History Learner
Well-known member
After initial success in fighting off the Italian invasion of their territory, by early 1941 the Greeks were in dire straights. Simple economics-in terms of forces and industry behind them-painted the picture well enough but so too had their own success undone them; the Greek Army was over-extended outside of its prepared defenses and starting to suffer a crippling ammunition shortage. With no recourse, the Greece approached the UK asking for assistance, as such was essential to prevent their collapse and occupation by the Axis powers. Churchill was immediately quite taken by the idea, as it fit into his mindset of periphery operations to weaken the Germans as well as granted the British the propaganda value of having a continental ally. With Crete also in British hands, Romania and its oil supplies would also come into bombing range. All in all, it seemed like a brilliant scheme.
With his mind made up, Churchill ordered the diversion of two ANZAC divisions and an armored brigade to Greece, as well as supporting air elements. Wavell and other Commonwealth commanders were rightfully alarmed and protested the decision; the diversion of 60,000 troops, 100 tanks and 200 aircraft seriously undercut 8th Army just as Operation Compass was seeing results but also triggering serious Italian reinforcements. Even worse, Rommel and the first of what would become the Afrika Korps were starting to arrive on scene as well. The diversion in resources were also unlikely to achieve the desired results, as the Greeks had asked for nine divisions; what was sent was enough to compromise British operations in North Africa but not enough to secure Greece either. The end result was a predictable disaster on both fronts, with Greece as well as Crete falling into German hands and the British thrown back in North Africa.
Since that time, there has been considerable debate on the wisdom of this decision by Churchill and others. Given the gambit failed in its stated role and directly injured the British position in North Africa, it seems like a pretty obvious case of Churchillian hubris gone awry. I, however, have a different outlook on it and would posit this decision is probably what prevented the USSR from collapsing in 1941, thus allowing the Allies to win the war.
Martin Van Creveld's book Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: the Balkan Clue argues that Operation Lustre engendered Hitler's decision in March to cancel the planned two-pronged attack by AGS into Ukraine then under planning. Hitler could see the same strategic value in Crete and Greece as the British could, and this provoked grave concern among the Germans that the British could threaten their Southern flank. As a result, 12th Army was diverted to the Balkans for an expanded operation against Greece and, as fate would have it, Yugoslavia. This left the less capable and prepared 11th Army to take their place, with no pincer taking place. Instead, a broad front advance was undertaken which ultimately failed to achieve the encirclements seen elsewhere in Operation Barbarossa and gave AGS a staggered start.
Had there been no Operation Lustre, AGS would've kept 12th Army and achieved a major encirclement in the opening days of Barbarossa whereby 6th, 12th and 26th Armies of the Soviet Southwestern Front would've destroyed. This would've left a gaping hole and seriously impeded Soviet defensive operations on this front, but also would have serious ramifications elsewhere; because of the situation of OTL, the Soviets were able to transfer forces from this sector to face Army Group Center. These were the 16th and 19th Armies, and they played a very serious role in extending out combat operations around Smolensk, inflicting serious attrition on Army Group Center. Here, because of the loss of the three border armies in the opening days, there is no possibility of this occurring due to the serious pressure the Soviets will be under.
The end result of this would thus be no Kiev diversion and Smolensk ending some weeks ahead of schedule, with Army Group Center in better shape than OTL. Operations to secure out the flanks in the North (Velikiye Luki) and South (Central Front) can be conducted handily, which by middle to late August enables AGC to begin a much earlier advance on Moscow as the railways become available. It is highly likely that both Kiev and Leningrad will fall in August or perhaps early September in the case of the latter, while Moscow will follow suit by mid September. By the time of the first snows, AGS can also secure Rostov and the Donets Basin as a whole, while AGN can link up with the Finns around the Svir River. This is fatal for the USSR, and will enable the Germans to complete their victory in 1942 by achieving the Archangelsk-Astrakhan Line, then moving onto the Urals sometime in 1943 or 1944. With the USSR out, the Anglo-Americans will seek an armistice, effectively ending WWII in Europe and setting the stage for a Nazi-American Cold War.
Maybe, perhaps, it wasn't such a folly by Churchill after all?
With his mind made up, Churchill ordered the diversion of two ANZAC divisions and an armored brigade to Greece, as well as supporting air elements. Wavell and other Commonwealth commanders were rightfully alarmed and protested the decision; the diversion of 60,000 troops, 100 tanks and 200 aircraft seriously undercut 8th Army just as Operation Compass was seeing results but also triggering serious Italian reinforcements. Even worse, Rommel and the first of what would become the Afrika Korps were starting to arrive on scene as well. The diversion in resources were also unlikely to achieve the desired results, as the Greeks had asked for nine divisions; what was sent was enough to compromise British operations in North Africa but not enough to secure Greece either. The end result was a predictable disaster on both fronts, with Greece as well as Crete falling into German hands and the British thrown back in North Africa.
Since that time, there has been considerable debate on the wisdom of this decision by Churchill and others. Given the gambit failed in its stated role and directly injured the British position in North Africa, it seems like a pretty obvious case of Churchillian hubris gone awry. I, however, have a different outlook on it and would posit this decision is probably what prevented the USSR from collapsing in 1941, thus allowing the Allies to win the war.
Martin Van Creveld's book Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: the Balkan Clue argues that Operation Lustre engendered Hitler's decision in March to cancel the planned two-pronged attack by AGS into Ukraine then under planning. Hitler could see the same strategic value in Crete and Greece as the British could, and this provoked grave concern among the Germans that the British could threaten their Southern flank. As a result, 12th Army was diverted to the Balkans for an expanded operation against Greece and, as fate would have it, Yugoslavia. This left the less capable and prepared 11th Army to take their place, with no pincer taking place. Instead, a broad front advance was undertaken which ultimately failed to achieve the encirclements seen elsewhere in Operation Barbarossa and gave AGS a staggered start.
Had there been no Operation Lustre, AGS would've kept 12th Army and achieved a major encirclement in the opening days of Barbarossa whereby 6th, 12th and 26th Armies of the Soviet Southwestern Front would've destroyed. This would've left a gaping hole and seriously impeded Soviet defensive operations on this front, but also would have serious ramifications elsewhere; because of the situation of OTL, the Soviets were able to transfer forces from this sector to face Army Group Center. These were the 16th and 19th Armies, and they played a very serious role in extending out combat operations around Smolensk, inflicting serious attrition on Army Group Center. Here, because of the loss of the three border armies in the opening days, there is no possibility of this occurring due to the serious pressure the Soviets will be under.
The end result of this would thus be no Kiev diversion and Smolensk ending some weeks ahead of schedule, with Army Group Center in better shape than OTL. Operations to secure out the flanks in the North (Velikiye Luki) and South (Central Front) can be conducted handily, which by middle to late August enables AGC to begin a much earlier advance on Moscow as the railways become available. It is highly likely that both Kiev and Leningrad will fall in August or perhaps early September in the case of the latter, while Moscow will follow suit by mid September. By the time of the first snows, AGS can also secure Rostov and the Donets Basin as a whole, while AGN can link up with the Finns around the Svir River. This is fatal for the USSR, and will enable the Germans to complete their victory in 1942 by achieving the Archangelsk-Astrakhan Line, then moving onto the Urals sometime in 1943 or 1944. With the USSR out, the Anglo-Americans will seek an armistice, effectively ending WWII in Europe and setting the stage for a Nazi-American Cold War.
Maybe, perhaps, it wasn't such a folly by Churchill after all?
