AHC: Have Japan Surrender before Germany does in WWII

[raharris1973]

With a Point of Divergence after Pearl Harbor, your challenge is to ensure that the final surrender of an Axis power comes not from Japan, as it historically was in September 2nd 1945, but from Germany. This can be done by either extending the lifespan of Nazi Germany powers,or by ensuring the Japanese will be the first one to collapse. Ideally Japan would surrender with as few preconditions as OTL (IE, related to the Emperor), but you can bend this requirement if you feel you must and can devise a convincing way to get the Allies to accept a more conditions attached to Japan's surrender than OTL, or fewer.

This is not including other powers such as Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland and Thailand, those can surrender at any time.

A Japan-first policy amongst the allies may be the challenge here because Britain and the Soviets will both push far more to counter Germany, which is an imminent threat to their homelands, than the Japanese. The second challenge is the fanaticism of the Japanese defenders in the first place, considering the military even attempted a coup in 1945 (that is after it was apparent the war was lost, with two nuclear detonations, a Soviet invasion, and the loss of the IJN) despite going against the Emperor's wishes.

 

[Arthur_Phuxache]

Japanese invasions of Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia Dutch East Indies end in disaster for the Japanese.

Kuomintang get the level of aid the USSR gets IOTL.

 

[Charles EP M.]

Successful defences against Japan early on and more backing for China (who did the bulk of the fighting) seems the easiest: they don't have a period of repeated victory before it goes to shit, they have less resources to show for it, they take greater losses in the country they most want to control, and they're still looking at naval losses against the Allies.

 

[raharris1973]

Japanese invasions of Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia Dutch East Indies end in disaster for the Japanese.

Kuomintang get the level of aid the USSR gets IOTL.

How can you realistically get such results?

The British were rather busy protecting their homeland from a Nazi dominated continent, their Atlantic lifelines, Mediterranean lifelines, and Suez, a lending whatever could be spared for Soviet Russia. The Dutch were rather busy being occupied and exploited by the Germans, with their limited refugee government and forces just going along with the British for the ride.

One could drastically improve the British and Dutch situation in Europe in such a manner that they are left more free to devote defensive resources to protect their Southeast Asian possessions. But for scenario purposes, the danger of ameliorating their strategic situation too much is that the Japanese at a certain point would then realistically not even attempt to attack if success appears out of reach.

 

[History Learner]

With a Point of Divergence after Pearl Harbor, your challenge is to ensure that the final surrender of an Axis power comes not from Japan, as it historically was in September 2nd 1945, but from Germany. This can be done by either extending the lifespan of Nazi Germany powers,or by ensuring the Japanese will be the first one to collapse. Ideally Japan would surrender with as few preconditions as OTL (IE, related to the Emperor), but you can bend this requirement if you feel you must and can devise a convincing way to get the Allies to accept a more conditions attached to Japan's surrender than OTL, or fewer.

This is not including other powers such as Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland and Thailand, those can surrender at any time.

A Japan-first policy amongst the allies may be the challenge here because Britain and the Soviets will both push far more to counter Germany, which is an imminent threat to their homelands, than the Japanese. The second challenge is the fanaticism of the Japanese defenders in the first place, considering the military even attempted a coup in 1945 (that is after it was apparent the war was lost, with two nuclear detonations, a Soviet invasion, and the loss of the IJN) despite going against the Emperor's wishes.

Hitler doesn't hold back U-Boats defending Norway against phantom threats in 1942, so you get a reinforced Operation Drumbeat. Assuming linear level increases in losses (you can play around with this if you prefer a more conservative scenario), you could probably double shipping losses in the operation. FDR will still prioritize Lend Lease to the USSR and a Pacific offensive for political reasons, which moves back Operation Torch probably three months because of shipping constraints.

This frees up enough German forces for a reinforced Army Group Don to evacuate Army Group B from the Stalingrad area. This, combined with North Africa ending late, frees up ~300,000 troops (Let's say 15 Divisions) for use in the Summer 1943 campaign in the East. 10 Divisions on the Mius would be enough to prevent the historical offensives there in July-September finding success, while the other five used as reserve during Kursk would allow Army Group South to destroy 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies along with supporting infantry armies, which eliminates Operation Rumyantsev before it can even start. After Operation Kutuzov forces Army Group Center out of the Orel Salient, the Eastern Front basically comes to a stalemate because the Soviets can no longer replace their losses without the recapture of Ukrainian and Belarusian manpower that historically happened after Kursk.

By this point, the decision had already been made to only bomb Japan with the Atomics, so the Empire probably goes down in 1946 because of that and the submarine campaign starving them while Germany can last until 1947 or fight the Allies to a draw at this point.

 

[TheIO]

Hitler doesn't hold back U-Boats defending Norway against phantom threats in 1942, so you get a reinforced Operation Drumbeat. Assuming linear level increases in losses (you can play around with this if you prefer a more conservative scenario), you could probably double shipping losses in the operation. FDR will still prioritize Lend Lease to the USSR and a Pacific offensive for political reasons, which moves back Operation Torch probably three months because of shipping constraints.

Were the U-boats being held back capable of reaching the US coast? There were attempts made to send the Type VIIs across (the majority of the fleet), but to do so pushed them to the absolute limit of their capacity. Said attempts (from what I can tell) occured from early March onwards - when were the phantom threats anyway?

 

[History Learner]

Were the U-boats being held back capable of reaching the US coast? There were attempts made to send the Type VIIs across (the majority of the fleet), but to do so pushed them to the absolute limit of their capacity. Said attempts (from what I can tell) occured from early March onwards - when were the phantom threats anyway?

These would mostly be Type VIIs, IIRC; with special measures they could be made to reach North America. As for threats, Hitler for almost all of WWII had this weird fear of Norway being invaded; something like 400,000 Germans were garrisoning Norway in 1945 if that tells you anything. There's also this research paper on how the Germans could've won a temporary victory in the Battle of the Atlantic, from a different PoD:

​

This study concerns the naval campaign in the 1939-1945 conflict between the Allied and Axis forces known as the ‘Battle of the Atlantic’. To facilitate the understanding of this battle a computer-based battle model of a typical engagement between the opposing forces was created. The key naval assets in this conflict were the Allied merchant ships carrying vital supplies that were organised into convoys and were escorted for their protection by warships. On the Axis side were submarines (U-boats) including their organisation into Wolf Packs. The Axis goal for the U-boats was the cutting off of the supply of vital war materials, especially oil and fuel, that were carried in the Allied convoys to Britain and the Allied forces in the UK, Mediterranean theatre and on the Russian front. Allied air power played a key role eventually, as did radio signal detection and interception. The focus of the modelling work was on the battles over the convoys SC107 and TM1, which represented serious Allied failure and Axis tactical, but not strategic, victory. The model created was a convoy centric kinematic one and was not a dynamic model of forces and accelerations. During this study, it was found that the U-boat commanders were not using their U-boats and torpedoes to the full efficiency that they could have achieved. The reason lay in the direct orders to attack individually and not simultaneously. A counterfactual aspect was created in the model to explore the effects of simultaneous formation attacks by all the members of a Wolf Pack. A profound increase in sinking of convoy ships per U-boat was obtained and reductions in U-boat losses identified. If used this could have led to a temporary Axis victory in the Atlantic in 1942-1943, and might even have delayed Allied victory and impacted post war Europe.​

 

[raharris1973]

These would mostly be Type VIIs, IIRC; with special measures they could be made to reach North America. As for threats, Hitler for almost all of WWII had this weird fear of Norway being invaded; something like 400,000 Germans were garrisoning Norway in 1945 if that tells you anything. There's also this research paper on how the Germans could've won a temporary victory in the Battle of the Atlantic, from a different PoD:

​

This study concerns the naval campaign in the 1939-1945 conflict between the Allied and Axis forces known as the ‘Battle of the Atlantic’. To facilitate the understanding of this battle a computer-based battle model of a typical engagement between the opposing forces was created. The key naval assets in this conflict were the Allied merchant ships carrying vital supplies that were organised into convoys and were escorted for their protection by warships. On the Axis side were submarines (U-boats) including their organisation into Wolf Packs. The Axis goal for the U-boats was the cutting off of the supply of vital war materials, especially oil and fuel, that were carried in the Allied convoys to Britain and the Allied forces in the UK, Mediterranean theatre and on the Russian front. Allied air power played a key role eventually, as did radio signal detection and interception. The focus of the modelling work was on the battles over the convoys SC107 and TM1, which represented serious Allied failure and Axis tactical, but not strategic, victory. The model created was a convoy centric kinematic one and was not a dynamic model of forces and accelerations. During this study, it was found that the U-boat commanders were not using their U-boats and torpedoes to the full efficiency that they could have achieved. The reason lay in the direct orders to attack individually and not simultaneously. A counterfactual aspect was created in the model to explore the effects of simultaneous formation attacks by all the members of a Wolf Pack. A profound increase in sinking of convoy ships per U-boat was obtained and reductions in U-boat losses identified. If used this could have led to a temporary Axis victory in the Atlantic in 1942-1943, and might even have delayed Allied victory and impacted post war Europe.​

That link was an interesting find!

 

[raharris1973]

By this point, the decision had already been made to only bomb Japan with the Atomics,

Please elaborate on how the Allies got to such a definitive decision to keep their atomic hands off Germany so early, by basically June-July 1943.

 

[History Learner]

Please elaborate on how the Allies got to such a definitive decision to keep their atomic hands off Germany so early, by basically June-July 1943.

Turns out it was even earlier then I thought; May of 1943, in fact.

The point of use of the first bomb was discussed and the general view appeared to be that its best point of use would be on a Japanese fleet concentration in the Harbor of Truk. General Styer suggested Tokio but it was pointed out that the bomb should be used where, if it failed to go off, it would land in water of sufficient depth to prevent easy salvage. The Japanese were selected as they would not be so apt to secure knowledge from it as would the Germans.​

​

Post-War General Groves had this to say when asked in an interview, giving further context:

REPORTER: General Groves, could we go back for a minute. You mentioned in your book [Now it Can Be Told] that just before the Yalta Conference that President Roosevelt said if we had bombs before the European war was over he would like to drop them on Germany.3 Would you discuss this?
GROVES: At the conference that Secretary Stimson and myself had with President Roosevelt shortly before his departure, I believe it was December 30th or 31st of 1944, President Roosevelt was quite disturbed over the Battle of the Bulge and he asked me at that time whether I could bomb Germany as well as Japan. The plan had always been to bomb Japan because we thought the war in Germany was pretty apt to be over in the first place and in the second place the Japanese building construction was much more easily damaged by a bomb of this character than that in Germany. I urged President Roosevelt that it would be very difficult for various reasons.
The main one was that the Germans had quite strong aerial defense. They made a practice, as every nation does, that when a new plane came into the combat area, that they would run any risk that they could to bring such a plane down so that they could examine it and see what new ideas had come in so that they could make improvements and also would know the characteristics of the plane so that they could prepare a better defense against it. We had no B-29’s in Europe. If we had sent over a small squadron or group as we did against Japan of this type, everyone of them would have been brought down on the first trip to Germany. If they hadn’t been, it would have been through no lack of effort on the part of the Germans.
The alternative would be to bring a large number of B-29’s over to to England and that would have been a major logistical task and the other possibility would have been to have used a British plane which would not have been a bit pleasing to General Arnold and also would have created a great many difficulties for our general operation because then it would be an Allied operation with the United States furnishing the bombs and everything connected with it but using a British plane and a British crew to actually drop the bomb and it would have raised a tremendous number of difficulties.
And difficulties like that — while you say you should be able to handle that — you can but in a project of this character there are so many little things, each one of them key, that you can’t afford to throw any more sand into the wheels that you can help.
The bombing of Germany with atomic bombs was, I would say, never seriously considered to the extent of making definite plans but on this occasion I told the President, Mr. Roosevelt, why it would be very unfortunate from my standpoint, I added that of course if the President — if the war demanded it and the President so desired, we would bomb Germany and I was so certain personally that the war in Europe would be over before we would be ready that you might say I didn’t give it too much consideration.

 

[History Learner]

Were the U-boats being held back capable of reaching the US coast? There were attempts made to send the Type VIIs across (the majority of the fleet), but to do so pushed them to the absolute limit of their capacity. Said attempts (from what I can tell) occured from early March onwards - when were the phantom threats anyway?

Got the source, it's the GSWW series, Volume on the Global War. On Pg 371, it's stated 18 to 20 U-Boats were held back to protect the North Sea-Norway region. Also of note, of the 12 Type IXs available at the time, half were sent the the Mediterranean over Doenitz's desire to send all 12 for Operation Drumbeat according to Pg 369, so there's another PoD there.