Gettysburg Campaign Continues?

[Death's Companion]

Gettysberg whilst seen as the turning point of the Civil war (often with double billing with Vicksburg) and a clear Union Victory was at the time and forever after seriously controversial for Lee being allowed to escape afterwards with his army intact. At the time it was seen as a disappointing end to the campaign and one that Meade suffered severe criticism for.

In his defense his army was exhausted, the weather was awful and Lee actively wanted a battle and kept withdrawing to good defensive positions which the Union Army could not storm without heavy losses possibly risking a defeat. Still all these factors leave open a bunch of interesting possibilites. A more aggressive Union Pursuit damaging or destroying the Army of Northern Virginia, a follow up Northern attack ending in costly disaster, or a game of cat and mouse where Lee feels confident enough to continue operating in the North for the time being perhaps lengthening or shortening the war depending on the ultimate outcome and whether the eventual Confederate withdrawal sees it in good enough state to starve off Grant as OTL.

So anyone have any thoughts on what could have gone differently?

 

[Redolegna]

I can't provide much, but I remember on the other place somebody wrote a thing where Grant had come east just before (probably leaving Sherman in charge at Vicksburg for the last stretch?) and does not interfer much with Meade but does push for faster pursuit. Don't let the Paul V McNutt's OP fool you, this became usertron2020 thread pretty much immediately.

 

[Japhy]

Lee wasn't allowed to escape. No other General, no matter what Usertron thought, was going to be able to ignore the factors that stopped a follow up battle. In fact Lincoln's treatment of Meade in the aftermath is probably his least respectable moment in the war, other then the Indian Wars.

If III corps hadn't been shattered by Sickles orders things could have gone differently but logistics, weather and the losses suffered by other corps make it still highly unlikely. The most that could have been expected was what Meade wanted to do on Lee's Potomac position: a reconnaissance in force. And that would have been a mere coda. Lee would never stay to fight and Meade simply couldn't do more.

 

[Roger II]

To try an alternate tack: What if a clever or gambler Union general who got into the right place at the right time* talks Lincoln into letting him delay an attack if he thinks Lee is likely to overextend himself even further before Gettysburg? I don't know that this works (it depends both on Lee grabbing the idiot ball and the Union general in question figuring out fast enough" but the consequences of the Gettysburg campaign going from "high-water mark of the Confederacy" to "Lee's great mistake" are possibly interesting.

*I kind of want to handwave someone into this, but suggestions are welcome.

 

[Roger II]

I guess in this scenario the question is whether Lee goes for Baltimore (very bad time to try a move like that outlined above, probably needs to retreat to a defensive line at Pipe Creek IIRC although if someone were to figure out that being positioned to cut Lee's retreat off would be doable...) or Carlisle/Harrisburg (good way for him to get stuck between a rock and a hard place)

 

[Japhy]

To try an alternate tack: What if a clever or gambler Union general who got into the right place at the right time* talks Lincoln into letting him delay an attack if he thinks Lee is likely to overextend himself even further before Gettysburg? I don't know that this works (it depends both on Lee grabbing the idiot ball and the Union general in question figuring out fast enough" but the consequences of the Gettysburg campaign going from "high-water mark of the Confederacy" to "Lee's great mistake" are possibly interesting.

*I kind of want to handwave someone into this, but suggestions are welcome.

Delay what attack? Gettysburg was an entirely defensive operation by the Union and would have been fought fairly similarly with Joe Hooker or John Reynolds in command as George Meade.

 

[Japhy]

Also allowing Lee to run amuck in Union States is not politically feasible in a democracy during a Civil War.

 

[Roger II]

Delay what attack? Gettysburg was an entirely defensive operation by the Union and would have been fought fairly similarly with Joe Hooker or John Reynolds in command as George Meade.

Yea I should clarify-I mean "someone with more control of when and how to join battle" (IIRC Gettysburg was basically an accidental meeting) delaying say a day or two from OTL's date (if that) to see if Lee does something boneheaded.

(as in "we can try to join battle today, July 1st...but another day's march and we can get him with his flank to the mountains, his front to a rather unpleasant to cross river, and his rear about to be cut off by us"

 

[Japhy]

Yea I should clarify-I mean "someone with more control of when and how to join battle" (IIRC Gettysburg was basically an accidental meeting) delaying say a day or two from OTL's date (if that) to see if Lee does something boneheaded.

(as in "we can try to join battle today, July 1st...but another day's march and we can get him with his flank to the mountains, his front to a rather unpleasant to cross river, and his rear about to be cut off by us"

The problem here is that Gettysburg was a regional hub for the various roads Lee and Meade's armies were scattered around and Lee was moving to condense his forces. The battle on July 1st that began between Henry Heath and John Buford wasn't just an accidental meeting. Heath was violating his orders by looking to start an engagement but Buford had arrived at the position because he recognized that it was the central point for Lee to unite his scattered forces at and because it was terrain worth defending. AP Hill and John Reynolds agreed, which is why the battle wasn't just another minor, accidental skirmish. And there isn't another day's march to somewhere like that. Pipe Creek, now glorified in a lot of AH *was* better ground but only in a defensive sense, and there's no way that the Union could coax Lee down there. Just about anywhere else Lee could have been brought to a major battle would have put him in the advantage just because of the fact the Union was playing catch up.

End of the day though the "someone with more control" doesn't quite work because (1) There had to be an attempt to stop Lee somewhere, and continually dragging out his invasion of Pennsylvania only makes him stronger and increases Anti-War sentiment in the North (2) Gives Lee the advantage in finding a position to his advantage that he would want to fight at and (3) requires a full understanding of the situation that no one, not Lee, not Meade, not Hooker, or Jeb Stuart or George Sharpe could have had at the time. Neither side really had a full understanding where all of their forces were much less of the enemy. And you can't simply allow things to drag on in chaos in such a case.

You can build a scenario where Lee is in a more perilous position theoretically, but end of the day Gettysburg was probably the most wrong-footed he had been since Malvern Hill, it would take a lot to see any commander throw away the advantage the Union had on July 1st in favor of a more-perfect, purely theoretical battle. It would, in short require an entirely different operational situation which of course is more then possible. But as long as the parameters of the campaign are broadly the same Gettysburg is effectively the best case scenario, short of the Union keeping its losses down.

 

[Roger II]

Fair enough, I'm happy to admit I badly misunderstood the campaign in my quest to come up with a way for the Gettysburg campaign to go from "high water mark of the Confederacy" to "something that is an obvious and immediate ruinous debacle on the scale of something like Chattanooga"-I see now that this probably requires a very different operational situation. What would that look like?

 

[Japhy]

Fair enough, I'm happy to admit I badly misunderstood the campaign in my quest to come up with a way for the Gettysburg campaign to go from "high water mark of the Confederacy" to "something that is an obvious and immediate ruinous debacle on the scale of something like Chattanooga"-I see now that this probably requires a very different operational situation. What would that look like?

Joe Hooker doesn't get a concussion and Chancellorsville sees the obliteration of Jackson's Wing of the Army of Northern Virginia basically.

 

[Roger II]

Hey, works for me.

 

[Roger II]

So building this out-Hooker doesn't get a concussion, Chancellorsville is a debacle for Jackson, and Lee either is forced to call off the Gettysburg Campaign (and thus has spent the entire 63 campaign on the defensive in the east) or faces so much pressure to invade the north that he attempts an invasion at a bad time with a weakened army, straggles up through Maryland, and either Hooker (presumably not demoted because he did just win Chancellorsville) or Meade inflict a second crushing defeat somewhere in Maryland or Pennslyvania. IDK what that defeat looks like, probably you could conjecture something else (maybe

 

[Japhy]

If Jackson's force gets wrecked at Chancellorsville, even if they aren't obliterated, which can happen there's simply no chance Lee can launch an offensive. The forces he still had to operate with would have consisted of the Two Divisions Longstreet had taken (most of the troops in his corps) down to Suffolk, the Division of Jubal Early facing a successful federal attack at Fredericksburg and the two divisions he hadn't sent off with Jackson.

What happens in that case is fundamentally a more desperate version of the 1864 Overland Campaign. Hooker would drive on Lee and south towards Richmond.

 

[Roger II]

If Jackson's force gets wrecked at Chancellorsville, even if they aren't obliterated, which can happen there's simply no chance Lee can launch an offensive. The forces he still had to operate with would have consisted of the Two Divisions Longstreet had taken (most of the troops in his corps) down to Suffolk, the Division of Jubal Early facing a successful federal attack at Fredericksburg and the two divisions he hadn't sent off with Jackson.

What happens in that case is fundamentally a more desperate version of the 1864 Overland Campaign. Hooker would drive on Lee and south towards Richmond.

This still strikes me as an interesting trajectory-on the one hand the Union is more successful in the east earlier (bigger chunks of VA are back in Union hands, Richmond either fallen or in desperate straits, maybe the Valley is in play for the Union?) but on the other hand this is pre-1864 so although Grant is doing his work out west it won't necessarily be "the confederacy is already reduced to NC and VA." Where do things go from there? How does this affect passage of the 13th Amendment and Reconstruction?

 

[Japhy]

This still strikes me as an interesting trajectory-on the one hand the Union is more successful in the east earlier (bigger chunks of VA are back in Union hands, Richmond either fallen or in desperate straits, maybe the Valley is in play for the Union?) but on the other hand this is pre-1864 so although Grant is doing his work out west it won't necessarily be "the confederacy is already reduced to NC and VA." Where do things go from there? How does this affect passage of the 13th Amendment and Reconstruction?

Its kind of the anything goes sort of moment there. I know what stuff I consider for projects I have in the war but you can fairly make a case for just about all sorts of plans.