Plausibility check: could a better handled Italy have become France's partner in enforcing the Versailles treaty?

[raharris1973]

Could a better handled Italy have become France's partner in enforcing the Versailles treaty?

I've wondered about this.

I've always been quick to agree that by not, at a minimum, granting Italy all its territorial claims per the Treaty of London, the western Allies, France, the UK, and USA leading the pack, made a realpolitik blunder and alienated Italy.

Italy as a gainer from the Habsburg collapse, should have been a champion of the post-Versailles, post-Saint-Germain system, according to this thinking.

In realpolitik terms, ethnoloinguistics aside, wherever there was a clash between Italian and Yugoslav claims, it made more sense to resolve them in Italy's favor because Italy was stronger, and Serbia had plenty to be grateful for in terms of being rescued from occupation and the other South Slavs in independence from Austria-Hungary. Wilson seemed most determined to disregard the London Treaty as definitive grounds for resolving claims, but I've also read that that the French, less committed to idealism, saw Yugoslavia as sort of a counterweight or container to Italy. If so, that sounds like silly overreach for France - just how many powers did France think it could balance against?

However, recently, I've started to doubt whether an Italy granted its claims in the Adriatic and thus not driven to walk out on Versailles could really end up as a reliable police enforcer of Versailles and partner of France anyway. For one, internal social disorder was going to put Italian democracy in grave danger, and even without mutilated victory propaganda, fear or Red takeover could have been enough for the Italian establishment and royalty to surrender their country to Fascist dictatorship. Secondly, system of government aside even if the Italian people weren't fans of wars, or not fans of big wars against peers [and frankly, even Mussolini wasn't even a fan of wars against peer powers involving hard fighting, he thought the war he entered in Jun1940 was all but over], many, many Italians - Fascist and non-Fascist - had an opportunistic, revisionist foreign policy agenda, unsatisfied with the current division of the world favoring the British and French.

Italy demanded, and got, border adjustments in Libya in its favor during the interwar years from Britain and France. It had claims and ambitions to advance on French and British possessions as well, and Ethiopia, and claims to rightful influence over Spain and the Balkans.

Italy limiting its foreign policy demands, under any regime, to being an uncomplaining ally to London and Paris (and Washington), interested in no more than keeping Austria out of Germany's clutches, seems a bit unlikely, despite the hopes raised even in OTL by the Stresa Front. Even if we suppose territorial satisfaction of European claims at the end of Great War.

Your thoughts?

 

[LSCatilina]

The main problem there is that neither Britain and the United States were inclined to throw their lot behind Italy, and these were the dominant diplomatic powers in 1919 : hence partly why France (in spite of accepting the semi-fait accompli of Austria-Hungary collapse) went in back-and-forth trying to appease both Italian and Serbian claims while acknowledging their dependence on an alliance with Britain and the United States (leading to pretty much send the economic/toll union between France, Benelux, Rhineland and Italy down the toilet).

These arbitrages in Central Europe weren't so much led by the idea of gaining as much allies as possible than preventing the permanence of nationalist and geopolitical troubles they knew they couldn't assume militarily and could led to a quick resurgence of a German Mittleuropa (at least politically, probably economically as well). Hence even as late as 1918, you had french ouvertures about maintaining AH as sort of confederal ensemble.

If so, that sounds like silly overreach for France

Congratulations, you pretty much summarized the prospect for war goals and peace in military, economic, diplomatic and politic circles in France during the conflict.
Not to say all of them were irrealistic, but they also essentially depended from a balance of power not only in post-war Europe but within the Entente itself which was already hard to maintain by 1916 and definitely went the way of the dodo with Russian collapse and withdrawal. Except that, by 1918 or 1919, that wasn't wholly acknowledged and led to a lot of abandonments.

just how many powers did France think it could balance against?

It pretty much depends from when we're talking : as a rule of thumb, only Germany really was seen as a power to perpetually contain (excluding it from military, diplomatic and economic European cooperation) for all the war, but it did happen at the end of the war that Britain was seen as a too much powerful (as well as United States) partner that while not hostile per se, was actively curbing down French power (with even some ideas on a French-German cooperation).

Mostly, still, the French predominant position (altough not unanimous by far) was to maintain some sort of "European Concert" akin to 1815 (hence the late attempts at preserving AH) and more accepting the nationalities principles as both a discount replacement and in gaining some local partners generally seen as aggressive.

Italy itself wasn't really seen as to be counter-weighted, mostly because of a partnership was seen (in a semi self-deluded way) as natural between Paris and Rome. It's just that Paris tried to straddle the issues in the region as they went.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

If the London Pact were followed, that would include divvying up Albania. Yugoslavia might grumble less about not getting all of Dalmatia if they're getting more of Albania.



In theory there could also be adjustments though.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

Secondly, system of government aside even if the Italian people weren't fans of wars, or not fans of big wars against peers [and frankly, even Mussolini wasn't even a fan of wars against peer powers involving hard fighting, he thought the war he entered in Jun1940 was all but over], many, many Italians - Fascist and non-Fascist - had an opportunistic, revisionist foreign policy agenda, unsatisfied with the current division of the world favoring the British and French.


Italy demanded, and got, border adjustments in Libya in its favor during the interwar years from Britain and France. It had claims and ambitions to advance on French and British possessions as well, and Ethiopia, and claims to rightful influence over Spain and the Balkans.

Italy limiting its foreign policy demands, under any regime, to being an uncomplaining ally to London and Paris (and Washington), interested in no more than keeping Austria out of Germany's clutches, seems a bit unlikely, despite the hopes raised even in OTL by the Stresa Front. Even if we suppose territorial satisfaction of European claims at the end of Great War.

Your thoughts?

Italy's territorial demands against Britain and France were in part motivated by the London Pact itself not being fulilled. Italy was to be compensated by Britain and France with colonial gains, and initially Italy wasn't compensated. Article 9 promised Italy territory in the area of Antalya if the Ottoman Empire were partitioned. Article 10 purported to give Italy all of the rights the Sultan had in Libya, which was an ambiguous promise but could have been understood to promise border adjustments in Libya to account for Ottoman Libya's greatest extent. Article 13 promised Italy compensation Britain or France made gains in Africa at Germany's expense.

The Italians would still be interested in shaking up the international system, but compared to other allied powers they really did get very little from the war.

 

[raharris1973]

Italy's territorial demands against Britain and France were in part motivated by the London Pact itself not being fulilled. Italy was to be compensated by Britain and France with colonial gains, and initially Italy wasn't compensated. Article 10 purported to give Italy all of the rights the Sultan had in Libya, which was an ambiguous promise but could have been understood to promise border adjustments in Libya to account for Ottoman Libya's greatest extent. Article 13 promised Italy compensation Britain or France made gains in Africa at Germany's expense.

On the bolded parts, arguably *France* was pretty prompt about compensating Italy in Africa - in Libya, at the end of the war, adjusting the border favorably in 1919. See https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Territorial_growth_of_Italian_Libya.svg. But the British were laggards, only handing over Egyptian and Sudanese borderlands to Italian Libya in the 20s and 30s. And based on the link you provided, using the most liberal Ottoman definition of Tripoli, France would have handed over a bit of southeast Tunisia to make it complete. In East Africa, France, which only had tiny Djibouti, gave nothing. Britain handed over Jubaland from British East Africa/Kenya to Italian Somaliland however, but not until 1925.

But, Italian claims and pressure campaigns, under Mussolini at least, went further than the specifics of London. London didn't mention Abyssinia/Ethiopia specifically. Italy aimed anti-French revisionist campaigns at Djibouti, Tunisia, Corsica, Nice, and Savoy. It aimed anti-British revisionist campaigns at Malta. Italy also voiced a claim to former German Cameroon.

Article 9 promised Italy territory in the area of Antalya if the Ottoman Empire were partitioned.

The OE was partly partitioned, and Italy was disappointed in Antalya, but multiple powers were disappointed in Asia Minor and Thrace, mainly due to the actions of Ataturk and the Turkish nationalist movement, not Britain or France. Others in 'club disappointment' in losing spheres of influence or annexations in Asia Minor/Thrace along with Italy included: Greece, Russia, France (Cilicia), possibly Britain (Kurdistan)

The Italians would still be interested in shaking up the international system, but compared to other allied powers they really did get very little from the war.

This is rather subjective and 'eye-of-the-beholder'-ish. Italy gained plenty. She gained up to her ethnolonguistic boundaries in Europe, and beyond, acquiring non-trivial Austrian Tyrolese German and Istrian Slovene and Croat minorities in addition to Italians from the defeated Austro-Hungarian Empire, and solidified control over the Dodecanese from the twice defeated Ottomans, and in 1919 and the interwar decades receives territorial augmentations in Libya and East Africa from its French and British allies.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

In 1920:

France got Cameroon, Togoland, Syria-Lebanon, and Alsace-Lorraine.
Britain got Namibia, a slice of Togoland, a slice of Cameroon, Tanganyika, New Guinea, Samoa, Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq.
Italy got Trentino-Alto Adige, Zara, and desert lands along the French border.

I don't see why it's an eye-of-the-beholder'ish thing to point out that the Italians didn't get much from the war initially.

 

[Jackson Lennock]

Maybe something along the following lines? Italy gets a slice of Dalmatia, 2/3 of Albania, Aozou sooner, the maximalist interpretation of Ottoman Libya [at the expense of Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt], Jubaland, Tanaland/Witu (including Lamu), Socotra (which IIRC Britain offered to Italy as a penal colony at one point) and a slice of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan following a river that had its source in Eritrea. There is also a guarantee of British assistance in the Ethiopian Border dispute. By the end of the 20s, a version of Hoare-Laval occurs in which Italy gets a slice of Eastern Ethiopia which the Ethiopians lost control of to the Dervish historically, and some areas due south of Eritrea (but less than they'd have had to cede historically. In exchange, Ethiopia gets a coastline (more than the narrow coast promised historically) and some lands around Lake Turkana.




Map superimposed over modern borders. Red indicates lands given to Ethiopia by Britain. I guess the big problem with my idea is that Britain doesn't have much incentive to give Ethiopia anything, but on the other hand it's largely empty desert of a similar sort as the Ogaden lands Ethiopia is ceding.

 

[raharris1973]

I wonder if key decisions at the right time in *Belgrade* by *Serbian* decisionmakers in 1918-1919 could be even more decisive than better judgment in Paris, London, or Washington in making Italy a 'satiated' great power after the Great War, and indeed a patron, member, leader and *King* of an alternate version of OTL's anti-Habsburg restoration 'Little Entente'? - Indeed, a closer and more effective patron/leader than France ever could be.

The key PoD would be Serbian powerbrokers lowering of expectations of the boundaries for the new 'Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes', sometimes called Jugoslavia, in shorthand. The leadership in Belgrade makes this call upon learning of all Italian Adriatic claims, including those articulated in the Treaty of London. The decisionmakers decide to yield to Italian claims in all cases, even when there may be a reasonable historic or linguistic South Slav claim. The princial set of reasons being that Belgrade decides good relations with Italy are vital for a peaceful and prosperous future, for protection against Habsburg or general Germanic or Magyar revanchism, and given wartime agreements, support from western powers against Italy isn't guaranteed. The other, very, very important reason why Belgrade finds soft-pedaling and sacrificing some of its ideal maximum Adriatic, Dalmatian, Albanian claims an acceptable price for good relations with Italy is that it sacrifices Croat and Slovene interests, but not really Serb - and at heart, the Greater Serbian interest and achievement is the great win they feel they've gotten from the war and need to protect. Everything else is a dispensable luxury. Belgrade dispenses, and Italy-Yugoslavia amicably settle the border before the border becomes any matter of high drama for either delegation at the Versailles conference.

After the conference, with their border amicably settled, both Italy and Yugoslavia don't see each other as that threatening, and they see Austrian or Habsburg revanchism as a greater threat to themselves, even if not a very immediate one. Both seek good relations with Romania, Yugoslavia for anti-Magyar containment reasons, and Italy for linguistic affinity reasons and oil. The common suspicion of Austria and the Habsburgs creates a community of interest between Czechoslovakia and the Romanians, Yugoslavs, and Italians. With the Yugoslavs being more respectful or and accommodating to Italian power, they do not play the game of inciting French patronage in zero sum competition against Italy (despite their substantial wartime and pre-war cooperation with France) because although they want favors from both, they don't want to be forced to choose definitively or get torn apart in a feud they incite.

Furthermore, I would expect that Italy would enjoy the prestige of being the leader of a Central European quadripartite 'Little Entente', alllowing this least of great powers to pose as a champion of international order, an opponent of ex-CP revisionism, and an opponent of Bolshevism, in its Russian and (short-lived) Hungarian forms. France would naturally gravitate towards alliance with Poland, as the country on the other side of Germany. It would have a positive attitude toward Czechoslovakia as well. However, I think as a Catholic country, less developed and 'stuck in the middle', Italy would generally have positive sentiments towards Poland also. That is despite some bitter Polish-Czechoslovak disputes. The Poles and Romanians, as in OTL, would have their natural, common anti-Soviet containment interests which would suit Italy and the western powers just fine.