French Politics in a 1918 CP Victory?

[Jackson Lennock]

Many online like copy + pasting the historic German revanchism onto France in Central Powers victory discussions. But I think this is unlikely.

Revanchism. Unlike Germany, which from the average person's perspective seemed to be on the verge of victory before suddenly surrendering, here the French will not have an easy narrative of a stolen victory. Plus, WWI technically was the second round of Franco-German tumult. France had a defeatist movement historically after winning the war, so I'm not sure . On the other hand, the generals may blame the left (like soldiers revolting in the trenches) and Petainist-style movements could develop too. But that's not the same as outright revanchism.

Britain? France perhaps could also blame the British and Americans. "If only the British had committed more," etc. etc. etc.
There's also the fact that in any 1918 CP victory, Britain is still winning out in the colonial game. Britain by Spring 1918 has Jerusalem, Baghdad, Tanganyika, Namibia, etc. and isn't giving that stuff back. France on the other hand loses territory, pays an indemnity, doesn't get middle eastern gains, and probably doesn't get African gains either. They'd likely be bitter towards the Brits over this.

European conflict or cooperation? The French and Germans nearly formed a proto-European Union OTL under Locarno Diplomacy and the Briand-Stresemann agreement. A defeated France may just accept the reality that Germany is top dog on the continent and adjust itself accordingly. Or they may just pursue a strategy of national autarky (like British-style imperial preference) and focus on internal development.

I think an autarkic, sort of left-nationalist France makes sense, but that's just a guess. The narrative could go that France fought better and more honorably than the Germans, but was simply outgunned by the Germans (sort of American Lost Causers saying that about the North) and was wrong to go to war in support of other nations (Russia, Serbia, etc.) and in reliance on other nations (Britain, America, etc.).

 

[Time Enough]

I think an autarkic, sort of left-nationalist France makes sense, but that's just a guess.

I could see if you’re looking for a ‘Nationalist’ figure, someone like François de La Rocque gaining prominence as a ‘Proto-Gaullist’ type figure who could gain power through working with the left.

You then have the NeoSocialist movement, which is kind of convoluted but was the mid point for a number of French Socialists to cross over to Fascism, @Walpurgisnacht had them appear in a list at one point.

 

[Walpurgisnacht]

De La Rocque seems more likely, as a sort of ultra-but-not-too-ultra-conservative figure who could work with the mainstream and the fascists at the same time, to lead any sort of revanchist movement. The Neosocialists were much more theoretical than political figures, but I could see a few of them (and the various other non-conformiste/technocratic figures wandering around the French political sphere at the time) forming the policy backbone of any such government, in the same way various dissident syndicalists and Futurists contributed to the ideas behind Mussolini.

It's probably worth looking at OTL examples of French political instability from this period, here--the main problem seems to have been the right's inability to get its shit together and strike a blow, but I could see a shaky vaguely left-wing French democracy constantly harried by revanchist Leagues going in a lot of directions...

 

[Jackson Lennock]

De La Rocque seems more likely, as a sort of ultra-but-not-too-ultra-conservative figure who could work with the mainstream and the fascists at the same time, to lead any sort of revanchist movement. The Neosocialists were much more theoretical than political figures, but I could see a few of them (and the various other non-conformiste/technocratic figures wandering around the French political sphere at the time) forming the policy backbone of any such government, in the same way various dissident syndicalists and Futurists contributed to the ideas behind Mussolini.

It's probably worth looking at OTL examples of French political instability from this period, here--the main problem seems to have been the right's inability to get its shit together and strike a blow, but I could see a shaky vaguely left-wing French democracy constantly harried by revanchist Leagues going in a lot of directions...

Would France be revanchist though? At this point, they'd have lost against Germany twice.


Also, what was De La Rocque's view of the Blum proposal for Algerian citizenship?

 

[Radac]

I think even a red France is kind of cool if it could be done right. "French Social Republic" is also just an awesome name.

That being said a red France is a little bit trope-y too alongside fascist France.

 

[Radac]

I could see if you’re looking for a ‘Nationalist’ figure, someone like François de La Rocque gaining prominence as a ‘Proto-Gaullist’ type figure who could gain power through working with the left.

You then have the NeoSocialist movement, which is kind of convoluted but was the mid point for a number of French Socialists to cross over to Fascism, @Walpurgisnacht had them appear in a list at one point.

I think the emergence of neosocialism is contingent on the situation of Western European socialism in such a setting. Notably, the neosocialists were fairly Germanophilic (Deat especially) and pacifist so this twists things a bit as well.

 

[LSCatilina]

@Radac, @Walpurgisnacht

I think you're both anticipating too broadly on what French politics were IOTL in the 1930's or even 1940's altough they were the result of significant (but not exactly massive) political shifts directly issued from the rise of communism and fascism that ITTL would be probably butterflied away as themselves.Déat's pacifism (rather than germanophilia, which was more easily rooted on traditional socialism and a part of far-right, Action Francaise notably excluded).

Similarily, the exemple mentioned above of "political instability" in the 1930's is representative of a general "crisis of faith" of liberal democraties rather than some innate "French disease" : it's worth pointing out that IOTL, it's not the fairly fragile parlementarian unity in France that turned in a de facto military dictatorship during the WW1, neither the 1930's parlementarian crisis that led to a democratic collapse but much more "institutionally stable" Germany, both times. It's important, when talking of XXth century French politics, to be careful to nuance the idea that because the governments were particularly instable in time of crisis, the institutions were fragile. It's pretty much disproved by the general structural stability of the IIIrd republic in the 1910's and 1930's, whatever the usual suspects and promoters of "LaW aNd OrDeR" had to say about the evils of democracy.

As for more "traditional" alternatives in right-wing and far-right, remember that these were durably shaped by the wars year, veteran collective memory, etc. that were IOTL more or less directly and immediatly assumed by the state (whereas post-war Italian politics make it more a para-state activity with Fascists). Even assuming De La Rocque, for instance, have a much more stellar career during WW1 than IOTL, the means of its political rise wouldn't necessarily be there and almost certainly not in the immediate post-war.

 

[LSCatilina]

More to the point of this thread, we ought not to forget one very important fact : namely that German wars plans in WW1 included a durable neutralisation of France.

Economical neutralisation by imposing an hefty war indemnity, Industrial neutralisation by annexing the Briey basin, Military neutralisation by the dismantlement of fortifications and de facto control of the Boulogne-Dunkerque coast (in anticipation of a second conflict with Britain) but also political neutralisation at the very least implying control of political life. France was supposed to end as much dependent of Germany it was possible to achieve. Any speculation on what French political life would looks have to take this in account.

While it's pretty much a given IMHO that many compatible political groups or personalities would be emerging outside, or taken from, parlementarian political groups, as far as I know, there wasn't particular prospections on this regard in German political or military circles, so radical institutional changes (a monarchic restoration, a civilian directorate, etc.) wouldn't be necessarily on the table especially giving the rabid anti-Germanism of Action Française.

I'd expect more, giving the aforementioned point, Germany to expect the French assembly to rubber-stamp these changes (for legitimacy sake, at least) and actually avoid any nationalist take-over, a bit like German political life was treated by the Entente IOTL (the will to utterly cripple the country notwithstanding).

Which political groups would dominate is hard to determine : I'd think the German occupier would require elections to happen to have the new assembly rubber-stamp the leonine peace treaty, pretty much as what happened in 1871.

There weren't really any defaitist group in 1914 (again, that's really anticipating on political groups and figures behaviour in the 1940's), but you could see groups benefitting from a "we'd have managed the war better, now is time to manage the peace" or hoping to get a better deal from Germans.

The defeat will leave left-wing divided, IMO, around the idea the Union Sacrée was a failure or badly done, around the question of governmental support or participation, so I wouldn't see a Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière victory, at the contrary, especially as I wouldn't see something comparable to a revolutionary or proto-revolutionary spark in France comparable to IOTL 1918 Germany. But I'd consider a divided left to form a significant part of the Chambre still, notably if the Parti Républicain-Socialiste manages to survive the war.
It wouldn't impossible to see the emergence of a left-socialist voting group, already emerging before the war with independent socialist and maybe somewhat more organised ITTL : nothing really comparable to a communist party (or rather comparable to the immediate post-Tours PCF, that is not really a leninist party and more of a more radical and syndicalist SFIO).

I could see the Action Libérale Populaire (and possible dependents) benefiting from a credibility collapse of the Fédération Républicaine ITTL, elected on a conservative, christian, moralistic platform possibly more radical than IOTL without going as far as turning back to monarchism in all likeness. A pontifical support (at least diplomatically) would help to backtrack on their decline as well. This would probably a best case scenario as far as Germany would be concerned. Republican enough to be legitimate, rural and liberal enough not to force a principled opposition against the occupier, focused enough on internal matters, etc.

I wouldn't count out what would emerge from the corpse of the Fédération Républicaine, not a quasi-Action Française but unaffiliated (and ready to prosper on the republicain crisis) independent votes.

As far as personalities goes, depending how victory goes, I could see Jacques Piou (for being a leading figure in ALP), Joseph Caillaux (with the aura of the man who tried to warn the war was unwinnable), Aristide Briand ( surprisingly, maybe, giving his war leadership, but an influential figure still focused on rebuilding the country and susceptible to unify part of the center and left)

I'd expect French politics to indeed turn more anglophobic, adressing some a concern about european concert of nations (which to be fair, was a strong point in IOTL French war goals, but there utterly dominated by Germany) and to be fairly importantly stressing traditionalism, rurality, catholicism, order, etc. basically a call for the return of Ordre Moral. Maybe in fine up to a illiberal republic, although it wouldn't necessarily obvious.
But you wouldn't have the rather strong ideological attraction that existed in the 1930's and 1940's of a fascist or nazi model IOTL among the anti-republican fringes ITTL to make an authoritarian shift likely.

 

[Walpurgisnacht]

Similarily, the exemple mentioned above of "political instability" in the 1930's is representative of a general "crisis of faith" of liberal democraties rather than some innate "French disease" : it's worth pointing out that IOTL, it's not the fairly fragile parlementarian unity in France that turned in a de facto military dictatorship during the WW1, neither the 1930's parlementarian crisis that led to a democratic collapse but much more "institutionally stable" Germany, both times.

That’s a fair point—I brought those up more as examples as to what forms political reaction and extremism took in France in that period OTL to suggest what might bubble up, rather than prescribing them as inevitable, but I’ve definitely been a bit too determinist.

Appreciate you bringing up pre-existing German war plans. How long do you think Germany could reasonably sustain a de facto occupation, considering the trouble a more populous Allies had merely occupying the Rhineland OTL?

 

[LSCatilina]

Appreciate you bringing up pre-existing German war plans. How long do you think Germany could reasonably sustain a de facto occupation, considering the trouble a more populous Allies had merely occupying the Rhineland OTL?

Well, contrary to imperial prospective plans regarding Eastern Europe turned as at best controlled by Germany if not turned into a lebensraum, but as well contrary to Nazi perception of France as an inherent enemy of Germany and thus to be effectively destroyed as a modern state, Imperial Germany tended to saw it as "the best weapon of Britain" and the United Kingdom as the true main opponent to Germany.

As such, I wouldn't expect a full occupation comparable to what happened in WW2, of course, or even fully comparable to WW1 and more something akin to 1871-1873 with a progressive withdrawal from non-strategical or non-important occupied territories while actively disarming armies and dimenteling fortifications.

OTOH, I'd fully see a longer occupation in several areas already occupied especially along an Arras/CharlesVille/Verdun/Epinal line and almost certainly a permanent occupation on the French Flemish coast : this region (more or less the industrial core of France) was already "used" to German occupation : that is a quite brutal occupation (comparable, economically and socially, if not worse than during WW2, let alone the Rhineland occupation) when it comes to local population, troops more or less living on the land, requisition, starvation, etc. That could pretty much last as long as needed, maybe with the resigned acceptation of the French government (contrary to what happened in 1871, but there a German administration was simply set to deal with that).

Now, ITTL, while Germany would be spared a blockus and wouldn't undergo the economic and social crisis it knew in 1918, I wouldn't see a reason why the occupation wouldn't be still brutal (altough probably less so than during the war, would it be only because of the absence of logistical pressure and sense of emergency) with likely significant food requisitions (harvest, cattle, etc.), coal, industrial products (and partly planned industrial dismantlement) to Germany, but between war indemnity and requisitions, it would "pay for itself".

It's quite possible that a resigned French republic that would accept its subservient status would see actual "good will" gestures and concessions from Germany, still, giving the differences in perception with Eastern Europe and WW2. So, after a relatively short while, it's possible that occupation on the North-East would gradually shift westwards and become less heavy-handed as times go, maybe in conjunction with a French remnant army as an "european bulwark", with France turning as a market for German products and a junior partner in mainland western Europe in the best case scenario.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

My guess was that Germany would position its western border on the Meuse and otherwise try to turn France and Belgium into big neutral zones. They'd prefer a Belgium in Germany's sphere, but my guess is a neutral Belgium would be the result.

 

[Radac]

My guess was that Germany would position its western border on the Meuse and otherwise try to turn France and Belgium into big neutral zones. They'd prefer a Belgium in Germany's sphere, but my guess is a neutral Belgium would be the result.

Would Germany want Belgium to exist still? I remember reading that Germany backed Flemish nationalism in the later stages of the war

 

[LSCatilina]

My guess was that Germany would position its western border on the Meuse and otherwise try to turn France and Belgium into big neutral zones. They'd prefer a Belgium in Germany's sphere, but my guess is a neutral Belgium would be the result.

It really depends how the war ends, granted and I did look on this thread with the idea of a decisive German victory while not necessarily overwhelming and in a more difficult outcome (still at German benefit), I agree Berlin would have to make significant concessions.
And, of course, that would be clearly truer in the case of a "Peace of the Braves" on the western front, but that would be another matter to discuss IMHO (if plausible on its own right).
But in 1918, the successes on the Eastern Front (regardless of the actual costs involved) made German military, diplomatic and politic groups (at the exception of the parlementarian far-left) pretty much expecting decisive gains there as well : l'appétit vient en mangeant.

Eventually, German prospects over Belgium remained fairly cohesive trough the entiere conflict : that is making Belgium a protectorate but in name fully integrated within a customary and a political union. Partly because Belgian neutrality was eventually considered as an hinderance and benefiting to Britain with the control of the Channel and North Sea being a main geostrategical concern.

In that, I'd say Imperial claims and priorities in a peace settlement would be, if there's such a choice to be made, to first focus on Belgium to both directly control industrially (and strategically) important eastern regions but as well over the coast. Eventually, I don't think there would be any actually "neutral" post-war Belgium possible, no more than IOTL, especially for Imperial circles that would see such a neutrality as barely veiled British buffer zone.

Would Germany want Belgium to exist still? I remember reading that Germany backed Flemish nationalism in the later stages of the war

The Flamenpolitik wasn't really seen as a prelude to an actual division of the country AFAIK, but more as a means to get a friendly, more "germanized", Belgium (especially as Liège, certainly, and Belgian Luxembourg, possibly, would get directly annexed, to not speak of the likely control over the Flemish coast and Antwerp). Even that paternalist pangermanist attitude wouldn't be as reckless as to commit itself to the more radical Flemish program such as autonomy, let alone independence.

 

[ShortsBelfast]

There's also the issue of the Imperial Russian money that went into French politics and journalism to secure the French alliance and, among other things, secure Poincare's election. OTL this was exposed by the Communists in the 1920s. In a non-victorious France this political interference will have much greater resonance and a sense of being manipulated into defeat and disgrace will have strong resonance for French democracy. I would anticipate much greater interest in constitutional reform to ensure that THIS NEVER HAPPENS AGAIN and an earlier Fourth Republic.

 

[AH Layard]

Sorry to update this thread after two months. I was reading this interesting article about the British and French economies after the First World War, which led me to some other reading and thoughts:

During the War, despite introducing an income tax, the French were unable to raise as much income from taxation as the British. Both the British, and to a greater extent the French, relied on selling foreign assets and borrowing (in 1916 French credit collapsed and the British facilitated loans through JP Morgan). France’s debt to GDP ratio in 1919 was 190% and the Franc fell to 2/5 of its pre-war value, contributing to inflation.

The Germans were closer to France than Britain with regards to borrowing in 1918, which they had planned to fund through annexation of territory and a significant war indemnity from the French. With the shoe on the other foot, it’s now likely that France faces similar economic difficulties as Weimar: perhaps even worse as France suffered greater industrial damage and Germany had gambled everything on extracting the spoils (and now with a population starving and restless). Perhaps the Americans will show some tolerance towards restructuring British and French debt, there’s going to be further imperial retreat and fire sales, but it’s still very bad for France.

This article notes that economic and political uncertainty i.e. over the timing and quantum of debt payments accelerated inflation in Weimar Germany into a negative spiral and hyperinflation. One could easily see France falling into hyperinflation and defaulting on debt repayments as Weimar did, which could lead to a German reaction like the Ruhr crisis. Politically, the Right would be calling to hike up indirect taxes which is going to increase the cost of living, while the Left would be calling for a capital levy which as OTL could cause capital flight and weaken confidence in the Franc further. You probably have a national coalition government at some point (but with less credibility than Poincaré and can’t stabilise the franc as soon as OTL) imposing heavy austerity which strengthens the CGT and far-right revanchism in opposition to indemnities - so although revanchism is a cliche I could easily see it getting to this point (not immediately, but probably by the 1920s!).

Would be interested what you think @Jackson Lennock @LSCatilina

 

[Jackson Lennock]

Sorry to update this thread after two months. I was reading this interesting article about the British and French economies after the First World War, which led me to some other reading and thoughts:

During the War, despite introducing an income tax, the French were unable to raise as much income from taxation as the British. Both the British, and to a greater extent the French, relied on selling foreign assets and borrowing (in 1916 French credit collapsed and the British facilitated loans through JP Morgan). France’s debt to GDP ratio in 1919 was 190% and the Franc fell to 2/5 of its pre-war value, contributing to inflation.

The Germans were closer to France than Britain with regards to borrowing in 1918, which they had planned to fund through annexation of territory and a significant war indemnity from the French. With the shoe on the other foot, it’s now likely that France faces similar economic difficulties as Weimar: perhaps even worse as France suffered greater industrial damage and Germany had gambled everything on extracting the spoils (and now with a population starving and restless). Perhaps the Americans will show some tolerance towards restructuring British and French debt, there’s going to be further imperial retreat and fire sales, but it’s still very bad for France.

This article notes that economic and political uncertainty i.e. over the timing and quantum of debt payments accelerated inflation in Weimar Germany into a negative spiral and hyperinflation. One could easily see France falling into hyperinflation and defaulting on debt repayments as Weimar did, which could lead to a German reaction like the Ruhr crisis. Politically, the Right would be calling to hike up indirect taxes which is going to increase the cost of living, while the Left would be calling for a capital levy which as OTL could cause capital flight and weaken confidence in the Franc further. You probably have a national coalition government at some point (but with less credibility than Poincaré and can’t stabilise the franc as soon as OTL) imposing heavy austerity which strengthens the CGT and far-right revanchism in opposition to indemnities - so although revanchism is a cliche I could easily see it getting to this point (not immediately, but probably by the 1920s!).

Would be interested what you think @Jackson Lennock @LSCatilina

France OTL was willing to sell colonies to the Americans in exchange for the right to purchase planes on credit. My guess is that the French would try for a "colonies for debt forgiveness" scheme with the Americans. Selling interests in France's colonial empire to the Americans for debt relief would also be possible. Nor would this necessarily be limited to selling interests to the Americans. Japan and perhaps even Germany come to mind.

Plus ... they're a colonial empire. There's always the prospect of extractive nastiness.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

Maybe this. USA gets France's Pacific and Caribbean colonies. Liberia gets territorial cessions and France has to end its protectorate over Morocco (which falls into the US sphere). The same could be true for East Asia, where the US supports decolonization & entry of the new countries in Southeast Asia as Monroe Doctrine 2.0.

Meanwhile West Africa (which the US has a tougher time pushing the French out of) is just opened up to US trade and resource concessions.