No ww2

[sergentfox]

what would the world be like had there been no world war 2??

 

[SinghSong]

Have to say, this is a very, very broad question. And nigh-impossible to attempt to answer, without asking another question first- why does WW2 never happen, in this timeline?

 

[raharris1973]

I assume there would still be local or regional wars, just not anything on the scale of WWII or anything that looks like it matches up with the Great War.

One thing that would be interesting would be the long-term perceptions of both the Great War and the treaties ending it in the ATL.

A war to end war that lives up to its name in the big picture sense? Or a futile waste? Would Imperial Germany be remembered as a big bad for generations, or would that fade with time? The League - a failure or a decent start at a fairer, more orderly world? Versailles - unfair punishment and victor's peace, or a peace conference where the participants matched the successes of the Congress of Vienna, and then topped them, by adding in democratic and national principles?

Whether the Great War and its aftermath is regarded as a grim success, a futile tregedy, or something in between, I suspect that peace movements, disarmament movements and even some outright pacifism would be less on the fringes of culture, especially in the west.

Why do I say that? Because as much as WWII made people in Europe and Asia even more sick and tired of war, Hitler and the chance of another Hitler-like figure emerging is the ultimate trump card in Anglophone and Francophone and Russophone politics when arguing to always remain militarily prepared. The failure of appeasement prewar is always the Trump card played in the Anglophone and Francophone world against backing down or resolving disputes by compromise. Without World War Two, the world lacks this story. Appeasement doesn't have a bad rep. It might have a good rep.

Not sure what happens in Asia, but in OTL, China has been emphasizing its cult of WWII. If there is no second Sino-Japanese War, that is big deal too.

 

[History Learner]

Not sure what happens in Asia, but in OTL, China has been emphasizing its cult of WWII. If there is no second Sino-Japanese War, that is big deal too.

One prediction that can be firmly made: Imperial Japan displaces the United States as the dominant economic power in the 1960s. How the world reacts to the Asian Century coming in the 1960s is going to be interesting, to say the least.

 

[JesterBL]

One prediction that can be firmly made: Imperial Japan displaces the United States as the dominant economic power in the 1960s. How the world reacts to the Asian Century coming in the 1960s is going to be interesting, to say the least.

OTL's Japanese Economic Miracle was hugely historically contingent. First off, the Occupation enacted comprehensive land reform, which became a model for land reform elsewhere and broke the back of rural landlords as a political class. That doesn't happen without the Occupation of Japan (similar dynamic with land reform in the Republic of China/Taiwan- the KMT probably doesn't get land reform in an ATL where they don't get grafted on to Taiwan). Secondly, most of what we consider the genius of Japanese manufacturing was itself a development of American World War 2 era industrial management- you're not importing those practices or getting MITI to play such a central role without that cultural and technical exchange. And finally the export-focused model of development pursued by Japan IOTL only really worked because the US was willing to absorb those exports and effectively subsidize the Japanese economy by simultaneously allowing the Japanese to restrict imports and subsidize exports at the same time as allowing them unfettered access to US markets. And all of this is to say nothing of Article 9's impact which some say allowed post-War Japan to underinvest in the relatively economically unproductive business of maintaining offensive forces in land, sea and air and therefore, to overinvest elsewhere.

No World War 2 and I think it is far from clear that Imperial Japan becomes an economic superpower, even if we assume it holds the Home Islands, Taiwan and Korea.

 

[History Learner]

OTL's Japanese Economic Miracle was hugely historically contingent. First off, the Occupation enacted comprehensive land reform, which became a model for land reform elsewhere and broke the back of rural landlords as a political class. That doesn't happen without the Occupation of Japan (similar dynamic with land reform in the Republic of China/Taiwan- the KMT probably doesn't get land reform in an ATL where they don't get grafted on to Taiwan). Secondly, most of what we consider the genius of Japanese manufacturing was itself a development of American World War 2 era industrial management- you're not importing those practices or getting MITI to play such a central role without that cultural and technical exchange. And finally the export-focused model of development pursued by Japan IOTL only really worked because the US was willing to absorb those exports and effectively subsidize the Japanese economy by simultaneously allowing the Japanese to restrict imports and subsidize exports at the same time as allowing them unfettered access to US markets. And all of this is to say nothing of Article 9's impact which some say allowed post-War Japan to underinvest in the relatively economically unproductive business of maintaining offensive forces in land, sea and air and therefore, to overinvest elsewhere.

Paul Kennedy argues much of the basis for Japan's economic rebirth was already there in The Rise and Fall of Great Powers:

Spoiler: Page 417

He doesn't address Land Reform, but I think that is being over-stated; Annual GDP growth rates in the 1930s was 5% per year, with manufacturing and mining at over 30% of GDP. There was also almost direct institutional continuity between Old Japan's economic giants and New Japan's:

The nation has also benefited from economies of scale. Although medium-sized and small enterprises generated much of the nation's employment, large facilities were the most productive. Many industrial enterprises consolidated to form larger, more efficient units. Before World War II, large holding companies formed wealth groups, or zaibatsu, which dominated most industry. The zaibatsu were dissolved after the war, but keiretsu--large, modern industrial enterprise groupings-- emerged. The coordination of activities within these groupings and the integration of smaller subcontractors into the groups enhanced industrial efficiency.​

Growth rates among heavy industry was, in particular, strong:

Japanese heavy industry – the backbone of a nation’s military output – showed strong growth from 1929 to 1937, and then began to increase very rapidly as German investment and licensing agreements took hold. The Japanese labor force paid the price for this, taking home pitiful wages in exchange for long hours – an average of 56 hours per week for industrial workers even before the war (compared to 35 hours per week for the average American factory hand).​

As for relations with the United States, even in 1941 Japan was the single largest trading partner of the United States in the Pacific. Even though the terms won't be as favorable as they were IOTL (Possibly, given we saw the opposite with China), there would still be trading and unlike OTL Japan has a formal Empire to which it could export to heavily as a captive market. It'll probably still have high defense spending, but such would take the place of U.S. spending in Korea and Vietnam.

No World War 2 and I think it is far from clear that Imperial Japan becomes an economic superpower, even if we assume it holds the Home Islands, Taiwan and Korea.

If the Soviet Union could hold onto the Warsaw Pact for 45 years and Britain could do the same for India for over a century, I don't see any reason why Japan could not hold onto its Empire for an extended amount of time before transitioning to something else. I'd also include Manchuria into that, as both China and the Anglo-Americans were historically open to accepting such.

 

[Arthur_Phuxache]

One prediction that can be firmly made: Imperial Japan displaces the United States as the dominant economic power in the 1960s. How the world reacts to the Asian Century coming in the 1960s is going to be interesting, to say the least.

Not going to happen, without the USA defeating and occupying Japan first.

To begin with, Japan will be unable to occupy much more of China without seizing the resources of the British and Dutch Empires, and without the Fall of France, there will be no Japanese forces based in Indochina to enable this.
Japan will remain an aggressive pariah state with feuding militaries, as per most of the 1930s

 

[History Learner]

Not going to happen, without the USA defeating and occupying Japan first.

See the above post; Paul Kennedy rejects those arguments and its GDP was already growing 5% a year since the late 1920s; they were already matching the Soviets in machine tools and IIRC had a higher productivity rate. The organizational structures also had Pre-War continuity with the Post-War ones.

To begin with, Japan will be unable to occupy much more of China without seizing the resources of the British and Dutch Empires, and without the Fall of France, there will be no Japanese forces based in Indochina to enable this.
Japan will remain an aggressive pariah state with feuding militaries, as per most of the 1930s

Do we have to assume Japan still goes into China? If we do, why do we assume it preforms less than it historically did up to 1941?

80% or so of China's industrial base had been occupied, the CCP had nearly come undone as a result of the Hundred Regiments Offensive and the KMT lost its 1940 offensive attempt so bad it did not attempt another until 1945, when Japan was already collapsing. 1944's Ichi-Go Offensive, which overran much of the remaining agricultural base, sent China into a famine so deep cannibalism became common. The relevancy to this is that the planning for said offensive extended back for years, and was initially meant to go forward in 1942 but the needs of the Pacific Theater consumed the resources; here, that's not an extant cause.

 

[JesterBL]

See the above post; Paul Kennedy rejects those arguments and its GDP was already growing 5% a year since the late 1920s; they were already matching the Soviets in machine tools and IIRC had a higher productivity rate. The organizational structures also had Pre-War continuity with the Post-War ones.

The organizational structures did NOT have continuity- the zaibatsu were by and large eliminated (and many were partially nationalized during the war before their post-war dissolution). The zaibatsu (vertically integrated, commonly held by a single family with interlocking directorships, which was specifically banned post-War) were not the same as the keiretsu (generally horizontally integrated with financialized equity and capital relationships to one another and generally, to a sponsoring commercial bank). They are not the same.

In addition the passage you cited specifically calls out the influence of WW2 era American industrial management, the lack of Japanese defense spending, the US subsidizing Japanese industry directly and indirectly, and the role of MITI. Paul Kennedy's passage does not read to me as agreeing with you- it is arguing the Japanese miracle was historically contingent upon the Occupation of Japan.

 

[History Learner]

The organizational structures did NOT have continuity- the zaibatsu were by and large eliminated (and many were partially nationalized during the war before their post-war dissolution). The zaibatsu (vertically integrated, commonly held by a single family with interlocking directorships, which was specifically banned post-War) were not the same as the keiretsu (generally horizontally integrated with financialized equity and capital relationships to one another and generally, to a sponsoring commercial bank). They are not the same.

I think that is to underestimate the amount of continuity:

At the end of World War II, not only had the military nationalized a large portion of zaibatsu holdings, but remaining assets were severely damaged by the conflict. The military economic advisors who came to Japan with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) were Americans whose memories were still fresh with thoughts of the Great Depression. These Keynesian economists recommended and implemented liberal fiscal and monetary policies similar to those of the American New Deal under President Roosevelt. Fourteen zaibatsu were targeted for destruction, but only ten of the fourteen were ever actually dismantled by SCAP. 29 In 1945, General MacArthur suggested that the zaibatsu themselves walk the Americans through how best to dissolve them. Needless to say, a commission of the most powerful zaibatsu went to work with a great deal of enthusiasm, fervently jumping at the chance to hide their assets. As more experienced economists arrived from America, this plan was quickly abandoned.30 Finally, in 1948, SCAP came up with a list of 325 companies, mostly zaibatsu subsidiaries, to be broken up and sold back to the public. MacArthur envisioned the sale of these assets would provide the first step to establishing a middle class in Japan. Again, though, only 18 were ever actually dissolved. 31​

​

Some zaibatsu families managed to conceal a small portion of their former wealth and attempted to ensure the firms that they once managed were not broken up and sold. In some cases, like that of Nomura Group, the company’s employees were allowed the first chance to purchase shares in Nomura subsidiaries. Unknown to SCAP, these loyal employees had been lent money by each Nomura firm to purchase stocks and hold them until they could be sold back to the Nomura Group at a later date. Some others, like Sumitomo, were able to retain their vast holdings of real estate, as the Americans could not see the value of lands that had been ravaged by war and largely ignored these acquisitions. 32 This oversight provided a financial shelter for many companies. However, SCAP managed to irrevocably change the zaibatsu system: in 1946 one in four stocks were held by zaibatsu; by 1950, this number was reduced to only one in twenty. Eventually, ownership of these shares passed primarily to individual investors and financial institutions.​

​

After the Treaty of San Francisco was signed in 1952 and the SCAP post was made permanently vacant, the Japanese government relaxed some of the laws banning several key features of zaibatsu. During this period, new businesses referred to as keiretsu were formed from the bits and pieces of the zaibatsu left behind after the departure of the Allied occupation forces33. Many of these organizations are still in existence today, some even with their old financial institutions at the helm. Instead of being owned and managed by a single family, however, ownership of these companies has passed to individual shareholders. The keiretsu are much looser organizations of firms, and do not hold the same pyramidal structure as the zaibatsu once did. However, throughout the second half of the 20th century they still wielded great influence on Japanese economic and military policies. 34​

Now, was SCAP able to change the nature of the organizations? Yes, undoubtedly so, but such ignores that most of the organizations, whether formally or not via such underhanded tactics as described above, did survive the war. I think then the question becomes is the lack of SCAP's changes of importance? I think not, given the specific economic culture already present and the similarity between the Zaibatsu and the Chaebol of South Korea giving us an example to to go off of.

In addition the passage you cited specifically calls out the influence of WW2 era American industrial management, the lack of Japanese defense spending, the US subsidizing Japanese industry directly and indirectly, and the role of MITI. Paul Kennedy's passage does not read to me as agreeing with you- it is arguing the Japanese miracle was historically contingent upon the Occupation of Japan.

He directly states there was much more to the economic recovery than American stimulation via war demand and doesn't mention American industrial management, rather that the Japanese could and did borrow methods from the West at large. I see no reason Imperial Japan couldn't do the same, both with the United States or other nations like Germany which it already had deep ties with in the 1930s. For example, it wasn't SCAP that forced Deming on the Japanese; rather, it was JUSE that invited his expertise after previous study on the topic of quality control. Its much the same with MITI, in that the imperial ministries responsible for economic affairs survived the war largely intact according to Aaron Forsberg, so something like MITI is likely given the continuity there. Now, specific to defense spending, an Imperial military budget would replace the American time-limited spending of Korea and then Vietnam with a more stable, consistent spending that isn't limited to set amounts of time.

 

[JesterBL]

The passage you are citing is claiming the exact opposite of what you are asserting. Reading that passage as 'the keiretsu are exactly the same as the zaibatsu' is like claiming 'the Baby Bells were unchanged from Ma Bell'. The zaibatsu were by and large dismantled, their influence in Japanese economy and society reduced by a huge margin and they were replaced by the keiretsu, a completely different method of organizing industry and capital. That is what the passage you just quoted states.

What specific advantages do you think that Imperial Japan would have over OTL's post-Occupation Japan given that literally every factor in Paul Kennedy's passage would be lacking because every single factor he mentions was tied up in the conditions of post-war Japan? The industrial management techniques he is referring to were exclusively American and forged from the crucible of WW2 and you know that given that you referred specifically to Deming. He doesn't even mention land reform, which is astounding given how much credit that is given to the development of Japan's post-war human capital and to the freeing up of actual capital and stimulation of rural productivity and which you just outright dismissed. You can't twist massive defense spending and the costs of occupying colonial territories as economic positives- that is money which once spent cannot be spent on actual, economically productive activity.

I have no doubts that the economy of a continued Imperial Japan would be large, especially if we assume they hold Korea and Taiwan (and sure, whatever, Manchuria). They would have access to more raw materials and more raw labor power than OTL's post-War Japan, sure. But Imperial Japan would be held back by high defense spending, low rural productivity, low investment in human capital across much of the claimed territories (and Japan's own rural areas) and by the rigid, closed nature of the zaibatsu (to say nothing of the fact that, as mentioned by posters above, they will likely struggle in international trade and have pariah status if they are the sole aggressors of the era). Imperial Japan would not be leapfrogging the West in terms of individual income or productivity, because the advantage of Manchuria's natural resources simply wouldn't be a substitute for every disadvantage Imperial Japan would be weighed down with.

If you want a country that is the largest beneficiary of no WW2, it is almost certainly the Soviet Union. Japan likely ended up being better off in real terms on the losing side of World War 2 than the Soviets did being on the winning side. Eliminating the severe demographic damage to the Soviet Union in World War 2 does a lot to help them to increase their chances of closing the gap with the West post-WW2 and the additions of the territories of the Warsaw Pact are probably not even close to making up for it.

 

[Arthur_Phuxache]

See the above post; Paul Kennedy rejects those arguments and its GDP was already growing 5% a year since the late 1920s..

I'm not surprised he does. If I had to point out everything that Paul Kennedy wrote that was inaccurate, wrong, or just plain hyperbole, this would be a very long post.

Japan's economic growth was contingent on seizing the resources of countries that weren't part of Japan, oil, rubber and aluminium, particularly.