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AHC: Christian Asia Minor, Islamic Iberia

History Learner

Well-known member
Basically, achieve the reverse of what happened OTL (or maintain the Middle Ages dynamic, if you prefer lol). Historically, the Turks ultimately broke Byzantine rule in Anatolia and gradually converted the region, ultimately birthing the the Ottoman Empire while in Iberia the petty Christian Kingdoms were able to stage the Reconquista. To make the challenge easier-and because of my own affection for the aforementioned petty Kingdoms-the borders in Iberia have some leeway. For example, something like this:

iberia_0900.gif


As for Anatolia, something like this at least (can be more!):

AnatolieLimits.jpg
 
You can butterfly away the OTL mass-migration of Turkish tribes into central Anatolia plus areas of the South and North quite close to the coasts, in the 1070s - which was never reversed even at the height of the Comnene recovery in the mid-C12th - by a few major changes to Byzantine politics and military events in the 1050s to 1070s. Most plausibly, have a series of stable and decently competent 'legitimate' emperors following Basil II who keep a grip on the court nobility and bureaucrats, prioritise the army and tax-raising, and do not alienate the provincial aristocratic elites to the extent that there is a series of rebellions (eg 1043 by Maniaces, 1047 by Leo Tornicius, and 1057 by Isaac Comnenus and his allies in OTL). If Basil II is temperamentally unwilling to marry, have him insist on his weak brother and heir Constantine VIII marrying off his eldest daughter (either Eudocia, who ends up in a convent after having smallpox, or his OTL successor Zoe) to a capable general who continues Basil's policies after C dies in 1028. Otherwise , either military strongman Maniaces wins his revolt against Zoe and her easygoing and over-cautious civilian husband no. 3, Constantine IX, in 1043 and revives a strong and flexible army or Isaac Comnenus has much longer for his military reforms after 1057 and passes the throne in the later 1060s or 1070s to his nephews (Manuel if he is not killed as in OTL, or the actual ruler from 1081, Alexius I) and one of this trio wins the battle of Manzikert.

A competent Byz emperor/ general who has full support and no plotters ready to stage a coup behind his back (as Romanus IV did in 1071 in OTL) and an adequately trained and flexible army with cavalry archers (Pecheneg or mercenary non-Saljuk Turks?) to keep the Saljuks from over-running the defensive Byz infantry phalanxes at Manzikert, plus no panic, muddle or treason at the battle as in real life, would at least secure a draw and keep the army intact. This luck/ skill plus some stronger Byz defensive units to patrol the frontier and catch raiders. logically settled in the region so incentivised to defend their own homes, would hopefully check the Turks. The latter usually preferred 'hit and run' tactics on swift cavalry raids and looting from unarmed civilian farmers and unwalled towns to a pitched battle, so would they give up attacking Anatolia after a mauling in a major battle and head for Syria instead to loot and settle there? The Saljuk Sultans, as 'protectors' of and strongmen behind the Sunni Caliphs in Baghdad and in only precarious command of their tribal vassals ( a factor often forgotten by historians - the 1060s Turkish raids in to Anatolia were by tribal opportunists not by the Sultan's orders), would also have the incentive of driving the unwelcome 'heretic' Shi'a Fatimids out of Syria/ Palestine, plus a lack of major Sunni states in Syria capable of holding them back. That way, we get a major Turkish nomad migration to Syria and Palestine not to Anatolia in the 1070s to 1090s, and if a line of competent Byz rulers with a large and viable army with adequate cavalry continues - aided by more Western knights lured to join up by Alexius with a promise of lands on the frontier? - things stay that way. If the Turks settle in Syria in large numbers, we also get butterflies for the Crusaders if they arrive as in OTL 1098 to 'rescue' Jerusalem- more Moslem enemies intent on attacking them and a greater chance of failure, or at least of having to rely on Byz help and admit Alexius as their overlord. A mass of quarrelsome rival Turkish warlords in Syria ruling mini-kingdoms also provides headaches for any would-be unifier, eg Zengi, Nureddin, and Saladin.

The lack of a large or militarily coherent civilian local population or many large walled cities in sparsely-populated and infertile upland eastern and inland central Anatolia is a continuing Byz problem - so if the frontier is breached and/or the army defeated , or a civil war in the capital distracts the military, there is no 'defence in depth' and it is open season for invaders. But a 'defence line' of smallish fortresses and blocked passes plus mobile army units across the East of Anatolia, probably SW (Cilicia) via the Theodosiopolis/ Erzerum area to the NE (at the Black Sea's SE corner, near Phasis) is easier to hold for Alexius I , his hugely capable son John II, and John's showy and risk-taking but reasonably flexible son Manuel I , in c. 1080 to 1180 than the 'bow-shaped' OTL frontier, which had the Turks still occupying central Anatolia (one, Saljuk state at Konya, a smaller , Danishmend state to the N, and assorted roaming tribes), and all 3 emperors were capable of keeping the army in action year by year to keep up training and ward off raiders. In this scenario, if - a big 'If' but plausible - stability in Constantinople continues under a longer-lived Manuel (d aged around 62 in 1180 in OTL) , who lasts until his half-Crusader son Alexius II (born 1169, son of a princess of Crusader Antioch) is adult and a Byz-Crusader alliance keeps going and holds Saladin back, we get no Myriocephalum battle disaster in 1176, no tyranny of Andronicus I in 1183-5 fracturing the Byz elite, no disastrous Angeli dynasty, no 1204, and no Horns of Hattin Crusader disaster of a Byz-led rescue of Jerusalem in 1187-91. Do we have Alexius II and his army rescuing his mother's city, Antioch, and then the Kingdom of Jerusalem as 'leader' of the Third Crusade if Saladin takes J, and so improving Byz-Western relations but annoying his own elite by 'wasting' resources on ' barbarian Latins' and 'heretics'? That way, I can see a continuing and centralised Comnene dynasty (if Alexius II dies without a son or is overthrown as 'too Latin and pro-heretic', perhaps led by Andronicus I's capable grandsons Alexius and David, OTL founders of the Trebizond dynasty), or even Theodore Lascaris and John III Vatatzes keeping the Byz state ruling most or all of Anatolia until the Mongols arrive. (There is also a militarily useful new population of exiled Armenian refugees from the Saljuks in SE Anatolia to defend that area, though they are not Orthodox Chalcedonian Christians so the Byz Church could cause persecution and anti-Byz revolts.)

The chances of the Empire keeping hold of Anatolia in and after the 1240s and not suffering a Kose Dagh-style defeat by the huge Mongol army in 1243, as the Saljuks did in OTL, must be limited - and an equivalent of Manzikert then and a huge flood of Mongols and Turcoman nomads into central Anatolia as a result are likely. John Vatatzes if anyone is capable of holding onto the West and stabilising a frontier line (across the centre of the peninsula from Attaleia N via Dorylaion to Sinope and Trebizond?) with resettled Christian refugees plus a rebuilt army, logically with the OTL Empire of Nicaea military/ civilian 'theme system' admin structure plus his tax-raising priorities saving the Empire. This frontier could stabilise for centuries if the Byz stay united (not too hopeful but possible given a line of adult and sane father to adult and sane son descent of the throne as with the Capetians in France). But holding the far East of Anatolia too would really depend on the Mongols heading in another direction in 1243 , given their vast resources that the medium-sized Comnene Byz state could not match - perhaps there's a Mongol decision to 'chase ' the refugee Khwarizmian Turk nomad coalition (driven out of Iraq by the Mongols) across Syria to Palestine in 1243-4 instead, and/or the Saljuks - ruling in Syria , probably at Aleppo, in this timeline - distract the Mongols into a war. if this war and the Mongol campaigns of 1258-60 are all safely beyond the Byz frontier in the Fertile Crescent, I can see a Byz state plus a larger Cilician Armenia lasting for centuries - but at some point the mass of Turcoman tribes roaming around the Kurdistan / Azerbaijan areas are likely to be turned by a charismatic leader into a 'jihad' against the Christians. A lot will depend on a stable and large-size Byzantium taking on the OTL role of the Ottoman state and not being stabbed in the back by Western land-hunting kings like Charles of Anjou...
 
You can butterfly away the OTL mass-migration of Turkish tribes into central Anatolia plus areas of the South and North quite close to the coasts, in the 1070s - which was never reversed even at the height of the Comnene recovery in the mid-C12th - by a few major changes to Byzantine politics and military events in the 1050s to 1070s. Most plausibly, have a series of stable and decently competent 'legitimate' emperors following Basil II who keep a grip on the court nobility and bureaucrats, prioritise the army and tax-raising, and do not alienate the provincial aristocratic elites to the extent that there is a series of rebellions (eg 1043 by Maniaces, 1047 by Leo Tornicius, and 1057 by Isaac Comnenus and his allies in OTL). If Basil II is temperamentally unwilling to marry, have him insist on his weak brother and heir Constantine VIII marrying off his eldest daughter (either Eudocia, who ends up in a convent after having smallpox, or his OTL successor Zoe) to a capable general who continues Basil's policies after C dies in 1028. Otherwise , either military strongman Maniaces wins his revolt against Zoe and her easygoing and over-cautious civilian husband no. 3, Constantine IX, in 1043 and revives a strong and flexible army or Isaac Comnenus has much longer for his military reforms after 1057 and passes the throne in the later 1060s or 1070s to his nephews (Manuel if he is not killed as in OTL, or the actual ruler from 1081, Alexius I) and one of this trio wins the battle of Manzikert.

A competent Byz emperor/ general who has full support and no plotters ready to stage a coup behind his back (as Romanus IV did in 1071 in OTL) and an adequately trained and flexible army with cavalry archers (Pecheneg or mercenary non-Saljuk Turks?) to keep the Saljuks from over-running the defensive Byz infantry phalanxes at Manzikert, plus no panic, muddle or treason at the battle as in real life, would at least secure a draw and keep the army intact. This luck/ skill plus some stronger Byz defensive units to patrol the frontier and catch raiders. logically settled in the region so incentivised to defend their own homes, would hopefully check the Turks. The latter usually preferred 'hit and run' tactics on swift cavalry raids and looting from unarmed civilian farmers and unwalled towns to a pitched battle, so would they give up attacking Anatolia after a mauling in a major battle and head for Syria instead to loot and settle there? The Saljuk Sultans, as 'protectors' of and strongmen behind the Sunni Caliphs in Baghdad and in only precarious command of their tribal vassals ( a factor often forgotten by historians - the 1060s Turkish raids in to Anatolia were by tribal opportunists not by the Sultan's orders), would also have the incentive of driving the unwelcome 'heretic' Shi'a Fatimids out of Syria/ Palestine, plus a lack of major Sunni states in Syria capable of holding them back. That way, we get a major Turkish nomad migration to Syria and Palestine not to Anatolia in the 1070s to 1090s, and if a line of competent Byz rulers with a large and viable army with adequate cavalry continues - aided by more Western knights lured to join up by Alexius with a promise of lands on the frontier? - things stay that way. If the Turks settle in Syria in large numbers, we also get butterflies for the Crusaders if they arrive as in OTL 1098 to 'rescue' Jerusalem- more Moslem enemies intent on attacking them and a greater chance of failure, or at least of having to rely on Byz help and admit Alexius as their overlord. A mass of quarrelsome rival Turkish warlords in Syria ruling mini-kingdoms also provides headaches for any would-be unifier, eg Zengi, Nureddin, and Saladin.

The lack of a large or militarily coherent civilian local population or many large walled cities in sparsely-populated and infertile upland eastern and inland central Anatolia is a continuing Byz problem - so if the frontier is breached and/or the army defeated , or a civil war in the capital distracts the military, there is no 'defence in depth' and it is open season for invaders. But a 'defence line' of smallish fortresses and blocked passes plus mobile army units across the East of Anatolia, probably SW (Cilicia) via the Theodosiopolis/ Erzerum area to the NE (at the Black Sea's SE corner, near Phasis) is easier to hold for Alexius I , his hugely capable son John II, and John's showy and risk-taking but reasonably flexible son Manuel I , in c. 1080 to 1180 than the 'bow-shaped' OTL frontier, which had the Turks still occupying central Anatolia (one, Saljuk state at Konya, a smaller , Danishmend state to the N, and assorted roaming tribes), and all 3 emperors were capable of keeping the army in action year by year to keep up training and ward off raiders. In this scenario, if - a big 'If' but plausible - stability in Constantinople continues under a longer-lived Manuel (d aged around 62 in 1180 in OTL) , who lasts until his half-Crusader son Alexius II (born 1169, son of a princess of Crusader Antioch) is adult and a Byz-Crusader alliance keeps going and holds Saladin back, we get no Myriocephalum battle disaster in 1176, no tyranny of Andronicus I in 1183-5 fracturing the Byz elite, no disastrous Angeli dynasty, no 1204, and no Horns of Hattin Crusader disaster of a Byz-led rescue of Jerusalem in 1187-91. Do we have Alexius II and his army rescuing his mother's city, Antioch, and then the Kingdom of Jerusalem as 'leader' of the Third Crusade if Saladin takes J, and so improving Byz-Western relations but annoying his own elite by 'wasting' resources on ' barbarian Latins' and 'heretics'? That way, I can see a continuing and centralised Comnene dynasty (if Alexius II dies without a son or is overthrown as 'too Latin and pro-heretic', perhaps led by Andronicus I's capable grandsons Alexius and David, OTL founders of the Trebizond dynasty), or even Theodore Lascaris and John III Vatatzes keeping the Byz state ruling most or all of Anatolia until the Mongols arrive. (There is also a militarily useful new population of exiled Armenian refugees from the Saljuks in SE Anatolia to defend that area, though they are not Orthodox Chalcedonian Christians so the Byz Church could cause persecution and anti-Byz revolts.)

The chances of the Empire keeping hold of Anatolia in and after the 1240s and not suffering a Kose Dagh-style defeat by the huge Mongol army in 1243, as the Saljuks did in OTL, must be limited - and an equivalent of Manzikert then and a huge flood of Mongols and Turcoman nomads into central Anatolia as a result are likely. John Vatatzes if anyone is capable of holding onto the West and stabilising a frontier line (across the centre of the peninsula from Attaleia N via Dorylaion to Sinope and Trebizond?) with resettled Christian refugees plus a rebuilt army, logically with the OTL Empire of Nicaea military/ civilian 'theme system' admin structure plus his tax-raising priorities saving the Empire. This frontier could stabilise for centuries if the Byz stay united (not too hopeful but possible given a line of adult and sane father to adult and sane son descent of the throne as with the Capetians in France). But holding the far East of Anatolia too would really depend on the Mongols heading in another direction in 1243 , given their vast resources that the medium-sized Comnene Byz state could not match - perhaps there's a Mongol decision to 'chase ' the refugee Khwarizmian Turk nomad coalition (driven out of Iraq by the Mongols) across Syria to Palestine in 1243-4 instead, and/or the Saljuks - ruling in Syria , probably at Aleppo, in this timeline - distract the Mongols into a war. if this war and the Mongol campaigns of 1258-60 are all safely beyond the Byz frontier in the Fertile Crescent, I can see a Byz state plus a larger Cilician Armenia lasting for centuries - but at some point the mass of Turcoman tribes roaming around the Kurdistan / Azerbaijan areas are likely to be turned by a charismatic leader into a 'jihad' against the Christians. A lot will depend on a stable and large-size Byzantium taking on the OTL role of the Ottoman state and not being stabbed in the back by Western land-hunting kings like Charles of Anjou...

Very informative and detailed, thank you!

What is your opinion on using the POD of 1176, in that Manuel I wins at Battle of Myriokephalon? The Anatolian interior might remain ethnically "Turkish", but in the long run the restoration of Byzantine authority allows for the conversion to Christianity of these Byzantine Turks. IIRC, something like 10-15% of Turks did end up converting to Christianity IOTL and a lot of modern Turks are mixed/plurality Greeks who just adopted Turkish culture and Islam, at least that's my understanding.
 
Yes, this is certainly possible and is one of the central premises of the first chapter of my forthcoming Sealion book/ ebook 'Rampart of Christendom'. Manuel, who some modern analysts have argued should have tackled eastern Anatolia far sooner (eg in the later 1140s in the aftermath of the Second Crusade and left Roger II's Sicily alone as his target until later), led one large army into SE Anatolia along the old Constantinople-Iconium/Konya-Cilicia Byzantine military road, headed for Konya the Saljuk capital, and was ambushed in a mountain pass en route in a semi-repeat of the Manzikert disaster - poor scouting , a lack of scouts, or over-confidence to blame? At the same time his Northern Anatolian army was heading for Niksar/ Neocaesarea, the main remaining (small) walled city of the region which was also in Turkish hands, but this was defeated too; he had a massive army, said to stretch for ten miles on the march, and he refused to accept Saljuk Sultan Kilij Arslan's offer to become his loyal vassal - the terms which he had accepted from KA's predecessor in 1146 on a similar march on Konya - so he was probably aiming at annexing Konya permanently. the war was also played up as a 'Crusade' in letters sent to the Crusader states in Palestine and involved his own Balkan vassals, eg Serbia, sending troops plus some Jerusalem/Antioch/ European Western knights. It was therefore probably his biggest ever Anatolian war and more than his usual showy but ephemeral demonstration of power - and it followed his rebuilding of the main central Anatolian fortresses of Sublaion and Dorylaion, which served to protect local farmers and travellers from Turkish raids and would keep any new Byz settlers in the region safe.

The defeat, by a more flexible force of Turkish cavalry attacking a lumbering Byz infantry column whose cavalry was inadequate, unaccustomed to hit-and-run skirmishers, or vulnerable to long-range archers, was rare for the skilled Manuel. Had he prepared adequately or were his disparate army sections not used to fighting together? Did he rely on numbers not on skill? The sources refer to Byz panic and loss of nerve, leading to a rapid and uncontrolled retreat that turned into a rout. A victory if he had been more careful or had better lieutenants was plausible; then he could have occupied Konya and hopefully set up a chain of small fortresses and a well-patrolled road link to keep the city safe, plus occupying the (few) other Saljuk-held cities and towns in mostly rural eastern Anatolia, eg Caesarea Mazacha/ Kayseri. Combined with success in the NE in taking and holding Niksar and nearby Amasya, if (a big if given his restless character) Manuel had the skill and patience to put in enough troops , cavalry units in particular, to hold down the towns and forts and keep the Saljuk and their Danishmend rivals (NE Anatolia) broken up the Byz could then keep the disunited local Turkish nomads - mostly pastoral tribes not settled farmers - as leaderless and overawed vassals. As said, they could then be gradually converted to Christianity and kept as (bribed or intimidated) vassals in the meantime; provided the Byz had a cohesive and well-led army this could last for generations , until the 1243 Mongol war at any rate. The Byz could even use a well-paid and motivated long-term Turkish cavalry mercenary force as part of their army for Anatolian and Syrian wars, though they were perhaps unreliable at obeying orders.

If Manuel wins, it could also keep him from slipping into his probable depression and loss of energy in the later 1170s, when he was around 58-62 - and keep him alive for a few more years? If he lives until his half-Antiochene son Alexius (II) is adult, then that butterflies the usurpation of Andronicus I away and keeps the Byz elite cohesive ; and if the 1176 war in NE Anatolia is a success then Manuel's late elder brother 's son John Comnenus, one of his main lieutenants, is not killed in action but probably survives as a political counter-balance to JC's feckless and incompetent younger brother Alexius, who in OTL was the main regent with Manuel's widow Maria in 1180-2 and was so disliked by the other nobles that many turned to Andronicus (in 1176-80 returned from long exile after being blackmailed into doing this by having his mistress kidnapped but having been sent off from the capital into provincial obscurity) as a rescuer to depose the regency.

Manuel seems to have lacked the businesslike organisation and dogged tenacity of his father John II, who had concentrated on restoring Byz power and settlers in Anatolia and regarded the West as a distraction unlike pro-Western Manuel - his own interest in Anatolia or any long-term wars there was sporadic, so possibly his attempt to reconquer Apulia and Sicily and secure influence in Italy in the 1150s led to the Empire missing a vital chance to push the Turks back then. (He had an excuse, ie the power of the Sicilian fleet threatening a repeat of the 1081 and 1107 invasions of Epirus from S Italy; at one point in 1148 the Sicilians raided Greece to kidnap his silk-weaving craftsmen from Thebes and landed men at night in Constantinople to climb the harbour wall and steal fruit from his palace gardens.) One other favourable alternative scenario of 'Byz regains all of Anatolia' has John II, aged 55 when he died of gangrene after cutting his arm on an arrow (or was it poisoned?) while he was hunting in Cilicia in 1143 during a planned march on Antioch, lasting for another decade and taking Konya himself. Another has one or both of his elder 2 sons, Alexius and Andronicus, who both died in 1142, surviving so that 4th son Manuel does not take the throne; another has the 3rd son, Isaac, who was set aside by the generals when John died as not as vigorous or skilled as Manuel, succeeding instead. John in fact intended Manuel as his sub-ruler in Antioch when he regained it from the Latins; if John and his elder sons had not died early, Manuel would not even have been emperor. An alt Emperor fighting the Saljuks in the 1140s to 1160s could have been more methodical and successful at this sort of campaign than Manuel - or M had to fight as a general for and obey the priorities of an elder brother as Emperor.
 
Basically, achieve the reverse of what happened OTL (or maintain the Middle Ages dynamic, if you prefer lol). Historically, the Turks ultimately broke Byzantine rule in Anatolia and gradually converted the region, ultimately birthing the the Ottoman Empire while in Iberia the petty Christian Kingdoms were able to stage the Reconquista. To make the challenge easier-and because of my own affection for the aforementioned petty Kingdoms-the borders in Iberia have some leeway. For example, something like this:

iberia_0900.gif


As for Anatolia, something like this at least (can be more!):

AnatolieLimits.jpg
@LSCatilina said several times at alternatehistory.com that he was very skeptical of Al-Andalus' ability to survive.
 
@LSCatilina said several times at alternatehistory.com that he was very skeptical of Al-Andalus' ability to survive.
Up to a point at least when it comes to a survival "as is" without much fundamental changes and especially as a sole peninsular state.

Although there is a distinction to be made between al-Andalus as its own entity and Islamic Spain in the sense you could well end up with a "Maghrebi" southern Spain either peripheral or integral part to a Morrocean political ensemble. And it wasn't as if Christians couldn't be as divided as Muslims or that the latter couldn't benefit from that (the emirate of Grenada basically survived more than one century partly because of it).
There's nothing inherently preventing an ATL Morroco to control both sides of the Alboran Sea, basically, or even controlling a decent chunk of Southern Spain.

One of the main military and demographic advantages of the northern Christian petty-kingdoms was that they were directly connected to the medieval Christian world (Normans, French, Provencals, etc. participating to campaigning and settling), especially in the context of Crusades and delegation of collective social duty to a religious one that met with the emergence (ca. the late Xth century to the early XIth century IIRC) of a "reconquista" perspective.

On the other hand, al-Andalus (as was Sicily) was kind of peripheral to the broader medieval Islamic world, treated as a more or less remote marge by Syrian authors, with the notable exception of Maghribi polities. Furthermore, while jihâd was treated by several western Islamic groups as a duty, especially in establishing a "border" (seen with Almoravids, but even earlier with the "outpost-state" of Fraxinetum), it was also something "collectively delegated" to the state or specialized groups through regular raiding expeditions to display legitimacy and power.
It wouldn't necessarily a crippling difference, as the Almoravids and Almohads armies answered that, but even these failed to while successfully defeated Christians in many occasions, precisely because they weren't really able to re-settle and take control of the regions as their Christian opponents did.
 
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Up to a point at least when it comes to a survival "as is" without much fundamental changes and especially as a sole peninsular state.

Although there is a distinction to be made between al-Andalus as its own entity and Islamic Spain in the sense you could well end up with a "Maghrebi" southern Spain either peripheral or integral part to a Morrocean political ensemble. And it wasn't as if Christians couldn't be as divided as Muslims or that the latter couldn't benefit from that (the emirate of Grenada basically survived more than one century partly because of it).
There's nothing inherently preventing an ATL Morroco to control both sides of the Alboran Sea, basically, or even controlling a decent chunk of Southern Spain.

One of the main military and demographic advantages of the northern Christian petty-kingdoms was that they were directly connected to the medieval Christian world (Normans, French, Provencals, etc. participating to campaigning and settling), especially in the context of Crusades and delegation of collective social duty to a religious one that met with the emergence (ca. the late Xth century to the early XIth century IIRC) of a "reconquista" perspective.

On the other hand, al-Andalus (as was Sicily) was kind of peripheral to the broader medieval Islamic world, treated as a more or less remote marge by Syrian authors, with the notable exception of Maghribi polities. Furthermore, while jihâd was treated by several western Islamic groups as a duty, especially in establishing a "border" (seen with Almoravids, but even earlier with the "outpost-state" of Fraxinetum), it was also something "collectively delegated" to the state or specialized groups through regular raiding expeditions to display legitimacy and power.
It wouldn't necessarily a crippling difference, as the Almoravids and Almohads armies answered that, but even these failed to while successfully defeated Christians in many occasions, precisely because they weren't really able to re-settle and take control of the regions as their Christian opponents did.
Thanks for the reply. I knew you said at https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/ahc-islamic-state-on-iberia.355912/post-10841474
that a North African state including Southern Spain could survive but even then, it would be hard, because of their management hell. Remember the Almohads were so fanatic that they destroyed relations between Iberian Muslims and North Africans. There were Iberian Muslims who prefered to live under Christian rule than under Almohad rule.
 
Thanks for the reply. I knew you said at https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/ahc-islamic-state-on-iberia.355912/post-10841474
that a North African state including Southern Spain could survive but even then, it would be hard, because of their management hell. Remember the Almohads were so fanatic that they destroyed relations between Iberian Muslims and North Africans. There were Iberian Muslims who prefered to live under Christian rule than under Almohad rule.
Heh, I was far too categoric on that one (and really overestimating Christian capacities on their own), and not overly humble, so probably best to ditch that post : for instance, while some Muslims groups did preferred a Christian dominance over them in the short run, many much more did preferred a Berber dominance.
After all, fanaticism was not an exclusivity of Berber dynasties, and Christian powers were very able to display some themselves as Muslims got expelled or forcibly converted, nothing we couldn't see helping an Islamic state in Morroco or Spain benefit from with a much more clearly "ethnicized" division (which is, eventually, what happened IOTL)
 
RE: Iberia, does the calculus changes if Tours goes better? Not in the "Arabic from the pulpits in Canterbury" nonsense sense, but in the sense of being able to project power even minimally in southern Gaul mean more time to absorb/conquer petty kingdoms along the northern border like Asturias and make attempting to push the Muslims out of Spain a more costly and irritating endeavour.
 
RE: Iberia, does the calculus changes if Tours goes better? Not in the "Arabic from the pulpits in Canterbury" nonsense sense, but in the sense of being able to project power even minimally in southern Gaul mean more time to absorb/conquer petty kingdoms along the northern border like Asturias and make attempting to push the Muslims out of Spain a more costly and irritating endeavour.
Thing is, Tours did not prevented Arabo-Andalusian projection on the north, neither on Spain or Gaul as you can see with the campaigns of 734 to 737 in Languedoc and Provence. What stopped, for a moment (as you had Arabo-Andalusian raids and campaigns in Languedoc or Provence in the IXth and Xth centuries), was the Berber Revolt of 739 and the following inner strife in the peninsula : "marches" being emptied, the bulk of Arabo-Andalusian forces not being available (either those in Spain or those recruited in Maghrib and Ifriqiya), civil war, etc. until a sole authority emerged with Ummayad takeover.
Not that Tours wasn't an important step in the raids and counter-raids of the VIIIth century, but its impact on al-Andalus is difficult to assess, although I agree we can speculate on the impact it had on peninsular Christians : it's after all well celebrated in the Chronicle of 754 made by a Cordoban monk, but I'm not sure how it can be mirrored to the northern Christian principalities.

The question of whether the northern petty-kingdoms could have been conquered or not is interesting, even if there's a damning lack of sources : I wouldn't dismiss the possibility the failure of the raids and campaigns in Aquitaine in the late 710's and early 720's and the Battle of Toulouse in 721 to have been a factor in the *rejection* of northern Christian nobles of Arabo-Berber dominance (as the region had been raided and tributarised in the mid-710's).
An Arabo-Berber presence north of the Pyrenees (very roughly on a Garonne/Aude and up to Rhône axis) is possible and might have the impact to maintain the Cantabrian highlands in obedience in a similar fashion to other Christian autonomous princes (as Tudmir/Theodomir in Murcia) : it would be fragile, however, as essentially counting on limited Berber reinforcements and overall numbers (a reason why northern-western Spain was not that well militarily controlled, or why you had few enough Arabo-Berber garrisons in Gaul IOTL), relying on the good-will of native leaders, and with a Peppinid Francia more than able to act on.
But it's something that can be worked on, IMHO.
 
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Yea I'm less interested in a specific claim about Tours and more in a broader assessment of what role the continued existence of petty kingdoms played in the reconquista starting and in the failure of Islamic polities to retain control of Spain through the Middle Ages and into the early modern period.
 
Yea I'm less interested in a specific claim about Tours and more in a broader assessment of what role the continued existence of petty kingdoms played in the reconquista starting and in the failure of Islamic polities to retain control of Spain through the Middle Ages and into the early modern period.
I'm not sure I understand your point?
Mine was that going trough the military historical changes as you proposed might not be the best outlook, as the projection capacity of al-Andalus in the very early period, was less a matter of military defeats than political issues as a remote province (factional infighting, dependency from Ifriqiyan politics and Maghrebi recruits, etc.).

Eventually, that's what allowed Christian petty-princes or local aristocracy to cement their independence in the Cantabrian mountains, or to gamble on Carolingian takeover beyond the Pyrenées or even muladi dynasties to emerge as the Banu Qasi (or, arguably, what not allowed Tudmir's descendents to do the same). The difference between being "in" or "out" the province of al-Andalus by the early VIIIth century might not have been that important on that light, IMHO.

I'm sorry if I miss your argument there again, though.
 
no, I think I misunderstood your post honestly. I think my question was more "would fully annexing the christian petty principalities as opposed to the sort of loose vasselage situation they were in have made a major difference for Andulasi survival" but I didn't pick up on the stress about internal Andulasi dynamics as limiting the reach of its power projection capacities.
 
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