President of the United States' but some senators fancied 'Highness' or 'Excellency' and Adams agreed with them so instigated a debate that lasted weeks before Mr. President was settled on; would routinely debate, harangue and lecture the members from his chair in ways that would give John Bercow pause; and served as a rubber stamp for the administration and the Federalists including voting against a bill that would have required Senate consent for removal of executive branch officials confirmed by the Senate. This is the area where perhaps one POD could have taken the US down the route to a parliamentary system - either the adoption of the Virginia Plan or a different Vice President, but the former is perhaps too implausible and for the latter the best candidates are also Virginians so would be impossible to become VP to Washington, and there are few potential candidates from the North outside of Adams and even those would perhaps be just as likely to be cosy with the administration.
2. The Republican Option - Disagreements between the President and Congress were nothing new by the 1860s*** but they were taken to a new level in the fights between President Andrew Johnson and the Radical Republican Agenda Congress. Johnson tried to speedily reintegrate the former Confederate States back into the Union, so Congress refused to seat their legislators and enacted legislation to overturn the Black Codes being set up in those states. He would veto their bills, they would overrule him, and back and forth it would go. They limited his ability to dismiss Cabinet officials, he tried it anyway, they impeached him, he narrowly avoided conviction. Congress would flex its muscles for the rest of the century and would grow fat and corrupt with the development of the lobby system against a string of weak Presidents****. This also saw the paradoxical development of the Democratic Party seeing its support based amongst ex-Confederates in the South and poorer immigrants and Catholics in Northern cities; whilst the Republicans had their support amongst Union veterans, businessmen and farmers in the North as well as blacks in the South. The failures of Reconstruction would see the latter disenfranchised and the Solid South born. Against those weak presidencies the House and Senate were paragons of stability, especially after the Democrats were able to lift the last vestiges of Reconstruction and disenfranchise blacks. Would a harsher, radical reconstruction and a more total dominance of postbellum politics by the Republican Party have seen a lasting shift in power from the Presidency to the legislature? Without the elction of Grover Cleveland, itself achieved by a mix of the Solid South, Catholic voters and Republicans disenchanted with the perceived corruption of their James G. Blaine; would the presidency have become a veritable rubber stamp for the Republican Congress? House Speakers like Thomas Brackett Reed and Joseph Gurney Cannon***** were OTL amongst the most powerful men in the country during or in the immediate aftermath of this era, how much more powerful might they or their successors have become?
3. The Progressive Option - The Progressive Era was the last era of true political experimentation in the United States. There is a lot to criticise the people involved with the activism and reform of the era - being overwhelmingly white and middle class, the support of eugenics and prohibition - but in a way we could do with such a movement and willingness to try new things today. Amongst the changes wrought by this era were the direction election of Senators and the instigation of primary elections, the goal of these was to take political power away from political bosses and party machines and put it back into the hands of the people. A century later these changes have become just as corrupt and ineffectual as the systems they sought to replace******. Congress was still very powerful at this time, as much as the Theodore Roosevelt is held up as the all-conquering mustachioed gunshot-to-the-chest-no-selling bull-moose-fucking lion-eating bespectacled man's man in office he found himself frequently challenged by the aforementioned Cannon as Speaker of the House of Representatives. Power would not truly shift back to the Presidency until the tenure of noted fan of the number fourteen and probable vampire demon Woodrow Wilson. Without Wilson perhaps Congress remains on the path to becoming the dominant branch of government. Wilson was one who saw the country as moving towards a Parliamentary system, so perhaps he instead decides to go with what he sees as the flow and seeks entry into Congress with the intention of becoming leader of the Democratic Party in the House; perhaps others will see this as another way of breaking the power of the bosses and machines and United States parties gain a flavour recognisable to those in Europe. That this would come at a time when the Socialist Party was still active and the Bull Moose Progressive still existing on paper, so we might see others follow suit. This, with the continuing 19th century trend of weak Presidents, might eventually lead to constitutional amendments limiting the power of the President in favour of Congress and eventually ending up with a Prime Minister of the United States in everything but name*******.

Three options for how the United States might have developed into a parliamentary system throughout its history, any others you think might have been more likely opportunities? How would the systems have developed in each of these three eras? Would a Parliamentary system be possible early in US history when Congress barely met********? Would a more powerful Reconstruction/Gilded Age Era Republican Congress simply lead to an even bigger backlash? Is the Progressive Era too anti-political party to see further reform toward a parliamentary system? Is reform to any form of Parliamentary system impossible under the current Constitution?

*Incidentally, taxes contributed as a method of apportionment is something I don't think I've seen done for any theoretical election maps - would be an interesting thing to model a modern election against.
**Another aspect of this system that was abandoned would be that Senators from one state would vote together, as with electors in the electoral college. That this was abandoned removed the Senate as a bastion of federalism and greatly increased the power of individual senators over members of the House and the state legislators that nominated them.
***Andrew Jackson (what is it with Presidents named Andrew that draw the ire of Congress) vs. the Anti-Jacksonians is another option for this, but a more difficult one in my opinion.
****With the exception of Grover Cleveland, who perhaps more than any other figure kept the lights on for presidential power during this era.
*****Cannon is perhaps more of a Progressive Era figure, but the groundwork for his power was laid earlier.
******They even hoped that direct election of Senators would break the continuous cycle of deadlock.
*******The most powerful office in the House of Representatives is the Speaker, unlike in Parliamentary systems were the presiding officer is expected to be impartial. Whenever Congress has been at the height of its powers men like Henry Clay, Reed, and Cannon have acted as the leader of their party in the House whilst occupying this office.
********Largerly due to travel difficulties, the reason Washington and Adams were inaugurated in April was because Congress and the Senate did not have a quorum until almost a month after the election.

 

[Thande]

One thought I had was that indirect appointment of electors (e.g. by the state legislatures) becomes the norm - and it did feel like it was heading in that direction at one point in the 1820s, probably helped by the Era of Good Feelings. Then, rather than this indirect election of the presidency (and the Senate) being reformed, the presidency and Senate's powers are just gradually scaled back by constitutional amendments as popular representative democracy becomes seen as more important and legitimising. So the House, as the only popularly elected part of the government, becomes supreme and the presidency and Senate are reduced to a ceremonial figurehead and a review body respectively.

 

[Indicus]

Henry Clay proposed constitutional amendments to decrease the power of the presidency during Jackson's tenure. One was to make the presidential veto able to be overrided by a simple majority of Congress (with provisions for eliminating the pocket veto), another was for dismissal of executive officials (including the cabinet) to require Congressional approval (rather than unilateral dismissal by the President), and another was for the Secretary of the Treasury to be appointed by Congress (Clay believed that the powers of the treasury were powers of the purse, and therefore a legislative power). These constitutional amendments, if ratified, would dramatically weaken the power of the presidency and strengthen the power of Congress, and perhaps the Secretary of the Treasury could turn into the de facto head of government.

 

[Beata Beatrix]

Henry Clay proposed constitutional amendments to decrease the power of the presidency during Jackson's tenure. One was to make the presidential veto able to be overrided by a simple majority of Congress (with provisions for eliminating the pocket veto), another was for dismissal of executive officials (including the cabinet) to require Congressional approval (rather than unilateral dismissal by the President), and another was for the Secretary of the Treasury to be appointed by Congress (Clay believed that the powers of the treasury were powers of the purse, and therefore a legislative power). These constitutional amendments, if ratified, would dramatically weaken the power of the presidency and strengthen the power of Congress, and perhaps the Secretary of the Treasury could turn into the de facto head of government.

That is fascinating! Seems like a little bit of a pipe dream and I doubt Harry of the West would get support for it - he obviously wants to be in charge - but I’d love to know more about these.

EDIT: It seems like these were kind of a way to kneecap John Tyler, which might be a good POD - Tyler’s resignation / impeachment could empower Clay’s plan, although I doubt he’d go through with it as President.

 

[Indicus]

That is fascinating! Seems like a little bit of a pipe dream and I doubt Harry of the West would get support for it - he obviously wants to be in charge - but I’d love to know more about these.

EDIT: It seems like these were kind of a way to kneecap John Tyler, which might be a good POD - Tyler’s resignation / impeachment could empower Clay’s plan, although I doubt he’d go through with it as President.

I found this in a JSTOR article, which can be found here. Here's the most relevant passage:

Following the election of William Henry Harrison in 1840 Clay said that "... the most important object which should engage the serious attention of a new administration, is that of circumscribing the executive power, and throwing around it such limitations and safeguards as will render it no longer dangerous to the public liberties;"88 To accomplish this end Clay proposed (1) that the President be limited to one term, (2) that the veto power be subjected to further limitations and qualifications, (3) that the power of dismission from office be restricted, (4) the the control over the treasury of the United States be confined exclusively to Congress, and (5) that the appointment of members of Congress to any office, while serving in Congress and for one term there after, be prohibited. Clay wanted Congress to be able to override a President's veto by a simply majority rather than the required two-thirds majority. He recognized that the President's arguments against a bill, as well as his influence, would always be great, but that if a majority of both Houses were still convinced the bill ought to become law, it shouldn't be necessary to secure the vote of two-thirds of Congress.

In a footnote, it notes that the proposal of a veto ultimately originates during Jackson's tenure.

For more on Clay's views on the treasury:

Clay, of course, regarded the removal of the deposits as an assumption of power by the executive. In the past it was never doubted that Congress possessed the power over the public purse, but Jackson disregarded this legal and constitutional precedent. Clay maintained that Jackson had removed the deposits after an executive committee, a committee of Congress, and the House of Representatives had all vouch safed its security.

Like Webster, Clay showed decisively that the power to remove the deposits was given, by the Congress, to the Secretary of the Treasury alone, exclusive of the President. In addition, the Secretary was to report to Congress annually; his duties were defined and prescribed by Congress. He was, according to the 1791 act which established the Treasury, an agent of Congress, and ought to have been left alone, uncontrolled by the President.

For more on Clay's view on the veto:

Clay regarded the veto as virtually an unqualified negative on the legislation of Congress, due to the difficulty of obtaining a two-thirds vote on controversial bills, which often passed the first time by a bare majority. Up to 1842 Congress had not been able to override a single Presidential veto. Clay believed that the veto power drew after it the power to initiate legislation, and ultimately the veto power conferred on the executive the entire legislative power of the government. He declared: "With the power to initiate and the power to consummate legislation, to give vitality and vigor to every law, or to strike it dead at his pleasure, the President must ultimately become the ruler of the nation."85 Clay was fearful that the executive's use of the veto power would change Congress' function from that of deciding what measures are necessary to solve the nation's grievance and restore its prosperity, to what measures the executive will sanction. He saw that "already the idea was becoming familiarized to the minds of freemen, to men of only the second generation after the days of the Revolution, of submitting to the dictation of the executive, because without his assent they could do nothing."86

Also:

Clay wanted Congress to be able to override a President's veto by a simply majority rather than the required two-thirds majority. He recognized that the President's arguments against a bill, as well as his influence, would always be great, but that if a majority of both Houses were still convinced the bill ought to become law, it shouldn't be necessary to secure the vote of two-thirds of Congress.89

For more on Clay's view on dismissal of executive officials:

Clay feared that the union of the sword and the purse in the hands of the President could result in a practical despotism, with the forms of free government. He warned that the President, with the use of his tremendous power of dismissal, coerced public officials to promote the view and interests of the President's party. Jackson, for example, tended ". . . to judge men by their political faith and personal loyalty, not by their executive ability."67 Clay discovered that it was not uncommon for a faithful officer, of the highest character and undoubted probity, to be fired because his political sentiments differed from those of the President. Clay also learned of the case of two Army officers who were being tried for purchasing army supplies from members of the Whig Party instead of the Democratic Party. The extent of executive power was so great that Clay felt compelled to say that "if the President of the United States were to receive the title of Autocrat of the United States, the amount of his authority would not be increased without an alteration of the Constitution."68

Clay chided Jackson for seeking precedents in the Congress of 1789 which expanded his authority, but refusing to admit the existence of precedents from the same Congress which sustained the powers of Congress. Webster, like Clay, found that Jackson rejected the authority of all precedent except when suitable to his own purpose.69 Among other sources, Jackson sought for precedents in the arguments made by Madison during the debates in Congress in 1789.

Although Clay believed that no one knew more about the Constitution than Madison did, Clay criticized some of the points Madison made about the removal power. Clay thought that Madison had failed to distinguish between executive power as signed by the Constitution, and executive power enacted by law. Madison had declared that if a President removed a public officer merely for his political sentiments, he could be impeached by the House of Representatives and tried by the Senate. Clay rejoined that (1) the impeachment of the President for dismissing a register of the land office or a collector of customs is unlikely, and (2) ". . . suppose a majority of that House should consist of members who approve the principle that the spoils belong to the victors; and suppose a great number of them are themselves desirous to obtain some these spoils, and can only be gratified by displacing men from office whose merits require that they should be continued, what chance do you think there would be to prevail upon such a House to impeach the President.

Madison's second security against the executive's removal of a meritorious officer was that the President could not appoint another person without the consent of the Senate. Clay, however, replied that even if the Senate did not approve the President's nominee, the removed officer would still not be reinstated. In addition, the President could easily wear down the Senate's resistance and patience by nominating another man, and another, until the Senate finally confirmed his nominee. Clay observed that over half of the Senate would probably be of the President's party and therefore ready to approve all his nominations and some members of the other half would not want to leave the office vacant for a long time. White agrees that the Senate's power of confirmation had little or no effect on Jackson's actual appointments, that the Senate was unable to prevent Jackson from removing men on the basis of their political sentiments, or to compel him to state his reason for the removals.71 Even today ". . . the members of the Senate will vote to approve almost any Presidential appointment, unless the man has been caught with his fingers in the till clear up to the elbows."72

Clay feared that the executive power of removal could easily be abused, as the more than 2000 dismissals under Jackson indicated, and that this abuse of power would tend to subvert the Constitution and over throw public liberty. He believed that if a corps of one hundred thousand public officers were actuated by one spirit and obeyed one will, it could be more dangerous than a standing army. He concluded: "The President has no power to dismiss the judiciary; and it might be asked, with equal plausibility, how he could see that the laws are executed, if the judges will not conform to his opinion, and he cannot dismiss them."73 In this conclusion Clay seems to suggest that if Jackson's interpretation of the constitutional injunction to the President, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, is correct, it would not be long before the judiciary would be added to that corps of one hundred thousand, actuated by one spirit, obeying one will.

 

[RyanF]

One thought I had was that indirect appointment of electors (e.g. by the state legislatures) becomes the norm - and it did feel like it was heading in that direction at one point in the 1820s, probably helped by the Era of Good Feelings. Then, rather than this indirect election of the presidency (and the Senate) being reformed, the presidency and Senate's powers are just gradually scaled back by constitutional amendments as popular representative democracy becomes seen as more important and legitimising. So the House, as the only popularly elected part of the government, becomes supreme and the presidency and Senate are reduced to a ceremonial figurehead and a review body respectively.

A good POD, though I wonder how much the calls might be to limit the power of the executive as opposed to making the office more democratically accountable like we saw with the Senate OTL.

We might wind up with a bizarre system where the electors are individually elected (whether by block vote or preference voting) so you wind up with different electors in each state voting for different candidates.

Henry Clay proposed constitutional amendments to decrease the power of the presidency during Jackson's tenure. One was to make the presidential veto able to be overrided by a simple majority of Congress (with provisions for eliminating the pocket veto), another was for dismissal of executive officials (including the cabinet) to require Congressional approval (rather than unilateral dismissal by the President), and another was for the Secretary of the Treasury to be appointed by Congress (Clay believed that the powers of the treasury were powers of the purse, and therefore a legislative power). These constitutional amendments, if ratified, would dramatically weaken the power of the presidency and strengthen the power of Congress, and perhaps the Secretary of the Treasury could turn into the de facto head of government.

Seems I should not have dismissed the chances of Clay as an option.

There's a nice parallel to the office of Prime Minister in the United Kingdom evolving as an unofficial title for the First Lord of the Treasury, an office which still exists an is held ex officio by the PM (Number 10 is the official residence of the First Lord of the Treasury, not Prime Minister for instance).

America being America, wonder if First Secretary might wind up the eventual term for head of government.

That is fascinating! Seems like a little bit of a pipe dream and I doubt Harry of the West would get support for it - he obviously wants to be in charge - but I’d love to know more about these.

EDIT: It seems like these were kind of a way to kneecap John Tyler, which might be a good POD - Tyler’s resignation / impeachment could empower Clay’s plan, although I doubt he’d go through with it as President.

Suppose if he can get enough of his changes through might no longer see any point in going for President when he can have much more power as Speaker of the House.

I found this in a JSTOR article, which can be found here. Here's the most relevant passage:

I wonder how malleable Harrison might have been to Clay's views on limiting the powers of the presidency had he lived.

If I read his fifth proposal correctly:

that the appointment of members of Congress to any office, while serving in Congress and for one term there after, be prohibited.

Would this not preclude any member of the House from serving as Secretary of the Treasury or indeed any other cabinet role?


I do think though that strengthening the powers of Congress as a reaction to the presidencies of Jackson and Tyler makes for a nice POD. Whatever the lasting changes will be from that really depends on how the issue of slavery comes to a head, and with a battle between executive and legislature over issues like the annexation of Texas or war with Mexico might force the issue to come to a head far sooner.

 

[Indicus]

Would this not preclude any member of the House from serving as Secretary of the Treasury or indeed any other cabinet role?

Yes, but it is certainly possible to have parliamentary governments while not having cabinet members serving in congress. This is the case in the Netherlands, for instance. The Secretary of the Treasury, nevertheless, would report to Congress and be selected and removed by it. It should also be noted that, in this scenario, cabinet members (other the treasury secretary) would require senatorial approval to be removed. So while this would be something like a parliamentary system, it would have substantial differences to that of Westminster.

I do think it’s possible this ends up creating a semi-presidential system in the US rather than a parliamentary one, but on the other hand the only real difference between parliamentary and semi-presidential systems is that the president exerts his powers more.

 

[Roger II]

One thought I hadn't seen-at one point there were theories that the president should only veto legislation if it was in their view unconstitutional. If this becomes the norm, the president would be far less able to veto congress, although you'd still have questions of power of the purse or executive branch/cabinet offices.

 

[RyanF]

Yes, but it is certainly possible to have parliamentary governments while not having cabinet members serving in congress. This is the case in the Netherlands, for instance. The Secretary of the Treasury, nevertheless, would report to Congress and be selected and removed by it. It should also be noted that, in this scenario, cabinet members (other the treasury secretary) would require senatorial approval to be removed. So while this would be something like a parliamentary system, it would have substantial differences to that of Westminster.

I do think it’s possible this ends up creating a semi-presidential system in the US rather than a parliamentary one, but on the other hand the only real difference between parliamentary and semi-presidential systems is that the president exerts his powers more.

Both would be interesting proposals, and something akin to the Netherlands model with the President acting as monarch strikes me as a very American development. Or maybe for a semi-presidential system something akin to Weimar Germany, at least for a while.

One thought I hadn't seen-at one point there were theories that the president should only veto legislation if it was in their view unconstitutional. If this becomes the norm, the president would be far less able to veto congress, although you'd still have questions of power of the purse or executive branch/cabinet offices.

One thing this thread has highlighted is how up to around World War One a lot of the US was convinced the Constitution was open to interpretation and what was decided in the 1780s might not be very good for modern governance - compared with today where it has become a shibboleth for so many.

 

[Nanwe]

One thought I hadn't seen-at one point there were theories that the president should only veto legislation if it was in their view unconstitutional. If this becomes the norm, the president would be far less able to veto congress, although you'd still have questions of power of the purse or executive branch/cabinet offices.

I wonder if that would have implications for the ability of the Supreme Court to also review federal legislation. If the President already acts as a sort of magistrate/umpire, then less of a point for them.

 

[OwenM]

From what I can remember, the discussion in the Federalist Papers is that the purpose of the veto is so the President can prevent the Congress from unconstitutionally impinging on his powers and creating a parliamentary system, ironically enough.

 

[Roger II]

I wonder if that would have implications for the ability of the Supreme Court to also review federal legislation. If the President already acts as a sort of magistrate/umpire, then less of a point for them.

I think you'd still need judicial review as a final backstop and to arbitrate state/federal and inter-elected-branch conflicts. Plus as a general anti-tyranny backstop if they actually are capable of that(IDK if they really are)

EDIT: Also, a lot of the work of SCOTUS has always been nonconstitutional review-for instance, cases raising questions of federal(as opposed to state law), disputes between citizens of different states, circuit splits, and so on.