I would add that it varied from Power to Power. For example, the Fashoda Crisis (1898) between Britain and France led to a rapprochement between Britain and France, and an agreement on spheres of influence, reducing the potential for conflict between them.
The Bosnian Crisis saw one of the Powers (in this case, Austria-Hungary) learning quite a different lesson. It unilaterally overturned an 1878 agreement and annexed Bosnia. After a lot of bluff and bluster, with A-H and Germany threatening war over the issue, Russia, France, Britain, Ottoman Empire, and Italy reluctantly agreed and leant on Serbia to accept the situation. What AH learned was that it could annex who the hell it liked in the Balkans because no-one wanted a general war. It also taught Italy that AH couldn't be trusted to keep any agreement, and Italy quietly (and without telling anyone) left the AH/Germany club and secretly joined the Britain/France/Russia club.
The Agadir Crisis saw Germany threaten a general war if it didn't get concessions from a French incident in Morocco, initially ignoring French offers to negotiate with Germany (not with Morocco, obviously. Don't be silly). After shilly-shallying, Britain realised that Germany stood to gain a port on the Atlantic. Can't have that, so it backed France. A financial crisis in Germany persuaded it to back down, and accept some territory in the French Congo as compensation.
The lessons being learned were that Powers would bluff and bluster and push things to the edge, but someone would back down at the last minute.
Until they didn't.
If the Sarajevo Crisis hadn't sparked war, it would simply have reinforced that lesson, and another crisis would be along shortly.