AHC/WI : Italy under harsher occupation and peace conditions after WWII

[LSCatilina]

IOTL, the occupation and peace terms for Italy was significantly more benign than Germany or Japan, or even comparatively to lesser partners of the Axis in Central and Eastern Europe. Territorial losses were particularly limited (including the restoration of a colonial mandate in Somalia), war reparations overall comparable to those of Finland or Hungary, limited military agency (which was shrugged off not two years later as Italy entered NATO), superficial de-facisation, etc. followed by a prompt re-integration of Italy in regional networks.

This was principally motivated by the quick initial collapse of Fascist Italy in 1943 giving the opportunity for Allies to quickly benefit from Italian resources and administration (at least, disregarding the Fascist remnant state surviving trough German support) additionally with Italy being seen both popularly and politically as a side-show, the strength of anti-fascist networks, unwillingness to rock the boat and to give both far-right and far-left in Italy far too much credibility or power in the post-war, and especially not giving both Yugoslavia (and indirectly the USSR) a strong contention point in the region while the costs for occupying a relatively minor strategically region (comparatively to Germany) would have been frowned upon.

Of course, it did not prevent some calls for occupations or harsher peace terms, especially from Yugoslavia with bigger war reparations and territorial gains in Istria and Friul, but as well with French attempts at annexing Ventimiglia and the Roya Valley (and somewhat half-assed attempts in the Aosta Valley) quickly stopped by Americans (basically pulling a "what is wrong with you"), and eventually calls for a retrocession of Sud-Tirol to Austria. So, even IOTL, there were some grounds we can use for an ATL development.

Now, what would be necessary to at least get the basic foundation of an harsher situation in Italy?
Giving it's intimately tied with the military situation, an obvious point might be found in Allies doing much worse in Sicily but I'm not sure how realistic it would be to expect British and American armies to just get stuck in Central Mediterranean threater at this point, giving that I feel like it would be unrealistic (maybe wrongly) to expect an Allies success in Sicily not to translate naturally towards a quick and victorious presence in southern mainland Italy.

Another initial issue would be how to reincofrce the fascist state apparatus in order to prevent its political collapse (or rather, dissolution within the italian state apparatus overall) which, barring significant political reforms and purges in the late 30's/early 40's I'm not to sure how to achieve : doing so, still, might be the best way to at least push forwards Yugoslavian and Italian communists elements while preventing the IOTL liberal/right-wing/post-fascist de facto integration in the immediate late/post-war situation in Italy.
Lasting warfare in the peninsula might be what both French and Yugoslavian ambitions might need to legitimize a-posteriori de facto takeovers (trough more or less phony plebiscites), altough probably not very far from the actual IOTL borders. That'd definitely, even if definitely more symbolic than German losses, put in jeopardy the relations with post-war Italy but again comparatively to West Germany IOTL, I don't think it would necessarily prevent anything similar to IOTL to happen especially with a stronger Soviet/Yugoslavian eastern pressure.

To be honest, i'm not too sure we'd have an occupation comparable to Germany or Japan (and barring an unlikely Soviet takeover, to say the least to Eastern Europe) but something more akin to stricter de-militarizaiton and control of strategic points and harbours.

 

[SinghSong]

Obvious answer would be to either prevent the quick initial collapse of Fascist Italy, or have the Fascist remnant state successfully survive and retain control through German support. Let's say that the invasion of Sicily in 'Operation Husky' either fails or never gets carried out. Or, analysing what really weakened Fascist Italy and the regime's support from the Italian people the most, that Mussolini doesn't decide, unprompted, to try and curry greater favor with Hitler and Nazi Germany (unsuccessfully, with Hitler having been distinctly unenthusiastic about their involvement) by committing Italy to participate in Operation Barbarossa, or to subsequently scale up the Italian effort in the Soviet Union from three to ten divisions, expanding the pre-existing CSIR to become the ARMIR.

As such, Mussolini's Italy chooses to retain those troops (primarily an infantry army, specialized for mountain warfare, with little to no armored component) for the more expedient mission which his chief detractors (particularly from the pre-Fascist elites in the Royal Court faction) decried him for not having assigned them (or anyone else) to carry out instead. Namely, the matter of properly pacifying their newly conquered and annexed territories in Yugoslavia and the Balkans, tackling the Greek resistance and Yugoslav partisans head-on in the same manner that they'd pacified the Senussis in Libya (i.e, the main phase of the Libyan Genocide, aka 'Shar', which had greatly inspired and served as an effective 'role model' for the chief perpetrators of the Nazi Holocaust), and properly implementing De Vecchi's and Mussolini's irredentist vision of an "Imperial Italy"- with all of the territories of the "Imperial Italy" dreamed of by De Vecchi, save for the sole exception of Malta, being fully in Italian hands at this phase, after the Italian occupation of Corsica and Tunisia.

This serves to avert (or at least greatly delay) the political collapse of Mussolini's regime by giving the imperialist Royal Court faction exactly what they wanted, as well as further strengthening Italy's dominion over its newly acquired territories and the military strength available for its defense. But it also sets up a basic foundation which would've definitely led to a harsher situation in Italy. ITTL, freed from their obligations and the subsequent debacle of their participation in Operation Barbarossa, the Fascist Italians' reinforced occupation forces (relative to OTL) enable them pursue Italianization even more aggressively in their occupied territories, as the Royal Court faction decreed that Mussolini should've been doing; rounding up dissidents, setting up concentration camps (just like those they'd established and used to great effect in Libya/'Cyrenaica') in Tunisia and the Balkans. And potentially even escalating to the deployment of chemical weapons against active insurgencies' strongholds, using spray nozzles from their purpose-built aerial-application 'troop-duster' aircraft (rather than letting them languish in cold storage after having been used extensively 'to great effect' in Libya and Ethiopia, as was the case IOTL)- with Mussolini having been far less fearful, and more enthusiastic, about the use of chemical warfare than Hitler was.

Piero Parini in particular, a veteran of the Second Italo-Ethiopian War who was placed in charge of the Greek Ionian Islands, was one of the most enthusiastic about doing so (having himself visited, and been inspired by the success of, Imperial Japan's ongoing Japanization efforts in Manchukuo and Korea)- even IOTL, he opened up three small concentration camps, rounded up and imprisoned 3,500 people there, before the ousting of Il Duce from power and the subsequent armistice with the Allies prevented his efforts from escalating any further. ITTL, having gotten the 'green light' from Il Duce (along with De Vacchi himself, over in the Dodecanese Islands) they establish even more concentration camps, several months earlier, and in a couple of cases, escalate to outright extermination camps for the Hellenist and Macedonian Greeks deemed to be lending direct or indirect support to the Greek Resistance. The Allies' far higher estimation of the Greek peoples' place in the established 'racial heirarchy' at the time, and the Greek Royalist government-in-exile's enduring endorsement by Britain especially as a full honorary member of the Allies, would incite far greater outrage and condemnation ITTL when they're brought to light.

And/or if Mussolini did wind up inadvertently 'letting the genie out of the bottle' by using chemical warfare against enemy troops (i.e, to turn/stall the tide in the Tunisian campaign) or against civilian populations (even those under Italian occupation) in the European or North African theatres of WW2, you'd definitely have way harsher terms being imposed against Italy. Since the Allies would almost certainly green-light the deployment of chemical warfare against Fascist Italy in response (as stipulated in the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, which was only ratified after inserting a clause where signatories reserved the right to use chemical weapons in retaliation for another signatory's chemical attack against them, in spite of having chosen to 'turn a blind eye' and 'let it slide' in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, in spite of both Italy and Ethiopia having been signatories of this treaty) and the Axis would be guaranteed to retaliate in kind at that point.

 

[Charles EP M.]

Greater brutality in occupation and/or not surrendering fast do seem the big easy ones. Germany forcing Italy to keep going likely helped them as any deaths are now Hitler's fault, that could go different if Italian forces collapse & Germany backs them up but they never formally surrender, Salo isn't seen as a German puppet but seen as a last gasp

 

[Thande]

If Italy was never invaded as part of a war strategy but was bypassed (e.g. as in Drake's Drum) and was left as the last European Axis power after Germany was defeated from the north, it seems likely the resulting peace would be harsh.

 

[raharris1973]

Maybe Italy would actually be slower to surrender, and not invaded at home for most of the war as too hardened a target (terrain-wise), and an annoying (to the Allies) source of surplus infantry and labor for the Axis, until the end of the war if it gets into the war early, or we have a "France fights on" from Algeria or the Mediterranean scenario, that sees Italy lose its overextended African possessions early, with their troops with little to do but homeland defense and population pretty pissed off at the Allies, at a time when the Russians and Americans are years away from getting in, so there's no prospect of a real Allied invasion/occupation working. Perhaps the Italians might feel especially outraged at the Allies and motivated for homeland defense if it is the Allies starting the fight with *them* in winter 1939-1940 to go after the German-allied but softer Italian target while they are too timid to go headlong against the Siegfried line.

 

[The Red]

Another initial issue would be how to reincofrce the fascist state apparatus in order to prevent its political collapse (or rather, dissolution within the italian state apparatus overall) which, barring significant political reforms and purges in the late 30's/early 40's I'm not to sure how to achieve

In early 1943 Mussolini was trying to reinvigorate the Fascist regime by bringing in more hardline figures and centralising more power around himself. The new PNF Party Secretary, Carlo Scorza called for a wider purge in April which Mussolini seemed open to however he didn't act on it nor did he respond to the warnings of the plots against him. He was apparently genuinely surprised by the outcome of the meeting of the Grand Council on the 25th of July and was surpised again by his dismissal having been confident in the King's support and ready to dismiss the Grand Council as an advisory body he could ignore. It seems clear there was a willingness on Mussolini's part to hold on to power and see the war through, even to defeat if necessary, and there were opportunities for him to do so but he was suffering from increasingly poor physical health and potentially mental health issues as well; his behaviour was becoming increasingly erratic and he seemed stuck in a deep depression after Husky.

Nonetheless avoiding Mussolini's removal probably is the surest way of keeping Italy in the Axis and ensuring a harsher peace subsequently. The easiest way of bringing this about is probably to have the Germans occupy Italy sooner with the original Alaric plan in the Spring and avert Mussolini's removal by doing so. German occupation becoming a reality will likely cause the conspiracies against Mussolini to lose momentum and allow the Fascists to muddle on reinvigorated or not.

To be honest, i'm not too sure we'd have an occupation comparable to Germany or Japan (and barring an unlikely Soviet takeover, to say the least to Eastern Europe) but something more akin to stricter de-militarizaiton and control of strategic points and harbours.

Certainly the initial plans for occupying Italy were very strict; military government with minimal civilian input. Nonetheless it wasn't a plan SHAEF was happy with as it was considered a waste of manpower and resources. The occupation will likely depend on the circumstances of how Italy ends the war. If Mussolini remains secure in power you would at least initially be looking at military government in areas liberated by the Allies although it's quite possible the WAllies don't move north beyond Sicily in such a scenario with no existing Allied administration on the mainland by the time Germany capitulates.

 

[Death's Companion]

I wonder if Churchill gets his Balkan campaign if he's talked out of Sicily/Mainland Italy.