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Policies (especially foreign) of a Hearst Presidency, 1913-1917

raharris1973

Well-known member
What if William Randolph Hearst won the Presidential election of 1912 as the Democratic nominee?

The likely backstory to this would be him having consecutively advanced in the half dozen years beforehand from Mayor of New York City to Governor of New York State to be a viable contender for nomination after Bryan loses to Taft in 1908.

His political views at the time were both generally populist and progressive. He likely would have had a generally pro-reform, pro-regulation, and pro-labor domestic record. He probably would have given his program some catchy two-word name, I am not sure what. (TR had his 'Square Deal', Woodrow Wilson had his 'New Freedom', TR as a Bull Mooser proclaimed a 'New Nationalism'...Hearst would proclaim his own thing)

Based on his public persona, compared with Wilson, I would expect his populism to overshadow his progressivism, and White House showmanship and exuberance to contrast with Wilson's intellectualism and scoldiness.

As a non-southerner, I would not expect him to go out of his way to re-segregate the federal government like Wilson did. However, I wouldn't rule it out either, I don't know if he middling, progressive, or regressive on white-black racial issues for his time, but horse trading and influences in his Democratic Party coalition could lead to some roll-backs in black civil rights or well-being even if personal opinions do not push him that way.

It is foreign policy where I expect Hearst to contrast the most from Wilson and with Wilson's 1912 opponents, Taft and TR, at least based on the views expressed in his papers in the 1912-1917 timeframe.

Hearst pumped up Japanophobia in general in this timeframe over both Japanese immigration and Japan's power abroad, and made a particularly big deal about Japan's alleged interest in Magdalena Bay, Baja California, Mexico, in the 'War Scare' of 1913, which coincided with Japanese complaints about California's discriminatory Alien Land Law.

Could this war scare escalate into a Japanese-American shooting war in 1913, or by early 1914, before WWI even gets started in Europe? If the Hearst Press editorial line of the time matched Hearst and his closest confidante's genuine perceptions of Japan's intentions and threats, it would at least point toward a bellicose posture toward Japan and escalatory behavior, although some reciprocation would likely be necessary for Hearst to win an actual declaration of war.

Of course it is entirely possible that faced with the imperatives of governing rather than increasing newspaper circulation, he is more circumspect about Japan, and in no rush to conflict.

By the way, at the time, although Britain and Japan were Allies, the 1911 version of their alliance treaty included an escape clause that allowed Britain to duck any chance of being obligated to help Japan if it found itself at war with the USA. It said Britain wouldn't be obligated to fight any countries it had an arbitration treaty with, and America was one of the few.

But, Hearst, at least as expressed in the editorial pages of his papers, was an Anglophobe as well as a Japanophobe, so might not have understood or truly believed the escape clause. That ironically might have deterred him from taking the ultimate step of war with either power, out of feeling too weak, or could have simply increased his hostility to, and friction with both, and his interest in cooperating with other countries at odds with them, like China and Germany.

On Mexico, I am not sure how his policy would have played out differently from Wilson's, if at all. Lots of Americans and American interests would have been on edge because of the revolutionary situation there.

If there is no near or medium term war with Japan, and we get to August 1914, and WWI begins as in OTL, subsequent developments could get interesting.

Based on Hearst's Anglophobic sentiments, he is going to be more bothered, in principle, by the British distant blockade of Germany. Will he let economic pragmatism and the rising value of trade with the Entente hold him back from challenging the blockade via economic retaliation, or attempts at direct defiance? If he does defy the blockade by either means, how does Britain deal with this headache, and what does it do to WWI?

What are Hearst's odds of getting reelected in 1916 for a second term?

I would also note, that Hearst might not have had to be nominee and President to have had significantly greater influence than OTL. Contemporary 1912 press articles discussed him as a very close ally and backer of Champ Clark, often considered a favorite for the Democratic nomination that year, and there was speculation that Hearst was being considered for SecState as his reward.

Your thoughts?
 
Something similar, in that you can play around with the candidate choice in 1912 here:

Strange Times make for Strange Bedfellows - a Central Powers USA TL

Interesting link and TL. Some of the steps towards conflict are believable, even though they require a bit of recklessness on the American part. Some of the Allied strategies in latter part - keeping Canadian forces engaged in France for so long rather than returned home for defense, seem a bit far-fetched. Also, I'm not so sure sure Quebecois anti-WWI sentiment would apply at all in the entirely different circumstances of a USA invasion (I wish I knew more about Bourassa). Qualitative differences, based on Canadian forces west front experience, and superior combat tested equipment, could result in some nasty thrashings of invading US forces in early probes and invasions. I could imagine at least a discussion about a Canadian separate peace while staying territorially intact while adopting a neutral status. The Canadians earning their negotiating leverage by being better fighters pound for pound - not so easily taken hostage as Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamaica, and the Americans earning their leverage by the universal knowledge they will be unstoppable once more built up and trained.
 
Interesting link and TL. Some of the steps towards conflict are believable, even though they require a bit of recklessness on the American part. Some of the Allied strategies in latter part - keeping Canadian forces engaged in France for so long rather than returned home for defense, seem a bit far-fetched. Also, I'm not so sure sure Quebecois anti-WWI sentiment would apply at all in the entirely different circumstances of a USA invasion (I wish I knew more about Bourassa). Qualitative differences, based on Canadian forces west front experience, and superior combat tested equipment, could result in some nasty thrashings of invading US forces in early probes and invasions. I could imagine at least a discussion about a Canadian separate peace while staying territorially intact while adopting a neutral status. The Canadians earning their negotiating leverage by being better fighters pound for pound - not so easily taken hostage as Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamaica, and the Americans earning their leverage by the universal knowledge they will be unstoppable once more built up and trained.

Biggest issue for Canada is that even with their entire contingent in Canada instead of France, the border is just too long and there are too many Americans. Also worth noting the Dakotas and Minnesota have so much rail infrastructure because of Canadian usage of the same; while other railways exist, the emergence of a hostile U.S. would automatically weaken them by severely limiting East-West communications and transportation.

As an aside though, I think the most likely end result of a Hearst Presidency is a neutral U.S. and a peace deal by early 1917 that favors the Central Powers.
 
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