raharris1973
Well-known member
What if Admiral Thierry D'Argenlieu, who kicked off the heavy fighting phase of the French Indochina War with the bombing of Haiphong in November 1946 (that also ended the prior mutual French and Viet Minh position-taking and negotiating phase and the Ho-Sainteny agreement of 1945) had died of his battle wounds years earlier in the Battle of Dakar in September 1940?
And, as a butterfly of this, one of the other most prominent French military commanders on the scene, Leclerc, is not killed in transit.
As one member of this board said years and years ago on another board:
With the situation in an alternate fall of 1946, without Admiral D'Argenlieu personally committed to either a) maintain Cochinchina as a separate state from Vietnam, and b) escalate tensions with the Viet Minh to an all invasion and reoccupation of northern Indochina, starting with the bombardment of Haiphong, and Leclerc, supportive of the Ho-Sainteny agreement for co-existence and limited time and scope French troop presence in Vietnam (5 years), continued economic, cultural, foreign policy, military union, and de facto Viet Minh administration in the north, how would things play out in Indochina from 1946 to 1950, and then beyond 1954, and thence to the 1970s?
How long could Leclerc maintain his position out in the region and keep the Ho-Sainteny deal intact from the French side? In particular, how could he protect it from resident and metropolitan based colonial lobbies and others of views similar to D'Argenlieu and maintain the confidence of Parisian cabinets? Especially as Cold War polarization sets in within Europe through the 1947 strike waves, the Czech coup, and Berlin Blockade 1947-1949?
Might French toleration of Ho's/Viet Minh's autonomy and de facto independence inspire more demanding and restive behavior from political elites in French Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria in the late 1940s, that might turn into rebellion if not conceded?
Any impact on how the Madagascar revolt of 1947 is handled?
I believe the Ho-Sainteny deal was supposed to have a duration of five years. How much French meddling in Vietnamese affairs would Viet Minh tolerate over each of those years in terms of questions of French business interests, academic (and academic freedom) interests, missionary interests, discussions about politics and human rights if/when Vietnamese opponents of the Viet Minh make appeals/complaints to the French, or if/when Viet Minh and French officials might say divergent things on international questions like the Marshall Plan, NATO, and once we get to 1950, the Korean War?
The deal should still be in effect as of the October 1949 declaration of the PRC, and the appearance of Communist troops on the Vietnamese and Laotian borders. I would think that would alter the Franco-Viet Minh diplomatic equilibrium a bit for any implementation or renegotiation of the deal from that point.
Actually, by 1949-1950, even if entitled by the mutual Ho-Sainteny agreement to some residual links with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, but with Vietnam effectively independent and the Viet Minh the effective power, would France even have any interest in keeping or exercising any of its remaining links or interests, even if the Vietnamese are no putting them under relentless assault? Or do they see them as awkward liabilities, hard to square with other Cold War commitments, that should be liquiidated as soon as possible.
So @Hendryk, @ anybody else, what do you think?
And, as a butterfly of this, one of the other most prominent French military commanders on the scene, Leclerc, is not killed in transit.
As one member of this board said years and years ago on another board:
With the situation in an alternate fall of 1946, without Admiral D'Argenlieu personally committed to either a) maintain Cochinchina as a separate state from Vietnam, and b) escalate tensions with the Viet Minh to an all invasion and reoccupation of northern Indochina, starting with the bombardment of Haiphong, and Leclerc, supportive of the Ho-Sainteny agreement for co-existence and limited time and scope French troop presence in Vietnam (5 years), continued economic, cultural, foreign policy, military union, and de facto Viet Minh administration in the north, how would things play out in Indochina from 1946 to 1950, and then beyond 1954, and thence to the 1970s?
How long could Leclerc maintain his position out in the region and keep the Ho-Sainteny deal intact from the French side? In particular, how could he protect it from resident and metropolitan based colonial lobbies and others of views similar to D'Argenlieu and maintain the confidence of Parisian cabinets? Especially as Cold War polarization sets in within Europe through the 1947 strike waves, the Czech coup, and Berlin Blockade 1947-1949?
Might French toleration of Ho's/Viet Minh's autonomy and de facto independence inspire more demanding and restive behavior from political elites in French Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria in the late 1940s, that might turn into rebellion if not conceded?
Any impact on how the Madagascar revolt of 1947 is handled?
I believe the Ho-Sainteny deal was supposed to have a duration of five years. How much French meddling in Vietnamese affairs would Viet Minh tolerate over each of those years in terms of questions of French business interests, academic (and academic freedom) interests, missionary interests, discussions about politics and human rights if/when Vietnamese opponents of the Viet Minh make appeals/complaints to the French, or if/when Viet Minh and French officials might say divergent things on international questions like the Marshall Plan, NATO, and once we get to 1950, the Korean War?
The deal should still be in effect as of the October 1949 declaration of the PRC, and the appearance of Communist troops on the Vietnamese and Laotian borders. I would think that would alter the Franco-Viet Minh diplomatic equilibrium a bit for any implementation or renegotiation of the deal from that point.
Actually, by 1949-1950, even if entitled by the mutual Ho-Sainteny agreement to some residual links with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, but with Vietnam effectively independent and the Viet Minh the effective power, would France even have any interest in keeping or exercising any of its remaining links or interests, even if the Vietnamese are no putting them under relentless assault? Or do they see them as awkward liabilities, hard to square with other Cold War commitments, that should be liquiidated as soon as possible.
So @Hendryk, @ anybody else, what do you think?