While the collapse of Richard Nixon’s 1968 campaign for the White House could be blamed on many things, historians agree that Gaylord Parkinson’s resignation from his post as Nixon’s campaign manager was the catalyst. Parkinson, the former chairman of the California G.O.P., found himself increasingly isolated in his line of work, his liberal Republicanism alienating Nixon’s increasingly conservative advisers. His wife also happened to be seriously ill, and the two didn’t have much time to spend together as Gaylord followed his boss around the country. But he figured he would wait it out – he had worked for Dick in 1960, he worked for him in 1962, and he would work for him in ’68, illness be damned. But as the months dragged on and Nixon ignored the day-to-day problems plaguing his staff, Parkinson couldn’t put up with it any longer. Parkinson, meeting with Nixon and his advisers in Washington, D.C., announced he would be leaving the campaign entirely.
The announcement left Nixon stunned – the Primaries were set to begin in February, leaving him just three months to try and find someone to fill Parkinson’s shoes. While Nixon took out his rage on his put-upon staff, the overriding feeling among the campaign was one of uncertainty. Who would replace him? Who could replace him? Names such as Henry Bellmon, Dean Burch and even Robert Finch were considered, but the job was finally given to Robert Ellsworth, a former Representative from Kansas and a policy adviser and confidante to Nixon. Ellsworth was little more than a puppet, someone who would do little more than act as Nixon’s mouthpiece while he was out on the stump; Richard Nixon was, for all intents and purposes, acting as his own campaign manager. While Nixon was an astute political mind in his own right, veterans from the 1968 campaign would often complain of the ramshackle nature of the entire affair, with Nixon micromanaging every last campaign stop and TV interview, often with less-than-positive results. Reporters noted that Nixon no longer seemed like the relaxed and cool frontrunner of a few weeks prior and had reverted to his old nervous, antagonistic self, and more than a few made the explicit connection between this change and Parkinson’s departure. Nixon left for a visit to Egypt on short notice in late December, leaving his campaign rudderless and unstable just over a month before the primaries were slated to begin.
The chaos plaguing the Nixon campaign did not go unnoticed. Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who had long been considering making a third run for the White House and who had previously declared his support for Michigan Governor George Romney, consulted with donors and supporters in early January on whether he should enter the race. Their advice was uniform; now’s the time, don’t miss your chance. On January 10th, in front of a throng of reporters inside the New York Executive Mansion, Nelson Rockefeller announced he was running for President. The race was currently between Rockefeller and Romney, with the field expected to grow once Nixon declared his intentions. Romney, for what its worth, was furious – not only had he been betrayed by his most prominent supporter, but staffers who had formerly worked for “Rocky” in 1964 began defecting back to their old boss, most prominently foreign policy adviser Henry Kissinger.
Nixon, ever the paranoiac, left nothing up to chance in advance of the New Hampshire. Fueled by Romney’s withdrawal just a week before the primary, Nixon toured the state in aggressive fashion, beefing up his conservative credentials by attacking New York’s expansive Medicaid program as “government overreach.” Rockefeller largely ignored the attacks, but a pointed endorsement of President Johnson’s proposal for an income tax surcharge of ten percent enraged conservatives. While Nixon’s turn to the right worked, the results were far from decisive; Nixon had won with 55% of the vote, with Rockefeller coming in second with 38%. While the headlines at the time were dominated by the news of Senator McCarthy’s strong performance in New Hampshire and President Johnson’s subsequent withdrawal, Rockefeller had overperformed expectations, seeing how New Hampshire had been predicted to be a landslide for Nixon by the political punditry.
Rockefeller used this pseudo-victory to its fullest extent, touting it as confirmation that his platform would resonate with Republican primary voters. And what was that platform? Sweeping cuts to Great Society programs designed to cut out bureaucratic bloat (notably advocating for the complete abolishment of the VISTA program), the adoption of the American Medical Association’s so-called ‘Eldercare,’ which would finance drugs and other secondary costs along with making the program entirely voluntary, and an accompanying 15% decrease on marginal income taxes over three years. Those weren’t the planks that grabbed people’s attention, however – Rockefeller’s “negotiated settlement” plan for Vietnam called for a withdrawal of 50,000 troops, putting troop numbers back under 500,000, but for all intents and purposes the war would continue until the North had been sorely beaten and was willing to make concessions. Anti-war activists would follow Rockefeller around the country, greeting him with jeers and NVA flags (infamously, Tom Hayden claimed that he “making money from killing babies”). Rockefeller’s full embrace of civil rights equally angered right-wing voters, who believed he was advocating for unconstitutional policies that infringed upon the individual’s right to discriminate as they pleased. Despite having these easy lines of attack against Rockefeller, Nixon instead chose to focus on going after his record as Governor of New York, which went largely ignored by primary voters.
The Wisconsin Primary lived up to the hype, with Nixon pulling in 70% of the vote, but Rockefeller’s win in Massachusetts and his upset victory in Indiana putting a halt to Nixon’s momentum. As the primaries went on and the Nixon began to look weaker, Rockefeller grew bolder and began probing Nixon’s agenda. “Richard Nixon says he wants to cut federal spending, but what exactly does he want to cut? Programs to help our nation’s elderly, or money needed for our boys in Vietnam?” was a common line on the stump. Nixon shot back and questioned why Rockefeller had refused to endorse Senator Goldwater in 1964. It went on like this, the two men trading blows as the weeks dragged on, with the two-man race solidifying with little upset.
Then, Ronald Reagan officially declared his candidacy for his party’s nomination. Reagan, the handsome face of the Republican right, radically shifted the dynamic of the race. Reagan and Rockefeller sandwiched Nixon between the left and the right, both men largely ignoring each other and choosing to focus their vitriol squarely on the former Vice-President. Nixon, while pleased to sell himself as the ideological center of the race, was uneasy with having to fight off two strong candidates who wanted to see his downfall. After Reagan picked up Oregon and California and Rockefeller edged out Nixon in New Jersey, no candidate seemed positioned to win the nomination at the Convention.
What happened at the 1968 RNC is the stuff of political legend, its legacy having effects on American politics even in 2019. Debates still rage over whether Reagan and Rockefeller made a secret arrangement to pressure Nixon out of the race, or whether Nixon and Reagan attempted to handicap Rockefeller in the worst-case scenario of him actually winning. Historians are largely divided on what happened behind-the-scenes, and primary sources from the time are unusually tight-lipped. What is certain is this: after Nixon failed to win the nomination on the First Ballot, Reagan and Rockefeller began scraping off delegates after each successive ballot, with the South and West backing Reagan and the Northeast and Midwest forming Rockefeller’s base of support. Despite a shot of adrenaline provided by Governor Jim Rhode’s release of his Ohio delegation, Nixon’s found his voice growing smaller and smaller as the Convention became increasingly polarized. Despite some last-ditch wheeling and dealing, meeting with Governor Romney to try and drag out an endorsement, Nixon faltered after Reagan pulled ahead in the delegate count on the fourth ballot. While we do know that negotiations between Nixon and the other two camps continued up until the end of the Convention, he did not endorse any other candidate.
While Reagan adhered tightly to the so-called Eleventh Commandment (“thou shalt not speak ill of any other Republican” – which ironically had been coined by Parkinson), surrogates such as Governor Claude Kirk, Jr. of Florida alleged that Rockefeller would raise taxes on middle-class Americans and expand Great Society programs like he did in New York. Rockefeller virulently denied these allegations and talked up his record on fighting crime while as Governor, but the damage was done – Reagan saw an immediate jump from roughly 500 to 600 delegates. Reagan, while encouraged by the results, believed that he would lose handily in the General Election if he appeared to be just another Goldwater. He had to make himself acceptable, palatable, moderate, and he had to do it now.
Before the beginning of the Seventh Ballot, RNC Chairman Ray Bliss announced over the P.A. that Governor Reagan would be taking the stage for a short announcement. The Convention Hall buzzed in anticipation – what will he say? Has he made a deal with Rockefeller? Is he bowing out? Once Reagan took the mic, the crowd fell silent, all eyes watching the actor in the pinstriped suit. The announcement went on for a minute or two, but it could be boiled down into a single sentence; if nominated, Reagan would pick the distinguished and honorable Senator from Illinois, Chuck Percy, as his running-mate.
While the deal had been orchestrated by William Rusher, publisher of the National Review, conservatives were fuming. Percy’s attention-grabbing work in encouraging development and his endorsement of Goldwater in 1964 were cited as the reasons he was chosen, but his vocal support for Rockefeller and his perceived centrism infuriated Reagan’s delegates, who had chosen to back him over Nixon because of his firm commitment to right-wing policies – Percy just diluted that. Immediately, Reagan’s camp began to splinter, with right-wing delegates begin to start draft campaigns for Claude Kirk and Norris Cotton (some going even as far as to bring up Strom Thurmond himself), alienating Southern moderates who had been following the orders of their delegation leaders up to this point. As few delegates defected to Reagan on the Seventh Ballot, those moderates began giving Rockefeller a second look, while conservatives screamed to high heaven about Reagan “betraying the movement,” and Rockefeller’s 1964 divorce returned to the conversation as opponents tried to desperately to derail his campaign. He wisely kept his mouth shut, content to let the Goldwaterites dig their own grave. As soon as the writing on the wall became obvious, some began talking up another Nixon comeback, but his career was dead for good. Two more ballots took place, with Rockefeller getting closer and closer to winning the nomination outright as the opposition weakened under the pressure. Finally, on the Tenth Ballot, Rockefeller crossed the final threshold of 686 delegates, and became the official nominee of the Republican Party.
While Reagan’s tepid endorsement meant something, the large walk-outs were immensely demoralizing. The nomination of Howard Baker was inoffensive and welcomed by the delegates remaining, but the mood was grim. How could Rockefeller win against Humphrey and Wallace if his own party couldn’t stand behind him?
He would prove the naysayers wrong one more time – Nelson Rockefeller would be inaugurated as the 37th President of the United States next January after winning in one of the tightest elections in American history. But his Presidency would be defined by the opposition against him, from both outside his party and from within.