Pickett Goes Forth: Confederate Victory at Gettysburg

[History Learner]

With the 160th Anniversary of the most famous battle in the American Civil War having recently passed, I thought it worthwhile to create a thread looking at one of the overlooked PoDs of the Battle. Over the last decade, Pickett's Charge has been somewhat reassessed, moving from an unworkable scheme to one that was plausible, but badly mismanaged with the end result being rather infamous. Michael J. Armstrong of Brock University and Steven E. Sodergren of Norwich University conducted a study on the matter in 2015, which stated that:

Objective. We model Pickett’s Charge at the Battle of Gettysburg to see whether the Confederates could have achieved victory by committing more infantry, executing a better barrage, or facing a weaker defense. Methods. Our mathematical modeling is based on Lanchester equations, calibrated using historical army strengths. We weight the Union artillery and infantry two different ways using two sources of data, and so have four versions of the model. Results. The models estimate that a successful Confederate charge would have required at least 1 to 3 additional brigades. An improved artillery barrage would have reduced these needs by about 1 brigade. A weaker Union defense could have allowed the charge to succeed as executed. Conclusions. The Confederates plausibly had enough troops to take the Union position and alter the battle’s outcome, but likely too few to further exploit such a success.

As the study further points out, the brigades were available and actually did move forward until Longstreet cancelled their movement:

The Confederate assault did not occur in a vacuum; additional units stood by ready, though many had seen high casualties in the previous days of the battle and thus were not assigned to the initial attack. The brigades of Cadmus Wilcox and David Lang were in support on the right and actually advanced later to reinforce the assault, bringing an additional 1400- 1600 men towards the Union line (Stewart, 1959: 172-3 & Sears, 2003: 454). They went in too late to properly support the assault, however, and suffered 360 casualties from Union artillery fire before retreating (Sears, 2003: 454-55).

According to Sears, three additional brigades from Anderson’s division under Wright, Posey and Mahone were “loosely designated” as support on the left for the attack, but never engaged. They contained approximately 3350 men (Sears, 2003: 392). Stewart notes that at least Wright’s brigade was briefly moved forward, but Longstreet recalled it to defend against a potential counterattack (1959: 237). The remainder of Longstreet’s corps also stood in the area, and thus Coddington notes that Lee “anticipated throwing another 10,000 or so infantry into the breach he expected to be made by the assaulting column” (Coddington, 1983: 462).

Another missed chance is further elucidated upon later on:

Alexander had originally intended to fire a longer initial barrage, and also make use of several guns from the army’s artillery reserve. Unfortunately, General Pendleton, the Confederate Chief of Artillery, repositioned both the reserve and the ammunition train during the barrage (Sears, 2003: 407), making them unavailable. In his memoirs, Alexander remembers Longstreet’s dismay when told that the barrage would be shorter than planned, even going so far as to suggest that it was doomed to fail as a result (Gallagher, 1989: 261)

So let's say Longstreet doesn't fumble that much on Day 3; as a result, Wilcox and Land have their brigades sent in while Longstreet is able to prevent Pendleton from moving the artillery reserve thanks to having fewer operational concerns. The attack thus successfully breaches the Federal line and Lee is able to commit the second wave to the attack:



2nd and 1st Corps get encircled and destroyed, but the rest of the Army of the Potomac is able to retreat though at the cost of much of their equipment and baggage. Lee is too damaged and low on ammunition to force the issue, so Meade is able to withdraw to the Pipe Creek Line, and thus the campaign comes to an end. Total casualties are around 23,000 for the Confederates to 36,000 Federals (An extra 14,000+ losses from the destruction of the aforementioned Corps), leaving the Army of the Potomac extremely battered and likely necessitating pulling forces from the Western Theater, where Vicksburg is concluded as historically. Perhaps Grant comes East with the 13th, 15th and 17th Corps to revive the Army of the Potomac?

 

[Md139115]

Unfortunately I do not seem to have access to the full text, so I cannot properly comment on this scenario. I would however be interested in knowing how the study takes into account the reserves that Meade would have had on hand to respond to a more concerted attack, particularly the recently arrived VI Corps.

 

[Japhy]

Yeah not really keen to put all faith in one article that places itself directly in opposition to all other studies on the matter. No matter how many time you rush to cite them.

 

[History Learner]

Unfortunately I do not seem to have access to the full text, so I cannot properly comment on this scenario. I would however be interested in knowing how the study takes into account the reserves that Meade would have had on hand to respond to a more concerted attack, particularly the recently arrived VI Corps.

Meade had no reserves, sans two brigades guarding the flank; VI Corps was deployed into the line as soon as it arrived:

Yeah not really keen to put all faith in one article that places itself directly in opposition to all other studies on the matter. No matter how many time you rush to cite them.

Besides the study cited, I also cited Troy Harman's Winter Lecture Series presentation. Harman has been a Gettysburg NPS Parker Ranger since 1989, and has multiple books on the subject published. I would certainly be curious as to what studies you're referencing?

 

[Md139115]

Meade had no reserves, sans two brigades guarding the flank; VI Corps was deployed into the line as soon as it arrived:

I do apologize for the late reply - work has left me unable to do the in-depth research that such a response deserves.

Before anything else, I should note that I am going off of this map of the 3rd day of the battle prepared by the Corps of Engineers in 1878, as it is finely detailed enough to show the starting, intermediate, and final positions of various brigades and regiments.

https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3824g.cw0326000c/?r=0.495,0.695,0.147,0.09,0

I should begin by noting that you are broadly correct in noting that the VI Corps was largely split up into its individual brigades in the battle. Specifically the two brigades of the 2nd Division under Grant and Neill were posted on the extreme left and right of the Union lines, with the 3rd brigade of the 1st Division (David Russell commanding) initially being deployed next to Grant. The rest of the 1st Division, and the 3rd Division of the VI Corps, along with the V Corps, took the place in line on the Union left that the III Corps had previously occupied after its mauling the previous day.

When Pickett’s Charge began, Russell’s brigade and the III Corps were moved north to reinforce Hancock’s and Doubleday/Newton’s positions. The III Corps would eventually deploy between the V and I Corps, allowing Newton to shift north and consolidate and later repulse Wilcox, Perry, and Lang, while II Corps under Hays (following the wounding of Hancock and Gibbons) would also be able to consolidate through this. Russell’s brigade would arrive after the charge had been repulsed, so it would be sent back south to reinforce what was happening there.

And what was happening is that free of worry of another Confederate offensive, Meade had ordered Sedgwick to make an offensive against the Wheat Field and possibly the Peach Orchard and Devil’s Den. This Sedgwick did with the 3rd Division of his corps and the 3rd Division, V Corps (McCandless commanding) and they were successful in recapturing the Wheat Field, although it was decided to not press further.

To say that Meade had no further reserves is incorrect. He would have had one fresh brigade on hand in Russell to respond to any immediate Confederate breakthrough, and he would have been able to use the III Corps (admittedly reduced from its previous day’s total of 11,900 to around 7,800 through the fighting) to either also respond directly or to do the OTL move of filling the I Corp positions so they could shift north. He also did not need to order Sedgwick to attack the Wheat Field, which would free up the 3rd Division, VI Corps at minimum, and maybe even more if Lee has ordered Law (commanding Hood’s division after the latter’s wounding the previous day) and McLaws forward to support a breakthrough (though Law would have probably been unable to reply since Kilpatrick decided to suicide his division of cavalry against him at 5:00 PM).

I am not saying the study is wrong, to be clear. It is by respected scholars, references legitimate primary and secondary sources, and Lanchester equations are a commonly used modeling method. Without reading it though I cannot give further commentary besides cautioning against assuming the Union line was brittle enough to be shattered utterly by a single successful drive through the center. There was enough flexibility in the line OTL to easily respond and riposte Pickett’s Charge, and it is possible that this could have been used to contain a more successful offensive otherwise.

 

[Md139115]

And really, while I know that the (narrower) point of this exercise is to investigate a relatively undiscussed PoD of Gettysburg, I do find it strange that we’re quibbling over whether a major Confederate victory with tens of thousands of additional Union casualties is possible on July 3, when there’s like 5 or 6 unquestioned, obvious PoDs on July 2nd where Lee shatters the far more brittle Union lines and sweeps all before him.

 

[marktaha]

Would it have made any difference in the long term? Read a book that argued that the North would simply have recruited a new army.

 

[David Flin]

Would it have made any difference in the long term? Read a book that argued that the North would simply have recruited a new army.

Next to none.

Lee's army didn't have any siege artillery and the Washington defences were fully manned. Lee's army was low on equipment and resources (recall why it went to Gettysburg in the first place). Fort Stevens, in 1864, when the Washington defences had been denuded of troops, demonstrates that even with undermanned defences, Confederate armies bounce.

There was no hope - since this is post Emancipation Proclamation - of Britain recognising the Confederacy.

The North isn't yet suffering from war weariness, and there's no upcoming presidential elections.

Lee's foray was simply a raid writ large, to grab slaves because that's what mattered to the Gentlemen of the South.

In fact, a Confederate victory at Gettysburg was the very first use of ASB. The ASBs were used to give the CSA victory at Gettysburg without firing a shot or losing a man, and the Army of the Potomac just removed from the board without doing anything. The balance of forces is such that Lee's army can wander around for a time, enslaving free blacks and the like, until such time as attrition and/or Western Union armies come along to resolve matters.

 

[marktaha]

Would probably have led to more draft riots like in New York but no more.

 

[Death's Companion]

Another event on the other side of the country a day later would have killed the CSA just fine eventually. Also like one army was completely destroyed in the entire war, they were stubborn buggers and nobody had the cavalry arm to properly pursue so if the Union gets beaten back they just...get beaten back towards the next defensive position.

Confederates are not breaking the line cheaply regardless of what they throw at it, its an entrenched well manned position with artillery batteries in support, see just about any other battle of the war with that combination, the Confederates with more units just take more casualties and if they do push through then what's left of them has to take the brunt of any Union counterattack or rearguard.

OTL the Union after decisively winning the battle were just too damn battered to pursue in terrible conditions, that gets reversed here. Lee would have to settle for a victory and then limp home or push his luck and advance further and take more losses he can't afford. You could potentially see the war end sooner if the Army of Northern Virginia bleeds to death in the North and can't afford the Overland Campaign or Petersburg.

Life kind of sucks when you are fighting a multi front war against a larger and more industrialised power. You have to keep rolling sixes everywhere or the situation declines rapidly.

 

[History Learner]

To say that Meade had no further reserves is incorrect. He would have had one fresh brigade on hand in Russell to respond to any immediate Confederate breakthrough, and he would have been able to use the III Corps (admittedly reduced from its previous day’s total of 11,900 to around 7,800 through the fighting) to either also respond directly or to do the OTL move of filling the I Corp positions so they could shift north. He also did not need to order Sedgwick to attack the Wheat Field, which would free up the 3rd Division, VI Corps at minimum, and maybe even more if Lee has ordered Law (commanding Hood’s division after the latter’s wounding the previous day) and McLaws forward to support a breakthrough (though Law would have probably been unable to reply since Kilpatrick decided to suicide his division of cavalry against him at 5:00 PM).

Grant and Russell's brigades were whom I was referring to in my previous post, but they're both guarding the flanks. Meade can pull on them of course, but that entails accepting a high degree of risk. Shifting III Corps North would be a disaster, as they had taken 35% casualties and thus had a massively reduced effectiveness:

The Second Wave Lee envisioned was Pender and Rodes moving forward with their troops, which in such a scenario would be slamming right into the already shaky III Corps.

I am not saying the study is wrong, to be clear. It is by respected scholars, references legitimate primary and secondary sources, and Lanchester equations are a commonly used modeling method. Without reading it though I cannot give further commentary besides cautioning against assuming the Union line was brittle enough to be shattered utterly by a single successful drive through the center. There was enough flexibility in the line OTL to easily respond and riposte Pickett’s Charge, and it is possible that this could have been used to contain a more successful offensive otherwise.

If you feel comfortable, send me your email and I'll send you a PDF copy of the study if you like? It's also available on Libgen too if you prefer.

And really, while I know that the (narrower) point of this exercise is to investigate a relatively undiscussed PoD of Gettysburg, I do find it strange that we’re quibbling over whether a major Confederate victory with tens of thousands of additional Union casualties is possible on July 3, when there’s like 5 or 6 unquestioned, obvious PoDs on July 2nd where Lee shatters the far more brittle Union lines and sweeps all before him.

There's many PoDs I agree, my favorite is Longsteet gets to Gettysburg on Day 1 on Hagerstown Road. I chose this one because it has a more firm, data basis to it.

 

[History Learner]

Would it have made any difference in the long term? Read a book that argued that the North would simply have recruited a new army.

A huge difference, which comes through when you read all of the literature surrounding 1863 and 1864.

The 1863 Pennsylvania gubernatorial election saw the Copperhead Democrat, George Woodward (of 1864 election fame), lose by a very close margin; I find it reasonable to conclude that a Confederate victory would shift that margin enough for Woodward to become Governor and thus hinder the Army of the Potomac's recovery by refusing to aid in recruitment/conscription efforts in the Commonwealth. There was also, historically, growing signs of dissatisfaction with the war in general that would be exacerbated by Confederate battlefield success. See the Battle of Fort Fizzle in Ohio in 1863, the Detroit Race Riots of 1863, the Charleston Riot in March of 1864 in Illinois, the Fishing Creek Confederacy in Pennsylvania from July to November of 1864, and the occupation of New York City by the Federal Army in the Fall of 1864. You can also view the newspaper reporting in the Summer of 1864 in general, as the Northern public was shocked by the immense casualties taken by Grant and inflation in July of 1864 reached its war-time height. This all had a tangible effect on the war effort: Between July 1863 and December 1864, 161,224 men failed to report to service under the draft.

There's also the massive change to the strategic situation. The 13th Army Corps is about 20,000 men, the 15th about 14,500 men and the 17th numbers about 13,500 men. In total these sum to 48,000 men, which leaves about 26,000 Union troops around Vicksburg while the Confederate Army of Relief under Johnston is almost 30,000 at nearby Jackson, Mississippi. The Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department on the other side has about 50,000 Confederates under arms too.

 

[Md139115]

The Second Wave Lee envisioned was Pender and Rodes moving forward with their troops, which in such a scenario would be slamming right into the already shaky III Corps.

I’m sorry but is this correct? It is different from your original post, and an impossiblity; Pender’s division, with Isaac Trimble in acting command, was already sent forward in the initial attack, and Rodes is occupying the right-center of the Confederate lines directly in front of Cemetery Hill - moving him without filling the gaps with other units puts Ewell’s entire corps in jeopardy of being cut off and destroyed.

 

[History Learner]

I’m sorry but is this correct? It is different from your original post, and an impossiblity; Pender’s division, with Isaac Trimble in acting command, was already sent forward in the initial attack, and Rodes is occupying the right-center of the Confederate lines directly in front of Cemetery Hill - moving him without filling the gaps with other units puts Ewell’s entire corps in jeopardy of being cut off and destroyed.

Roughly half of Pender's Division was held back IOTL and to be sent in with Rodes as the Second Wave; see the map where Thomas and Perrin's brigades are shown attached to Rodes and didn't go forward with the PPT Charge. No hole would be created in their lines because they were to attack the Union position directly in their front, at the base of the "fishhook". Lee had tasked about 30,000 man collectively to his July 3rd concept of operations, with each wave having about 15,000 each attacking different sectors but converging upon Cemetery Ridge in a sequenced attack. I'm assuming you thought I meant Penders-Rodes would move in behind the PPT Charge as the source of confusion, but they were actually to attack a different sector slightly to the North.

 

[History Learner]

Would probably have led to more draft riots like in New York but no more.

To expand further on the strategic situation, Johnson's Army of Relief can plausibly detach 10,000 men to safeguard Jackson against the overstretched 26,000 Federals along the Mississippi littoral. This frees up roughly 20,000 men to join the Army of Tennessee, granting it a better force ratio than it enjoyed at the Battle of Chickamauga IOTL but they still hold the fortifications of Chattanooga here, since Rosecrans was unable to take the city until September IOTL. At a minimum, this halts Federal success until the following Spring and will require them to conduct frontal attacks against well entrenched Confederate positions in mountainous country in an election year. Alternatively, Bragg can wield his superior force to undue the results of the Tullahoma Campaign, reclaiming much of Tennessee for the Confederacy; Rosecrans may or may not give battle and instead favor retreat to Nashville.

Best case Confederate scenario is using the Division of Jones in Southwest Virginia (3 Brigades, ~4,000 men) and Buckner's Division in East Tennessee (3 Brigades, ~6,000 men) to form a Corps and invade Kentucky with it to harass the supply line of Rosecrans. This would force him to abandon Tennessee entirely in a replay of the 1862 Heartland Offensive, lest he be encircled and destroyed at Nashville without logistics. Bragg could follow him into Kentucky, which puts the Federals in quite a bind as a united Confederate force would have almost 80,000 men against 60,000 under Rosecrans if they give battle. If they don't give Battle, then the Confederates overrun Kentucky and, combined with their success at Gettysburg, it's probably enough to trigger French intervention as well as see the Copperhead Democrats elected to Governor in both Pennsylvania and Ohio, crippling Union manpower efforts.

Likewise, with Union manpower so restricted, there's really nothing preventing Kirby-Smith's 50,000 strong Department of the Trans-Mississippi from doing an 1863 version of the OTL 1864 invasion's of Missouri by Sterling Price. The Union can't be strong everywhere here, given their losses, which opens up a lot of Confederate opportunities.

 

[Md139115]

Roughly half of Pender's Division was held back IOTL and to be sent in with Rodes as the Second Wave; see the map where Thomas and Perrin's brigades are shown attached to Rodes and didn't go forward with the PPT Charge. No hole would be created in their lines because they were to attack the Union position directly in their front, at the base of the "fishhook". Lee had tasked about 30,000 man collectively to his July 3rd concept of operations, with each wave having about 15,000 each attacking different sectors but converging upon Cemetery Ridge in a sequenced attack. I'm assuming you thought I meant Penders-Rodes would move in behind the PPT Charge as the source of confusion, but they were actually to attack a different sector slightly to the North.

Ah, I see what you mean, thank you.