raharris1973
Well-known member
Consider, if you wish, some alternatives courses of action, or outcomes of their actions, in the American War of Indepence:
1) No Bernardo Galvez as Governor of Luisiana, Commandante del Lame-O instead: What if instead of the talented Sr. Galvez as Governor of Luisiana and commander of Spanish forces in North America from 1777-1783, there is a crappy, administratively and militarily less competent appointee?
As a result, the Crown and Ministry policy of first allowing arms-smuggling to the Americans occurs via Spanish New Orleans, but the Spanish campaign based out of Luisiana to reclaim Florida, which succeeded in taking Pensacola and West Florida, and securing Spain's claim to recover all Florida, completely fails, as does Spanish campaigning in the Bahamas.
What are the consequences? A continued British Florida? Of what size and extent? Or Britain conceding Florida to the young USA early? With what historical effect?
2) Super-Bernardo: Galvez has even more foresight and ambition as the war approaches, and support from the New Spain Viceroyalty and Spain, which broadens the scope of his offensive from Luisiana into West Florida into Pensacola. A parallel. northern prong positions a smaller, but meaningful, mixed Spanish, local Francophone and native force under Spanish command around St. Louis to cross the Mississippi, which, operating well before Yankee George Rogers Clark, defeats pro-British native tribes, British detachments, and forts, secures garrisons around the base of the Great Lakes, Chicago and Detroit areas, and secures the Kentucky/Tennessee settlements.
Thus, the most forward of Spanish claims to the Trans-Appalachian/Allegheny West made at OTL's Paris negotiation, is actually backed by de facto occupation, troop sweeps, deals with natives, from the current western border of Georgia up through the middle of Ohio to Lake Erie, placing Spain, the owner of the real Toledo, as the probable owner of the land that became in OTL, Toledo, Ohio.
3) Spain can't be bothered: What if Spain, despite all its butt-hurt feeling against Britain, and pining for lost Florida, Gibraltar, and Menorca, and its family alliance with France, just feels like it's bad precedent, bad karma, bad juju, and bad vibes to be supporting independence rebels of another colonial power. It's just too risky, win or lose, expensive, win or lose, and prone to fail anyway. So Spain doesn't help the American rebels, even though the French go all in, first with covert aid, then with recognition, alliance, and war with Britain.
How does an American revolutionary war/war of independence, with the American Patriots, and the French, going all in, but the Spanish staying all out, go differently from OTL, if at all? In terms of final outcomes on the map, perhaps not much different, except for near-certainly, no transfer of Florida from Britain to Spain [so what there, Florida stays British? Ceded to America? Ceded to France of all strange things?] Or maybe quite different - Maybe the Americans lose? Maybe the French do not get Tobago or Senegal?
But certainly some campaigns would be different. No focus on a siege of Gibraltar. A pretty good chance of no massed Bourbon Armada of 1779, because Spain was pushing more for that type of decisive massed assault at the heart of British power - France on its own may be more satisfied with an expeditionary naval duel focused on the North American and Caribbean theaters.
4) Spain is a scaredy gato and stays out of open war: Spain is cool with covert aid to the Americans, but eschews the risk, and the propaganda contradiction of open warfare with the British and relations with the Americans. So they pass material aid to the US and France under the table, but do not engage in combat or warfighting alliances. How does this change the war? It must change the campaigns the way I describe, but the resource picture is not as reduced for the Franco-American coalition as much as in scenario #3 I imagine. Difficult to see Britain getting any improved strategic result out of this except the possibility of keeping Florida.
1) No Bernardo Galvez as Governor of Luisiana, Commandante del Lame-O instead: What if instead of the talented Sr. Galvez as Governor of Luisiana and commander of Spanish forces in North America from 1777-1783, there is a crappy, administratively and militarily less competent appointee?
As a result, the Crown and Ministry policy of first allowing arms-smuggling to the Americans occurs via Spanish New Orleans, but the Spanish campaign based out of Luisiana to reclaim Florida, which succeeded in taking Pensacola and West Florida, and securing Spain's claim to recover all Florida, completely fails, as does Spanish campaigning in the Bahamas.
What are the consequences? A continued British Florida? Of what size and extent? Or Britain conceding Florida to the young USA early? With what historical effect?
2) Super-Bernardo: Galvez has even more foresight and ambition as the war approaches, and support from the New Spain Viceroyalty and Spain, which broadens the scope of his offensive from Luisiana into West Florida into Pensacola. A parallel. northern prong positions a smaller, but meaningful, mixed Spanish, local Francophone and native force under Spanish command around St. Louis to cross the Mississippi, which, operating well before Yankee George Rogers Clark, defeats pro-British native tribes, British detachments, and forts, secures garrisons around the base of the Great Lakes, Chicago and Detroit areas, and secures the Kentucky/Tennessee settlements.
Thus, the most forward of Spanish claims to the Trans-Appalachian/Allegheny West made at OTL's Paris negotiation, is actually backed by de facto occupation, troop sweeps, deals with natives, from the current western border of Georgia up through the middle of Ohio to Lake Erie, placing Spain, the owner of the real Toledo, as the probable owner of the land that became in OTL, Toledo, Ohio.
3) Spain can't be bothered: What if Spain, despite all its butt-hurt feeling against Britain, and pining for lost Florida, Gibraltar, and Menorca, and its family alliance with France, just feels like it's bad precedent, bad karma, bad juju, and bad vibes to be supporting independence rebels of another colonial power. It's just too risky, win or lose, expensive, win or lose, and prone to fail anyway. So Spain doesn't help the American rebels, even though the French go all in, first with covert aid, then with recognition, alliance, and war with Britain.
How does an American revolutionary war/war of independence, with the American Patriots, and the French, going all in, but the Spanish staying all out, go differently from OTL, if at all? In terms of final outcomes on the map, perhaps not much different, except for near-certainly, no transfer of Florida from Britain to Spain [so what there, Florida stays British? Ceded to America? Ceded to France of all strange things?] Or maybe quite different - Maybe the Americans lose? Maybe the French do not get Tobago or Senegal?
But certainly some campaigns would be different. No focus on a siege of Gibraltar. A pretty good chance of no massed Bourbon Armada of 1779, because Spain was pushing more for that type of decisive massed assault at the heart of British power - France on its own may be more satisfied with an expeditionary naval duel focused on the North American and Caribbean theaters.
4) Spain is a scaredy gato and stays out of open war: Spain is cool with covert aid to the Americans, but eschews the risk, and the propaganda contradiction of open warfare with the British and relations with the Americans. So they pass material aid to the US and France under the table, but do not engage in combat or warfighting alliances. How does this change the war? It must change the campaigns the way I describe, but the resource picture is not as reduced for the Franco-American coalition as much as in scenario #3 I imagine. Difficult to see Britain getting any improved strategic result out of this except the possibility of keeping Florida.