Operation Eisenhammer in June 1943

[boomhauer]

By the sound of it, I'd have to go with GWB and Incognitia: the Soviets are now dramatically more dependent on lend-lease and are making ever-desperate noises for a second front asap, the Allies are going to have a much harder time of it in Italy (and bombing Germany) but are still going to need to keep hitting western Europe regardless so the USSR has time to recover, and the RAF/USAAF will go bomb German power stations where they didn't IOTL. Even if they think it's going to be horrifically bloody, look what pulling it off has done to the Reds!

Why would they try when IOTL, despite knowing about the knock out effect was known IOTL, but thought to be too diffuse and robust to bother with? Unlike the highly concentrated Soviet system, the German one was based on a national grid with many small stations rather than a handful of highly centralized ones, so a German attack on the Soviet grid wouldn't make the German one appear any more vulnerable because they were simply very different systems. Plus the Allies lacked insights about the German electrical issues until after the war when they were able to interview Speer and others. As you'll see below their pre-war and wartime assessments were actually really bad and just assumed that the national grid was so robust and had a massive production surplus, so even taking out dozens of facilities would simply be compensated for. This is a very different situation that was existed in the USSR, which was experiencing rolling blackouts with significant production effects even before the bombing of Gorky in June 1943.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War)

www.ibiblio.org

Electric Power​

The German power system, except for isolated raids, was never a target during the air war. An attack was extensively debated during the course of the war. It was not undertaken partly because it was believed that the German power grid was highly developed and that losses in one area could be compensated by switching power from another. This assumption, detailed investigation by the Survey has established, was incorrect.

The German electric power situation was in fact in a precarious condition from the beginning of the war and became more precarious as the war progressed; this fact is confirmed by statements of a large number of German officials, by confidential memoranda of the National Load Dispatcher, and secret minutes of the Central Planning Committee. Fears that their extreme vulnerability would be discovered were fully discussed in these minutes.

The destruction of five large generating stations in Germany would have caused a capacity loss of 1.8 million kw. or 8 percent of the total capacity, both public and private. The destruction of 45 plants of 100,000 kw. or larger would have caused a loss of about 8,000,000 kw. or almost 40 percent, and the destruction of a total of 95 plants of 50,000 kw. or larger would have eliminated over one-half of the entire generating capacity of the country. The shortage was sufficiently critical so that any considerable loss of output would have directly affected essential war production, and the destruction of any substantial amount would have had serious results.

Generating and distributing facilities were relatively vulnerable and their recuperation was difficult and time consuming. Had electric generating plants and substations been made primary targets as soon as they could have been brought within range of Allied attacks, the evidence indicates that their destruction would have had serious effects on Germany's war production.

What's the likely outcome if the Allies bomb Germany's power network after all and find it worked better than thought?

That's a different thread entirely, because it does not follow from this POD. But your answer is above in the USSBS conclusion, though as you'll see below they did attack part of the grid and judged it as a failure from the POV of shutting off electricity.

https://media.defense.gov/2017/Dec/29/2001861964/-1/-1/0/T_GRIFFITH_STRATEGIC_ATTACK.PDF

Despite this endorsement by the subcommittee there were other factors that influenced the entire COA in its assessment of the German electrical system. The first was the belief that the German national power grid was highly flexible and could shift power quickly between regions. Because of this flexibility, the COA concluded that the German electrical system contained between 15 and 20 percent excess power which, they believed, constituted an “enormous reserve.”37

Effectively they believed even if they could smash entire regions, which they thought necessary to even have any sort of impact, the effort would be cancelled out by an enormous production reserve of power that could simply be shifted via the national grid. This of course negated the entire rationale for attacking the electrical grid there, relative to other panacea targets like ball bearings. If you read the above study they were VERY well aware of how crippling attacks on the electrical grid could be IF they could actually turn off sufficient numbers of stations. Their own studies demonstrated that was basically impossible due to the reasons given above. Of course this was incredibly incorrect, but they didn't know that. In fact, as I will point out below, even when they did such attacks IOTL and got a big result from it, they didn't even realize and thought the attack was a failure, so never repeated it throughout the war.

Also there was this issue:

The COA also postulated that the poor results of the Luftwaffe bombing of British power plants demonstrated that “the vulnerability of electric power plants is debatable.”38

Britain had a similar system to Germany in that it was highly diffuse, so based on flawed assumptions about German intentions during the Blitz (they never targeted the electrical system despite Steinmann, author of the Eisenhammer plan, pushing for it), they thought that bombing efforts against the grid already failed against such a system. Also the Soviets, besides lacking a national grid, had suffered badly from the invasion and lost a lot of power generators in occupied territories, so had a severe lack of surplus power and were already experiencing rolling blackouts in 1943. Issues Germany was not facing, especially as it was also able to purchase extra power from the Swiss grid.


Not only that, but the trial run for such attacks on the German grid, Operation Chastise, which targeted the Ruhr dams, was deemed a failure since it did not shut off German power:

Bomber Harris thought the Dambusters' attacks on Germany 'achieved nothing'

Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris, the wartime head of Bomber Command, privately dismissed the Dambuster air raids on German dams were a waste of men and aircraft, it has been revealed.

www.telegraph.co.uk

Bomber Harris thought the Dambusters' attacks on Germany 'achieved nothing'

web.archive.org

Harris regarded the raid as a failure and a waste of resources.

In one letter to the Air Staff, written in Dec 1943, just six months after the raid, Harris said: "For years we have been told that the destruction of the Mohne and Eder dams alone would be a vital blow to Germany."

But, he continued, "I have seen nothing in the present circumstances or in the Ministry of Economic Warfare reports to show that the effort was worthwhile."

Though it did have a major impact on the German system:

Operation Chastise - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Allied intelligence on this subject was just bad and explains exactly why they wouldn't go after the German system, since they couldn't even figure out the major impact their one raid on the system had or the value of follow up raids. Don't expect that a major success against the USSR would change any of these views. You'll still get the Chastise raid before TTL's Eisenhammer and the same assessment as OTL. They will compare their attacks on the dams and their view that the attack failed to achieve any significant results and that their assumptions about the German electrical grid being too robust were accurate with the results the Germans achieved and simply assume that the grids were just too different to compare.

Besides they had in their heads already that morale was the vulnerable point so city bombing and the USAAF's 'panacea' target of ball bearings would do the job more effectively:

Schweinfurt–Regensburg mission - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Which hadn't been tried yet.

 

[Charles EP M.]

Why would they try when IOTL, despite knowing about the knock out effect was known IOTL, but thought to be too diffuse and robust to bother with?

IOTL, they haven't just seen the Luftwaffe devastate the Soviet war effort by targeting power stations and the Western Allies aren't facing a lot more German forces as a result. I can see why they wouldn't do it in most timelines because 'everyone knew' it wouldn't work, but in this specific one I could see circumstances (and desperation) prompting a rethink. "But what if it did work?"

 

[Incognitia]

IOTL, they haven't just seen the Luftwaffe devastate the Soviet war effort by targeting power stations and the Western Allies aren't facing a lot more German forces as a result. I can see why they wouldn't do it in most timelines because 'everyone knew' it wouldn't work, but in this specific one I could see circumstances (and desperation) prompting a rethink. "But what if it did work?"

The Germans knocked out Soviet power, yes the German system is a tougher target, but we're better at bombing than they are.

It's certainly hard to imagine that if a German bombing campaign had that serious an effect on the Soviets the British and Americans wouldn't change somerging.

 

[Charles EP M.]

I can believe it would take a lot of arguing and harsh words and sackings to pull off though. Nobody likes having to admit the thing they said couldn't be done might possibly work.

 

[boomhauer]

IOTL, they haven't just seen the Luftwaffe devastate the Soviet war effort by targeting power stations and the Western Allies aren't facing a lot more German forces as a result. I can see why they wouldn't do it in most timelines because 'everyone knew' it wouldn't work, but in this specific one I could see circumstances (and desperation) prompting a rethink. "But what if it did work?"

They probably wouldn't be seeing that many more German units turn up, as the Soviets still had a ton of banked combat power as of June-July 1943 due to the lull in operations since about March 1943. If anything they'd be locked down in the east and ensure the Soviets would be stopped around their September 1943 lines due to lack of replacement material. That helps them much more than trying to move more to Italy. The incentives aren't there to change anything given the strategy already in motion AND Stalin's demands for a 2nd front ASAP. Airpower is going to be more focused, at least in the US case, on going after specific military supporting industries, as the Luftwaffe was their main target for 1943, because once defeated then air forces could roam at will over Germany

The Germans knocked out Soviet power, yes the German system is a tougher target, but we're better at bombing than they are.

It's certainly hard to imagine that if a German bombing campaign had that serious an effect on the Soviets the British and Americans wouldn't change somerging.

That isn't what the US thought at the time. In fact both the British and Americans thought that accuracy was too much of a problem to hit the targets and that factories were simply easier. See below for citations on that. What they'd change is probably trying to open up that 2nd Front sooner or multiplying where they attack, such as the Balkans, which could be done much sooner than France.

I can believe it would take a lot of arguing and harsh words and sackings to pull off though. Nobody likes having to admit the thing they said couldn't be done might possibly work.

Doubtful given the strategic priorities of the Allies and their massive bureaucratic interia. I didn't include this part of the paper I cited above to avoid muddying the waters, but it is just as relevant, doubly so since Stalin will be screaming for the 2nd Front immediately:

The target priorities and air strategy of this first air plan were reviewed one year later, in August 1942, when President Roosevelt directed the services to prepare a new plan for the production requirements of aircraft in order to achieve “Air Ascendancy” in 1943.23 In light of this new guidance, the new plan, called AWPD/42, revised the target priority list, displacing electrical power to fourth, preceded by the German air force, submarine construction, and transportation. While in AWPD/1 electric power was ranked second only to the German air force.24 With the shift away from attempting to defeat Germany through air power alone to the need for attaining air superiority in preparation for a land invasion, the new air strategy focused less on affecting civilian morale and war production, and more on the impact of bombing on the fielded military forces of Germany. This put less emphasis on hitting economic targets like electricity and more on traditional military targets such as the transportation system.25 AWPD/42 was issued on 9 September 1942 and became, according to the official historians, the “basis for all AAF [Army Air Forces] strategic planning prior to the Casablanca conference of January 1943.”26

....

The policy of a Combined Bomber Offensive between the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the United States Army Air Forces’ Eighth Air Force, resulted from the Casablanca conference held in January 1943, between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and the British and American chiefs of staff. The Allied leaders issued the directive with the hope of coordinating the night bombing efforts of the RAF with the daylight bombing raids of the Eighth Air Force. The objective of both efforts was, “The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistence is fatally weakened.”42 Because the CBO directive was more a policy statement than an employment plan, it was not greatly concerned with target selection.

However, within the overall objective of the bombing effort, it did prioritize the general order in which target systems should be attacked. 1. German submarine construction yards 2. The German aircraft industry 3. Transportation 4. Oil plants 5. Other targets of war industry.43

It should be remembered that this list constituted one part of a strategic plan, and these were not intended to be the only targets attacked. There were many changes to this list and ample opportunity for the air commanders to attack targets not on this list or to change the target priorities. The operational targeting plan which did specify targets was developed by representatives of Eighth Air Force and RAF Bomber Command who combined the Casablanca directive and the target list from the COA. When the planning team received the suggested targets from the COA, they could have changed the ranking of the targets, but according to Haywood Hansell, a planner of AWPD/1 and a member of the CBO staff, they were “reluctant . . . to challenge the intelligence structure.”44 Thus, when the Combined Bomber Offensive officially began on 10 June 1943, electric power was a low priority target and regular attacks were never carried out against the system.45

Machinery was already set in motion and the one org that could have changed things refused to alter the plan, especially once it was already underway, which would be before or around the same time as the German attacks ITTL.

At least one other American targeting organization in Europe addressed the possibility of attacking electrical power—the Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU). As part of the Economic Warfare Division in the US Embassy, this unit was assigned the task of formulating criteria for target selection and then applying them to different target systems. Such a process would, theoretically, produce the best targets to attack.46 The methodology developed by the EOU was based on the premise that targets would be “chosen in light of an explicitly defined military aim, linked to the full context of war strategy.” The members of the unit opposed attacks designed to weaken the economy or 21 to affect morale,47 and instead concentrated on the impact bombing would have on the German military capability.48

Such as the Transport Plan of 1944 and attacks on ball bearings and aircraft production.

Defense Technical Information Center

apps.dtic.mil

The EOU was the civilian intelligence org that did target selection for the 8th Air Force and they were explicitly against targeting the electrical grid due to a variety of factors, namely the grand strategy laid out for the USAAF, but also the belief that the system was simply too hard to knock out, therefore a waste of effort. That means the only group that could have pushed for the electrical grid were the guys selecting targets for 8th AF and they had zero interest in targeting the grid leaving no other group that could change the strategy for strategic bombers. In terms of the RAF, Harris was dead set on city bombing and considered small targets either impossible to hit accurately or a waste of time. As it was the Americans had to twist his arm badly by going through Churchill to get him to even help at all with the oil bombing campaign in 1944. Without the US pushing for it, the RAF won't, since they were dead set on cracking German morale by directly targeting civilians with bombing (officially 'dehousing') due to their experience with the 1918 German civil war.

The EOU Handbook specifically states, “The target systems in this Handbook have been selected on the basis of their direct military effects only.”49 While this organization operated autonomously from Eighth Air Force, much of the target analysis was used by the Eighth in its efforts to prioritize targets. Electric power was rejected on general principle by the EOU analysts because attacking it would not lead to “an early reduction in military strength disposable in the field.”50 Electric power was also rejected for three specific assumptions. Contrary to the COA, the EOU felt that the targets were dispersed in “extraordinarily small” units and they postulated that “23 [of the] largest stations produce only 20 percent of German output.”51 However, they agreed with the COA findings regarding the grid system’s flexibility which minimized the effectiveness of any attack.52

The first underlined part is huge. The air strategy was to take out specific industries supporting specific military arms, namely the Luftwaffe. It was thought by everyone of influence that the electrical grid was simply too robust to do that quickly if at all and it was far simpler to smash the specific factories, which were much larger and concentrated targets vs. hitting dozens of electrical grid targets just to shut down a single region...that is assuming the national grid didn't compensate, which is exactly what they thought would happen and render all that bombing pointless. Also remember that the Allies understood how strong the German air defenses were in 1943, so didn't want to risk going after all those electrical targets and suffer all those losses only for the national grid to compensate for any regional damage inflicted. After all unlike the Soviet system the German one was very diffuse requiring something >100 small targets to be hit to achieve a result like hitting the 11 large Soviet facilities around Moscow-the Upper Volga region.

Finally, the EOU felt that “installations in power plants and switching stations are of such a kind as to require bombing of the highest concentration and precision,”53 a level of precision they obviously felt was beyond the capability of Eighth Air Force. There were two main factors that caused both the COA and the EOU to disagree with the ACTS instructors and early air planners that German electric power should be a key target. The belief that the interconnections within the German electrical system would allow power to be transferred and thus reduce the vulnerability of the system was the first element, but more important was the change in air strategy from one of affecting the will of the civilian population to one of support for a land invasion. As a result, the German power system was never systematically attacked during the war.

So it was both the grand strategy that FDR himself laid out AND everyone of influence in target selection thought the system was FAR too difficult to attack successfully given the constraints (8th Air Force accuracy in 1943 through much of 1944 was abysmal).

 

[Charles EP M.]

What they'd change is probably trying to open up that 2nd Front sooner or multiplying where they attack, such as the Balkans

Churchill has just rolled in his grave to give a thumbs up

 

[Mumby]

One of the reasons a second front was delayed (amongst many others) was the prioritisation by de Gaulle's Provisional Government to take Paris in any invasion of France and for the taking of Paris specifically to be a visibly French affair, and by French they did mean white. The Free French army in 1943 was a very African affair and it took a lot of 'blanching' - largely by integration of former Vichy troops in Algeria - to make that Army visually suitable for de Gaulle's purpose.

If opening a second front becomes an absolute priority, then that blanching might have to be set aside - and taking Paris is less of a priority - and we might see African soldiers participate in the early stages of the liberation of France!

 

[Torten]

Did the Germans have the ability to bomb accurately enough to cause anything more than minor damage to the generating plants?

 

[boomhauer]

Did the Germans have the ability to bomb accurately enough to cause anything more than minor damage to the generating plants?

Yes, the Lotfe 7D was better than the Norden, so much so the Soviets tried to install captured ones into their American aircraft after the war. Then there was the Fritz-X, a 1400kg glide bomb that had a CEP of about 100 feet. Plus they did hit some facilities during their bombing of Gorky in June 1943.

One of the reasons a second front was delayed (amongst many others) was the prioritisation by de Gaulle's Provisional Government to take Paris in any invasion of France and for the taking of Paris specifically to be a visibly French affair, and by French they did mean white. The Free French army in 1943 was a very African affair and it took a lot of 'blanching' - largely by integration of former Vichy troops in Algeria - to make that Army visually suitable for de Gaulle's purpose.

If opening a second front becomes an absolute priority, then that blanching might have to be set aside - and taking Paris is less of a priority - and we might see African soldiers participate in the early stages of the liberation of France!

Only assuming an early invasion with a much weakened Russia even works. The Soviets losing somewhere between 50-60% of their combat power for at least 12 months is going to be extremely crippling for the Allied war effort and will ensure a lot more Germans are available in France by 1944. Even if the Germans had just avoided the massive collapse in Ukraine in early 1944 they'd have likely had enough around Normandy in 1944 to defeat the invasion or at least contain it Anzio style, but this POD will ensure they have a much more favorable situation in the East than that.

In fact the Soviets may well not be able to breach the Panther line and simply run out of replacements, as most of their 1944-45 manpower came from the liberated territories in 3rd and 4th Q 1943 and beyond. If the Soviets are held on the Panther line in 1943 then the Germans do have the ability to save on manpower and shift troops west in 1944. That is also assuming Italy plays out exactly the same as IOTL. IMHO Leningrad becomes the focus after the front in Ukraine and Belarus/west Russia solidifies, so the OTL Panther line is probably the front line in spring 1944 and maybe be the ultimately stop line for that front.

The real question is does Stalin try to keep attacking in the meantime before France or does he let the Allies try to have a go in the Balkans for something even sooner? Is there a real attempt to negotiate in the east (IOTL there were talks in March 1943, though the Soviets claimed it was to leverage the Wallies into a second front)? That will really determine how things play out. The German resistance may well not have as much clout to pull people into their conspiracy if the line holds in 3Q 1943 and the Soviets noticeably weaken due to lack of equipment and ammo. Also if D-day fails then you would see FDR losing the 1944 election, which likely means the end of the war.

As it is Germany will be getting bombed heavily in 1943 still and in 1944 per OTL, so even holding the line in the east they're still going to take some serious damage. But if they can defeat an invasion of France it is hard to see the war going for much longer, as Stalin is likely to cut a deal if he thinks he cannot advance and his Allies are not useful. Still the idea of a Balkan invasion to open up a second front in addition to Italy is interesting, especially if it happens in early 1944 instead of trying to push up Italy in the face of extra Axis troops not needed in the East. So no Anzio, but instead a Balkan front. Then later they can invade France on time.

Of course they'd likely be missing out of the manpower from places like Brazil, since as stated by another poster more equipment will be sent to the Soviets to make up part of their deficit, which has impacts too, as they have less divisions to use in Italy, while the Soviets are still massively weakened. But if they invade the Balkans, say by jumping the Adriatic from southern Italy into Yugoslavia, then things can get very interesting vis-a-vis the resistance movements there. Question is whether Stalin sanctions that and is willing to accept that his ambitions there are unrealistic ITTL. Also ITTL the Soviets may well not be in a position to attack Japan, with significant results, especially if there is a negotiated end to the war in Europe in 1944. Maybe there is also a negotiated end with Japan? A Cold War between the Axis and Allies from 1945 on would be interesting. Communism then wouldn't be the enemy for the US, but would Stalin survive politically if he had to cede the areas west of the Panther line?

 

[Paulo]

It may be that rather than retargeting Bomber Command and 8th Airforce, the Admiralty step up Operation Outward, targeting the distribution net rather than the power plants themselves.

 

[iainbhx]

It may be that rather than retargeting Bomber Command and 8th Airforce, the Admiralty step up Operation Outward, targeting the distribution net rather than the power plants themselves.

I think that Outward couldn't easily be stepped up, it used up a large stock of old balloons, it didn't use critical new latex.

 

[Paulo]

I think that Outward couldn't easily be stepped up, it used up a large stock of old balloons, it didn't use critical new latex.

The prioritisation of the raw materials might have changed if they saw it as a low risk way of targeting the German power grid, and how effective those attacks could be?

Or maybe they could identify where the transmission lines are and use air deployed balloons to target them?

 

[boomhauer]

It may be that rather than retargeting Bomber Command and 8th Airforce, the Admiralty step up Operation Outward, targeting the distribution net rather than the power plants themselves.

That has hazards:

Operation Outward - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The effects of the incendiary attacks were very difficult to assess – it could be difficult to tell whether any particular fire was caused by Outward or by an accident, sabotage, or aircraft-dropped incendiary. Intelligence sources, including reports from newspapers printed in occupied Europe, indicated that some fires had definitely been caused by Outward.[27] Outward caused damage in neutral countries – on the night of 19/20 January 1944, two trains collided at Laholm in Sweden after an Outward balloon knocked out electrical lighting on the railway.[1] Changing winds could also blow balloons back to the United Kingdom. On one occasion, a balloon knocked out the electricity supply to the town of Ipswich.[28]

And keep in mind why they basically halted:

From May 1944 it was decided to change tactics because of increased Allied aircraft activity. The mass balloon launches were stopped and replaced with a "trickle" of balloons launched from three sites at ten-minute intervals throughout daylight hours.[27]

Not sure if they really could have had any greater successes than IOTL.