AHC/WI : Communist China reduced to Soviet occupied zones.

[LSCatilina]

What would be necessary to have a *PRC equivalent pretty much limited to the territories occupied by the Soviet Army up to 1946 IOTL, i.e. Manchuria and parts of Inner Mongolia, at least as a starting territory (with the caveat additional acquisitions would be backed by Soviet military involvement in the rest of Inner Mongolia or Xinjiang)?

I would think that it would require a very different strategical and political approach to revolutionary conflict, more defensive and/or conservative, and pretty much spelling an absence of Maoist leadership in the 30's.

Of course, that would have massive consequences in the history of China (development of a ROC without its traditional industrial heartland, no or lesser Chinese involvement in North Korea if the conflict even happens, etc.) I'd like to explore and to have your opinion on.

Focusing on this *PRC/North China I'd say no Maoist leadership would probably make *PRC much more aligned along the lines of North Korea or Rumania (i.e. with a decent level of autonomy and eventual de-sattelization) along with possible loss of territories in favour of a more successfully irredentist Mongolia. Would this state (if the description is somewhat plausible) be at term viable or not in an eventual collapse of the Soviet Bloc?

 

[History Learner]

David T posted this fascinating PoD some years ago:

After MacArthur issued his order that all Japanese troops in China (with the exceptions noted above) were to surrender only to Chiang's forces, "Bai Chongxi urged Chiang to accept [General Yasuji] Okamura's official surrender of Japanese troops in China only after Chinese government troops had taken over each garrison. That would have freed Japanese troops to fight aggressively, not just defensively, against Communist forces trying to take over territory the Japanese controlled.​

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"Instead, Chiang arranged a formal surrender date with Okamura, who agreed that the various Japanese garrisons in Japan, until relieved of their duty by government units, would resist if troops other than those of the central government demanded their surrender. In practice, what this meant was that, with few exceptions, the cities remained in Japanese hands until government troops arrived, but the Japanese garrisons did not carry out extensive patrols, and the Communists were able to move into the surrounding countryside. Within one year after Japan's surrender, the CCP had expanded its area of control from 57 to 310 counties. In North China and the northern part of Jiangsu, stiff battles resulted as Communist units attacked Japanese garrisons and forts in some smaller cities and along rail lines. Some 7,000 Japanese were killed or wounded in these engagements, but while the Communists overran a number of Imperial garrisons, none surrendered.​

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"In the Nationalist part of Shanxi, the warlord Wan Xishan began to recruit Japanese officers and soldiers to help fight the Communists, but when Chiang heard of this practice, he told Wan that it would provide the CCP propaganda opportunities. Also the Americans 'would not appreciate it.' All Japanese prisoners, Chiang decreed, would be sent back to Japan as soon as possible after the government units had taken over their positions. If Chiang had followed Bai's suggestion and ordered the Japanese to carry out aggressive patrolling of the rural areas, Okamura, who was strongly anti-Communist, would have doubtless agreed."​

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So suppose Chiang had indeed followed Bai's advice. Would the advantage of keeping the Communists from expanding their control of rural areas be worth the obvious offense to public opinion (both in China and the US) that such a use of the Japanese forces would involve? (Later, of course, Chiang would have no hesitancy about using Japanese military advisers in Taiwan--including the convicted war criminal "kill all, burn all, destroy all" Okamura.)​

 

[Jackson Lennock]

This was China just before the Japanese surrender. It seems like it would have been very difficult to dislodge the Communists from the area north of the traditional Qinling–Huaihe Line.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

View attachment 72128

This was China just before the Japanese surrender. It seems like it would have been very difficult to dislodge the Communists from the area north of the traditional Qinling–Huaihe Line.

As a slight caveat, the Communists could perhaps be pushed out of much of Shandong south of the Yellow River.

A HUGE amount of the Chinese migration to Northeast China in the 50s, 60s, and 70s came from Shandong, which was traditionally a very poor province. Without Shandong, Red China would be a lot less populous than OTL Northeast China. Maybe as much as 1/3 fewer people.

 

[Ricardolindo]

What would be necessary to have a *PRC equivalent pretty much limited to the territories occupied by the Soviet Army up to 1946 IOTL, i.e. Manchuria and parts of Inner Mongolia, at least as a starting territory (with the caveat additional acquisitions would be backed by Soviet military involvement in the rest of Inner Mongolia or Xinjiang)?

I would think that it would require a very different strategical and political approach to revolutionary conflict, more defensive and/or conservative, and pretty much spelling an absence of Maoist leadership in the 30's.

Of course, that would have massive consequences in the history of China (development of a ROC without its traditional industrial heartland, no or lesser Chinese involvement in North Korea if the conflict even happens, etc.) I'd like to explore and to have your opinion on.

Focusing on this *PRC/North China I'd say no Maoist leadership would probably make *PRC much more aligned along the lines of North Korea or Rumania (i.e. with a decent level of autonomy and eventual de-sattelization) along with possible loss of territories in favour of a more successfully irredentist Mongolia. Would this state (if the description is somewhat plausible) be at term viable or not in an eventual collapse of the Soviet Bloc?

IMO, you can simply have Chiang Kai-Shek listen to American advice and decide not to try to retake Manchuria.

 

[raharris1973]

As a slight caveat, the Communists could perhaps be pushed out of much of Shandong south of the Yellow River.

A HUGE amount of the Chinese migration to Northeast China in the 50s, 60s, and 70s came from Shandong, which was traditionally a very poor province. Without Shandong, Red China would be a lot less populous than OTL Northeast China. Maybe as much as 1/3 fewer people.

At the end of the war, the Yellow river actually ran *south* of Shandong because of the busting of the dykes in 1938. It took reconstruction work going through 1947 to restore the river to its main channel going through northern Shandong.

IMO, you can simply have Chiang Kai-Shek listen to American advice and decide not to try to retake Manchuria.

This would have been a more reliable way to preserve Chiang's forces for longer.

Of course, the Americans were crucial in providing the means for Chiang to disregard their advice. The Americans provided ship ferry service and airlift service to Chinese Nationalist troops, first to northern Chinese cities and ports, including ones adjacent to Manchuria itself, and then within southern Manchuria, even though some Americans (not all Americans) advised against Nationalist troop moves that way. US Marines right after the war also assisted in occupying North China ports and cities and rail lines between and taking Japanese surrender until arrival of larger Nationalist forces, which surely made Chiang feel more confident his rear was well guarded when advancing into Manchuria.

Had Americans done more tha just softly advised Chiang that overextending into Manchuria was a bad idea, and instead just refused to give his forces rides that far north and refused to use the Marines as a holding force, Chiang would have had no choice but to only move toward Manchuria gradually, on foot, while dealing with Communist guerrilla forces in the intervening areas along the way. So he’d have to default to a more conservative, and likely safer, campaign strategy.

 

[Hendryk]

In the France Fights On TL, we're going with the idea of a Communist-ruled Manchuria with the Nationalists holding on to the rest. The POD in June 1940 creates butterflies in the Asian theater that, by 1943, result in the Japanese destroying the CPC's Yan'an redoubt, which in turn shift the CPC's internal power dynamics back towards a pro-Soviet line under the leadership of Wang Ming. After the end of WW2, Wang, under instructions from Moscow, consolidates the CPC's control in the Northeast rather than restart the civil war, in order to give the USSR a comfortable buffer zone in the East.

 

[LSCatilina]

In the France Fights On TL, we're going with the idea of a Communist-ruled Manchuria with the Nationalists holding on to the rest. The POD in June 1940 creates butterflies in the Asian theater that, by 1943, result in the Japanese destroying the CPC's Yan'an redoubt, which in turn shift the CPC's internal power dynamics back towards a pro-Soviet line under the leadership of Wang Ming. After the end of WW2, Wang, under instructions from Moscow, consolidates the CPC's control in the Northeast rather than restart the civil war, in order to give the USSR a comfortable buffer zone in the East.

Genuinly curious for the reasons why the Kanto Army would focus on a CCP that, historically, was fairly passive during WW2 at best and a cause for KMT waste of resources to counter or fight both outside and inside occupied territories even in the context of the United Front.

Especially since the later and much more successful Soviet involvement in the war might spell even more clearly to Japan ("Let's not piss off Communists for the lulz of it") from one hand, and IJA forces already spread thinner than IOTL.

I guess I could see a scenario where Yan'an is, well, just getting in the way for an attack on Sichuan in an Kogo-like bid, but with the failure to take on Singapore and (in 1941, arguably it might have changed in 42-43?) to cut Allies supplies to KMT, wouldn't the IJA have so many other fishes to fry?

 

[Hendryk]

Genuinly curious for the reasons why the Kanto Army would focus on a CCP that, historically, was fairly passive during WW2 at best and a cause for KMT waste of resources to counter or fight both outside and inside occupied territories even in the context of the United Front.

One of the butterflies is that the US sets up a number of airfields in Shaanxi alongside those in southern provinces. Along with their loss of strategic initiative south of the Yangzi, this convinces the IJA to strike into north-central China instead.

 

[Torten]

The Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-Shek would want to control Beijing in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender at the very least to provide further legitimacy over the CCP, and to deny the CCP the legitimacy of controlling Beijing.

Additionally, if a armistice is eventually concluded between the two sides, a CCP which doesn't control Beijing would end up very dependent on Moscow.