Erin's Erfurt III Experience

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Time for a real thing:

And the full map:

I had a thought today that one of my favourite very specific details in alternate elections is when someone takes a real-life political party and gives it a different colour than it has irl (apart from the Dem/Rep red/blue swap - that's expected by now). This made me want to do a little tweaking to a German election - i.e. make the CDU orange, which is their official colour. The idea snowballed into this. It's basically Germany but slightly off. The parties are more or less the same, but have different colours and brands.

The Social Democratic Party is a modern centre-left progressive party, who style themselves with a friendly pink. The CDU/CSU, referred to as the Coalition rather than the Union, use classic Christian democratic orange. The Free Democrats use blue like other liberal parties in neighbouring Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland. They are a catch-all liberal party with substantial wings both left and right-of-centre (Alvaro, for his part, represents the social liberal wing.) The Socialist Left was formed as a left-wing splinter from the Social Democrats, and represents trade unions above all, though socialists and left-ecologists are well-represented in its ranks. Unlike the Left party of reality, relations between the SPD and Socialist Left are fairly warm. The Greens are a right-of-centre environmentalist party, who draw heavily from Christian ethics in both their social and economic platform. Of the five parties, they are the most estranged from the rest.

 

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Another thing I made recently.

On 17 February 2020, during cross-party negotiations to resolve the Thuringian government crisis, Bodo Ramelow suggested that former Minister-President Christine Lieberknecht be invested by the Landtag to lead a barebones, three-minister technocratic cabinet. She would maintain the day-to-day affairs of government for about two months while the Landtag voted to dissolve itself and call an early election to resolve the crisis.

This was a tempting proposal, and contained implicit concessions to the CDU - Lieberknecht was, after all, one of their most respected members. She also appeared open to it herself. In reality, the CDU rejected this, likely fearing that they would perform poorly in a snap election (polls had them below 14% support and the Left as high as 40%). The POD is simple: they decide to take their chances and agree to the proposal.

The September result is a legitimate attempt to project what would happen in this scenario, relying on polling from both Thuringia and other states as well as educated assumptions. The full result is here, for anyone interested. The main features are losses for the AfD, gains for the CDU, and the prompt exit of the FDP. The red-red-green coalition falls barely short of a majority, with the CDU and AfD together holding a 1.4 percentage point lead over the three leftist parties. The Landtag inflates to 99 seats thanks to overhang seats won by the CDU (the results of the single-member constituencies are 28 CDU, 12 Left, 3 AfD, and 1 SPD.)

 

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Real life content incoming

The 1994 Hungarian parliamentary election was the second held after the transition to democracy. Like every former Eastern Bloc nation, the first term of democratic governance was transformative but difficult. In 1990, the conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) came to power with a slim plurality of 24% of votes cast, but a sizable 42% of seats. It formed a coalition with likeminded right-wing parties and set about transitioning Hungary to a market economy. The immediate effects were not ideal: unemployment, inequality, inflation, and crime all grew dramatically. Prime Minister Josef Antall struggled to keep his government in line. One of his coalition partners withdrew partway through the term after suffering a huge internal split, and the MDF itself suffered a small rupture when a dozen MPs left to form the far-right Life and Justice Party. Antall clashed with the nation's President, who was a member of the opposition SZDSZ, and responded poorly to strikes and protests.

Antall had been diagnosed with lymphoma shortly after entering office, and his illness worsened in the following years. He died in office on 12 December 1993, and was succeeded by his Interior Minister, Peter Boross. Boross himself faced internal opposition and only narrowly won the confidence of his party to remain in office. Ultimately, with the government's popularity sinking and a new election coming up, the MDF appeared likely to be swept from office.

The expected result was a victory for the opposition Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), a social liberal party who had spearheaded the pro-democracy movement in the late 80s. They had placed a narrow second to the MDF in 1990, and appeared well-placed to win the coming election. However, things didn't quite turn out that way.

Hungarians went to the polls on 8 May 1994, and a startling picture started to form as the results came in. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the moderate successor of the ruling party of the Hungarian People's Republic, looked set to win. The party had tripled its vote share from 11% to 33%. Bewilderingly, the SZDSZ had in fact suffered a decline compared to 1990. Although 175 of the 176 single-member constituencies went to runoffs, the MSZP was well-placed in almost all of them. Turnout in the runoffs three weeks later was 55%, up ten percentage points compared to four years earlier, and the MSZP won a resounding victory - 45% of the vote and 149 seats, for a final tally of 209.

Not only had they claimed first place, they had won a clear majority in the National Assembly. It was an alarming result to many both in and outside Hungary - a post-communist party had returned to power just four years after the collapse of Iron Curtain. MSZP leader Gyula Horn, aware of his position, was keen to assuage fears. Although he had more than enough numbers to govern alone, he invited the SZDSZ to form a coalition government. Indeed, far from the return to socialism which many feared (and some desired), the new government went on to introduce the Bokros package - a "shock therapy" austerity programme so harsh that even the conservative opposition were outraged.

Needless to say, this was not what most of the MSZP's newfound voters had wanted, and the government became deeply unpopular. They lost to Viktor Orban's Fidesz in the next election, but only suffered a slight decline in support compared to 1994. The MSZP had successfully established themselves as a major party of Hungarian politics in record time. They came to government again in 2002, and remained until Orban's landslide victory in 2010.

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On the electoral system: from 1990 to 2010, Hungary used a modified form of the mixed-member majoritarian system. 176 of the 386 seats in the National Assembly were elected from single-member constituencies using the two-round system. It was a little more complicated than a simple runoff, though: if no candidate won 50%+1 votes in the first round, the top three candidates advanced to the second round, as did any other candidates winning more than 15% of votes. Additionally, if turnout was below 50% in any constituency, its first round result (including for the party list vote) was invalidated and the election was rerun during the runoffs, using first-past-the-post to ensure a winner. (However, if turnout in the runoff was below 25%, the seat would be declared vacant. They were really worried about this I guess.)

The remaining 210 seats were elected proportionally via two methods: 146 were distributed between 20 multi-member constituencies, corresponding to Hungary's counties, and 64 were allocated to a national leveling list to ensure some degree of proportionality. A threshold of 5% of party list votes was applied for both, although this was never a practical concern in the MMCs since all except Budapest were too small for it to apply. The application of the electoral quota in the MMCs almost always left some seats unallocated; those empty seats were added to the leveling list. This meant that the total number of leveling seats varied over time (as high as 90 in in 1990, and as low as the legal minmum of 64 in 2010.)

Once all the seats had been distributed in both the SMCs and MMCs, the party's residual votes were calculated. This included any votes over the quota in the MMCs, as well as the first-round votes of any SMC candidates who hadn't been elected. The leveling seats were then distributed to the parties based on their number of residual votes.

This system was fairly good at creating proportionality in normal circumstances, though it was probably more complicated than it needed to be. However, it broke down during landslides such as 1994 and 2010, when one party won the vast majority of single-member constituencies. Its performance in 1990 was also less than ideal.

This system was replaced in 2011 under the second Orban government. Alongside the constitutional reform which reduced the National Assembly to 199 seats, a new simplified electoral law was passed. The proportion of single-member constituencies was increased (from 46% to 53%), the proportional component was unified into a single national list, and the compensatory elements were removed. The current electoral system guarantees a strong majority for a hegemonic party who is able to consistently dominate the single-member constituencies.

 

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The 1990 East German parliamentary election was the first election held after the Peaceful Revolution, a series of protests in late 1989 which caused the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) to give up its monopoly on power. It was the first free and fair election on East German territory since 1932. The 400 members of the Volkskammer (People's Chamber), the unicameral legislature of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), were elected via party-list proportional representation. No electoral threshold was applied.

The election was won by Alliance 90, an electoral alliance of the groups who had spearheaded the pro-democracy movement – the New Forum, Democracy Now!, and the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights. The Alliance 90 won 36% of votes. It was followed by the SED, rebranded as the Party of Democratic Socialism, with 15%. An array of smaller parties won representation, including the right-wing German Social Union, centrist German Forum Party, Christian Democratic Union, Social Democratic Party, liberal United Democrats, and the Green Party.

The major issue in the election was a proposed unification with West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany, FRG) which was supported by the large majority of the public and parties. The DSU, CDU, SDP, and FDP received campaign funding from counterpart parties in the West. Other issues included reform of the economy, including the adoption of the West German mark, European integration, the future of state institutions, and the dissolution of the Ministry for State Security.

The Alliance 90 nominated activist Jens Reich as East Germany's first democratically elected head of government. He brought together a broad coalition of democratic forces, assembling a cabinet of the Alliance 90, DFP, CDU, SDP, Democrats, and Greens. The government's first priority was clarifying relations with West Germany. Most of the governing coalition were strongly pro-unification, and both West and East were united in support. However, opinions differed about what form it should take: polls showed that most of the public supported rapid unification with the adoption of the West's legal, political, and economic systems, as advocated by the conservative parties and FRG government. However, the Alliance 90 originated in the left-opposition to the SED, and most ministers were wary of the West's private market system. The consent of the four Allied powers was also required for any change to Germany's territorial or legal status, and the British and French governments were less than enthusiastic about the idea.

Despite this, both the GDR and FRG approached negotiations optimistically. Substantial strides were made toward an economic union, and the Volkskammer amended the GDR constitution to liberalise its legal and political system. Economic principles remained divisive, however, and this was exacerbated by the increasingly poor condition of the Eastern economy. Finance minister Walter Romberg requested increasingly generous packages from the FRG, straining relations with the conservative government, who refused to grant them. With conditions worsening, the Eastern public began to question whether the West was willing to sacrifice for unification. Many left-wing activists accused the West of seeking to enrich their corporations at the expense of the Eastern people.

By the end of 1990, relations had deteriorated substantially - the economic union was only partly complete, no unification agreement had been signed, and plans for further negotiations were postponed. The Allied powers, sensing that the movement was losing momentum, remained quiet. The Eastern CDU, who pushed for rapid reunification and were largely in agreement with the Western government's approach, were frustrated by the lack of progress. The three CDU ministers resigned from the government in September.

Even after the CDU's departure, tensions continued to grow inside cabinet. The SDP was perceived as holding outsized influence thanks to funding and expertise from the West, which other parties lacked. The Alliance 90 and Greens, whose ministers comprised a diverse group of activists, lacked experience and often clashed due to differing opinions on policy. The German Forum Party, nominally the second largest member of the government but lacking important positions, was dissatisfied. The liberal Democrats pushed for greater economic liberalisation but were opposed by the cabinet majority.

Tensions came to a climax with Jens Reich's "Europe over Germany" speech in February 1991, in which he outlined a European path to German unification as the only way to safeguard Eastern interests. Rejecting the "easy path" of a simple West-East merger, he claimed that East Germany would have to fend for itself for the forseeable future. He also accused the CDU and SDP, among others, of abandoning the Eastern people and acting as proxies for Western powers and politicians.

The speech triggered the dissolution of the government. The Social Democratic and liberal ministers resigned en masse, as did a number of leading figures in the Alliance 90. His position clearly untenable, Reich reached out to President of the Volkskammer, Joachim Gauck, to seek the dissolution of the Volkskammer and new elections.

 

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The political landscape shifted dramatically in the aftermath of the Reich cabinet's collapse. The Alliance 90 melted down almost overnight. Reich remained at the head of New Forum, though it dramatically bled members. Appetite for unification remained high, but the bright-eyed idealism of '89 was largely gone, particularly among the new activist-political class. Three main currents emerged: pro-unification, pro-European, and nationalist. Most groups fell into the former categories, and many were wracked by internal disagreement.

Outgoing ministers Werner Schulz, Marianne Birthler, and Vera Wollenberger together founded the Union pro Germany, a broad pro-unification platform. They quickly won over most members of the United Democrats, as well as some from the CDU and SDP. The Forum Party, already on its last legs, dissolved into the UpD. On the other end of the political divide, New Forum dissident Hans-Jochen Tschiche launched the Democratic and Progressive Movement (DFB) with a group of left-wing activists and the remnants of the women's movement.

Trouble was emerging not only among the government, but also the opposition. While the PDS had expelled most of the old guard and hardliners, a new rift was emerging between the progressive reformers and a growing nationalist wing supported by disaffected public servants. The DSU had been abandoned by the Western CSU after its exclusion from government, and many in the party resented the CDU for joining the left-leaning Reich cabinet. Other minor parties struggled to stay afloat in the new landscape; the Eastern FDP, Women's League, and United Left were defunct before election day.

Some attempts were made to broker an alliance between the DSU, CDU, and Democratic Awakening, but were unsuccessful. Only a merger between the latter two parties could be agreed to. The DSU once again ran an independent campaign, positioning itself as East Germany's leading conservative party.

The new elections took place on 24 March 1991, and demonstrated at least that reunification remained a top priority for most voters. The Union pro Germany placed first with 23%, followed by the New Forum, largely retooled as Reich's personal political vehicle, on 15%. The PDS came in third place with small losses attributed to its internal strife. The SDP almost doubled its popularity to 12%, beating out both conservative parties. The DSU retained its lead over the CDU by a few thousand votes, but both improved their result to over 11%. The Greens also made gains despite the defection of leader Vera Wollenberger. Tschiche's DFB won a respectable five percent. The Farmers' Party retained five seats.

While the result was a clear victory for pro-unification forces, those supporting a "fast track" model still lacked a majority – let alone the two-thirds constitutional majority that would be required to enact such a plan. Schulz, the UpD's premier candidate, put together a cabinet with the CDU, DSU, and generally pro-unification SDP, hoping to scrape the remaining numbers together on the floor of the Volkskammer.

The government entered office with a much more coherent platform than the previous. Its first priority was liberalising the economy in order to reach the targets set out by the West German government, and hopefully reverse the abysmal situation in the process. The West German mark was officially adopted as the currency of the GDR, and large portions of public industry were privatised. While the Schulz government also faced difficulties securing the substantial support required to keep the economy afloat, the issues were worked through after careful negotiation. Gradually, things began to stabilise.

 

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The GDR was not the only country facing problems, however. West Germany held its national elections in January, before the collapse of the Reich cabinet. The CDU/FDP government of Helmut Kohl lost its majority in the face of a public dissatisfied with the lack of progress on unification. This mainly benefited the nationalist right, represented by the far-right Republicans, whose entrance delivered a hung parliament. Unwilling to seek a grand coalition with the SPD nor risk new elections in the turbulent situation, Kohl was reinvested to lead an unprecedented minority government, securing conditional support from the SPD on various financial and diplomatic matters. Though this state of affairs did nothing to help public confidence in unification, the Schulz government in the GDR was welcomed warmly by the Western public, and negotiations continued month by month. The new coalition was confident of proving Jens Reich wrong – to prove that the East would not need to fend for itself, and that Germany could be whole again.

Their hope turned to ashes in June of 1991, when Germany awoke to a joint statement issued by the British and French governments declaring that the threat of resurgent German nationalism was too great and that, as a result, they were forced to oppose the project of German unification. Both halves of Germany were blindsided, but the move had been developing for some time. Europe had traumatic memories of a united Germany, and were wary as early as 1989 of what unification might bring. To many, the entrance of the Republicans into the FRG parliament had confirmed their fears. Unification could not proceed without support from all four Allied powers, and two had just declared their clear opposition.

Of course, the official statement was not the full story – Britain and France feared a united Germany's potential economic and geopolitical power much more than they feared neo-Nazism. This was not lost on the German people, who reacted about as well as could be expected to Germany's supposed friends deciding to torpedo their greatest national dream.

Mass protests erupted across both West and East. Schulz resigned along with his entire cabinet. Jens Reich had had the last laugh, though no one was laughing: East Germany would have to fend for itself.

Once again, East German politics was transformed overnight. The country's institutions were the immediate concern. The constitution was a mess, amended numerous times in the last year, but never intended for long-term use. Volkskammer president Joachim Gauck, still serving ex-officio as head of state, formulated an emergency solution: he commissioned Jens Reich to form an interim cabinet, and created a Constitutional Committee in the Volkskammer. Dubbed the "cleanup crew", these would be tasked with recommending and implementing the immediate changes required to ensure the functioning of the state while a long-term revision of the constitution was debated.

The committee recommended the creation of an interim head of state separate from the President of the Volkskammer, and the modification of the electoral system to introduce a threshold for entry, as well as a majority bonus system. Though both warranted substantial debate, there was little appetite, and the issues were time sensitive. The appropriate changes were legislated in a bit under a month. The Volkskammer was dissolved for the second time in just six months, and the election was set for August.

 

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The already-chaotic political landscape faced a fresh realignment. With unification no longer the defining issue, competing visions for the future of the country took centre stage. Though Schulz and his government were still popular, they were now obsolete, and the UpD struggled to redefine itself. It shed members and public support, but barely managed to hold together. Rebranded as the Democratic Alliance, the party entered the campaign with Schulz and Birthler at its head. They hoped to attain at least a respectable result.

Jens Reich once again led his New Forum into the election, though nobody would have bet on his chances. He still had his supporters, but no shortage of enemies either, and his brand was further tarnished after his brief stint as interim premier; he was fast becoming the closest thing the GDR had to a new establishment.

With the fall of the UpD, the champions of the Peaceful Revolution found themselves politically homeless. Some retired; some founded their own microparties. Most joined one of the various established parties. Many gravitated toward the SDP, which had emerged as the most stable and reliable party in the country after surviving two terms in government largely unharmed. Though about as heartbroken about unification as anyone else, the SDP maintained a large Europeanist faction who were more than ready to take on the challenge. Sensing an opportunity, they picked popular and outspoken former labour minister Regine Hildebrandt as their candidate for premier.

The right, the most emphatic supporters of unification, were severely wounded by the death of the project. The Western CDU had already turned off the money tap for its Eastern counterpart. Forced together by mutual need, the DSU and CDU merged, adopting as a name the only thing they all agreed they had in common – The Union. Several leaders were proposed, including Hansjoachim Walther and Lothar de Maizière, but they ultimately settled on ex-minister Else Ackermann, who had led the CDU campaign in 1990. The decision to nominate a moderate with feminist leanings was not uncontroversial. Nonetheless, the party held together; and with the largest parliamentary group, they were a force to be reckoned with.

By far the most significant transformation, however, happened within the PDS. Ironically, the party most opposed the unification was the most bitterly divided when they got what they wanted. The latent nationalists were set ablaze by their apparent victory. They sought the adoption of a new party platform advocating the repeal of the free market reforms, termination of the economic union with the West, and re-implementation of protectionist measures. The progressive wing around Gysi, favouring stronger European ties and a move toward the mainstream, flatly rejected these demands. The situation boiled over at the national congress in July.

The party split down the middle. Both sides walked out. The nationalists sent out a call for patriotic comrades, and found new allies from across the political spectrum. Not all would call themselves comrades. Together they launched the Coalition of the East (KdO), an unabashedly populist, unapologetically anti-Western platform. Proclaiming themselves "the only patriotic force in the GDR", they grabbed headlines across the continent, but their position was – if possible – even more marginal than the PDS.

Gysi, in truth, was relieved to be rid of the nationalist wing. His reformers were strong enough to stand alone, especially since they retained control of the PDS apparatus and its resources. But they were eager to align themselves with a natural ally: Hans-Jochen Tschische. He had burnished his credentials as a left-wing opposition voice over the previous months, and with an almost prescient focus on domestic policy over foreign, had ranked among the most popular figures in the country since June. His Democratic and Progressive party positioned itself between the PDS and SDP, and Gysi saw the opportunity to build a united socialist party (he carefully avoided phrasing it like that).

Both approached negotiations enthusiastically, and the Democratic Left was born. Gysi and Tschische would jointly lead the new party into the elections. They pledged to buttress democracy with a new progressive constitution, stabilise the economy with a social-ecological market approach, and end the chaos of the last 18 months by building a stable majority. The reception was mixed – Gysi remained a highly controversial figure, and a campaign with such socialist overtones was anathema to some. Others thought he was trying a bit too hard to broadcast his commitment to democracy.

 

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The second parliamentary election of 1991 took place on 25 August. The electoral system had undergone some modification. It retained its foundation of party-list proportional representation, with seats distributed across the various districts. New features included an electoral threshold of 3%, and a more controversial change: a majority bonus of 40 seats to the largest party. The current situation was unstable. Nobody was sure which party would win the election, and the Constitutional Committee had recommended such an element to assist with building majorities. The SDP and Union, believing themselves well-positioned, welcomed the change. Most others were uneasy about warping the proportionality of the Volkskammer, but agreed to pass it as a temporary measure.

Opinion polling in the GDR was still relatively primitive. Findings from the last two elections were inconclusive, and most outlets had still yet to build reliable models. Western pollsters had difficulty adapting to the fluidity of the East compared to the more rigid landscape back home. But as July turned to August, a pattern began to emerge: the Democratic Left and KdO were on the rise.

Young former SED and FDJ staffers, sidelined since the end of 89, were energised by the possibility of a return to government and campaigned vigorously for their parties. However, they spent more time targeting one another than anything else, each accusing the other of treachery and betrayal. Plastered on street corners were posters labeling Gysi a pro-American fascist; pasted over the top were others accusing KdO leader Höpcke of allying with Nazi skinheads and Stasi bosses. Off the streets, access to the PDS's ample resources gave the DL a decisive advantage in campaigning. They ran circles around the other parties, broadcasting adverts and holding rallies. The SDP and Union, forced to stand on their own without Western help, struggled to keep up. Attacks against the DL intensified as they began to pull ahead, but they remained focused on economics and security. Much rhetoric focused on Gysi and the SED connection, but this was blunted by Tschiche's respected activist credentials. When it came to the dictatorship and the Stasi, most of the public's ire was now directed at the KdO.

With the momentum behind them, the Democratic Left stormed to a remarkable victory. They won 25% of the vote and a clear plurality of 134 seats thanks to the majority bonus. A sober campaign centred on stability, security, and cooperation saw the SDP place second on 19%. Unexpectedly, the Union suffered a net decline to 18.5%. In retrospect, their embrace of free-market orthodoxy and continued focus on unification were criticised. The Coalition of the East placed fourth with 14%, below what some had hoped and others feared, but enough to anchor themselves as a serious force. The New Forum, Democratic Alliance, and Greens each recorded 6%. It was a crushing defeat for Schulz and Birthler, who finished behind Jens Reich and became the joint-smallest faction in the Volkskammer. The aggregate forces of the grassroots pro-democracy current, which appeared all-encompassing less than a year ago, had garnered just 12% of the total vote.

While the centre and right reeled from the result, the left were euphoric. The DL and SDP held a majority between them, and the path to government seemed clear. However, there were details to work out. Despite his popularity, Tschiche did not have the experience or skill to serve as premier. Gysi was too contentious and would never be accepted by the SDP faction. Rather than scour their ranks for a suitable candidate, the DL offered an olive branch to the moderates, suggesting that SDP lead candidate Hildebrandt lead the next government.

This arrangement was not an easy sell for either party. Some within the DL saw it as a capitulation to the SDP, while much of the SDP distrusted Gysi and anyone associated with the SED/PDS. But the leadership of both parties was keen to push ahead, and managed to bring their factions in line without major incident.

 

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Regine Hildebrandt was elected Minister-President by the Volkskammer on 24 September, becoming the first female leader of either East or West Germany. She received 201 votes on the first ballot, the minimum number required for an absolute majority. Though the vote was secret, estimates suggested that, due to the number of abstentions and no votes from her own governing coalition, Hildebrandt only got over the line thanks to yes-votes from a handful of Greens and New Forum deputies. Losing the first ballot would only have been a minor stumbling block, but winning afforded her much-needed legitimacy.

The new cabinet was sworn in the same day. It comprised ten ministers from the Democratic Left and six from the SDP. Notably, neither Gysi or Tschische joined the cabinet, instead remaining active in the Volkskammer faction, which Gysi chaired. His close ally Lothar Bisky became Deputy Minister-President and interior minister. SDP chairman Meckel got the foreign affairs portfolio. The SDP also took over the much-contested labour ministry, to the dissatisfaction of the trade unions, who favoured former BGL boss Marlies Deneke of the DL. Nonetheless, she was chosen as finance minister.

Before the government could begin its work, matters of state had to be dealt with. Joachim Gauck had served as President of the Volkskammer and thus acting head of state for the last two legislative periods. He was elected in 1990 for the Alliance 90, and in March 91 as an independent on the Union pro Germany list, but declined to seek re-election this time. In accordance with tradition, the largest faction nominated the new presiding officer. The DL chose Götz Kreuzer. He was elected with a surprisingly large majority of 307 votes, indicating support from a number of Union and KdO deputies.

Two days after investing the government, the Volkskammer reconvened to elect three new high offices: the President of the Republic and the commissioners of two new agencies. A lively debate took place behind the scenes in the weeks prior, but by the day of the vote, all three nominees had been settled upon. Gerd Poppe, a respected activist who had served as disarmament minister in the Reich government, was elected President. Author Lutz Rathenow became Commissioner for the Stasi Records, overseeing the archives of the agency which targeted him for years. Green deputy speaker Carlo Jordan became Commissioner for Data Protection; he resigned from his party after taking office.

 

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TLDR: the 2017 German federal election with the borders of the Weimar Republic.

Supplementary material:

• List seat results
• Blank constituency map
• Table of results by region

Detail: a projection of the 2017 German federal election on the Weimar Republic as it existed in 1925. The constituencies and electoral regions were drawn and calculated with population numbers from the 1925 census. This was primarily a project to show how dramatically the distribution of population has shifted since the interwar era. Most strikingly, the old centre/modern east has become severely underpopulated due to stagnation and emigration since the end of the Second World War. This is especially pronounced in Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt, which used to be some of the most densely-populated and industrialised parts of Germany. Berlin also suffered severely from the war and subsequent division. The dense centre of the city lost the large majority of its population, and the density of the city has become much more uniform over time. Meanwhile, the Rhine-Ruhr and Frankfurt metro areas have grown dramatically as part of a general westward shift in the centre of population and wealth.

The election is partly window dressing, but also a fun attempt to project how Germany's politics would be affected if it still had that extra land to the east. This is not a super deep analysis, so the difference in population is essentially ignored - I just duplicated OTL 2017 results wherever I could. Basically, I assumed that history has proceeded more or less the exact same other than the borders, meaning the GDR was about twice as big as IOTL. Since reunification, the eastern territories (Pomerania, Silesia, East Prussia, and the eastern part of Brandenburg) vote more or less similarly to the rest of the East, with variations emerging due to demographics (such as Catholics in Upper Silesia) and geography.

The overall change is an increase in popularity for the AfD and Die Linke, and a relatively uniform decline for all other parties. The most striking feature on the map is that the AfD swept large parts of the rural east in Pomerania and Brandenburg. These are the kinds of very rural, very conservative areas where the AfD excels IOTL. They're big constituencies, but are sparsely populated - overall, the AfD was not that much more successful than IOTL. East Prussia is traditionally a CDU bastion, but similarly to Saxony, they have seen record losses to the AfD. Upper Silesia is the CDU's safest Eastern region, since the AfD has encountered difficulty swaying its primarily Catholic voters.

Die Linke also benefits from the new eastern territories, especially industrial Silesia, where they maintain a strong presence. In 2017, Lower Silesia was a bloody three-way fight between the CDU and AfD (22% each) and Linke (20%), hence the messy map.

Another significant consequence of the border change is not felt in this election, but in the previous: thanks to extra votes in the eastern territories, the AfD was able to pass the 5% threshold and enter the Bundestag in 2013. The FDP, meanwhile, missed it by a larger margin than IOTL. This probably has ramifications, but my exploring them isn't my goal.

 

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Not my favourite subject, but I found the data and the opportunity was too good to pass up. This is the 5 March 1933 German federal election, held five weeks after Hitler was appointed Chancellor and six days after the Reichstag fire. By this point, democracy in Germany was well on death's door. The Nazis intended to overcome their final serious obstacle, the Reichstag, by winning a majority and rendering it useless. The Sturmabteilung were given free reign to terrorise and attack political opponents and voters. 50,000 brownshirts were formally appointed as auxiliary police in Prussia to "monitor" the election. Huge numbers of Communist Party leaders and members had been arrested in the week prior to the election. It's common knowledge that the first concentration camps held Communists, but the very first was opened in Nohra, Thuringia, two days before the election, for this purpose. The SPD was also already operating partly underground by this time.

People often say that Hitler was elected to power, but it's a testament to the general commitment to democracy that, even in these conditions, the Nazi Party only won 43.9% of the vote. Their allies the DNVP won 8%, meaning that 48% of votes were cast for an opposition party. This included over 30% for the SPD and KPD. Despite the great lengths to which the Nazis had gone to ensure their victory, Hitler was still denied his majority.

The Nazi Party won pluralities in the large majority of the country's districts and cities. Their support was strongest among rural Protestants and weakest among Catholics, who mostly stuck with the Centre Party. The Bavarian People's Party also endured fairly well. The SPD still found quite broad support nationwide, and was even able to win a plurality in Hamburg - no mean feat given the circumstances. In general, urban areas voted less strongly for the Nazis than rural areas even despite SA suppression. However, the division between the SPD and KPD meant that the Nazis were still able to win pluralities almost everywhere. The KPD retained a strong presence in Saxony and Merseberg in particular; they even came close to winning pluralites in a couple of cities.

This was the last multi-party election in Germany until the various Allied occupation zones held their first elections in 1945. The KPD's result was only symbolic; all deputies were either arrested or forced into hiding, and so were never able to take their seats. The SPD made their final symbolic stand on 23 March at the Reichstag vote on the Enabling Act, which invested total and unlimited power in Hitler's government. The chamber was filled with brownshirts and SS men to intimidate deputies into voting for the motion. Social Democrat Otto Wels was the only deputy to speak against it. Addressing Hitler directly, he concluded his speech as follows:

You can take our lives and our freedom, but you cannot take our honour. We are defenseless, but not honourless.

 

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Made this a couple weeks ago but forgot to post it.

Second-strongest party by city and district in the March 1933 German federal election. The first map shows vote strength, the second is flat shaded by party to make it easier to read. Combined with the above map of the first-place parties, this gives you a good sense of the electoral geography of the late Weimar Republic. The Nazis were strong everywhere, especially in the rural and Protestant north and east, while the Zentrum was strongest in the Catholic west and south. The SPD did best across the centre and north, especially in the Saxonies, and achieved respectable results in most cities (shoutout to greater Nuremberg which, despite being the Nazis' home turf, was the most Social-Democratic area in the whole south or west). The KPD's bastion was the Merseberg region in the south of Prussian Saxony, as well as Berlin, the Ruhr, and parts of Thuringia and southwestern Saxony (their appearances in Württemberg and other areas in the southwest were due to severe vote splitting in most cases). The DNVP, to my surprise, recorded quite a few second-place finishes, especially in its traditional stronghold Pomerania. It seems that the party retained its core constituency of noble elites and some rural conservatives despite losing its broader base to the Nazis.

 

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Old Content incoming. Made this last year but I really like it so here it is.

The 2020 South Korean legislative election, held on 15 April, was a landslide victory for the social liberal Democratic Party of President Moon Jae-in. The 180 seats won by the party and its decoy list was the largest ever majority for a liberal party in South Korea, and the largest for any party since 1960. The United Future Party's 103 seats was likewise the worst result for the right-wing since 1960. The UFP narrowly won a plurality in the proportional vote with 33.8%, but this mattered little in comparison to the Minjoo's 49.9% of constituency votes. They secured a majority of seats via constituencies alone, sweeping most of Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi; Sejong and Daejeon; and even a majority of seats in both North and South Chungcheong. They also triumphantly reclaimed their traditional bastion of Gwangju and Jeolla, which had been won by Ahn Cheol-soo's People's Party in 2016.

In a moment for the history books, UFP leader Hwang Kyo-ahn, who had served as Prime Minister from 2015-17 and Acting President after Park's impeachment in 2017, was defeated by the Minjoo candidate in the Seoul seat of Jongno - home to the Blue House, the President's official residence, among other symbolic landmarks.

The Democratic Party's victory was in some ways literally perfect. Not only did they secure a majority and deliver the UFP a beating they will not soon forget, but they won enough seats to overcome the greatest political hurdle in South Korea - the supermajority clause in the legislative process. Legislation may not come to a vote unless three-fifths of legislators approve; 180 in total. This law was introduced in 2012, theoretically to prevent governments from being able to override the opposition with a standard majority, but is predictably ripe for obstructionism. The Minjoo won exactly the number of seats required to overcome this hurdle, meaning they in theory did not require approval from either the opposition nor the minor parties to introduce legislation.

To get into the meat of the election process: South Korea uses a mixed-member electoral system, traditionally a simple mixed-member majoritarian system with 84% of seats elected in single-member constituencies and just 16% elected via a nationwide proportional list. This has enabled the representation of a number of minor parties, such as the left-wing Justice Party, though they are vastly underrepresented compared to the major liberal and conservative camps. In 2019, however, an amendment was passed to the electoral system which made it a bit more complicated. 30 of the 47 proportional seats are now distributed in a compensatory manner, a la the MMP system of Germany or New Zealand. The remaining 17 continue to function in a parallel manner. Though a relatively minor change, this should have made the composition of the National Assembly a bit closer to that of the voting public by providing greater representation for minor parties.

As it turned out, the change had almost no impact on the result. Two months before the election, the UFP shamelessly announced that it would deploy a decoy list to exploit the new system. A decoy list is essentially a quirk in the way MMP works. Since every constituency candidate must be linked to a party list for the purpose of calculating compensatory seats, parties can create a dummy list to run for the proportional list without attaching any constituency candidates to it. They instruct their voters give their proportional vote to this decoy list, which can then collect as many proportional seats as it wants without worrying about the pesky compensatory element. To put it simply, parties can cheat the system to turn MMP into MMM.

The UFP formed the "Future Korea Party" for this purpose (in Korean, the two parties' names differ by only one character.) In response, the Minjoo deployed its own decoy list, the Platform Party (also only one character different) to counter the UFP's strategy. This all but ensured that the new electoral system would function identically to the old, and the minor parties would fail to benefit in any way. Indeed, on election day, the decoy lists collectively won 23 of the 30 compensatory seats, completely screwing the minor parties out of fair representation. The Justice Party, which increased its share of the vote to just under 10%, remained stuck with just 6 seats - 2% of the National Assembly. The two other minor parties which achieved representation fared even worse; Ahn Cheol-soo's new People Party won 7% and 3 seats, while the Minjoo-split Open Democratic Party won 5% and 3 seats. Both decoy lists were dissolved shortly after the election, and their MPs simply rejoined the mother parties.

 

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Oldposting for content pt. 2

 

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The 2021 Greater Berlin regional election was held on 27 June 2021 alongside other regional and local elections across Germany. The incumbent National Bourgeois government was defeated. The Progressives overtook the Socialists to become the second largest party in the Assembly, while the pirate-based Alliance for New Politics coalition rose from 4% to 14% and won seats for the first time. The United Right also passed the 5% threshold and won 13 seats. The National Bourgeois-New Democracy government lost its majority and was replaced by a three-party coalition of the Progressives, Socialists, and Alliance for New Politics. Dilek Kalayci replaced Burkard Dregger as Mayor-President of Greater Berlin.

 

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This is probably very niche, but I've been reading a lot about pro-republican forces in the Weimar Republic and it absolutely fascinates me, so here's a scenario.

Carlo Mierendorff was a German socialist, journalist, and politician in the 1920s and 30s. A young member of the up-and-coming generation of the SPD during the late years of the Weimar Republic, he had a talent for propaganda and a number of unorthodox ideas about what the party and the country needed. He was a dedicated republican but painfully aware of its flaws and deeply afraid that it might fall. Among other things, he supported revising the constitution, overhauling the federal system, and a move from proportional representation to majoritarian elections (probably FPTP). He helped co-found the Iron Front, a broad extraparliamentary alliance of pro-republican forces centered around Germany's powerful trade unions and the Reichsbanner, which acted as the militant arm of the SPD.

Like nearly all socialists, he believed the Nazis were a clear and present threat to the republic and had many opinions about what could be done to stop them. As a propagandist, he focused on the public image and campaigns of the SPD and Iron Front, attempting to bring a new sense of comradery and activism to the fairly stale social-democratic scene. He sought to appeal to emotion rather than reason, as the SPD traditionally had, in order to counter the Nazis; among other things he helped created the Three Arrows and popularised the anti-fascist salute, a raised fist, among the Iron Front. Though his ideas were fairly popular among the membership, the SPD leadership thought they were cringe, and were hesitant to let him put them into practice. By the time he convinced them to try it on a larger scale, however, it was late 1932 and things were moving much too fast for his efforts to make any difference.

Essentially, in this scenario, Mierendorff's ideas are put into full force, including the sweeping constitutional reforms he advocated. There is no real string of events that leads here, because in my opinion the Republic was more or less doomed after ~1930, which is too early for a plausible POD. But basically the Nazis don't come to power, the Republic hangs on a bit longer, the SPD adopts Mierendorff's platform: radical reforms to the economy, constitutional, federal system, and electoral system, and manages to implement them one way or another (shameless handwaving). The Depression eases but the republic is still in peril.

Mierendorff believed that a majoritarian electoral system would force parties to focus on candidates and alliances rather than appealing to narrow demographics. He also believed that the Iron Front should be an active and enthusiastic bulwark of the republic, rather than a last resort option. In this scenario, it becomes a fully-fledged electoral vehicle for the republican movement, backed by the trade unions and energised youth. It comprises a broad alliance of the SPD; the United Workers' Electoral League (VAWB), which puts trade unions directly into electoral politics by endorsing or running candidates themselves; the Republican Centre League (RM-Bund), an alliance of republican liberals and centrists; and the SPD-L, the former SAPD which has been coopted to compete with the KPD for the radical left vote. Together, this broad platform storms to a near-majority in the 1936 election, the first held under the majoritarian system. Against all odds, the republicans have won.

But politics keeps going. The Iron Front was only able to win because of horrific vote splitting among the right-wing, who didn't quite get the memo about the new electoral system. Between them, the three largest right-wing forces (the Nazis, DNVP, and a bourgeois-conservative alliance) won almost 45% of the vote, but not even 200 seats. In the following years they toil to forge a national alliance to topple the Iron Front. Hitler staunchly refuses to join, because Hitler, but the remnants of the DNVP coalesces with various bourgeois, conservative, and national forces. The result is the National Front, comprising: the United National Party of Germany (VNPD), a broad-based national-conservative party taking in most of the DNVP, WP, and some members of the DVP and Zentrum; the DVP itself; and the Christian-Social People's Service, which serves to sharpen the alliance's appeal to Protestants. This alliance proves massively successful in the 1940 election, easily usurping the Nazis' place as the leading party of the right with 28% of the vote.

Just as Mierendorff predicted, Germany appears to have emerged into a two-party system by electoral necessity alone. There remain three significant minor parties, though: the Zentrum, which maintains a rock-solid presence thanks to its unshakeable base. It has its own alliance with the Bavarian People's Party (BVP) and small agrarian parties. Hitler's appeal had naturally waned after years of rhetoric and almost nothing to show for it, but suffered an almost mortal blow with the emergence of the National Front. The Nazis fall from second to fourth place, losing two-thirds of their seats thanks to the majoritarian system. The Iron Front's newfound energy and image damaged the KPD substantially, sapping them of much of their appeal, though they retain a clear presence in the Merseberg region, as well as Berlin and the Ruhr.

 

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The 1925 German presidential election was a mess of jockeying and political machinations. Far from being a candidate-focused race, the electoral system was expressly designed with political parties in mind: the first round was intended to help the various factions gauge their strength before deciding on joint candidates in the second round, which was decided by a plurality. In the weeks leading up to the election, the parties and their leadership discussed and negotiated numerous candidates. All were keen to build broad alliances in the hopes of securing a first-round majority and avoid a runoff. The DVP put forward Karl Jarres, mayor of Duisburg, who drew broad support among the conservative right in light of the lack of attractive alternatives. The DVP and DNVP, however, suspected they lacked the strength to win alone, were eager to bring the Zentrum, DDP, and BVP on board for a united bürgerlich candidate, who would be all but guaranteed victory.

Their chance came in early March when the DDP's Anton Erkelenz appealed to all parties from the SPD to the DNVP to unite behind acting president Walter Simons, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In his view, this apolitical consensus candidacy would stabilise the political situation and garner goodwill abroad. In truth, very few were interested. They all had something to gain from putting forward their own candidates. Indeed, the SPD had already decided to pass on a joint candidacy of any kind and announced Otto Braun as their nominee two days earlier. The conservatives, however, saw an opening and invited the five bourgeois parties to discuss a possible joint candidate.

The pretense of uniting behind Simons was dropped almost immediately. The DVP and DNVP both rejected him. The Zentrum and DDP responded by refusing to support Jarres. Representatives from the right-wing bourgeois camp then brought a new name into the equation: Otto Gessler. Gessler was the federal Defence Minister, one of the most conservative members of the DDP, a Catholic from Württemberg, had a mixture of democratic and monarchist sympathies, and had helped bring down Saxony's SPD government in 1923. He seemed to have something to offer everyone. For a moment, it seemed like they'd found their bürgerlich candidate.

In reality, there were holes all over this proposal: the SPD and even DDP press began flanking him from the left by emphasising his commitment to republicanism, which damaged his appeal among the DNVP. Likewise, DVP leader Stresemann feared the international repercussions of elevating the Reichswehr minister to the presidency. At a meeting on 12 March, he intentionally scuttled talks by goading Zentrum and the DDP into endorsing Gessler, only to bait the DNVP by putting up Jarres, who immediately backed him and refused to entertain further discussions. The Zentrum and DDP representatives thus walked out, bringing the project to ruin. Jarres went on to win 39% of the vote to the Weimar coalition's combined 49%, paving the way for the emergency selection of Paul von Hindenburg as the right-wing's candidate in the second round.

If the talks hadn't been sabotaged, though, a broad Gessler candidacy could have eventuated.

 

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Soft reboot of my Communist Germany scenario (election, DSL), in which a monarchist restoration during the Weimar Republic leads to a Franco-German war and a brief civil war won by a communist/socialist/liberal/Christian democratic coalition, producing a socialist-oriented republic in which the Communist Party is the most dominant force until its collapse on the late 80s.

• Democratic People's Party (DVP): a broad party of the centre to centre-right and the standard-bearer of liberalism in Germany. The DVP was the primary opposition of the KPD during the second republic, and has governed the country most of the time since 1989. They favour economic liberalism, decentralisation of government power, and European integration. On moral issues, the party is divided between a conservative southern wing and a more moderate northern one.
• German Socialist Left (DSL): the primary successor of the KPD, a democratic socialist party backed by most trade unions. Representing the mainstream left, they embrace progressivism, the welfare state, and industrial democracy. Though never as potent as force as the KPD, they remain the second force in parliament. Most recently in government 2007-15, which ended in a disastrous defeat from which they are still recovering.
• Reichsblock: a national conservative party with a völkisch streak and the black sheep of German politics. Still unable to shake their association with the monarchist dictatorship from which they descend, they retain a loyal voting bloc planted firmly on the right of the spectrum. Though excluded from government since the 70s, they are sometimes approached by the DVP for support during confidence motions.
• Progressive People's Party (FVP): the party of the progressive centre and home for many dissatisfied moderates. Since the end of the second republic, they play kingmaker between the DVP and DSL. Social liberal in orientation and attract notable support from Germany's minority populations.
• Communist Workers' Party (KAP): the wing of the old KPD which rejected the DSL's turn away from socialist orthodoxy. Backed by some trade unions, they have managed to carve out a niche among radical workers. Principled, but willing to join coalitions with the DSL should the need arise.
• Ecology: an environmentalist party positioned close to the FVP, but with differing priorities. Not often brought into government, but often agree to support coalitions externally.
• Socialist People's Party (SVP): a splinter from the DSL formed by deputies disillusioned by developments during its second term in government. Narrowly leapt into parliament in 2015 but failed to accomplish much since.

After sweeping to victory in 2015, Volker Wissing formed a minority coalition with the FVP, supported by Ecology. A firmly centre-oriented policy followed. Despite its deep wounds, the DSL settled back into opposition and began to rebuild under new leader Hilde Mattheis. Polls saw the party reclaiming its base from the SVP and benefiting as the DVP's popularity declined. Come the 2019 election, they grew to a respectable 29% while the DVP slipped to 34%. Wissing secured another term after renewing his coalition with the FVP, but was forced to do a deal with the devil and approach Joana Cotar for support on the confidence motion.

 

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More from revamped Communist Germany. In 2007 the government of Hermann Otto Solms was swept from office among a DSL and KAP surge, with the latter recording their best-ever result. They formed a strong minority government externally supported by Ecology under Chancellor Dietmar Bartsch. While the Bartsch government was relatively well-received by the public, the KAP lost a substantial portion of support during its tenure. Come the 2011 election, the DVP's new leader Carsten Meyer-Heder failed to capture the public's attention. New Reichsblock leader Joana Cotar attracted millions of new voters, styling herself as a bourgeois conservative, and boosted the party to its best result in decades. It was not enough to topple Bartsch, however, and the red-red minority government was returned for a second term, again with support from Ecology.

The government's second term was troubled, however. Bartsch found stiff opposition from parliament and was ultimately forced to resign after a bribery scandal arose concerning one of his ministers. He was replaced by Doris Barnett, a leader of the right-wing of the DSL, who immediately encountered difficulties with the Communists. She struggled to even get policy through the party left. A series of embarrassingly legislative defeats caused a faction of left-wingers to leave the DSL and launch the Socialist People's Party. To patch up her numbers, Barnett secured additional confidence from the centrist FVP, but this further damaged relations with the KAP. Scarcely able to pass a budget and with a sinking public image, Barnett limped on to the next election, which saw the coalition catastrophically swept from power. Volker Wissing took over as Chancellor in a minority government with the FVP.

Once in opposition, Barnett was ousted in favour of Hilde Mattheis, who worked to reunite the party and brought a number of SVP leaders back into the fold. She led the DSL to a respectable 29% in the 2019 election, depriving the government of a working majority and forcing them to turn to the Reichsblock for confidence.