What if the British concluded an Ottoman alliance before World War I ?

[raharris1973]

What if the British concluded an Ottoman alliance before World War I ?

According to David Fromkin's "A Peace to End All Peace" the Young Turks proposed an alliance with Britain in 1911 and Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, favored it but the Cabinet as a whole did not.

What if the cabinet supported it? Does this deter the Italian Turkish Wars and then Balkan Wars?

Whether it does or not, how does it alter relations within the Triple Entente, the Triple Alliance, and between the two power blocs through the following 5 to 10 years?

All things being equal, if WWI breaks out like it did with the same line-up except the Ottomans going along with the British and thus the Alliance, well, at least Britain, under Churchill's impetus, have inoculated themselves against Churchill's greatest blunder. Hopefully he doesn't work with Jacky Fisher to replace it with a worse Baltic Sea or North Sea peripheral blunder.

....of course it is most likely, all things *won't* be equal by 1914 and any Sarajevo crisis.

The difficulty with when the Ottoman approach to Britain was made, in October 1911, was that it was right after Italian attack on the Ottomans in Libya had begun.

So at least a full-fledged alliance at that moment would have required Britain to side with Turkey against Italy.

Churchill judged Ottoman friendship more valuable than Italian, and told the Foreign Secretary so, saying that Ottoman land power was most relevant to British imperial positions (probably having Egypt, Suez, the Arabian Rim, and India in mind) and the Turks were worse to have as an enemy. From the point of view strictly of British imperial lines of communications and relations with its imperial subjects, he may have had a point, but from the point of view of where he stood in the Admiralty, weighing the two as naval powers and trying to assure British supremacy in the world and tranquility in distant waters to permit concentration in home waters, this made no sense at all, since the Italians were clearly the superior naval power to the Turks. The Italians were also more weighty in the European balance, affecting the fate of France, Austria-Hungary and Germany should a war break out and be decided on the continent.

All that said, unlikely as it would have been, if scenario #1 happened, and Britain aligned with the Turks and began aiding them immediately, it is hard to see how the Italians would find it possible to defeat the Turks. Italian troop transports to Libya would be at risk, and the Turks would be free to reinforce Libya. The Balkan League, and especially the Greeks with their Navy would be deterred from entering into a fight against the Ottomans.

The Italians would have to back off, sulk away. They would be quite angry with Britain, and with the other members of the Triple Entente, France and Russia, simply by association. The Italians would walk back to loyalty to the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, not out of great love for them but for lack of alternatives.

The Ottomans meanwhile, would be able to preserve their pre-war territorial status quo in North Africa, the Aegean, and the Balkans, dealing with simmering Albanian and Macedonian insurgencies while the Balkan States are deterred from attack.

Now some may object that alliance with the Turks would be anathema to a British Liberal government, because of the Liberals Gladstonian anti-Turkish tradition, but I think it is safe to say after the Young Turk revolt of 1908, the British were hopeful about the Young Turks and constitutional restoration, happy to see the back of bloody Abdul Hamid, and ready to give a reforming Turkey a chance.

Nevertheless, it may be more productive to look at a somewhat modified scenario, since a British intervention midstream against the Italians is so unlikely.

In scenario 1a - the start of the Tripolitania war is delayed by at least two months, but tension is building, and the Turkish search for allies is on. With no war having started, Churchill's arguments in favor of an Ottoman alliance are more persuasive to his Cabinet peers. It is still a vigorous debate and not an *easy* case because for years most European powers, including Britain, Triple Entente and Triple Alliance alike, have been winking at Italy and saying Libya is theirs to take.

However, the establishment of the alliance and private communication to the Italians that Britain is now obligated to it, compels the Italian government to back off from its course of escalating rhetoric and demands leading to planned war. Italy is blocked and frustrated, and feels Britain is responsible. For the moment, it is recommitted to the Triple Alliance. It must either forget about colonial expansion for now, or look elsewhere, like towards Abyssinia again, for engaging in such things.

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire does not have weaknesses exposed by Italian attack, so the Balkan League should remain quiescent.

In OTL, even Britain's naval mission to Constantinople was irritating to the Russians. An outright Ottoman-British alliance is likely to be even more irritating. The British will of course counter with similar arguments - would you like the Turks to buy German ships? To ally with Germany?

Britain will stick with the Ottoman tie it believes to be in its interest, and is happy to deepen its Entente with France and keep its Entente with Russia. But it won't disavow the Turkish treaty to appease Russia. The Russians can like it or lump it.

......another alternative scenario, scenario #2, is that Churchill loses the argument in Cabinet in 1911 as per historical, mainly because of a desire to avoid complications with Italy, but Churchill repeatedly comes back to the idea.

He brings it up again after the Italo-Turkish Treaty of Ouchy in October 1912. Unfortunately, by this point, the Balkan League powers have already attacked the Ottomans, so aligning with the Ottomans at the moment would put Britain in a hostile position relative to those countries, most notably, the Greeks.

Churchill again is put off and drops it.

However, once more, after the end of the 2nd Balkan War, which sees the Ottoman Empire finally at peace, and demonstrated that Britain's Entente partner Russia was not at the moment ready to immediately partition Turkey nor ready to see any other country, like Bulgaria, seize Constantinople, Churchill brings it up again. This time, adding strength to his argument, and actually within his remit as Lord of the Admiralty, is the growing British dependence on Persian Gulf Oil from Persia's Abadan refinery. Having the strongest local power in Mesopotamia be an ally is considered desirable, alongside the speculative geologists reports that Mesopotamia itself, especially around Mosul, is likely to be a rich source of oil for future Royal Navy requirements. Finally in early 1914, Asquith, Grey, and the Cabinet majority come to support an alliance with the Ottomans and over the winter and spring months come to a mutually agreeable deal.

At the end of June, the Sarajevo crisis happens.

 

[raharris1973]

Reviving this, and with yet a third variation - Britain, under pressure from Churchill and the Admiralty, offers the Ottoman Empire support, and at least de facto alliance, as soon as the Italians put ink to paper in their peace treaty with the Ottomans, the Treaty of Ouchy, in October 1912. Britain engages in naval posturing and ultimatums starting within the first month of the First Balkan War, that hamstring Greek Naval operations, and boost Ottoman fortunes:

What if Churchill and the Admiralty stage a pro-Ottoman alliance/intervention in autumn 1912

In late 1911, Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill proposed a British-Ottoman alliance, likely because of reasons of imperial interest and oil. Imperial interest in having the most prestigious independent Islamic majority state on the same side as Britain with its millions of Muslim imperial subjects, also to deny Germany any special strategic access via the Berlin-Baghdad rail project or worse, any line further down to Basra on the Persian Gulf, and oil because of the empire's own suspected oil reserves, the close proximity of the Mesopotamian provinces to the Anglo-Persian oil fields and refinery at Abadan, and his knowledge that oil was the superior naval fuel of the future.

This isn't the first time I've brought thus Churchillian proposal up, by the way, I brought it up in 2018 as well, https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...sh-ottoman-alliance-concluded-in-1911.440229/. and that's where any quoted material comes from.

A slight problem at that moment with aligning with Ottoman Turkey was that many enemies, internal and external, wanted to carve off a piece of it. Even worse, Italy, from September, 1911, was actively at war with the Ottomans, trying to carve off Libya.

And Italy was an important European 'swing state', formally in the German-led Triple Alliance, but demonstrably capable on certain issues in question of lining up with the Triple Entente.

According to Fromkin, the offer came after the Italian attack on Libya. Its hard to imagine that Britain would agree to go to war with Italy after it had started, so what exactly was the offer? Besides Italy, the only ones who might attack the Ottomans would be Russia or the Balkan states. The Ottomans couldn't possibly have expected the British to throw away the Entente with Russia, so the real targets had to be the Balkan states. The British would be of little use against Serbia or Bulgaria but of great value against Greece. In the Balkan Wars, Greece provided 200,000 men and the Greek Navy prevented the bringing up of troops from Syria. An Ottoman victory in the Balkan Wars butterflies away a lot down there

As stated, Italy was important, and by multiple military and industrial measures, though not necessarily all geographic characteristics, a more powerful country than the Ottoman Empire. Arguably, it would be absolutely dumb to go to war with, or thoroughly alienate, Italy, for the sake of friendship with the Ottomans. No one could deny that choice would be a BOLD GAMBLE.

However, the cost-benefit ratio of supporting/befriending the Ottoman Empire over Greece is quite a bit easier to argue in favor of the Ottoman Empire. Greece is less populous, less industrial, and borders neither France nor Austria. It's not a nothingburger, but it is a lower 'weight-class' in 1911-1912 than the OE.

Another poster was correct however to argue that the Admiralty really needs to make the case and be persistent in making the case in terms of Admiralty fuel requirement and [I would add] imperial (and alliance) naval communications:

But I guess the oil reserves in Iraq will make it up for London.

Tough choice... but for this to happen, the RN needs to promote it. Al Haasa and Iraq have enough oil to be used by the RN. Effectively all of the Mid-East oil will be held by pro-British factions.

Otherwise the government will still not go for it.

Having said all this, here is what I am thinking specifically. Churchill's idea about an Ottoman alliance is, rightly, dismissed when proposed in 1911 during the Italo-Ottoman War, on the grounds that it is not worth alienating Italy.

However, unlike OTL, the idea is not forgotten. It is stored on the shelf with a bookmark saying 'review when the Italo-Turkish war is over'.

In OTL, the Italo-Ottoman War ended on October 18th, 1912. Unfortunately, for the Ottoman Empire, prior to that, sensing Ottoman vulnerability in the face of Italy, and an Albanian revolt, the Balkan League or at least a member state (Montenegro) had declared war on the OE on October 8th, 1912.

Nevertheless with the conclusion of Italo-Ottoman peace, Churchill, with other Admiralty officials, comes out swinging again in favor of an alliance with the Ottomans and for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, largely on the grounds of Royal Navy needs, and by pointing out Ottoman strength at the core----the straights, despite any weaknesses at the periphery.

The Cabinet, with a hot war going on between the OE and the Ottomans will not authorize or ask Parliament for an alliance treaty, nor will Grey nor Asquith agree to its exact non-treaty equivalent. They do not feel they can commit the country to open and full participation in the war on any side.

However, the Admiralty comes back proposing purely naval measures of assistance designed to help the Turks, encourage an early end to the war on terms favorable to them, and set the stage for formal alliance and future cooperation and oil agreements.

Here Churchill and Grey and others hash out whether and how much this would offend the Russian and French Entente partners.

Churchill, sticking to his Departmental knitting, emphasizes that whether Russia *likes* it or not, good Anglo-Ottoman ties on naval and other affairs are *good* for Russia, using as arguments that if the Ottomans cannot get British help they will turn to the Germans, that the Turkish straits are critical to Russia's export economy and revenues, and buttressing his straits argument by citing naval intelligence estimates that naval operations to force open or capture the straits, of a naval or combined nature, would not be easy, even for Britain, and simply not possible for Russia. Churchill reiterates the importance of oil for naval strength and that as the font of British power and diplomatic influence.

To the extent Grey dwells on Russia still not *liking* Anglo-Ottoman side-dealings, Churchill points to raise questions about whether Russia is really excited for Greece to gain any territory at Ottoman expense, much less any part of the straits (both men know the answer is no) or even if the Russians would want Bulgaria to possess Constantinople.

Having successfully argued his case, the specific measure Churchill orders and Asquith and Grey support is for the Admiralty to deploy available heavy fleet units to the eastern Mediterranean, and to declare Britain's 'vital' interest in there being a naval 'cease-fire' in the Aegean Sea, Balkan Waters, Ottoman waters, and Cypriot waters, and lanes in between, that will be guaranteed based on Royal Navy patrols. The Royal Navy pledges to capture, impound, disable, or destroy naval vessels who violate the cease-fire by.......firing weapons, laying mines, or undertaking blockade actions. But this notably does not forbid naval transportation or logistic movement.

The effect this British maneuver is to free the Ottomans to transport troops from Asia to Thrace by sea. The Turks still face some harsh battlefield setbacks in Thrace in initial border battles, and in Macedonia as well, but within a week, they have troops from Palestine and Syria on their way to western Asia Minor and Thrace.

I am thinking that even if this does not stop considerable loses of territory on the frontiers in Thessaly, Albania , Epirus, and Macedonia, that arrival of reinforcements should enable the Turks to relieve Adrianople. and to avoid having Constantinople boxed in on its peninsula behind the Catalcja line, so the capital maintains a continuous front with Gallipoli and other parts of the Ottoman European front. The Balkan fighting should become considerably more contested and costly for the Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks.

How do you think this causes the first Balkan War to end up? I doubt the Bulgarians have the reserves left at the end of the fight to engage in a 2nd Balkan War right away. And the Balkan Wars may not win enough territorial spoils to fight about, in a second round of war. But your mileage may vary.

And how would Russia react to this? Wary of British involvement, I think. But not displeased by lack of Greek and Bulgarian success either. After all, OTL, they threatened the Bulgarians to not go to far to the city. What about Austrian and German reactions.

I am certain that the Greeks, even Venizelos, will be livid at the British, and feel betrayed, that the British intervened and totally negated their naval advantage. I don't know if it will get as far as sparking an uprising on Cyprus. Greeks will have a stronger inclination to Germany now. I do not know how it will shape the shake out on the disposition of the Dodecanese islands. Britain will want to avoid having to pick sides here. Italy would like to slink away with them, but maybe with Britain playing a pro-Turkish role in the Aegean tub, they figure they should bandwagon with that crew and hand the islands back to the OE.

Will this wartime cooperation and facilitation of the Turkish position facilitate London's hoped for Anglo-Ottoman alliance, or at least good cooepration postwar?

By making Balkan aggression more costly and less futile, might Austria be a bit more calm, making it less likely to flip out and start a war, even if one of its archdukes gets murdered by a Serb.

Would Russia take this new Anglo-Ottoman understanding, presuming it persists for many years or a decade, so badly, that all previous Anglo-Russian Ententes and understandings are torn up? And so what if they are? What do both sides do afterward?