ChrisNuttall
Well-known member
The Armchair General World War One: Can You Win The Great War?
by John Buckley, Spencer Jones
It is very easy, as I noted in my review of the first Armchair General book (covering the Second World War), to fall into trap of believing that the people on the spot, at the time, enjoyed the same luxury of hindsight as yourself. This is obviously untrue. We have a far more rounded picture of what was happening than anyone who was actually there; the fog of war, at the time, made it impossible for them to know what was actually going on. Many seemingly bizarre decisions make sense in this context, because they were made based on what the decision-maker knew at the time.
The Great War has not been a particularly big stomping ground for alternate history. The war does not seem to have so many possible points of divergence as its successor, not least because the initial war of movement gave way to stalemate until tanks were invented and put into mass production. The battles outside Europe did not have any great influence on the war as a whole. Germany lost colonies, of course, but assuming a German victory those colonies could be easily reclaimed. The forces involved were often very small, and their absence did not affect the overall balance of power. This could not be said of the Second World War, where the relatively small engagements in North Africa played a major role in defining the military balance in Europe.
In this book, the writers have attempted to put the reader in the shoes of people who made the decisions and present the facts to them as the POV character would have seen it. (Like I said before, this comes across as a choose your own adventure book.) You are invited to decide what you would have done, under the circumstances, and explore possible alternate outcomes for the war. These outcomes are kept within the bounds of possibility, without any striking alterations such as a German invasion of Britain or a complete collapse of Germany much earlier than in the original timeline. As such, it is a very interesting read.
The book starts by asking just how the original July Crisis of 1914 blew up and what might happen if the assassination did not take place, or if the United Kingdom stayed out of the war. It offers several possibilities for the assassination never taking place, and suggests it might lead to better world, but it also discusses the British decision not to take part in the war and speculates that the Germans might have won fairly quickly if the British stayed out. This might be true, but it would be seriously against British interests to allow one power to dominate Europe. It is also true that personal feelings played a role in the outcome and those should not be underestimated.
We then move on to look at the dispatch of the British Expeditionary Force to France and the alternate prospects of the campaign. Deploying to Belgium instead of France looked good on paper and was actually quite a popular decision with British officers didn’t like the French. There was also an urgent need to provide support to the Belgians before the Germans crushed them. The book suggests that such a deployment would have been disastrous, at least at first; there were no plans for joint operations with the Belgians and they were simply not prepared for modern war, forcing both British and Belgian forces to withdraw into France. The only positive outcome Britain would be a distraction for the Germans, ensuring they could not take Paris in 1914.
Even following the historical path leaves you open to other possibilities. Should you stand and fight when the Germans give chase to British, or should you keep going? There are good arguments for both, but choosing to continue the retreat would have been disastrous; the Germans would have overwhelmed the rearguard and crush the British Army before laying siege to Paris, almost certainly winning the war in 1914.
This campaign also led to personal clashes between British officers - the authors speculate that if Sir John French had been dismissed by Kitchener in 1914, he would have been able to challenge Kitchener later and get promoted into a position he was temperamentally unable to handle, leading to later disaster. His historical character assassination of his rival would in this case was a military disaster instead.
The book then moves on to Gallipoli, and asks what might happen if the campaign had taken place elsewhere. On paper, the Dardanelles appear to be a reasonable target, but there were others - most notably Alexandretta in Syria. There were political issues, as the French believed the region had been promised to them after the end of the war, but these problems could have been solved. The authors argue that a successful landing in Syria would have crippled the Ottoman Empire and driven it out of the war in 1915 - ironically, this would have ensured the survival of the Ottomans in some form, although quite how long for is impossible to say.
The book then assesses the different choices of the Dardanelles campaign itself, pointing out the dangers of forcing the straits and then landing troops in very difficult and exposed locations along the shore. Deciding to embark on a naval-only campaign would end poorly, if the Navy could not silence the Turkish guns (and it could not); the only chance of a quick victory in the campaign came with an immediate trust into enemy positions and if that attack failed it is unlikely the campaign would have been victorious (although it is possible British and Allied troops would have remained in the Dardanelles trenches until 1918).
We then move onto the Battle of Jutland, which the authors believe to have been largely insignificant. It was possible, they argue, for the British to score more hits (particularly in the opening moments of the battle, if the fifth battle squadron had remained with the battlecruisers) and if the British commander had acted without orders he might have played a decisive role in a clear British victory. It was also possible that the battleships could have risked charging into the German torpedoes, closing the range between both fleets; in that case, the authors argue, greater British numbers would have led to a more significant victory. However, as I mentioned above, the impact of the battle was unlikely to be decisive even if the British wiped out the German fleet completely; the authors appear to believe the Germans could not have scored a decisive victory of their own.
The book then assesses the potential alternate outcomes for the Battle of the Somme. There were possibilities that the battle might be a slow and grinding victory for the British, following a ‘bite and hold’ set of tactics that would drive the Germans out of their trenches, and then force them to make counter-attacks against dug-in British troops. The authors speculate that this would have been decisive in a tactical sense, but the weather would prevent any major collapse of the German lines and the war would continue at least into 1917. An alternate possibility involves tanks - should they have been deployed as soon as they were available, or should they have been held in reserve? The author speculates that the tanks would have been decisive, and even though there would still have been a muddy stalemate by the end of the year their deployment would have boosted French morale and led to greater victories the following year. The authors conclude that a truly decisive victory was unlikely, but a firm commitment to one plan for the battle might have led to a vastly different outcome.
The book then considers the possibilities surrounding Lawrence of Arabia and the Arab Revolt, starting with which Arab faction the British should back. Should they side with Hussein bin Ali or Ibn Saud? Both warlords have their strengths and weaknesses; Hussein has greater political skill and legitimacy, while Saud has an army of zealots who may be more militarily effective in the coming conflict. The book believes that a decision to support Saud instead of Hussein would have been a dangerous mistake, sparking off a Civil War within Arabic ranks and effectively ensuring they posed no threat to the Ottoman Empire. The book then considers possible disasters that could have overwhelmed the revolt, many of which would have ended the Arabs as a military useful force.
The writers then explore the dilemma facing the British code-breakers when they deciphered the Zimmermann Telegram. On paper, the decision to inform the Americans that the Germans were planning to ally with Mexico and Japan against the United States seems a no-brainer. In practice, there were a number of other considerations. The United States would not be pleased to know that diplomatic telegrams were being deciphered - and the Germans, of course, would be delighted to know that their codes being broken. Simply releasing the intelligence would unleash an international incident, not least because the Germans could simply insist the message was faked.
An alternate possibility, of course, is the telegram never being publicly disclosed. If that happened, there was a very real possibility of Mexico taking hostile steps against the United States. The preponderance of American power was bitterly resented in Mexico, and the prospect of nationalising foreign-owned businesses was very tempting. It is unlikely, the authors argue, that Mexico would actually declare war on United States, but there might be some hostility along the border might distract the United States from sending troops to Europe.
Finally, the book looks at the last great what-if of the period, the Russian Revolution, and identifies a number of possible points in which a different decision could have changed history. Could the Tsar be convinced to reach out to dissidents before it was too late? Or should he use force to crush the rebels before they gained momentum that will be impossible to stop? Should he sue for peace, when the war becomes too costly, or risk continuing the fighting until it takes him down? Even when the provisional government takes power, should it continue the war? The book argues that a German-Russian peace treaty in 1917 would have saved the provisional government from the Bolsheviks, not least by giving them the prestige they needed to crush the uprising, although this would cause long-term problems for Russia (not least because the peace treaty would be seen as a betrayal by Britain and France). On the other hand, it could hardly be worse than the original timeline. They would certainly avoid the disaster of Brest-Litovsk!
It also suggests that the Bolsheviks were right to make peace in 1917, even on deeply unfavourable terms. Continuing the war, after overthrowing provisional government because it wanted to continue the war, might well have led to a White Russian victory in the Civil War. This would not be an unmixed blessing. On one hand, the world would be spared the horrors of communism; on the other, the reactionaries would certainly try to crush the rebels and lay the seeds for future rebellions in later years. It is unlikely that Germany (with or without Hitler) would have become so powerful in this timeline, but a reactionary Russia would not be as capable of defending itself and eventually crushing the Nazi beast in Berlin.
Overall, as the authors try to remind us, history is driven by more than just impersonal forces and geopolitical realities. Some decisions were driven by what the decision-makers knew at the time, and what they thought they knew, and others were driven by personal feelings that rarely enter into the calculations of dispassionate alternate historians. On paper, some decisions looked very good indeed and yet, as the Dardanelles Campaign taught us, turning a concept into reality can be incredibly difficult. Other choices were driven by factors that are difficult, if not impossible, to account for: personality conflicts and faction in-fighting can change history, yet they can be frightening difficult to predict.
Relatively few decisions offer the prospect of a radically changed world, although that seems incredible. If the July Crisis never takes place, what will spark a major war? If Britain does not join the war, or is driven out of France in 1914, Europe will be dominated by Germany, changing history beyond repair. The Ottomans leaving the war early might convince other German allies that they can leave too; by contrast, if the Dardanelles were abandoned without a major commitment, the Ottoman victory would not appear so crushing and the peace factions might be able to put together a workable compromise. A major failure in Arabia might not be that significant, at least immediately, but it would have an effect on the post-war world. So too would be America staying out of the war, or Russia trying to stay in it longer than OTL.
These points are disputable, of course. There’s plenty of room for speculation about what might happen if something had been different. But overall, this is a fresh look at the realities facing the decision-makers of the First World War and the limitations they had to overcome to win. It demands a great deal of commitment from its readers, but I do not feel that you will consider the time wasted if you’re interested in the war.
by John Buckley, Spencer Jones
It is very easy, as I noted in my review of the first Armchair General book (covering the Second World War), to fall into trap of believing that the people on the spot, at the time, enjoyed the same luxury of hindsight as yourself. This is obviously untrue. We have a far more rounded picture of what was happening than anyone who was actually there; the fog of war, at the time, made it impossible for them to know what was actually going on. Many seemingly bizarre decisions make sense in this context, because they were made based on what the decision-maker knew at the time.
The Great War has not been a particularly big stomping ground for alternate history. The war does not seem to have so many possible points of divergence as its successor, not least because the initial war of movement gave way to stalemate until tanks were invented and put into mass production. The battles outside Europe did not have any great influence on the war as a whole. Germany lost colonies, of course, but assuming a German victory those colonies could be easily reclaimed. The forces involved were often very small, and their absence did not affect the overall balance of power. This could not be said of the Second World War, where the relatively small engagements in North Africa played a major role in defining the military balance in Europe.
In this book, the writers have attempted to put the reader in the shoes of people who made the decisions and present the facts to them as the POV character would have seen it. (Like I said before, this comes across as a choose your own adventure book.) You are invited to decide what you would have done, under the circumstances, and explore possible alternate outcomes for the war. These outcomes are kept within the bounds of possibility, without any striking alterations such as a German invasion of Britain or a complete collapse of Germany much earlier than in the original timeline. As such, it is a very interesting read.
The book starts by asking just how the original July Crisis of 1914 blew up and what might happen if the assassination did not take place, or if the United Kingdom stayed out of the war. It offers several possibilities for the assassination never taking place, and suggests it might lead to better world, but it also discusses the British decision not to take part in the war and speculates that the Germans might have won fairly quickly if the British stayed out. This might be true, but it would be seriously against British interests to allow one power to dominate Europe. It is also true that personal feelings played a role in the outcome and those should not be underestimated.
We then move on to look at the dispatch of the British Expeditionary Force to France and the alternate prospects of the campaign. Deploying to Belgium instead of France looked good on paper and was actually quite a popular decision with British officers didn’t like the French. There was also an urgent need to provide support to the Belgians before the Germans crushed them. The book suggests that such a deployment would have been disastrous, at least at first; there were no plans for joint operations with the Belgians and they were simply not prepared for modern war, forcing both British and Belgian forces to withdraw into France. The only positive outcome Britain would be a distraction for the Germans, ensuring they could not take Paris in 1914.
Even following the historical path leaves you open to other possibilities. Should you stand and fight when the Germans give chase to British, or should you keep going? There are good arguments for both, but choosing to continue the retreat would have been disastrous; the Germans would have overwhelmed the rearguard and crush the British Army before laying siege to Paris, almost certainly winning the war in 1914.
This campaign also led to personal clashes between British officers - the authors speculate that if Sir John French had been dismissed by Kitchener in 1914, he would have been able to challenge Kitchener later and get promoted into a position he was temperamentally unable to handle, leading to later disaster. His historical character assassination of his rival would in this case was a military disaster instead.
The book then moves on to Gallipoli, and asks what might happen if the campaign had taken place elsewhere. On paper, the Dardanelles appear to be a reasonable target, but there were others - most notably Alexandretta in Syria. There were political issues, as the French believed the region had been promised to them after the end of the war, but these problems could have been solved. The authors argue that a successful landing in Syria would have crippled the Ottoman Empire and driven it out of the war in 1915 - ironically, this would have ensured the survival of the Ottomans in some form, although quite how long for is impossible to say.
The book then assesses the different choices of the Dardanelles campaign itself, pointing out the dangers of forcing the straits and then landing troops in very difficult and exposed locations along the shore. Deciding to embark on a naval-only campaign would end poorly, if the Navy could not silence the Turkish guns (and it could not); the only chance of a quick victory in the campaign came with an immediate trust into enemy positions and if that attack failed it is unlikely the campaign would have been victorious (although it is possible British and Allied troops would have remained in the Dardanelles trenches until 1918).
We then move onto the Battle of Jutland, which the authors believe to have been largely insignificant. It was possible, they argue, for the British to score more hits (particularly in the opening moments of the battle, if the fifth battle squadron had remained with the battlecruisers) and if the British commander had acted without orders he might have played a decisive role in a clear British victory. It was also possible that the battleships could have risked charging into the German torpedoes, closing the range between both fleets; in that case, the authors argue, greater British numbers would have led to a more significant victory. However, as I mentioned above, the impact of the battle was unlikely to be decisive even if the British wiped out the German fleet completely; the authors appear to believe the Germans could not have scored a decisive victory of their own.
The book then assesses the potential alternate outcomes for the Battle of the Somme. There were possibilities that the battle might be a slow and grinding victory for the British, following a ‘bite and hold’ set of tactics that would drive the Germans out of their trenches, and then force them to make counter-attacks against dug-in British troops. The authors speculate that this would have been decisive in a tactical sense, but the weather would prevent any major collapse of the German lines and the war would continue at least into 1917. An alternate possibility involves tanks - should they have been deployed as soon as they were available, or should they have been held in reserve? The author speculates that the tanks would have been decisive, and even though there would still have been a muddy stalemate by the end of the year their deployment would have boosted French morale and led to greater victories the following year. The authors conclude that a truly decisive victory was unlikely, but a firm commitment to one plan for the battle might have led to a vastly different outcome.
The book then considers the possibilities surrounding Lawrence of Arabia and the Arab Revolt, starting with which Arab faction the British should back. Should they side with Hussein bin Ali or Ibn Saud? Both warlords have their strengths and weaknesses; Hussein has greater political skill and legitimacy, while Saud has an army of zealots who may be more militarily effective in the coming conflict. The book believes that a decision to support Saud instead of Hussein would have been a dangerous mistake, sparking off a Civil War within Arabic ranks and effectively ensuring they posed no threat to the Ottoman Empire. The book then considers possible disasters that could have overwhelmed the revolt, many of which would have ended the Arabs as a military useful force.
The writers then explore the dilemma facing the British code-breakers when they deciphered the Zimmermann Telegram. On paper, the decision to inform the Americans that the Germans were planning to ally with Mexico and Japan against the United States seems a no-brainer. In practice, there were a number of other considerations. The United States would not be pleased to know that diplomatic telegrams were being deciphered - and the Germans, of course, would be delighted to know that their codes being broken. Simply releasing the intelligence would unleash an international incident, not least because the Germans could simply insist the message was faked.
An alternate possibility, of course, is the telegram never being publicly disclosed. If that happened, there was a very real possibility of Mexico taking hostile steps against the United States. The preponderance of American power was bitterly resented in Mexico, and the prospect of nationalising foreign-owned businesses was very tempting. It is unlikely, the authors argue, that Mexico would actually declare war on United States, but there might be some hostility along the border might distract the United States from sending troops to Europe.
Finally, the book looks at the last great what-if of the period, the Russian Revolution, and identifies a number of possible points in which a different decision could have changed history. Could the Tsar be convinced to reach out to dissidents before it was too late? Or should he use force to crush the rebels before they gained momentum that will be impossible to stop? Should he sue for peace, when the war becomes too costly, or risk continuing the fighting until it takes him down? Even when the provisional government takes power, should it continue the war? The book argues that a German-Russian peace treaty in 1917 would have saved the provisional government from the Bolsheviks, not least by giving them the prestige they needed to crush the uprising, although this would cause long-term problems for Russia (not least because the peace treaty would be seen as a betrayal by Britain and France). On the other hand, it could hardly be worse than the original timeline. They would certainly avoid the disaster of Brest-Litovsk!
It also suggests that the Bolsheviks were right to make peace in 1917, even on deeply unfavourable terms. Continuing the war, after overthrowing provisional government because it wanted to continue the war, might well have led to a White Russian victory in the Civil War. This would not be an unmixed blessing. On one hand, the world would be spared the horrors of communism; on the other, the reactionaries would certainly try to crush the rebels and lay the seeds for future rebellions in later years. It is unlikely that Germany (with or without Hitler) would have become so powerful in this timeline, but a reactionary Russia would not be as capable of defending itself and eventually crushing the Nazi beast in Berlin.
Overall, as the authors try to remind us, history is driven by more than just impersonal forces and geopolitical realities. Some decisions were driven by what the decision-makers knew at the time, and what they thought they knew, and others were driven by personal feelings that rarely enter into the calculations of dispassionate alternate historians. On paper, some decisions looked very good indeed and yet, as the Dardanelles Campaign taught us, turning a concept into reality can be incredibly difficult. Other choices were driven by factors that are difficult, if not impossible, to account for: personality conflicts and faction in-fighting can change history, yet they can be frightening difficult to predict.
Relatively few decisions offer the prospect of a radically changed world, although that seems incredible. If the July Crisis never takes place, what will spark a major war? If Britain does not join the war, or is driven out of France in 1914, Europe will be dominated by Germany, changing history beyond repair. The Ottomans leaving the war early might convince other German allies that they can leave too; by contrast, if the Dardanelles were abandoned without a major commitment, the Ottoman victory would not appear so crushing and the peace factions might be able to put together a workable compromise. A major failure in Arabia might not be that significant, at least immediately, but it would have an effect on the post-war world. So too would be America staying out of the war, or Russia trying to stay in it longer than OTL.
These points are disputable, of course. There’s plenty of room for speculation about what might happen if something had been different. But overall, this is a fresh look at the realities facing the decision-makers of the First World War and the limitations they had to overcome to win. It demands a great deal of commitment from its readers, but I do not feel that you will consider the time wasted if you’re interested in the war.