Meppo
Anticommunist Mole
- Location
- Default City, Russia
- Pronouns
- he/him
Fictional characters.
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Meppo's Electoral Molehill
- Thread starter Meppo
- Start date
Fictional characters.
Meppo
Anticommunist Mole
- Location
- Default City, Russia
- Pronouns
- he/him
Garland Campaign Russia
2012-2022: Vladimir Putin (Independent, de facto United Russia) [1]
2024-2033: Dmitry Mironov (Independent, de facto United Russia) [3]
2034-present: Anton Alikhanov (Independent, de facto United Russia) [5]
[1] Surprising very, very few people, President Biden and Attorney General Garland's campaign against the nascent threat of white supremacy provided easy propaganda material for Putin and United Russia, especially in light of the numbers of incarcerated families - sure, a lot of them are terrorists, but the White House forcing entire families into the inhumane conditions of the ever-expanding American prison system isn't going to produce less terrorists, and besides have you seen what the West is doing to Donald Trump?
More than that, of course, the War on Domestic Terrorism gave the Russian government an excuse to up the ante on suppression of political opposition. Aside from the basic anti-extremism law, "terrorist community" cases and cases of candidates being forced into covidariums sprang like mushrooms; while an appalingly high amount of single-member constituencies was lost in Moscow, United Russia kept a comfortable majority, allowing them to introduce new restrictive laws (the Sovereign Internet Law, anyone?). With Navalny's organization increasingly on the wayside, Putin and United Russia grew bolder in condemning the Bolsheviks' crimes and pushing for decommunization, no doubt leaving Ukraine and the Baltics bemused.
On the foreign front, however, Russian policy remained much of the same: reacting to NATO's vague promises of integrating Ukraine by ramping up military activities in Voronezh, buddying up with Xi Jinping, strengthening influence in various states abroad while condemning America's tacit support of revolutions in Venezuela, Cuba and Myanmar. The beginning of the Turkmen Civil War in 2022, with Iranian intervents waging war on a ramshackle, vaguely pro-Western "Free Republican Front" amidst a vaporized economy, saw yet another brief war scare as Putin threatened that any American interests meddling in Central Asia would be met with a thorough "asymmetric response"; that scare was snuffled, unexpectedly, with the increasingly distant President of Russia disappearing from the airwaves.
[2] With the announcement that Vladimir Putin had tragically passed away due to underlying health problems (unclear and alarmingly sudden to much of the populace as they were), Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin was thrust into the position of Acting President.
His inauguration was brief and somber, and though Mishustin made it clear that business would continue as usual, relations with the West warmed slightly as news of an amnesty and minor market reforms followed.
As he focused on resuscitating the post-COVID Russian economy, it seemed that the 56 year old professional taxmaster wanted to be elected President on his own terms. Unfortunately for him, far too many powerful figures in the Security Council resented his presence, his liberal overtures and engagement far overstepping the boundaries of a man appointed to warm the seat while the real players sort their squabbles out.
Mishustin grumbled, but ultimately decided not to stand for the Presidency in 2024 - in return for keeping his team in government.
[3] In his time as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Dmitry Mironov was described as adaptable and too cautious to throw his weight behind one of MVD's various competing groups. Perhaps it's the latter trait that allowed the Kremlin clans, with their increasingly public conflicts and all, to unite behind Putin's former ex-bodyguard and Governor of Yaroslavl Oblast. At 54 years old, Mironov was not exactly prime Successor™ material, but hey, he's about 26 years younger than his US counterpart.
While the aces of PR extolled Mironov's work as Governor and his closeness to the late Vladimir Vladimirovich, and "experts" on political talk shows promised that the new President would preside over economic growth, Mironov was hardly a player in his own right. Unlike the second President of Russia, however, he was not expected to be one in a long, long time.
The biggest beneficiaries of this development were Sergei Kiriyenko, now Prime Minister once more, and the enigmatic Chief of Staff Anton Vaino. Particularly belligerent figures, most of them siloviks, were pacified or otherwise "compromised": the most infamous example, of course, being a photo of an "esoteric altar dedicated to Ungern-Sternberg" found at Sergei Shoygu's dacha.
At times even more publicity-shy than the President, Kiriyenko and Vaino overshadowed their supposed superior in both Russian and Western media: in America in particular they were identified with QAnon's self-perpetuation through various anonymous outlets, and the creation of the so-called "New Afrika" hoax. Regardless of the accuracy of this statement, a number of Russian-speaking hackers were found to be involved in Save the Children; rather more concerningly, it took root in Russia proper, with "patriotic" organizations, militias and A Just Russia regional branches taking to the QAnon cause like flies to dung.
The biggest challenge to President Mironov came in 2030, with the COVID season (this time with mutated mucormycosis!) and climate change wracked Russia's in-person economy. It also plainly demonstrated the fragility of the Russian political system: most pre-2020 political parties were dead, CPRF was no longer pliable even in its diluted state, and trust in the electoral process was as low as support for the party of power.
Workers from rural Central Russia, forced off the fields by rhizoctonia, came to city centers to demand healthcare reform and the government's resignation. Others found themselves caught up in far-right militias, their explosive growth facilitated by Zakhar Prilepin's death from COVID - in the view of organizations such as Prilepin's Guard, the nationalist writer and would-be presidential candidate was murdered for "exposing a globalist pedophile cabal in the highest echelons of Russian government".
Of course, Russian media and the National Guard treated them as "imported extremists" all the same, new trade deals with China were signed, and immigration was curtailed severely to "facilitate improvements in the epidemiological situation", but the President and his government understood that something more substantial had to be done. They couldn't agree on what had to be done, however: with Dyumin's plane crashing near Nizhny Novgorod, infighting in the Kremlin intensified, and President Mironov's horrible fungus-induced demise seemed like an afterthought.
[4] With both Mironov and his predecessor Kiriyenko dead, Anton Vaino found himself in the unenviable position of being Acting President of Russia. A fourth-generation government functionary, Vaino was accustomed to working behind the scenes, and it showed: official polls indicated that a whopping 71% of Russian voters knew little about the man who had been Prime Minister for 3 years and Chief of Staff for longer - and yet it was commonly understood that he was the Surkov to Mironov's Putin, guiding the country's foreign and internal policies, its official ideological line.
While many in the State Duma and the State Council were amenable to the Acting President staying in power for longer, Vaino found it unviable. Instead, he chose to focus on getting Russia vaccinated and prepared for the snap general elections; one of his last presidential addresses was to United Russia's (greatly diminished) faction in the State Duma, asking them to unite behind a young, visionary candidate - a fresh face.
[5] Anton Alikhanov, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, was not exactly young or fresh, but he was younger than most and far from Moscow for long enough to be considered an outsider. Alikhanov campaigned heavily on transforming the Russian economy, ending corruption and pursuing democracy - and even if these words felt rather bizarre coming from a United Russia ex-governor's mouth, he was pleasant enough on the eyes that some ambivalent folks would vote for him.
Upon inauguration, Alikhanov and Prime Minister Daniil Yegorov - moreso the latter - announced a new political course, reversing electoral restrictions, investing in "climate defenses" and opening up the Russian market to investors and European trade relations. To say that the European Union was wary would be an understatement, but compared to the United States, with its President's inwardness, post-LaborWave economic anxiety and the Democratic Socialists' growing influence, the Russian economy was a breath of fresh air.
That is not to say the Alikhanov government was that of liberal democrats: the 2034 presidential election's legitimacy continues to be challenged, and recent changes to immigration policy have been met with criticism from foreign governments (including, oddly enough, that of PRC) and refugee support organizations such as Civic Assistance, and Yegorov's War on Corruption has coexisted with allegations of "stimulation" of regional elites. As the republics of Northern Caucasus have seen severe political crises and the situation with organized crime has left much to be desired, Alikhanov's first term has invited rather... unfavorable comparisons.
More than that, however, Alikhanov has to straddle the line between the West and China, as well his government's technocrats and siloviks; the latter, reactionary and dedicated to the protection of Putin's regime, have resented their lack of power in the halls of Kremlin. Some have allied with non-government actors such as monarchist oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev, whose Tsargrad media empire and movement have attacked Alikhanov since day one. To many of the older men in FSB and GRU, the government's behavior reeks of perestroika - and they're not going to sit and watch how far the Prime Minister is willing to take it.
2012-2022: Vladimir Putin (Independent, de facto United Russia) [1]
'12: def. Gennady Zyuganov (CPRF), Mikhail Prokhorov (Independent), Vladimir Zhirinovsky (LDPR), Sergei Mironov (A Just Russia)
'18: def. Pavel Grudinin (CPRF), Vladimir Zhirinovsky (LDPR), Kseniya Sobchak (Civic Initiative), various
2022-2024: Mikhail Mishustin (Independent, de facto United Russia) [2]2024-2033: Dmitry Mironov (Independent, de facto United Russia) [3]
'24: def. Anastasiya Udaltsova (CPRF), Yelena Letuchaya (New People), Maksim Suraykin (Communists of Russia), various
'30: def. Leonid Zyuganov (CPRF), Sergei Mikheyev (A Just Russia ~ Patriots for Truth), Maksim Suraykin (Communists of Russia), various
2033-2034: Anton Vaino (Independent, de facto United Russia) [4]2034-present: Anton Alikhanov (Independent, de facto United Russia) [5]
'34 (first round): def. Igor Molotov (A Just Russia ~ Patriots for Truth), Denis Parfyonov (CPRF), Anastasiya Bryukhanova (Urban Platform), various
'34 (second round): def. Igor Molotov (A Just Russia ~ Patriots for Truth)
[1] Surprising very, very few people, President Biden and Attorney General Garland's campaign against the nascent threat of white supremacy provided easy propaganda material for Putin and United Russia, especially in light of the numbers of incarcerated families - sure, a lot of them are terrorists, but the White House forcing entire families into the inhumane conditions of the ever-expanding American prison system isn't going to produce less terrorists, and besides have you seen what the West is doing to Donald Trump?
More than that, of course, the War on Domestic Terrorism gave the Russian government an excuse to up the ante on suppression of political opposition. Aside from the basic anti-extremism law, "terrorist community" cases and cases of candidates being forced into covidariums sprang like mushrooms; while an appalingly high amount of single-member constituencies was lost in Moscow, United Russia kept a comfortable majority, allowing them to introduce new restrictive laws (the Sovereign Internet Law, anyone?). With Navalny's organization increasingly on the wayside, Putin and United Russia grew bolder in condemning the Bolsheviks' crimes and pushing for decommunization, no doubt leaving Ukraine and the Baltics bemused.
On the foreign front, however, Russian policy remained much of the same: reacting to NATO's vague promises of integrating Ukraine by ramping up military activities in Voronezh, buddying up with Xi Jinping, strengthening influence in various states abroad while condemning America's tacit support of revolutions in Venezuela, Cuba and Myanmar. The beginning of the Turkmen Civil War in 2022, with Iranian intervents waging war on a ramshackle, vaguely pro-Western "Free Republican Front" amidst a vaporized economy, saw yet another brief war scare as Putin threatened that any American interests meddling in Central Asia would be met with a thorough "asymmetric response"; that scare was snuffled, unexpectedly, with the increasingly distant President of Russia disappearing from the airwaves.
[2] With the announcement that Vladimir Putin had tragically passed away due to underlying health problems (unclear and alarmingly sudden to much of the populace as they were), Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin was thrust into the position of Acting President.
His inauguration was brief and somber, and though Mishustin made it clear that business would continue as usual, relations with the West warmed slightly as news of an amnesty and minor market reforms followed.
As he focused on resuscitating the post-COVID Russian economy, it seemed that the 56 year old professional taxmaster wanted to be elected President on his own terms. Unfortunately for him, far too many powerful figures in the Security Council resented his presence, his liberal overtures and engagement far overstepping the boundaries of a man appointed to warm the seat while the real players sort their squabbles out.
Mishustin grumbled, but ultimately decided not to stand for the Presidency in 2024 - in return for keeping his team in government.
[3] In his time as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Dmitry Mironov was described as adaptable and too cautious to throw his weight behind one of MVD's various competing groups. Perhaps it's the latter trait that allowed the Kremlin clans, with their increasingly public conflicts and all, to unite behind Putin's former ex-bodyguard and Governor of Yaroslavl Oblast. At 54 years old, Mironov was not exactly prime Successor™ material, but hey, he's about 26 years younger than his US counterpart.
While the aces of PR extolled Mironov's work as Governor and his closeness to the late Vladimir Vladimirovich, and "experts" on political talk shows promised that the new President would preside over economic growth, Mironov was hardly a player in his own right. Unlike the second President of Russia, however, he was not expected to be one in a long, long time.
The biggest beneficiaries of this development were Sergei Kiriyenko, now Prime Minister once more, and the enigmatic Chief of Staff Anton Vaino. Particularly belligerent figures, most of them siloviks, were pacified or otherwise "compromised": the most infamous example, of course, being a photo of an "esoteric altar dedicated to Ungern-Sternberg" found at Sergei Shoygu's dacha.
At times even more publicity-shy than the President, Kiriyenko and Vaino overshadowed their supposed superior in both Russian and Western media: in America in particular they were identified with QAnon's self-perpetuation through various anonymous outlets, and the creation of the so-called "New Afrika" hoax. Regardless of the accuracy of this statement, a number of Russian-speaking hackers were found to be involved in Save the Children; rather more concerningly, it took root in Russia proper, with "patriotic" organizations, militias and A Just Russia regional branches taking to the QAnon cause like flies to dung.
The biggest challenge to President Mironov came in 2030, with the COVID season (this time with mutated mucormycosis!) and climate change wracked Russia's in-person economy. It also plainly demonstrated the fragility of the Russian political system: most pre-2020 political parties were dead, CPRF was no longer pliable even in its diluted state, and trust in the electoral process was as low as support for the party of power.
Workers from rural Central Russia, forced off the fields by rhizoctonia, came to city centers to demand healthcare reform and the government's resignation. Others found themselves caught up in far-right militias, their explosive growth facilitated by Zakhar Prilepin's death from COVID - in the view of organizations such as Prilepin's Guard, the nationalist writer and would-be presidential candidate was murdered for "exposing a globalist pedophile cabal in the highest echelons of Russian government".
Of course, Russian media and the National Guard treated them as "imported extremists" all the same, new trade deals with China were signed, and immigration was curtailed severely to "facilitate improvements in the epidemiological situation", but the President and his government understood that something more substantial had to be done. They couldn't agree on what had to be done, however: with Dyumin's plane crashing near Nizhny Novgorod, infighting in the Kremlin intensified, and President Mironov's horrible fungus-induced demise seemed like an afterthought.
[4] With both Mironov and his predecessor Kiriyenko dead, Anton Vaino found himself in the unenviable position of being Acting President of Russia. A fourth-generation government functionary, Vaino was accustomed to working behind the scenes, and it showed: official polls indicated that a whopping 71% of Russian voters knew little about the man who had been Prime Minister for 3 years and Chief of Staff for longer - and yet it was commonly understood that he was the Surkov to Mironov's Putin, guiding the country's foreign and internal policies, its official ideological line.
While many in the State Duma and the State Council were amenable to the Acting President staying in power for longer, Vaino found it unviable. Instead, he chose to focus on getting Russia vaccinated and prepared for the snap general elections; one of his last presidential addresses was to United Russia's (greatly diminished) faction in the State Duma, asking them to unite behind a young, visionary candidate - a fresh face.
[5] Anton Alikhanov, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, was not exactly young or fresh, but he was younger than most and far from Moscow for long enough to be considered an outsider. Alikhanov campaigned heavily on transforming the Russian economy, ending corruption and pursuing democracy - and even if these words felt rather bizarre coming from a United Russia ex-governor's mouth, he was pleasant enough on the eyes that some ambivalent folks would vote for him.
Upon inauguration, Alikhanov and Prime Minister Daniil Yegorov - moreso the latter - announced a new political course, reversing electoral restrictions, investing in "climate defenses" and opening up the Russian market to investors and European trade relations. To say that the European Union was wary would be an understatement, but compared to the United States, with its President's inwardness, post-LaborWave economic anxiety and the Democratic Socialists' growing influence, the Russian economy was a breath of fresh air.
That is not to say the Alikhanov government was that of liberal democrats: the 2034 presidential election's legitimacy continues to be challenged, and recent changes to immigration policy have been met with criticism from foreign governments (including, oddly enough, that of PRC) and refugee support organizations such as Civic Assistance, and Yegorov's War on Corruption has coexisted with allegations of "stimulation" of regional elites. As the republics of Northern Caucasus have seen severe political crises and the situation with organized crime has left much to be desired, Alikhanov's first term has invited rather... unfavorable comparisons.
More than that, however, Alikhanov has to straddle the line between the West and China, as well his government's technocrats and siloviks; the latter, reactionary and dedicated to the protection of Putin's regime, have resented their lack of power in the halls of Kremlin. Some have allied with non-government actors such as monarchist oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev, whose Tsargrad media empire and movement have attacked Alikhanov since day one. To many of the older men in FSB and GRU, the government's behavior reeks of perestroika - and they're not going to sit and watch how far the Prime Minister is willing to take it.
2e4ea4 - United Russia
e01f1f - Communist Party of the Russian Federation
fac01e - A Just Russia
e29d28 - A Just Russia - Patriots for Truth
0ad1c9 - New People
4488cc - Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation
4fa181 - Urban Platform
e01f1f - Communist Party of the Russian Federation
fac01e - A Just Russia
e29d28 - A Just Russia - Patriots for Truth
0ad1c9 - New People
4488cc - Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian Federation
4fa181 - Urban Platform
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One of my favorite lists I’ve done, even though it became outdated not long after I posted it!
I really like this scenario, how likely do you think these events are too take place?
Meppo
Anticommunist Mole
- Location
- Default City, Russia
- Pronouns
- he/him
Well, the event I find most likely is the Communist Party becoming Putin and United Russia's next punching bag (Putin's rhetoric is already increasingly anti-Soviet, and Communists - who tend to benefit the most from Smart Voting purely statistically - have seen some substantial attacks during the 2021 election season, like Pavel Grudinin[1] being taken off the Communist party list) after 2021. Kiriyenko retaining and expanding influence, assuming the 2021 campaign doesn't go utterly bad for UR, is also likely.
As for Putin's successor, I suppose, I think it'll be someone less obvious than a current Governor - probably some obscure regional official who knows his way around people's property and can ratfuck an entire legislature into doing his bidding, like Putin himself.
[1] Probably the funniest thing about this entire affair is that Grudinin, a Putin campaign proxy in 2000 who gave the Communists their lowest (official) results so far, had more balls to say that Navalny is a political prisoner than fucking Grigory Yavlinsky (who incidentally told Navalny supporters not to vote for Yabloko)
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Comrade Izaac
Secretary General of the Alt-Historians Union
- Pronouns
- They/Them
What are the States up to at this point in the TL? How are they reacting to the developments in Russia?
you mentioned something about a LaborWave?
you mentioned something about a LaborWave?
Meppo
Anticommunist Mole
- Location
- Default City, Russia
- Pronouns
- he/him
Originally mentioned in Oppo's post, as shown here:
I presumed that Russia would have a (superficially) similar phenomenon.
Refer to Oppo's post here, but generally speaking the United States - especially under Rogan and afterwards - are too embroiled in their own issues to focus effectively on rival powers, so they're more or less distrustful.
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Meppo
Anticommunist Mole
- Location
- Default City, Russia
- Pronouns
- he/him
Wolfram said:
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Meppo
Anticommunist Mole
- Location
- Default City, Russia
- Pronouns
- he/him
List of the Presidents of the Popular Assembly of the Argyrian Republic
[1] 1915-1929: Iosif Kafieris (Liberal)
[10] 1979-1983: Iakovos Vasiliadis (Conservative)
[1] 1915-1929: Iosif Kafieris (Liberal)
'15 (Liberal-Agrarian coalition) def. Serchio Karouzo (Agrarian), Lavrentis Apokaukos (Conservative), Keir Makedouel (Radical), Niketas Gatsos (Social Democratic)
'17 (Liberal-Agrarian coalition) def. Giorgios Melodis (Conservative), Serchio Karouzo (Agrarian), Keir Makedouel (Radical)
'22 (Liberal-Agrarian coalition) def. Iasar Sachinidis (Conservative), Tziovani Boskareli (Agrarian), Keir Makedouel (Radical), Kyprianos Mourouzis (Heritage)
'25 (Liberal majority) def. Iasar Sachinidis (Conservative), Antonino Ritzouto (Independent Agrarian), Simos Lemonis (Radical), Kyprianos Mourouzis (Heritage)
[2] 1929-1935: Maxentios Volpato (Liberal)'30 (Liberal majority) def. Frankiskos Karenidis (Conservative), Vaso Ismailidis (Everything for Argyria), Kouirino Kostantzo (Union of Farmers), Simos Lemonis (Radical)
[3] 1935-1943: Frankiskos Karenidis (Conservative)'35 (Conservative majority) def. Maxentios Volpato (Liberal), Tiverios Tzakson (Union of Farmers), Vaso Ismailidis (Everything for Argyria), Isaak Braounel (Radical)
'40 (Conservative majority) def. Markilianos Vasiliou (Liberal), Tiverios Tzakson (Union of Farmers)
[4] 1943-1950: Alkis Nikolatzis (Conservative)'45 (Conservative majority) def. Markilianos Vasiliou (Liberal), Tiverios Tzakson (Union of Farmers)
[5] 1950-1955: Avrilianos Dandolos (Liberal)'50 (Liberal majority) def. Alkis Nikolatzis (Conservative), Ignasio Armao (Union of Farmers), Titos Pyromaglou (Radical)
(4) 1955-1957: Alkis Nikolatzis (Conservative)'55 (Conservative minority) def. Avrilianos Dandolos (Liberal), Louis Mendes (New Force), Titos Pyromaglou (Radical), Ignasio Armao (Union of Farmers)
[6] 1957-1962: Panikos Pierri (Conservative)'57 (Conservative majority) def. Iannis Sampson (Liberal), Louis Mendes (New Force), Nikolas Tzakson (Country ~ Union of Argyrian Farmers), Titos Pyromaglou (Radical)
[7] 1962-1964: Emilios Rouslanopoulos (Conservative)'62 (Conservative minority) def. Pat Berri (Liberal), Klemens Karper (New Force), Spiro Goria (Radical)
[8] 1964-1976: Pat Berri (Liberal)'64 (Liberal majority) def. Emilios Rouslanopoulos (Conservative)
'69 (Liberal majority) def. Andronikos Karolides (Conservative), Savvas Zaropoulos (National Democratic)
'74 (Liberal minority) def. Theofania Ferante (Conservative), Savvas Zaropoulos (National Democratic)
[9] 1976-1979: Tomas Konali (Liberal)[10] 1979-1983: Iakovos Vasiliadis (Conservative)
'79 (Conservative majority) def. Tomas Konali (Liberal), Antonios Mundatos (Social Democratic)
[11] 1983-1990: Ethelbert Romero (Liberal)'83 (Liberal majority) def. Iakovos Vasiliadis (Conservative), Antonios Mundatos (Social Democratic)
'88 (Liberal minority) def. Regino Kapaki (Conservative), Tzasper Stavrou (Social Democratic)
[12] 1990-1995: Regino Kapaki (Conservative)'90 (Conservative majority) def. Themistoklis Theodoropoulos (Liberal), Panagiotis Floridis (Social Democratic)
[13] 1995-2000: Themistoklis Theodoropoulos (Liberal)'95 (Liberal majority) def. Regino Kapaki (Conservative), Panagiotis Floridis (Social Democratic)
[14] 2000-2015: Petros Timuridis (Conservative)'00 (Conservative majority) def. Themistoklis Theodoropoulos (Liberal), Konrad Karnei (Christian Charter), Panagiotis Floridis (Social Democratic)
'05 (Conservative majority) def. Orestis Lambrou (Liberal), Konrad Karnei (Chartist Bloc), Andreas Klein (Social Democratic)
'10 (Conservative majority) def. Iasar Versatse (Liberal), Seleni Friske (Chartist Bloc), Andreas Klein (Social Democratic)
[15] 2015-present: Ignasio Mendes (Liberal)'15 (Liberal majority) def. Yiorgos Nassou (Conservative), Venera Tran (Social Democratic), Seleni Friske (Chartist Bloc), Alexandros Chasan (Forward Together)
[1] Though the institutional referendum yielded a decisive majority in favor of the republic, Argyria's republican transition was uneasy: ultraviolet riots surged (and were put down with extreme prejudice) even as Queen Agathe eventually formally accepted the results; a faction of the Conservatives, led by the disgraced Beratidis, refused to recognize the referendum, even touting a letter from General Angelis denouncing the results' supposed threat to Argyrian values and nationhood. As elections to the first Popular Assembly - the one that would draft the Constitution - fast approached, Argyrian democratic society seemed in peril.
The Liberals, in lieu of nominating a veteran leader, settled on Iosif Kafieris. A fourth-generation military man of Kyrenaikan extraction, he was an unusual leader for the party of "urban coppolas", though accepted by party leadership as a low-key, reliable legislator uninvolved in factional infighting, by Agrarians as a business-minded administrator with long-standing ties in Little Sicily, and by the public as a personable politician opposed to royalist terror and liberal excesses.
With an unprecedented majority behind him, Kafieris moved to implement basic provisions of the Liberal program - reforming the justice system, getting rid of electoral restrictions, etc. - while also pursuing parliamentary cooperation and practical compromises. One of Kafieris' most significant achievements was spelling reform, reflecting Argyrian Greek conventions and settling the severely ethnically charged Alphabet Question. This enabled Kafieris to be publicly perceived as an apolitical figurehead - all while actively pursuing his goals of dismantling Matzinite party machinery and absorbing the Agrarians into the Liberal Party. A powerful base of so-called 'Kafierists' soon emerged, composed primarily of party workers from Filippopolis and freshmen deputies from previously deep-blue districts that owed their careers to the Kafieris wave.
The Global War greatly transformed Argyria: though Vesperian economic pressure and development of new lands for farming weakened the Little Sicilian ranchers and their political influence, and the country was affected by the post-war recession as many other countries were, new cities grew in oil-rich valleys and industrial outskirts, as professionals from Rhomania, Leon, moved to reap the benefits of Argyria's economic boom.
While not without its hiccups, Kafieris' tenure seemed long and prosperous, and he left office as a widely respected statesman.
[2] Maxentios Volpato, Kafieris's Minister of Justice, began his political career as a Matzinite machinist and ascended to power by mediating intraparty conflicts and building ties with Kafieris. Charismatic, brazen and persuasive, Maxi was lionized for his prosecution of the Laconian Society and criminal boss Gregor "King" Masterson. By 1929, his status as Kafieris's successor and the future Liberal leader was unassailable.
History would not be so kind. While historians no longer believe that the Clysman Collapse decimated shipping as greatly as has been argued, it did bring bourse trade to a screeching halt. Even so, the President remained popular for some months, by virtue of his rhetorical ability and proposed measures to prevent an economic freefall. Then it became increasingly clear that a lot of the "proposed measures" were byproducts of constant infighting and negotiations between Volpato and his cabinet, and the ones that were properly implemented did not achieve the intended effect: Volpato's attempt to secure the Argyrian dinar hampered exports and led to an employment crisis. Disaffected farm workers soon formed unions, marching upon New Athens and shouting increasingly radical slogans.
Though it could be said that Volpato's deflationary policies and farming programs set the stage for Karenides's public works, Argyria's economic recovery, Volpato's heavy-handed response to Vulgarist protests and sordid relationship with his own ministers have defined the second Republican President's reputation for a long, long time.
[3] In the end, Conservatives were put back into power, promising to secure the Argyrian economy. Frankiskos Karenides, veteran financier and heir to a prominent Pontic banking family, surprised Argyrian media by keeping his party's laten-leven tendencies in check and rejecting any and all insinuations of abolishing spelling reform.
To the relief of impoverished Argyrians, Karenides kept his party's pro-business tendencies in check, expanding and introducing new relief programs. Though Karenides's domestic overtures, collectively known as Dimósia Anárrosi, seemed to parallel those of Stauning's Vesperia, their relationship was tenuous: the President of Argyria had little tolerance for leftism and for Vesperian voluntarism, both of which had a healthy presence in the Vesperian Consul's worldview, and would work to strengthen trade networks in the Far Occident with Argyria being the top dog, as well as negotiating beef and lamb exports with Morocco and France.
Karenides' tenure, more than anything else, was oriented towards weakening political movements. The chief target of this was the ultraviolet Heritage Party, rebranded by 1930 under the "Everything for Argyria" ticket - while its leader, Duke Ismailidis, was arguably moderate compared to the ultranationalists of 1910s, he still maintained correspondence with former Sons of Rome officials, Osmanist exiles and Cleopatrist moguls in Egypt; the party's apparent organizational support by the Novatorist regime in Russia did much to ensure an inquiry into their activities. Similar cases would soon surround members of far-left organizations, be it the rurally oriented, vocally anti-socialist Vulgarists, many of whom had by that point joined the populist Tiverios Tzakson's Union of Farmers, or urban socialists and anarchists of the Radical Party; the latter, while not banned, found itself worn down by cases against its top leaders and outcompeted by the Union of Farmers.
Ultimately, Karenides' choice to retire without calling an election was mostly a matter of age: Karenides, who was once a staffer in the Beratidis' Ministry of Commerce, hit seventy by the time 1943 rolled over, and his administration intended to shore up its approval ratings amidst an economic downturn and increasing tensions on the foreign front.
[4] Alkiviades Nikolatzis became President in inauspicious circumstances. The Tsingtao Incident put Japan and China - and by extension the rest of the world - on the verge of another worldwide war. Russia, Japan, Ireland - a great many governments were caught up in chauvinist fervor and opposition to the world order established in the wake of the Global War.
The Rhoman Republic was abolished with the inauguration of right-wing general Karaliades, prompting a small wave of immigration to Hellenophone countries and yet another round of suspicion towards the Conservative government.
After securing a term in his own right against staunch Kafierist Linos Vasiliou, primarily on favorable economic growth and the promise of "keeping Argyria out of war", the President found himself backing out on it following an attack by Brasilian soldiers on a radio tower on the border. While immensely bloody and associated with systematic massacres and the deaths of 55 million people, the Second Global War (1945-1948) would prove to be relatively short.
For some time, Nikolatzis was considered Argyria's greatest leader. His handling of the Brasilian Front soon became a hot point among soldiers returning from the Cisplatine and certain left-wing leaders. Housing, too, had become an important issue in the wake of the war, with Nikolatzis and his "economic cardinals"' management of the issue - seeing "blacklisting" of certain neighborhoods - exposing ethnic tension and bringing the issues of Argyria's meschling population, vast and previously rather invisible, to the fore. The independence of the Republic of the Cisplatine, while ultimately favorable for Argyria, was fraught with debacles over potential annexation and terms of trade in ports of the Silver River's northern shore.
Not helping matters was Nikolatzis's personality: an ardent rank-and-file Conservative who placed loyalty above all else, Alkis lacked charisma and was held in great contempt by Liberals. Thus, his failure to get Liberals on board with the Grand Housing Bill of 1949 and negotiations with newly-elected Consul Saldanha contributed greatly to his 1950 defeat.
[5] Avrilianos Dandolos is traditionally overlooked by the public and considered unusual by historians: he was one of the few governors in Argyrian history to make a direct leap to party leadership, and the only one to lead his party to a majority. A shipping entrepreneur who made his name as a foreign and economic policy elder, Dandolos identified with the Liberal right (historically named after 19th century deputy Brant Konali), and, indeed, decided that the public works and healthcare programs introduced by past Presidents did not need any further inprovement or interference, other than "minor streamlining".
Dandolos' approach was understandable from the perspective of the time: the mild economic growth of the late Forties had neatly transitioned into a vast economic boom, with the metro areas of New Athens, Iasaropolis and Agios Expeditos benefitting from reconstruction and swelling with dozens of thousands of people. Though no longer the undeniable breadbasket of Brasil that it once was, Argyria saw its economy diversify with state-of-the-art machinery, grand refineries in the west and the beginnings of tourism. Argyrian magazines, music and wine increasingly pervaded the Far Occident, favored even by staunch Muslims in Tukandal and by staunch Helvetianists in Vesperia. Argyrian teams' dominance at the 1952 Olympiad and the Occidental Cup were the face of the Dandolomania that had, even for a brief moment, swept the country. Detrimental effects were present, of course: even despite changes made to housing programs, problems with disinvestment and attacks on households persisted; the growing demands of tourism made cooptment of existing resorts and resort companies by shipping conglomerates, with all the illegal employment and fraud viable; the interests of labor unions and environmental concerns became visible, often running counter to each other and to Liberal interests. Though Dandolos and his administration did much to investigate and settle conflicts in the Argyrian shipping industry, the President was ambivalent about how wide the scope should be, and notably told Minister of Justice Papaioannou that it was for the provincial governments to deal with.
Thus, when shipping magnate and hotel proprietor Petros Gebran was arrested for laundering millions of talers and smuggling, accusations of corruption were soon levied against Dandolos, who worked in Gebran's company and with Gebran as Governor of Agios Expeditos. Though the courts ultimately found Dandolos to be innocent, several Liberal functionaries, starting with Mayor of Agios Expeditos Viko Zefereti, were charged with accepting bribes and facilitating a money-laundering ring; the "stench of corruption" soon spilled over onto the Ministry of Development. Louis Mendes, a freshman Liberal deputy and Brasilian Front veteran of half-Andalusian Jewish mischling descent, led the charge in demanding an inquiry; by forcing him out of the party, Dandolos and his men hastened their administration's demise.
(4) Alkiviades Nikolatzis won a second (non-consecutive) term in inauspicious circumstances. The former war leader, ruthless and deeply involved, campaigned heavily on cleaning up corruption and standing up against criminals and unsavory state actors - namely Qulania, whose war on the Koellanisch Bevrijdingsfront was increasingly spilling over into Argyria. Even so, the Conservatives failed to attain a majority, with many maintaining goodwill towards Dandolos for economic prosperity and most disgruntled voters, particularly urban ones, choosing to vote for the dynamic Louis Mendes and his New Force. Much noise was made over the traditionally shipping-friendly Conservatives decrying Dandolos's corrupt connections in the shipping industry.
In any case, a minority government was not the preferred outcome. Occassionally depending on right-wing independents and the rotting corpse of the Tzakson political machine to pass bills, Nikolatzis ultimately came to avoid publicity as he focused on introducing increasingly severe anti-corruption and police reform bills, trudging through ever-stiffer opposition from Liberals and New Force deputies, and trying to get the Qulanian government to achieve a negotiated settlement. Ultimately, after a failed budgetary vote, Nikolatzis pushed to hold snap elections; his Minister of Development and party secretary Panikos Pierri convinced him to let "fresh blood" into the leadership race.
[6] At 47 years old, Panikos Pierri was the first President born in the 20th century. Having first joined the Conservatives as a paperboy, Pierri was noted by Karenides for his campaign to induct Italo-Argyrians into the party and soon grew prominence as the manager of the party's campaign wing. An effective administrator and personable fellow who was well-attuned to urban issues, Pierri was favored by Conservative leadership as a potential leader.
Facing off against Ivasopolis MP and labor leader Iannis Sampson in the 1957 elections, Panikos Pierri was successful in attaining a majority; as the Liberals dipped into infighting and the Qulanian government finally came to an agreement with the Bevrijdingsfront, holding free and fair elections with AEO supervision, this proved to be easier than thought. Much of Pierri's tenure was devoted to working out a comprehensive housing bill - firmly criminalizing blacklisting practices, among other things - and, increasingly, representing Argyria in world affairs, making the first call for a "standstill agreement" on atmospheric atomic testing, and working out new inter-Hesilian trade agreements.
The Vaudreuil Agreement of 1960 is to this day considered a crowning achievement in combatting smuggling. It also produced controversy for the President, as the terms of the agreement - and Pierri's subsequent policies - were deemed a bit too favorable to tobacco and wine companies based in Argyria, bringing about a very public spat between the Conservatives and Primo Joubert, the third Consul of the Cisplatine and a staunchly conservative Christian Democrat.
Pierri's successes were thereafter undermined by foreign blunders - failing to negotiate the building of a proposed AEO rocket launch site with Vesperia, for starters - and by protests against police brutality, starting in New Athens' Miaoulika neighborhood (primarily inhabited by Afro- and Romani Argyrians) and spreading to the rest of the city over the next months. Considered 'middling' by the end of his term, Pierri unexpectedly chose to resign as Conservative leader, citing continued family issues and mental exhaustion - though he did ultimately play a leading role in "directing" his successor's campaign.
[7] By 1962, the outgoing President was still personally popular, the Liberal nominee was publicly perceived as nebulous, and New Force lost much of its reputation among working-class voters for its support of the Miaoulika riots. All of that was just enough for Emilios Rouslanopoulos, Pierri's Foreign Minister, to just barely come short of a majority. Actually shoring up Conservative approval ratings was, in the President's own opinion, his "most daunting task".
Lacking the parliamentary acumen of Nikolatzis or the dynamism of Pierri, Emilios instead banked on his credentials as a "tough taskmaster", making light of his past as a military officer and war correspondent, his involvement in Aricoupa Accords and, above all, his preference for Law and Order. The problem was that, for all his genuine intelligence, Emil came off as authoritarian and had difficulty dealing with the media or knowing when to stop: this made him an unpalatable figure to urban youth and many voters who fled the Karaliades regime, and - after the publication of borderline derogatory comments in regards to the Miaoulika protests and related trials - perceived as a flappable buffoon. Ultimately, the most significant accomplishment of the Rouslanopoulos administration is believed to be local government reform, establishing a capital district and establishing several new provinces on the basis of the overgrown New Athens metro area - though its positive effects would only be felt after a few years.
[8] Affectionally known by supporters as "Grand Pat" or "Grandpappy Pat" (depending on whether they were of Italian or British extraction), Patrikios Chasan Berri is considered one of the modern Liberals' defining political figures. Born in 1897 to a Syrian Arab shoemaker and an Ulsterite seamstress on the shores of Olbia, Berri was Argyria's first British-Argyrian President, as well as the only one in Argyrian history to be a Protestant.
Raised in Olbia on the western shores of Argyria, Pat Berri began his political career as a labor union activist; historically affiliated with the Radical Party, Berri became a Liberal following a conflict with fellow Union members and service in the Second Global War, though he stated repeatedly that his involvement in socialist organizations "left quite the lasting effect on [his] outlook". Berri's jocular, larger-than-life personality and ever-expanding union and party contacts made him a fairly notable assemblyman; even so, his victory in the 1962 leadership election was unexpected, particularly so because of Pat Berri's age.
The 1964 election saw Berri propel his party to a vast majority, benefitting from Rouslanopoulos' unpopularity and the New Force central committee's decision to join the Liberals. Berri's first term was marked by substantial societal change such as renationalization of the steel industry and railroads, decriminalization of homophilic relationships and new legislation to address racial and ethnic discrimination; further successes that the Berri administration championed included the minimalization of external debt and unemployment, expansion of evening schools, and an "Argyrocentric", Vespero-skeptical foreign policy. A lot of these achievements often came despite the President, whose left-populist aspirations often defied the traditional Liberal platform; Berri's laidback attitude and prudence in legislation belied a domineering personality. Intraparty conflicts were thus unavoidable, as was a party schism by former Minister of Development Savvas Zaropoulos, who openly accused Berri of trying to subvert Argyrian liberalism. Nevertheless, Berri had little difficulty triumphing over his opponents.
Berri's second term was compounded by economic difficulties, primarily pertaining to oil production decline and competition in the petrochemical sphere with countries such as Tukanhola, Vesperia and the newly-democratic government of Zanzibar. Berri's renegotiation of oil exports with the AEO was marred by the President's sour relations not just with his counterparts and oil companies, but with his own cabinet - in an affair referred by De Courant as "The Neouenken War". Much light of the economic decline, Berri's increasing conflicts with the Assembly, and Berri's advanced age was made by Theofilia Ferante, the Conservatives' bright new leader.
The 1974 election was ultimately won by Berri, then nearing 77 years old, but the Liberal Party failed to secure a majority. Though publicly stating that he "intended to serve until at least 1980" and implying that he would call a snap election, Berri ultimately resigned in the spring of 1976.
[9] Tomas Konali, Liberal party secretary, ascended to the position in the late Berri years as a compromise choice; while a good friend and ally of Grand Pat, Konali was in many ways the opposite of his superior – a member of the Liberal right and the son of a long-time deputy from Iasaropolis (though ironically unrelated to the assemblyman for whom his political tendency was named), Konali was very much a background player, and the kind of politician Berri lambasted in his early campaigns.
With Berri's resignation, Konali pursued substantial party-wide reform - the main consequence of it being that Presidents no longer have to lead the party apparatus - and backtracked on a number of Berri's more "stalwart" initiatives, deregulating the television industry, re-repealing certain sections of the Protesters' Conduct Bill and downsizing the National Industrial Board while making it more efficient with greater introduction of technology.
President Konali, busy largely with management of foreign affairs and stabilization of parliamentary proceedings, was greatly derided for his administration's supposed lack of transparency and continued lackluster economic growth; the fact that Konali led the Liberals into the election stemmed more from a lack of non-scandalized leadership material than anything else.
[10] Iakovos Vasiliadis, a winemaker and Conservative deputy from Papalardou, achieved notability primarily on the basis of his victory over Theofania Ferante, that seemingly unassailable rising star of the Conservative Party, in the 1978 leadership election – in part by using her own celebrity status, and skewed priorities as a leader, against her. Coming to power after more than a decade of Liberal government, Vasiliadis positioned himself as a political outsider who would bring good government and a flourishing economy to replace Pat and Tom's socialist malaise.
While Vasiliadis as President would prove to be milder - and more than a little bit patronage-friendly - than his populist campaign suggested, he did make good on reducing the political strength of trade unions and "revitalizing" Argyria's shipping industry and small businesses, even if it took considerable cuts to existing relief programs. Vasiliadis's popularity waned due to an economic recession and conflicts in his administration between "Jake's cronies" and technocrats affiliated with past Conservative administrations. As 1983 began with reports of economic growth - and polls showing high Conservative approval ratings - Iakovos took the opportunity to call for a new election.
[11] Ethelbert Romero's victory came as a shock to many pundits, who did not expect the former Antofagasta city councillor and deputy to defeat the more-or-less still popular President. Born in a small town on the border of Qulania and Argyria, Ethelbert grew up in a military family, with roots in England as well as Argyria's own Little Sicily, and briefly worked in the police as a detective during the so-called "hash years" before becoming a politician. All of this, to a degree, influenced Romero's political thinking and broad image: deeply professional, a tad conservative and hardline on matters of crime (especially drugs), Romero was intensely proactive and felt that Argyria should be the same way, and - perhaps the first President in decades - named his meschling heritage as a point of pride.
Ethelbert's tenure is primarily remembered for its attempts to bring investors to deindustrializing districts, Argyria's increased involvement in the AES (including the creation of the Secretariat on Environmental Affairs and the General Assembly), the prioritization of environmental issues in general and mental health. More than anything else, it was deeply affected by anemic economic growth in 1986, Romero's attempts to stamp out the drug trade, and Argyria's involvement in the War in Dahomey - all of which strained Romero's relationship with the Assembly and led to a surge of anti-Vesperian sentiment across the country.
[12] Regino Kapaki, heir to a wealthy banking family and long-time Conservative deputy, only emerged as a party leader recently - a self-described laten-leven conservative, he was successful in harnessing Romero's misconduct in the War in Dahomey, his Anti-Drug Bills, and the administration's supposed failure to fix the economy to prevail above his Liberal opponent, Themistoklis Theodoropoulos. Agreeable and charismatic, Kapaki was deeply involved with his party's campaigning apparatus, and was favorable with most of the Conservatives' internal factions - up to and including the remnants of the deeply right-wing Vasiliadis group.
Kapaki's strength as a broadly popular candidate also was his greatest weakness: as President, Kapaki's most singular focus was "restoring the Argyrian economy", going further than Romero in slashing taxes and certain "wasteful" welfare programs, going abroad to meet with creditors, and proposing a 'hard' Brasilian Currency Unit. On social issues, however, Kapaki was considered mildly liberal, and came closer than any President before him in reforming abortion laws - angering many in his party who expected that Kapaki would uphold his campaign promises. Kapaki's mixed economic legacy and record of constantly backtracking on his promises weakened his popularity by 1995, ensuring a victory for Theodoropoulos.
[13] A third-generation barrister from New Athens, Themistoklis Theodoropoulos became visible as a rising star fairly early on - as far back as 1983, when he was only elected to the Assembly, the 37-year-old deputy and future Minister of Commerce was deemed a potential future leader by The News. Unlike most such "rising stars", however, he was successful in achieving control of party leadership - mainly by promoting himself as a "compromise candidate" between Romero, Konalites and the "new left" of the party - and defeating the beleaguered Regino Kapaki.
Though Theodoropoulos would later fill back Kapaki's tax cuts and oversee an increase in public spending, he was, for the most part, content to continue the economic consensus established in Argyria under his past three predecessors and the rest of the Occident. Successfully negotiating Kana II and seeing a surplus emerge by the end of 1997, Theodoropoulos basked in popularity. His biggest problem was his tendency to get blinded by success; bolstered by opinion polls, the President overturned Argyria's rigid abortion law. This, in addition to a failure to bail out the predominantly British-descent province of Rosalia, would result in attacks on Theodoropoulos by right-wing news media - already strong even in the latter eighties - and the signing of the so-called "Christian Charter" by a number of (mainly British-Argyrian) deputies.
[14] A "fun fact" that commonly crops up in crossword magazines is that Petros Timuridis is the most recent President to have been born outside Argyria - specifically in Alexandria, Egypt. Regardless, Petros is one of the the Republic's longest-serving Presidents, and - despite falling approval ratings in the 2010s - continues to be held in high esteem as one of the "grand old men" of Argyrian politics.
A veteran diplomat and "dull technocrat" to some, Timuridis benefitted from Theodoropoulos's falling public image, promising "moderate politics" and, as the Liberal President's negotations with Ireland and Scotland on technology collapsed, "Argyrian concerns first". Timuridis's tenure was marked by relative economic prosperity, the institution of homophilic unions, increased digitalization of both federal and local government, and greater involvement of Argyria in Hellenophone organizations - to the point where Timuridis jokingly called himself "the first Rhoman President" in 2005. With Liberal leadership divided - Theodoropoulos having fought Romeroite candidates for the nomination in 2000 and propped up his old ally Lambrou in 2005 - Timuridis remained largely popular with the population for his clean, professional attitude, occassional successes in geopolitical disputes with Vesperia, and overall economic growth. This extended even to 2010, when the Indian stock market bubble burst led to an economic recession; though at that point the President's age, and controversies involving defense contractor and Rhomanian trade lobbying in his administration, began showing all the same.
[15] The newly-elected Liberal President, Ignasio Mendes, has captivated public imagination in the same way that Dandolos, Berri and Romero once did - at 42, he is the youngest President in the history of the Argyrian Republic, as well as its first Jewish President. Closely related to 20th century political pioneer Louis Mendes, Iggy defeated a number of established candidates (including Theodoropoulos's former Minister of Development Iasar Versatse) and fought his way through to the nomination; he remains broadly popular with youth voters, having promised change to Argyria's economic consensus and greater "power to the people". Unashamedly left-wing, Iggy marked his first 100 days by revitalizing the National Industrial Board and instituting reforms that gave greater flexibility to local government. Whether his tremendous popularity will extend past the "honeymoon period" remains to be seen, though the continued - even if waning - presence of the Christian conservative Chartist Bloc, and the emergence of Neouenken governor Alexandros Chasan's populist vanity project on the political arena indicate that opposition to Liberals will continue to remain fairly fractious.
The Liberals, in lieu of nominating a veteran leader, settled on Iosif Kafieris. A fourth-generation military man of Kyrenaikan extraction, he was an unusual leader for the party of "urban coppolas", though accepted by party leadership as a low-key, reliable legislator uninvolved in factional infighting, by Agrarians as a business-minded administrator with long-standing ties in Little Sicily, and by the public as a personable politician opposed to royalist terror and liberal excesses.
With an unprecedented majority behind him, Kafieris moved to implement basic provisions of the Liberal program - reforming the justice system, getting rid of electoral restrictions, etc. - while also pursuing parliamentary cooperation and practical compromises. One of Kafieris' most significant achievements was spelling reform, reflecting Argyrian Greek conventions and settling the severely ethnically charged Alphabet Question. This enabled Kafieris to be publicly perceived as an apolitical figurehead - all while actively pursuing his goals of dismantling Matzinite party machinery and absorbing the Agrarians into the Liberal Party. A powerful base of so-called 'Kafierists' soon emerged, composed primarily of party workers from Filippopolis and freshmen deputies from previously deep-blue districts that owed their careers to the Kafieris wave.
The Global War greatly transformed Argyria: though Vesperian economic pressure and development of new lands for farming weakened the Little Sicilian ranchers and their political influence, and the country was affected by the post-war recession as many other countries were, new cities grew in oil-rich valleys and industrial outskirts, as professionals from Rhomania, Leon, moved to reap the benefits of Argyria's economic boom.
While not without its hiccups, Kafieris' tenure seemed long and prosperous, and he left office as a widely respected statesman.
[2] Maxentios Volpato, Kafieris's Minister of Justice, began his political career as a Matzinite machinist and ascended to power by mediating intraparty conflicts and building ties with Kafieris. Charismatic, brazen and persuasive, Maxi was lionized for his prosecution of the Laconian Society and criminal boss Gregor "King" Masterson. By 1929, his status as Kafieris's successor and the future Liberal leader was unassailable.
History would not be so kind. While historians no longer believe that the Clysman Collapse decimated shipping as greatly as has been argued, it did bring bourse trade to a screeching halt. Even so, the President remained popular for some months, by virtue of his rhetorical ability and proposed measures to prevent an economic freefall. Then it became increasingly clear that a lot of the "proposed measures" were byproducts of constant infighting and negotiations between Volpato and his cabinet, and the ones that were properly implemented did not achieve the intended effect: Volpato's attempt to secure the Argyrian dinar hampered exports and led to an employment crisis. Disaffected farm workers soon formed unions, marching upon New Athens and shouting increasingly radical slogans.
Though it could be said that Volpato's deflationary policies and farming programs set the stage for Karenides's public works, Argyria's economic recovery, Volpato's heavy-handed response to Vulgarist protests and sordid relationship with his own ministers have defined the second Republican President's reputation for a long, long time.
[3] In the end, Conservatives were put back into power, promising to secure the Argyrian economy. Frankiskos Karenides, veteran financier and heir to a prominent Pontic banking family, surprised Argyrian media by keeping his party's laten-leven tendencies in check and rejecting any and all insinuations of abolishing spelling reform.
To the relief of impoverished Argyrians, Karenides kept his party's pro-business tendencies in check, expanding and introducing new relief programs. Though Karenides's domestic overtures, collectively known as Dimósia Anárrosi, seemed to parallel those of Stauning's Vesperia, their relationship was tenuous: the President of Argyria had little tolerance for leftism and for Vesperian voluntarism, both of which had a healthy presence in the Vesperian Consul's worldview, and would work to strengthen trade networks in the Far Occident with Argyria being the top dog, as well as negotiating beef and lamb exports with Morocco and France.
Karenides' tenure, more than anything else, was oriented towards weakening political movements. The chief target of this was the ultraviolet Heritage Party, rebranded by 1930 under the "Everything for Argyria" ticket - while its leader, Duke Ismailidis, was arguably moderate compared to the ultranationalists of 1910s, he still maintained correspondence with former Sons of Rome officials, Osmanist exiles and Cleopatrist moguls in Egypt; the party's apparent organizational support by the Novatorist regime in Russia did much to ensure an inquiry into their activities. Similar cases would soon surround members of far-left organizations, be it the rurally oriented, vocally anti-socialist Vulgarists, many of whom had by that point joined the populist Tiverios Tzakson's Union of Farmers, or urban socialists and anarchists of the Radical Party; the latter, while not banned, found itself worn down by cases against its top leaders and outcompeted by the Union of Farmers.
Ultimately, Karenides' choice to retire without calling an election was mostly a matter of age: Karenides, who was once a staffer in the Beratidis' Ministry of Commerce, hit seventy by the time 1943 rolled over, and his administration intended to shore up its approval ratings amidst an economic downturn and increasing tensions on the foreign front.
[4] Alkiviades Nikolatzis became President in inauspicious circumstances. The Tsingtao Incident put Japan and China - and by extension the rest of the world - on the verge of another worldwide war. Russia, Japan, Ireland - a great many governments were caught up in chauvinist fervor and opposition to the world order established in the wake of the Global War.
The Rhoman Republic was abolished with the inauguration of right-wing general Karaliades, prompting a small wave of immigration to Hellenophone countries and yet another round of suspicion towards the Conservative government.
After securing a term in his own right against staunch Kafierist Linos Vasiliou, primarily on favorable economic growth and the promise of "keeping Argyria out of war", the President found himself backing out on it following an attack by Brasilian soldiers on a radio tower on the border. While immensely bloody and associated with systematic massacres and the deaths of 55 million people, the Second Global War (1945-1948) would prove to be relatively short.
For some time, Nikolatzis was considered Argyria's greatest leader. His handling of the Brasilian Front soon became a hot point among soldiers returning from the Cisplatine and certain left-wing leaders. Housing, too, had become an important issue in the wake of the war, with Nikolatzis and his "economic cardinals"' management of the issue - seeing "blacklisting" of certain neighborhoods - exposing ethnic tension and bringing the issues of Argyria's meschling population, vast and previously rather invisible, to the fore. The independence of the Republic of the Cisplatine, while ultimately favorable for Argyria, was fraught with debacles over potential annexation and terms of trade in ports of the Silver River's northern shore.
Not helping matters was Nikolatzis's personality: an ardent rank-and-file Conservative who placed loyalty above all else, Alkis lacked charisma and was held in great contempt by Liberals. Thus, his failure to get Liberals on board with the Grand Housing Bill of 1949 and negotiations with newly-elected Consul Saldanha contributed greatly to his 1950 defeat.
[5] Avrilianos Dandolos is traditionally overlooked by the public and considered unusual by historians: he was one of the few governors in Argyrian history to make a direct leap to party leadership, and the only one to lead his party to a majority. A shipping entrepreneur who made his name as a foreign and economic policy elder, Dandolos identified with the Liberal right (historically named after 19th century deputy Brant Konali), and, indeed, decided that the public works and healthcare programs introduced by past Presidents did not need any further inprovement or interference, other than "minor streamlining".
Dandolos' approach was understandable from the perspective of the time: the mild economic growth of the late Forties had neatly transitioned into a vast economic boom, with the metro areas of New Athens, Iasaropolis and Agios Expeditos benefitting from reconstruction and swelling with dozens of thousands of people. Though no longer the undeniable breadbasket of Brasil that it once was, Argyria saw its economy diversify with state-of-the-art machinery, grand refineries in the west and the beginnings of tourism. Argyrian magazines, music and wine increasingly pervaded the Far Occident, favored even by staunch Muslims in Tukandal and by staunch Helvetianists in Vesperia. Argyrian teams' dominance at the 1952 Olympiad and the Occidental Cup were the face of the Dandolomania that had, even for a brief moment, swept the country. Detrimental effects were present, of course: even despite changes made to housing programs, problems with disinvestment and attacks on households persisted; the growing demands of tourism made cooptment of existing resorts and resort companies by shipping conglomerates, with all the illegal employment and fraud viable; the interests of labor unions and environmental concerns became visible, often running counter to each other and to Liberal interests. Though Dandolos and his administration did much to investigate and settle conflicts in the Argyrian shipping industry, the President was ambivalent about how wide the scope should be, and notably told Minister of Justice Papaioannou that it was for the provincial governments to deal with.
Thus, when shipping magnate and hotel proprietor Petros Gebran was arrested for laundering millions of talers and smuggling, accusations of corruption were soon levied against Dandolos, who worked in Gebran's company and with Gebran as Governor of Agios Expeditos. Though the courts ultimately found Dandolos to be innocent, several Liberal functionaries, starting with Mayor of Agios Expeditos Viko Zefereti, were charged with accepting bribes and facilitating a money-laundering ring; the "stench of corruption" soon spilled over onto the Ministry of Development. Louis Mendes, a freshman Liberal deputy and Brasilian Front veteran of half-Andalusian Jewish mischling descent, led the charge in demanding an inquiry; by forcing him out of the party, Dandolos and his men hastened their administration's demise.
(4) Alkiviades Nikolatzis won a second (non-consecutive) term in inauspicious circumstances. The former war leader, ruthless and deeply involved, campaigned heavily on cleaning up corruption and standing up against criminals and unsavory state actors - namely Qulania, whose war on the Koellanisch Bevrijdingsfront was increasingly spilling over into Argyria. Even so, the Conservatives failed to attain a majority, with many maintaining goodwill towards Dandolos for economic prosperity and most disgruntled voters, particularly urban ones, choosing to vote for the dynamic Louis Mendes and his New Force. Much noise was made over the traditionally shipping-friendly Conservatives decrying Dandolos's corrupt connections in the shipping industry.
In any case, a minority government was not the preferred outcome. Occassionally depending on right-wing independents and the rotting corpse of the Tzakson political machine to pass bills, Nikolatzis ultimately came to avoid publicity as he focused on introducing increasingly severe anti-corruption and police reform bills, trudging through ever-stiffer opposition from Liberals and New Force deputies, and trying to get the Qulanian government to achieve a negotiated settlement. Ultimately, after a failed budgetary vote, Nikolatzis pushed to hold snap elections; his Minister of Development and party secretary Panikos Pierri convinced him to let "fresh blood" into the leadership race.
[6] At 47 years old, Panikos Pierri was the first President born in the 20th century. Having first joined the Conservatives as a paperboy, Pierri was noted by Karenides for his campaign to induct Italo-Argyrians into the party and soon grew prominence as the manager of the party's campaign wing. An effective administrator and personable fellow who was well-attuned to urban issues, Pierri was favored by Conservative leadership as a potential leader.
Facing off against Ivasopolis MP and labor leader Iannis Sampson in the 1957 elections, Panikos Pierri was successful in attaining a majority; as the Liberals dipped into infighting and the Qulanian government finally came to an agreement with the Bevrijdingsfront, holding free and fair elections with AEO supervision, this proved to be easier than thought. Much of Pierri's tenure was devoted to working out a comprehensive housing bill - firmly criminalizing blacklisting practices, among other things - and, increasingly, representing Argyria in world affairs, making the first call for a "standstill agreement" on atmospheric atomic testing, and working out new inter-Hesilian trade agreements.
The Vaudreuil Agreement of 1960 is to this day considered a crowning achievement in combatting smuggling. It also produced controversy for the President, as the terms of the agreement - and Pierri's subsequent policies - were deemed a bit too favorable to tobacco and wine companies based in Argyria, bringing about a very public spat between the Conservatives and Primo Joubert, the third Consul of the Cisplatine and a staunchly conservative Christian Democrat.
Pierri's successes were thereafter undermined by foreign blunders - failing to negotiate the building of a proposed AEO rocket launch site with Vesperia, for starters - and by protests against police brutality, starting in New Athens' Miaoulika neighborhood (primarily inhabited by Afro- and Romani Argyrians) and spreading to the rest of the city over the next months. Considered 'middling' by the end of his term, Pierri unexpectedly chose to resign as Conservative leader, citing continued family issues and mental exhaustion - though he did ultimately play a leading role in "directing" his successor's campaign.
[7] By 1962, the outgoing President was still personally popular, the Liberal nominee was publicly perceived as nebulous, and New Force lost much of its reputation among working-class voters for its support of the Miaoulika riots. All of that was just enough for Emilios Rouslanopoulos, Pierri's Foreign Minister, to just barely come short of a majority. Actually shoring up Conservative approval ratings was, in the President's own opinion, his "most daunting task".
Lacking the parliamentary acumen of Nikolatzis or the dynamism of Pierri, Emilios instead banked on his credentials as a "tough taskmaster", making light of his past as a military officer and war correspondent, his involvement in Aricoupa Accords and, above all, his preference for Law and Order. The problem was that, for all his genuine intelligence, Emil came off as authoritarian and had difficulty dealing with the media or knowing when to stop: this made him an unpalatable figure to urban youth and many voters who fled the Karaliades regime, and - after the publication of borderline derogatory comments in regards to the Miaoulika protests and related trials - perceived as a flappable buffoon. Ultimately, the most significant accomplishment of the Rouslanopoulos administration is believed to be local government reform, establishing a capital district and establishing several new provinces on the basis of the overgrown New Athens metro area - though its positive effects would only be felt after a few years.
[8] Affectionally known by supporters as "Grand Pat" or "Grandpappy Pat" (depending on whether they were of Italian or British extraction), Patrikios Chasan Berri is considered one of the modern Liberals' defining political figures. Born in 1897 to a Syrian Arab shoemaker and an Ulsterite seamstress on the shores of Olbia, Berri was Argyria's first British-Argyrian President, as well as the only one in Argyrian history to be a Protestant.
Raised in Olbia on the western shores of Argyria, Pat Berri began his political career as a labor union activist; historically affiliated with the Radical Party, Berri became a Liberal following a conflict with fellow Union members and service in the Second Global War, though he stated repeatedly that his involvement in socialist organizations "left quite the lasting effect on [his] outlook". Berri's jocular, larger-than-life personality and ever-expanding union and party contacts made him a fairly notable assemblyman; even so, his victory in the 1962 leadership election was unexpected, particularly so because of Pat Berri's age.
The 1964 election saw Berri propel his party to a vast majority, benefitting from Rouslanopoulos' unpopularity and the New Force central committee's decision to join the Liberals. Berri's first term was marked by substantial societal change such as renationalization of the steel industry and railroads, decriminalization of homophilic relationships and new legislation to address racial and ethnic discrimination; further successes that the Berri administration championed included the minimalization of external debt and unemployment, expansion of evening schools, and an "Argyrocentric", Vespero-skeptical foreign policy. A lot of these achievements often came despite the President, whose left-populist aspirations often defied the traditional Liberal platform; Berri's laidback attitude and prudence in legislation belied a domineering personality. Intraparty conflicts were thus unavoidable, as was a party schism by former Minister of Development Savvas Zaropoulos, who openly accused Berri of trying to subvert Argyrian liberalism. Nevertheless, Berri had little difficulty triumphing over his opponents.
Berri's second term was compounded by economic difficulties, primarily pertaining to oil production decline and competition in the petrochemical sphere with countries such as Tukanhola, Vesperia and the newly-democratic government of Zanzibar. Berri's renegotiation of oil exports with the AEO was marred by the President's sour relations not just with his counterparts and oil companies, but with his own cabinet - in an affair referred by De Courant as "The Neouenken War". Much light of the economic decline, Berri's increasing conflicts with the Assembly, and Berri's advanced age was made by Theofilia Ferante, the Conservatives' bright new leader.
The 1974 election was ultimately won by Berri, then nearing 77 years old, but the Liberal Party failed to secure a majority. Though publicly stating that he "intended to serve until at least 1980" and implying that he would call a snap election, Berri ultimately resigned in the spring of 1976.
[9] Tomas Konali, Liberal party secretary, ascended to the position in the late Berri years as a compromise choice; while a good friend and ally of Grand Pat, Konali was in many ways the opposite of his superior – a member of the Liberal right and the son of a long-time deputy from Iasaropolis (though ironically unrelated to the assemblyman for whom his political tendency was named), Konali was very much a background player, and the kind of politician Berri lambasted in his early campaigns.
With Berri's resignation, Konali pursued substantial party-wide reform - the main consequence of it being that Presidents no longer have to lead the party apparatus - and backtracked on a number of Berri's more "stalwart" initiatives, deregulating the television industry, re-repealing certain sections of the Protesters' Conduct Bill and downsizing the National Industrial Board while making it more efficient with greater introduction of technology.
President Konali, busy largely with management of foreign affairs and stabilization of parliamentary proceedings, was greatly derided for his administration's supposed lack of transparency and continued lackluster economic growth; the fact that Konali led the Liberals into the election stemmed more from a lack of non-scandalized leadership material than anything else.
[10] Iakovos Vasiliadis, a winemaker and Conservative deputy from Papalardou, achieved notability primarily on the basis of his victory over Theofania Ferante, that seemingly unassailable rising star of the Conservative Party, in the 1978 leadership election – in part by using her own celebrity status, and skewed priorities as a leader, against her. Coming to power after more than a decade of Liberal government, Vasiliadis positioned himself as a political outsider who would bring good government and a flourishing economy to replace Pat and Tom's socialist malaise.
While Vasiliadis as President would prove to be milder - and more than a little bit patronage-friendly - than his populist campaign suggested, he did make good on reducing the political strength of trade unions and "revitalizing" Argyria's shipping industry and small businesses, even if it took considerable cuts to existing relief programs. Vasiliadis's popularity waned due to an economic recession and conflicts in his administration between "Jake's cronies" and technocrats affiliated with past Conservative administrations. As 1983 began with reports of economic growth - and polls showing high Conservative approval ratings - Iakovos took the opportunity to call for a new election.
[11] Ethelbert Romero's victory came as a shock to many pundits, who did not expect the former Antofagasta city councillor and deputy to defeat the more-or-less still popular President. Born in a small town on the border of Qulania and Argyria, Ethelbert grew up in a military family, with roots in England as well as Argyria's own Little Sicily, and briefly worked in the police as a detective during the so-called "hash years" before becoming a politician. All of this, to a degree, influenced Romero's political thinking and broad image: deeply professional, a tad conservative and hardline on matters of crime (especially drugs), Romero was intensely proactive and felt that Argyria should be the same way, and - perhaps the first President in decades - named his meschling heritage as a point of pride.
Ethelbert's tenure is primarily remembered for its attempts to bring investors to deindustrializing districts, Argyria's increased involvement in the AES (including the creation of the Secretariat on Environmental Affairs and the General Assembly), the prioritization of environmental issues in general and mental health. More than anything else, it was deeply affected by anemic economic growth in 1986, Romero's attempts to stamp out the drug trade, and Argyria's involvement in the War in Dahomey - all of which strained Romero's relationship with the Assembly and led to a surge of anti-Vesperian sentiment across the country.
[12] Regino Kapaki, heir to a wealthy banking family and long-time Conservative deputy, only emerged as a party leader recently - a self-described laten-leven conservative, he was successful in harnessing Romero's misconduct in the War in Dahomey, his Anti-Drug Bills, and the administration's supposed failure to fix the economy to prevail above his Liberal opponent, Themistoklis Theodoropoulos. Agreeable and charismatic, Kapaki was deeply involved with his party's campaigning apparatus, and was favorable with most of the Conservatives' internal factions - up to and including the remnants of the deeply right-wing Vasiliadis group.
Kapaki's strength as a broadly popular candidate also was his greatest weakness: as President, Kapaki's most singular focus was "restoring the Argyrian economy", going further than Romero in slashing taxes and certain "wasteful" welfare programs, going abroad to meet with creditors, and proposing a 'hard' Brasilian Currency Unit. On social issues, however, Kapaki was considered mildly liberal, and came closer than any President before him in reforming abortion laws - angering many in his party who expected that Kapaki would uphold his campaign promises. Kapaki's mixed economic legacy and record of constantly backtracking on his promises weakened his popularity by 1995, ensuring a victory for Theodoropoulos.
[13] A third-generation barrister from New Athens, Themistoklis Theodoropoulos became visible as a rising star fairly early on - as far back as 1983, when he was only elected to the Assembly, the 37-year-old deputy and future Minister of Commerce was deemed a potential future leader by The News. Unlike most such "rising stars", however, he was successful in achieving control of party leadership - mainly by promoting himself as a "compromise candidate" between Romero, Konalites and the "new left" of the party - and defeating the beleaguered Regino Kapaki.
Though Theodoropoulos would later fill back Kapaki's tax cuts and oversee an increase in public spending, he was, for the most part, content to continue the economic consensus established in Argyria under his past three predecessors and the rest of the Occident. Successfully negotiating Kana II and seeing a surplus emerge by the end of 1997, Theodoropoulos basked in popularity. His biggest problem was his tendency to get blinded by success; bolstered by opinion polls, the President overturned Argyria's rigid abortion law. This, in addition to a failure to bail out the predominantly British-descent province of Rosalia, would result in attacks on Theodoropoulos by right-wing news media - already strong even in the latter eighties - and the signing of the so-called "Christian Charter" by a number of (mainly British-Argyrian) deputies.
[14] A "fun fact" that commonly crops up in crossword magazines is that Petros Timuridis is the most recent President to have been born outside Argyria - specifically in Alexandria, Egypt. Regardless, Petros is one of the the Republic's longest-serving Presidents, and - despite falling approval ratings in the 2010s - continues to be held in high esteem as one of the "grand old men" of Argyrian politics.
A veteran diplomat and "dull technocrat" to some, Timuridis benefitted from Theodoropoulos's falling public image, promising "moderate politics" and, as the Liberal President's negotations with Ireland and Scotland on technology collapsed, "Argyrian concerns first". Timuridis's tenure was marked by relative economic prosperity, the institution of homophilic unions, increased digitalization of both federal and local government, and greater involvement of Argyria in Hellenophone organizations - to the point where Timuridis jokingly called himself "the first Rhoman President" in 2005. With Liberal leadership divided - Theodoropoulos having fought Romeroite candidates for the nomination in 2000 and propped up his old ally Lambrou in 2005 - Timuridis remained largely popular with the population for his clean, professional attitude, occassional successes in geopolitical disputes with Vesperia, and overall economic growth. This extended even to 2010, when the Indian stock market bubble burst led to an economic recession; though at that point the President's age, and controversies involving defense contractor and Rhomanian trade lobbying in his administration, began showing all the same.
[15] The newly-elected Liberal President, Ignasio Mendes, has captivated public imagination in the same way that Dandolos, Berri and Romero once did - at 42, he is the youngest President in the history of the Argyrian Republic, as well as its first Jewish President. Closely related to 20th century political pioneer Louis Mendes, Iggy defeated a number of established candidates (including Theodoropoulos's former Minister of Development Iasar Versatse) and fought his way through to the nomination; he remains broadly popular with youth voters, having promised change to Argyria's economic consensus and greater "power to the people". Unashamedly left-wing, Iggy marked his first 100 days by revitalizing the National Industrial Board and instituting reforms that gave greater flexibility to local government. Whether his tremendous popularity will extend past the "honeymoon period" remains to be seen, though the continued - even if waning - presence of the Christian conservative Chartist Bloc, and the emergence of Neouenken governor Alexandros Chasan's populist vanity project on the political arena indicate that opposition to Liberals will continue to remain fairly fractious.
Heritage / Everything for Argyria - 850050
Liberal - DBB347
National Democratic - 405975
Agrarian - C8973D
Independent Agrarian - AF925D
Union of Farmers - 6B3C17
Country - CE9153
Radical - 9C7272
Social Democratic - F07E77 [historical] / D97373 [modern]
Christian Charter / Chartist Bloc - FF9402
Liberal - DBB347
National Democratic - 405975
Agrarian - C8973D
Independent Agrarian - AF925D
Union of Farmers - 6B3C17
Country - CE9153
Radical - 9C7272
Social Democratic - F07E77 [historical] / D97373 [modern]
Christian Charter / Chartist Bloc - FF9402
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Meppo
Anticommunist Mole
- Location
- Default City, Russia
- Pronouns
- he/him
Days before crucial State Duma vote, Litvinovich and Bryukhanova appear to settle negotations
September 13, 2021, Meduza
Reverberations in the Kremlin following the total decimation of United Russia's Moscow slate
Europe | September 22, 2021, The Irish Times
Grigory Yavlinsky slams 2021 results: "Once again 'smart voting' has undermined the one democratic party in our country"
September 23, 2021, Meduza
'Russians have not forgotten the meaning of freedom': what do the results of recent legislative elections mean for Russian politics?
September 23, 2021, Reuters
How Sobyanin's liberalism has weakened United Russia in Moscow
September 25, 2021, RIA Novosti
"Hey, Seryoga!": the rise and dramatic fall of Sergei Sobyanin
November 7, 2021, Meduza
September 13, 2021, Meduza
Reverberations in the Kremlin following the total decimation of United Russia's Moscow slate
Europe | September 22, 2021, The Irish Times
Grigory Yavlinsky slams 2021 results: "Once again 'smart voting' has undermined the one democratic party in our country"
September 23, 2021, Meduza
'Russians have not forgotten the meaning of freedom': what do the results of recent legislative elections mean for Russian politics?
September 23, 2021, Reuters
How Sobyanin's liberalism has weakened United Russia in Moscow
September 25, 2021, RIA Novosti
"Hey, Seryoga!": the rise and dramatic fall of Sergei Sobyanin
November 7, 2021, Meduza
Electoral district | Deputy of the 7th Convocation (2016-2021) | 2021 candidate supported by the Kremlin | Deputy of the 8th Convocation (2021-) |
|---|---|---|---|
№196 (Babushkinsky) | Ivan Teterin (United Russia) | Timofey Bazhenov (United Russia) | Valery Rashkin (CPRF) |
№197 (Kuntsevo) | Vyacheslav Lysakov (United Russia) | Yevgeny Popov (United Russia) | Kirill Goncharov (Yabloko) |
№198 (Leningradsky) | Galina Khovanskaya (A Just Russia) | Galina Khovanskaya (A Just Russia - For Truth) | Anastasiya Bryukhanova (Independent, then Yabloko) |
№199 (Lyublino) | Pyotr Tolstoy (United Russia) | Pyotr Tolstoy (United Russia) | Samson Sholademi (The Greens) |
№200 (Medvedkovo) | Denis Parfyonov (CPRF) | Dmitry Pevtsov (Independent) | Denis Parfyonov (CPRF) |
№201 (Nagatinsky) | Yelena Panina (United Russia) | Svetlana Razvorotneva (United Russia) | Anastasiya Udaltsova (CPRF) |
№202 (New Moscow) | Dmitry Sablin (United Russia) | Dmitry Sablin (United Russia) | Danil Makhnitsky (New People) |
№203 (Orekhovo-Borisovo) | Lyubov Dukhanina (United Russia) | Yevgeny Nifantyev (United Russia) | Vitaly Petrov (CPRF) |
№204 (Perovo) | Sergei Zheleznyak (United Russia) | Tatyana Butskaya (United Russia) | Nikolai Kavkazsky (Yabloko) |
№205 (Preobrazhensky) | Anton Zharkov (United Russia) | Anatoly Wasserman (Independent) | Alyona Popova (Yabloko) |
№206 (Tushinsky) | Gennady Onishchenko (United Russia) | Aleksandr Mazhuga (United Russia) | Irina Kopkina (Yabloko) |
№207 (Khovrinsky) | Irina Belykh (United Russia) | Irina Belykh (United Russia) | Ivan Ulyanchenko (CPRF) |
№208 (Central) | Nikolai Gonchar (United Russia) | Oleg Leonov (Independent) | Sergei Mitrokhin (Yabloko) |
№209 (Cheryomushkinsky) | Dmitry Morozov (United Russia) | Aleksandr Rumyantsev (United Russia) | Nikolai Volkov (CPRF) |
№210 (Chertanovo) | Anatoly Vyborny (United Russia) | Roman Romanenko (United Russia) | Mikhail Tarantsov (CPRF) |
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Meppo
Anticommunist Mole
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2021-2023: Joe Biden (DE) / Kamala Harris (CA) (Democratic)
'20: def. Donald Trump (FL) / Mike Pence (IN) (Republican)
2023-2024: Kamala Harris (CA) / vacant (Democratic)2024-2029: Kamala Harris (CA) / Roy Cooper (NC) (Democratic)
'24: def. Amy Coney Barrett (IN) / Darrell Issa (CA) (Republican), Andrew Yang (NY) / Tulsi Gabbard (HI) (Forward), Dario Hunter (OH) / Pam Keith (FL) (People's)
2029-present: Mike Garcia (CA) / Jon Husted (OH) (Republican)'28: def. Andy Beshear (KY) / Gina Ortiz Jones (TX) (Democratic), Andrew Yang (NY) / Alex Villanueva (CA) (Forward)
'32: def. Pete Buttigieg (IN) / Joe Nguyen (WA) (Democratic), Kevin Paffrath (CA) / Cynthia Lee Sheng (LA) (Forward), Brace Belden (CA) / various (write-in Democratic)
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Comrade Izaac
Secretary General of the Alt-Historians Union
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no fucking way pam keith runs against harris man. also dario hunter is from Ohio
Meppo
Anticommunist Mole
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aw, okay
Meppo
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Somewhat wish-fulfillmenty little scenario that I needed to get out of my system.
There are many points of divergence to this one, but the main ones are that Yavlinsky doesn't tell Navalny supporters not to vote for Yabloko, and the Smart Voting endorsement list for Moscow is decidedly different due to various disqualifications. The rest of the map was largely drawn up based on OTL election margins according to CIK, in addition to this map of incidencies of falsifications by region by Golos.
Clashes in St. Petersburg, Moscow as voters defend independent observers from police
~ Meduza.io, 20.09.2021
Sobyanin formally thanks voters, calls election results "proof of the security of our electronic voting systems"
~ Gazeta.ru, 22.09.2021
"We'll have to wait until September 24": Ella Pamfilova on the preliminary results
~ RBC, 22.09.2021
Tver Oblast and Khabarovsk Krai to hold gubernatorial second rounds
"United Russia's loss is inevitable," says A Just Russia candidate Marina Kim, who is running in the second round against Putin-appointed acting governor Mikhail Degtyaryov.
- Meduza.io, 22.09.2021
Deputies-elect Popova, Vishnevsky, Makhnitsky assaulted
~ Meduza.io. 23.09.2021
Russians elect first black candidate to the State Duma
Samson Sholademi, an obscure blogger and political novice, has edged out State Duma Deputy Chairman Pyotr Tolstoy in a raucous race...
~ RBC, 24.09.2021
"Our system has withstood challenges at home and outside": Dmitry Peskov on the results of the elections
~ TASS, 24.09.2021
Not a single State Duma candidate of the Sobyanin team won in Moscow
~ Meduza.io, 24.09.2021
Yabloko leader criticized for not mentioning political prisoners in meeting with Putin
~ Meduza.io, 26.09.2021
Dmitry Medvedev resigns as Chairman of United Russia
~ TASS, 30.09.2021
There are many points of divergence to this one, but the main ones are that Yavlinsky doesn't tell Navalny supporters not to vote for Yabloko, and the Smart Voting endorsement list for Moscow is decidedly different due to various disqualifications. The rest of the map was largely drawn up based on OTL election margins according to CIK, in addition to this map of incidencies of falsifications by region by Golos.
Clashes in St. Petersburg, Moscow as voters defend independent observers from police
~ Meduza.io, 20.09.2021
Sobyanin formally thanks voters, calls election results "proof of the security of our electronic voting systems"
~ Gazeta.ru, 22.09.2021
"We'll have to wait until September 24": Ella Pamfilova on the preliminary results
~ RBC, 22.09.2021
Tver Oblast and Khabarovsk Krai to hold gubernatorial second rounds
"United Russia's loss is inevitable," says A Just Russia candidate Marina Kim, who is running in the second round against Putin-appointed acting governor Mikhail Degtyaryov.
- Meduza.io, 22.09.2021
Deputies-elect Popova, Vishnevsky, Makhnitsky assaulted
~ Meduza.io. 23.09.2021
Russians elect first black candidate to the State Duma
Samson Sholademi, an obscure blogger and political novice, has edged out State Duma Deputy Chairman Pyotr Tolstoy in a raucous race...
~ RBC, 24.09.2021
"Our system has withstood challenges at home and outside": Dmitry Peskov on the results of the elections
~ TASS, 24.09.2021
Not a single State Duma candidate of the Sobyanin team won in Moscow
~ Meduza.io, 24.09.2021
Yabloko leader criticized for not mentioning political prisoners in meeting with Putin
~ Meduza.io, 26.09.2021
Dmitry Medvedev resigns as Chairman of United Russia
~ TASS, 30.09.2021
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Meppo
Anticommunist Mole
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my utmost apologies for whatever horrible transgressions against specific countries' politics I may have committed
2017-2023: Donald Trump / Mike Pence (Republican)
2023-2025: Mike Pence / Kristi Noem (Republican)
2025-0000: Terry McAuliffe / Julian Castro (Democratic)
2013-2020: Nicolás Maduro (PSUV, as part of Great Patriotic Pole)
2021-2022: Vladimir Padrino López (PSUV, as part of Great Patriotic Pole)
2022-2023: Henri Falcón (Progressive Advance) as leader of the Transitional Democratic Government
2023-2028: Lorenzo Mendoza (Soldiers of Democracy)
2019-2023: Jair Bolsonaro (Independent, initially Social Liberal) / Hamilton Mourão (Brazilian Labour Renewal)
2027-2028: Romário de Souza Faria (Podemos) / Eduardo Leite (Brazilian Social Democracy)
2030-0000: Luiz Philippe of Orléans-Braganza (Wake Up Brazil) / vacant
2012-2028: Vladimir Putin (Independent, de facto United Russia)
2030: Sergei Shoygu (United Russia)
2030-2031: Andrei Belousov (Independent, de facto United Russia)
2031-0000: Katerina Tikhonova (Independent, de facto United Russia)
2022-2024: Li Keqiang (CPC)
2024-2026: Wang Qishan (CPC)
2026-0000: Zhao Leji (CPC)
2017-2023: Donald Trump / Mike Pence (Republican)
'16: def. Hillary Clinton / Tim Kaine (Democratic)
'20: def. Mike Bloomberg / Val Demings (Democratic), Jesse Ventura / Dario Hunter (Green)
2023: Mike Pence / vacant (Republican)2023-2025: Mike Pence / Kristi Noem (Republican)
2025-0000: Terry McAuliffe / Julian Castro (Democratic)
'24: def. Donald Trump Jr. / Mike Pompeo (Republican), Mindy Finn / David Jolly (United We Stand)
'28: def. Mike Pompeo / Blake Miguez (Republican), Brace Belden / Michelle Mbeakani (People's)
2013-2020: Nicolás Maduro (PSUV, as part of Great Patriotic Pole)
'13: def. Henrique Capriles (Justice First, as part of Democratic Unity Roundtable)
'18: def. Henri Falcón (Progressive Advance), Javier Bertucci (Hope for Change), Reinaldo Quijada (Popular Political Unit 89)
2020-2021: Tareck El Aissami (PSUV, as part of Great Patriotic Pole)2021-2022: Vladimir Padrino López (PSUV, as part of Great Patriotic Pole)
2022-2023: Henri Falcón (Progressive Advance) as leader of the Transitional Democratic Government
2023-2028: Lorenzo Mendoza (Soldiers of Democracy)
'23: def. Henri Falcón (Progressive Alliance), others
2028-0000: Christian Sebastia (Faith in Venezuela)'28: def. David Smolansky (Popular Will), David Uzcátegui (Soldiers of Democracy), Américo de Grazia (Progressive Alliance), others
2019-2023: Jair Bolsonaro (Independent, initially Social Liberal) / Hamilton Mourão (Brazilian Labour Renewal)
'18: def. Fernando Haddad (Workers') / Manuela d'Ávila (Communist), Ciro Gomes (Democratic Labour) / Kátia Abreu (Democratic Labour), others
2023-2025: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Workers') / Renato Casagrande (Brazilian Socialist)'22: def. Jair Bolsonaro (Alliance for Brazil) / Walter Braga Netto (Brazilian Labour), Luiz Henrique Mandetta (Brazil Union) / Rodrigo Pacheco (Brazil Union), Ciro Gomes (Democratic Labour) / Marina Silva (REDE), others
2025-2027: Renato Casagrande (Brazilian Socialist) / vacant2027-2028: Romário de Souza Faria (Podemos) / Eduardo Leite (Brazilian Social Democracy)
'26: def. Flavio Dino (People's Bloc) / Talíria Petrone (People's Bloc), others
2028-2030: Eduardo Leite (Brazilian Social Democracy) / vacant2030-0000: Luiz Philippe of Orléans-Braganza (Wake Up Brazil) / vacant
2012-2028: Vladimir Putin (Independent, de facto United Russia)
'12: def. Gennady Zyuganov (CPRF), Mikhail Prokhorov (Independent), Vladimir Zhirinovsky (LDPR), Sergei Mironov (A Just Russia)
'18: def. Pavel Grudinin (CPRF), Vladimir Zhirinovsky (LDPR), Ksenia Sobchak (Civic Initiative), Grigory Yavlinsky (Yabloko), others
'24: def. Yury Afonin (CPRF), Yelena Letuchaya (New People), Maksim Shevchenko (Russian Party of Freedom and Justice), Maksim Suraykin (Communists of Russia), others
2028-2030: Gleb Nikitin (Independent, de facto United Russia)2030: Sergei Shoygu (United Russia)
2030-2031: Andrei Belousov (Independent, de facto United Russia)
2031-0000: Katerina Tikhonova (Independent, de facto United Russia)
'31: def. Maksim Galkin (Independent), Yury Afonin (CPRF), others
2012-2022: Xi Jinping (CPC)2022-2024: Li Keqiang (CPC)
2024-2026: Wang Qishan (CPC)
2026-0000: Zhao Leji (CPC)
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Meppo
Anticommunist Mole
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- Default City, Russia
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What does the 2031 campaign look like? Specifically, how much does Galkin get in his attempt to get Russia to copy Ukraine?
Very, very subdued (Russia being fresh off a coup attempt and a severe government reshuffle does that).
Galkin is 55 by that point I suspect I should look for another actor; he wins, I think, about 18% of the popular vote, which is relatively decent considering the low turnout and the airwaves dominated by news about reconstruction efforts in various Russian regions and stories about Katya "Totally Not Putin's Daughter" Tikhonova's various achievements as a St. Pete government functionary.
Meppo
Anticommunist Mole
- Location
- Default City, Russia
- Pronouns
- he/him
Testing out a format.
[25] 1897-1905: Gov. William McKinley of Ohio (Republican)
Great War (1914-1918): German Empire | Austria-Hungary | Bulgaria | Ottoman Empire (Central Powers) vs. Great Britain | France | Russian Empire | Japan | Serbia (Entente)
Turkey pandemic (October 1931 - October 1934): coronavirus, estimated 15-25 million dead
[25] 1897-1905: Gov. William McKinley of Ohio (Republican)
'96 (with State Sen. Garret Hobart of New Jersey) def. Frm. Rep. William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska | [MEC Pres. Arthur Sewall of Maine (Democratic, Silver) / Frm. Rep. Thomas Watson of Georgia (Populist)]
'00 (with Gov. Theodore Roosevelt of New York) def. Frm. Rep. William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska | Frm. Vice Pres. Adlai Stevenson of Illinois (Democratic)
[26] 1905-1913: Vice Pres. Theodore Roosevelt of New York (Republican)'04 (with Frm. Gov. William O'Connell Bradley of Kentucky) def. Chief Judge Alton B. Parker of New York | Frm. Sen. Henry G. Davis of West Virginia (Democratic)
'08 (with Vice Pres. William O'Connell Bradley of Kentucky) def. Frm. Rep. William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska | Frm. State Sen. John W. Kern of Indiana (Democratic)
[27] 1913-1915: Frm. Gov. John A. Johnson of Minnesota (Democratic)'12 (with Sen. George E. Chamberlain of Oregon) def. Sec. of War William Howard Taft of Ohio | Sen. Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana (Republican)
[28] 1915-1925: Vice Pres. George E. Chamberlain of Oregon (Democratic)'16 (with Sen. Lewis S. Chanler of New York) def. Sen. Theodore Burton of Ohio | Sen. John W. Weeks of Massachusetts (Republican), Former Pres. Theodore Roosevelt of New York | Former Rep. Eugene Foss of Massachusetts (Bull Moose)
'20 (with Vice Pres. Lewis S. Chanler of New York) def. Sen. Charles Deneen of Illinois | Gov. Charles S. Whitman of New York (Republican), Frm. State Sen. Eugene V. Debs of Indiana | Activist C. E. Ruthenburg of Ohio (Socialist)
[29] 1925-1933: Gov. Henry J. Allen of Kansas (Republican)'24 (with Sen. Miles Poindexter of Washington) def. Sen. Charles Wayland Bryan of Nebraska | Gov. Michael Liebel Jr. of Pennsylvania (Democratic)
'28 (with Vice Pres. Miles Poindexter of Washington) def. Frm. Sec. of Commerce Jesse H. Jones of Texas | Sen. Thomas J. Walsh of Montana (Democratic), Chicago Mayor William Hale Thompson of Illinois | Rep. Ole Hanson of California (Independent Republican), Rep. Max Eastman of New York | PFL Pres. James Maurer of Pennsylvania (Socialist)
[30] 1933-0000: Gov. William G. McAdoo of California (Democratic)'32 (with Sen. Royal S. Copeland of New York) def. Vice Pres. Miles Poindexter of Washington | Gov. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. of New York (Republican), Activist Sid Hatfield of West Virginia | Rep. Daniel Hoan of Wisconsin (Socialist), Frm. Rep. Ole Hanson of California | various (National)
Great War (1914-1918): German Empire | Austria-Hungary | Bulgaria | Ottoman Empire (Central Powers) vs. Great Britain | France | Russian Empire | Japan | Serbia (Entente)
Central Powers victory, Treaty of Geneva, abdication of Mikhail II and Wilhelm II amidst the Saison Rouge
Spanish flu (February 1918 - March 1921): influenza, estimated 30-50 million deadTurkey pandemic (October 1931 - October 1934): coronavirus, estimated 15-25 million dead
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Walpurgisnacht
It was in the Year of Maximum Danger
- Location
- Banned from the forum
- Pronouns
- He/Him
Absolutely stealing this way of doing World Wars for whenever I feel the need to specify that in a list.
Meppo
Anticommunist Mole
- Location
- Default City, Russia
- Pronouns
- he/him
No problem - though I suppose I could have added more detail here.
what do you think of the list?
- Pronouns
- He/Him
Interesting list, McKinley living longer leading to ‘Roosevelt Delayed’ and this kind of mushy Progressive Conservativism/Corporatism emerging from both parties is fun.
I’m guessing the Entente defaulting on there loans didn’t leave the healthiest economic situation for America.