Great Indian Rebellion of 1824

[SinghSong]

IOTL, the First Anglo-Burmese War, in 1824-26, nominally ended in a decisive British victory, giving the British total control of Assam, Manipur, Cachar and Jaintia as well as Arakan Province and Tenasserim, in addition to ending the period of French influence at the Court of 'Ava', and denying the French presence at Rangoon, which had been established by M. Feraud of the French East India Company more than half a century prior, facilitated by the groundwork of Pierre de 'Chevalier' Milard. But this was only achieved at great cost, proving to be the longest and most expensive war in British Indian history. 15,000 British and Indian soldiers died in the conflict (c.72% of these from disease, with this attributed to poor planning and logistics), and the blow to British India's finances amounted to approximately £13M (c. £1.12 billion in today's money- to provide context, this was equivalent to about 1% of the gross GDP of the entire world in 1820, which is estimated to have been roughly US$147 billion).

By 1833, even with the crippling indemnity imposed upon the Burmese after their defeat (of £1M, roughly 28% of Burma's estimated GDP of £3.5M), the war debts incurred by the BEIC in this conflict had precipitated a severe economic crisis in British India, bankrupting the Bengal agency houses. As a result, in the Charter Act of 1833, whilst the British East India Company's charter was extended by another 20yrs, it was forced to give up its remaining privileges, including the monopoly of trade to China (effectively ending the activities of the company as a commercial body, and rendering its activities purely administrative from this point on). And its shareholders voted to approve the Company's nationalisation by Parliament, in exchange for the British government's agreement to assume the debts and obligations of the company, which were to be serviced and paid from tax revenue raised in India, along with the guarantee of annual dividends of 10.5% for forty years (likewise to be funded by taxation revenue in India) prior to a final pay-off to redeem outstanding shares.

But the First Anglo-Burmese War could have easily been a lot more costly, both in lives and expenses, than it was IOTL. In the opening stages of the war, the Lord of Myawaddy and commander of the Burmese forces in the Arakan theater, Mingyi U Sa, had led a column into Bengal, defeating British troops in the Battles of Ramu and Gadawpalin, and capturing Cox's Bazar (hitherto known as 'Palonki'). However, his commander-in-chief, General Maha Bandula, stopped U Sa from proceeding to Chittagong and opening the way to Calcutta, even though it was (presumably unbeknownst to him) only lightly held by the British; and it continued to be largely undefended by the British for several months, with the Barrackpore Mutiny (which had in part been caused by the blow to morale caused by his victory in the Battle of Ramu) also contributing towards this.

So then, let's posit that, ITTL, U Sa's actually allowed to proceed to Chittagong, and captures the largely undefended city (along with its associated territories, consisting of the portion of the present-day Chittagong Division south of the Feni River, excluding the District of Tippera) just as easily as Cox's Bazar. This ramps up the extreme panic in Calcutta, along with the exaggeration of the rumored mystical prowess of the Burmese among the Indian sepoys, lowering their morale still further. And as a result of this, combined with the increased urgency of getting the Bengal Army's troops to Chittagong as quickly as possible, the British officers' increased threats to force their sepoys to take a sea voyage to Chittagong (planning to retake it and Cox's Bazar more quickly by mounting a naval assault, in the same manner as with their invasion of Rangoon), in violation of the Kala pani taboo, causes even greater dissent among their higher-caste majority Hindu regiments. This greatly increases the numbers of the Barrackpore mutineers, to the extent where the British aren't able to suppress the news of TTL's even more brutal 'Barrackpore Massacre' by General Paget; triggering its escalation from a peaceful protest to a full-blown widespread violent armed uprising before the end of the year ITTL, on a scale which wouldn't be seen until 1857 IOTL, with spontaneous revolts subsequently breaking out across British India (and most likely, with Muslim 'Ghazis' also joining in full force, seizing the opportunity to wage Jihad against British rule, as advocated by the Tariqah-al-Muhammadiya movement led by Syed Ahmad Barelvi).

How much of an impact do you think that this POD, with TTL's 'Great Indian Mutiny' preceding that of OTL by 33yrs, and breaking out in the middle of the longest and costliest war in the BEIC's history (which effectively rendered the Company nominally bankrupt even IOTL), having upon the course of history? Would the British East India Company have had any hope of emerging victorious, against the combined hostilities of the mutineers in this 'Great Indian Mutiny of 1824' and those of the Burmese Empire in the First Anglo-Burmese War (and even if so, how much greater would the cost of these conflicts be than the cost of OTL's 1st Anglo-Burmese War)? And with the dominion of the British over India having been far more tenuous, and less deeply entrenched, in 1824-25 than the near-absolute dominance it would have gone on to establish and consolidate by 1857 IOTL, how would you envision things panning from this point- is there a chance that British India itself might not even survive the Mutiny of 1824, or be greatly reduced in its extent in the aftermath of it? In the event of the BEIC's collapse into bankruptcy, and its dissolution, could the British government potentially even decide to cut their losses by abandoning several of the BEIC's territory in India altogether, rather than attempting to impose direct British colonial rule over them? And how different do you envision that the map of India (and the broader region of Greater South Asia) could plausibly look by 1850, 1900, and the present-day ITTL?

 

[Indicus]

and most likely, with Muslim 'Ghazis' also joining in full force, seizing the opportunity to wage Jihad against British rule, as advocated by the Tariqah-al-Muhammadiya movement led by Syed Ahmad Barelvi

Syed Ahmad Barelvi not only excommunicated Sufi orders, he declared himself caliph and his supporters openly called him the Mahdi. Any fanatical movement in that vein would not only fail to gain any support from Hindus; it would also fail to gain support from the vast majority of Muslims, in a time when it is needed.

But let’s say instead the Nawab of Oudh reasserts himself with rebel support, or maybe Yashwantrao Holkar lives on and his desire to strike the Britishers asserts itself in this period. In that scenario, I agree that the British are likely to lose almost all of India around the Ganges; they might hang on in Bengal, though how much of it I’m not sure. This might in turn open up issues with the Marathas, though at this point they were in dire straits if not almost entirely gone. But I suspect the British are likely to still keep control of South India. Presumably the East India Company is going to lose any control over its holdings, and the new British authorities are going to be keen on expanding their control over India; since whatever new order gets established is likely to be relatively weak, they’ll have a good shot at that.

 

[Thande]

I think this is a debatable point, but isn't one reason why the OTL rebellion spread so far among the Company's high-caste Hindu soldiers was that their pay and privileges had been frozen for decades in the face of inflation? Presumably that factor wouldn't be so extreme in an earlier setting. It could still be enough to catch alight for other reasons, of course.

 

[SinghSong]

Syed Ahmad Barelvi not only excommunicated Sufi orders, he declared himself caliph and his supporters openly called him the Mahdi. Any fanatical movement in that vein would not only fail to gain any support from Hindus; it would also fail to gain support from the vast majority of Muslims, in a time when it is needed.

Fair point, though I didn't say anything about how many Muslims would. It'd still almost certainly be enough to be a factor though, to a similar or even potentially greater extent than IOTL's rebellion of 1857- in which Muslim Ghazis comprised a quarter of the rebels in the siege of Delhi by the end of the siege, included a regiment from Gwalior who were suicidally fanatical to the extent that they vowed never to eat again and to fight until they met certain death at the hands of British troops. And that was even though none of their ulema ever agreed upon declaring a jihad IOTL; the most influential of these was Barelvi's successor as leader of the Ahl-i-Hadith ulema in Delhi, Maulana Sayyid Nazir Husain Dehlvi, who refused to call for a jihad and instead declared in favour of British rule. ITTL, over three decades earlier, you'd imagine that his predecessor, Barelvi, would've chosen to seize the opportunity instead. And how much larger might the minority of Muslims who support the Ahl-i-Hadith's Jihadi Movement be, ITTL, than the minority who joined the rebels in 1857 IOTL?

But let’s say instead the Nawab of Oudh reasserts himself with rebel support, or maybe Yashwantrao Holkar lives on and his desire to strike the Britishers asserts itself in this period. In that scenario, I agree that the British are likely to lose almost all of India around the Ganges; they might hang on in Bengal, though how much of it I’m not sure. This might in turn open up issues with the Marathas, though at this point they were in dire straits if not almost entirely gone. But I suspect the British are likely to still keep control of South India. Presumably the East India Company is going to lose any control over its holdings, and the new British authorities are going to be keen on expanding their control over India; since whatever new order gets established is likely to be relatively weak, they’ll have a good shot at that.

Back in 1824, there'd be a fair few other factions still in play who could be worth mentioning, even without Yashwantrao Holkar (on account of his having died over a decade prior to the POD). Tying in with the footnote about Barelvi, one of Holkar's foremost military commanders had been the ruler of Tonk, Nawab Muhammad Amir Khan. While his previously formidable army, which had been the largest of any of the Maratha chiefs by far, had been disbanded and integrated into the BEIC's ranks 7yrs prior, as one of the terms of his state becoming a British protectorate in 1817, several thousand of his soldiers had refused to enter the service of the British kuffir, led by Syed Ahmad Barelvi. But Barelvi still remained fiercely loyal to the man who he'd served under for 7 years, and whose leadership qualities and influence he sought to emulate. And he received most of the support and funding for his Jihadi campaign against the Sikhs, and his proclaimed Caliphate, from 1826-1830 from the Nawab of Tonk IOTL, with whom he continued to maintain a correspondence to the very end. If he decides to put his army back together again and oust the British, and if Barelvi decides to support him rather than declaring his own Caliphate (which is a possibility), mightn't he be the likeliest of the Maratha chiefs to rise to prominence in this scenario?

How well would you see Burma doing in this scenario- if the BEIC are forced to endure the humiliation of suing for peace, how much territory would they wind up having to cede to the Burmese? With France having held Burma firmly in its influence prior to the Anglo-Burmese Wars, and the bilateral relationship between it and Burma only likely to be further strengthened in the aftermath of an effective Burmese victory in this conflict, how much might they profit from this? And how about all of the other European powers' involvement in India in the aftermath- might we see a 'Scramble For India', triggered by the downfall of the British East India Company? Dutch India was still technically a thing at this point, albeit only just; would be until its trading posts in India (consisting of Dutch Coromandel and Dutch Bengal, since the restoration of these territories to Dutch rule in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814) were all awarded to the BEIC by default in 1825, after they'd already agreed to hand them over to the British per the terms of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. But with TTL's handover of these Dutch trading posts having been interrupted by the outbreak of the Great Indian Mutiny, and the BEIC most likely being bankrupted and dissolved in the aftermath of the rebellion and of the calamitous Anglo-Burmese War, does this even still happen? And if it doesn't, what might happen instead?

 

[SinghSong]

I think this is a debatable point, but isn't one reason why the OTL rebellion spread so far among the Company's high-caste Hindu soldiers was that their pay and privileges had been frozen for decades in the face of inflation? Presumably that factor wouldn't be so extreme in an earlier setting. It could still be enough to catch alight for other reasons, of course.

It was a factor, yes; with the costs of the war with Burma, and the servicing and payment of these war debts, along with the other obligations of the Company, and the guaranteed dividends of 10.5% for forty years for the Company's shareholders, all covered by an exponential increase in tax payments in India itself (along with such 'cost-cutting' measures as these). TTL's 'Great Indian Rebellion' doesn't necessarily have to be as severe, widespread, popular and 'great' as OTL's; but it could still easily be sufficient to bring about the end of the British East India Company, either directly or indirectly. Even in the event of the BEIC still emerging victorious against both the Mutiny and the Burmese, since a rebellion of any significance would have still inevitably greatly increased the BEIC's fiscal costs and losses, which were already high enough IOTL to have effectively rendered the company bankrupt, and forced it to be taken into public receivership by the British government.

Historically, in the Charter Act of 1833, only the usefulness of the BEIC's administrative activities spared it from liquidation; but ITTL, with a large-scale mutiny having taken place under its administration, would the British government still deem it worth the while of keeping the BEIC around in this capacity? Or would they just set about turning the remaining territories in their possession, in the respective Presidencies of British India (as they'd existed at that time), into Crown Colonies just like they'd done with British Ceylon after acquiring it directly from the Dutch in 1817? And if they did (and in the event of the Indian Princely States, or their Indian subjects, voicing dissatisfaction with the British colonial adminstration, adopted scorched earth policies in order to suppress them just like they did with the Kingdom of Kandy in the 3rd Kandyan War), how do you reckon that'd be likely to go down- could there be a chance of an actual Indian 'First War of Independence' kicking off by the time you got to 1857 ITTL?

 

[Indicus]

Fair point, though I didn't say anything about how many Muslims would. It'd still almost certainly be enough to be a factor though, to a similar or even potentially greater extent than IOTL's rebellion of 1857- in which Muslim Ghazis comprised a quarter of the rebels in the siege of Delhi by the end of the siege, included a regiment from Gwalior who were suicidally fanatical to the extent that they vowed never to eat again and to fight until they met certain death at the hands of British troops. And that was even though none of their ulema ever agreed upon declaring a jihad IOTL; the most influential of these was Barelvi's successor as leader of the Ahl-i-Hadith ulema in Delhi, Maulana Sayyid Nazir Husain Dehlvi, who refused to call for a jihad and instead declared in favour of British rule. ITTL, over three decades earlier, you'd imagine that his predecessor, Barelvi, would've chosen to seize the opportunity instead. And how much larger might the minority of Muslims who support the Ahl-i-Hadith's Jihadi Movement be, ITTL, than the minority who joined the rebels in 1857 IOTL?

One of the differences here is that Ahl-i-Hadith only got established after Syed Ahmad Barelvi died; there's no ulema apart from his followers and its doctrines haven't spread and systematized. But it is certainly possible that he's able to convince a great number of people to join him, as you say, and that combined with a proper alliance with Tonk would be major.

Back in 1824, there'd be a fair few other factions still in play who could be worth mentioning, even without Yashwantrao Holkar (on account of his having died over a decade prior to the POD). Tying in with the footnote about Barelvi, one of Holkar's foremost military commanders had been the ruler of Tonk, Nawab Muhammad Amir Khan. While his previously formidable army, which had been the largest of any of the Maratha chiefs by far, had been disbanded and integrated into the BEIC's ranks 7yrs prior, as one of the terms of his state becoming a British protectorate in 1817, several thousand of his soldiers had refused to enter the service of the British kuffir, led by Syed Ahmad Barelvi. But Barelvi still remained fiercely loyal to the man who he'd served under for 7 years, and whose leadership qualities and influence he sought to emulate. And he received most of the support and funding for his Jihadi campaign against the Sikhs, and his proclaimed Caliphate, from 1826-1830 from the Nawab of Tonk IOTL, with whom he continued to maintain a correspondence to the very end. If he decides to put his army back together again and oust the British, and if Barelvi decides to support him rather than declaring his own Caliphate (which is a possibility), mightn't he be the likeliest of the Maratha chiefs to rise to prominence in this scenario?

Oh yes, that would be a seismic shift in favour of the rebels. The Scindias and Holkars, however, had more widespread domains across Rajasthan/eastern Madhya Pradesh; if either or both of them join (which seems very possible with it having been very recently since they signed treaties with the British), they'd likely be prominent even with the Nawab of Tonk having larger armies. But in the aftermath, especially with Syed Ahmad Barelvi gathering a great number of soldiers into the service of the Nawab of Tonk, you might get him become more prominent. Lots of interesting dynamics there.

How well would you see Burma doing in this scenario- if the BEIC are forced to endure the humiliation of suing for peace, how much territory would they wind up having to cede to the Burmese?

I'm not sure if the Burmese had clear war goals, but I suspect it would include Chittagong and the whole region around it, as well as Sylhet, Tripura, and maybe Cooch Behar. But the Britishers would also be quite likely to plan a way to strike against the Burmese, and indeed the Burmese empire would be just about overextended here.

As for other European empires getting into the mix, it'll consist of foreign support of native states against the British. The Dutch, of course, were very weak and focused around the East Indies and they would still have all their territories surrounded by the British, and indeed the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1825 might still occur with the British eager to get new bases to reconquer India. The Portuguese colonies would be surrounded by Maratha and British lands, hard to expand there. While, with the fear of race war less intense at this point and all parts of French India still surrounded by the British, the French would be far more eager to support native states and the like, perhaps by sending in officers to support them. Maybe you'd see some attempt to take over Odisha through influence or otherwise, but the British would be intent to stop that.

 

[Thande]

Historically, in the Charter Act of 1833, only the usefulness of the BEIC's administrative activities spared it from liquidation; but ITTL, with a large-scale mutiny having taken place under its administration, would the British government still deem it worth the while of keeping the BEIC around in this capacity? Or would they just set about turning the remaining territories in their possession, in the respective Presidencies of British India (as they'd existed at that time), into Crown Colonies just like they'd done with British Ceylon after acquiring it directly from the Dutch in 1817? And if they did (and in the event of the Indian Princely States, or their Indian subjects, voicing dissatisfaction with the British colonial adminstration, adopted scorched earth policies in order to suppress them just like they did with the Kingdom of Kandy in the 3rd Kandyan War), how do you reckon that'd be likely to go down- could there be a chance of an actual Indian 'First War of Independence' kicking off by the time you got to 1857 ITTL?

It's an interesting question. In OTL Lord Lansdown's argument in the 1833 act debate (Hansard record here) was that even though the EIC was disliked, the Government could scarcely draw from any other body of potential administrators who had experience with the legal and cultural situation on the ground:

He was sure that their Lordships would feel, as he indeed felt, that their only justification before God and Providence for the great and unprecedented dominion which they exercised in India was in the happiness which they communicated to the subjects under their rule, and in proving to the world at large, and to the inhabitants of Hindoostan, that the inheritance of Akbar (the wisest and most beneficent of Mahometan princes) had not fallen into unworthy or degenerate hands. Hence, it was important that when the dominion of India was transferred from the East India Company to the King's Government, they should have the benefit of the experience of the most enlightened Councillors, not only on the financial condition of our empire in the East, but also on the character of its inhabitants.

So it feels like no matter what happened in principle, Company men would still end up in charge regardless, dull as that is from an AH perspective.

(I also looked up the coverage at the time in my favourite newspaper of record, the Glasgow Herald (page 1) but sadly they only describe the bill rather than giving any editorial opinion suggesting views at the time).

 

[Thande]

It's an interesting question. In OTL Lord Lansdown's argument in the 1833 act debate (Hansard record here) was that even though the EIC was disliked, the Government could scarcely draw from any other body of potential administrators who had experience with the legal and cultural situation on the ground:



So it feels like no matter what happened in principle, Company men would still end up in charge regardless, dull as that is from an AH perspective.

(I also looked up the coverage at the time in my favourite newspaper of record, the Glasgow Herald (page 1) but sadly they only describe the bill rather than giving any editorial opinion suggesting views at the time).

I tell a lie, there is a bit about how it was received in the Commons on page 2.



The full session they're summing up can be read here: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1833/jul/12/east-india-companys-charter.

The main argument seems to have been over how long an extension the act should give the Company to administer, and the tone implies that some of the MPs were a bit worried about the idea that the EIC would just collapse and leave India ungovernable if relations broke down it and Parliament. Even the MPs most critical of Company rule (such as Charles Williams-Wynn and Irish Repeal leader Daniel O'Connell) were talking about not giving the Company a fixed period of grace time but pushing for a transition to recruiting administrators from India, rather than seeking to sweep it away immediately. It does feel like nobody saw an alternative to using the Company's administrators, it was just a lot of people weren't happy about it.

 

[ChrisNuttall]

There would also be concern about who'd take Britain's place. The French? Or whom? A lot of expansion was driven by fear of French and Russian influences, which wasn't as legitimate as they thought but still possible.

Chris

 

[Thande]

There would also be concern about who'd take Britain's place. The French? Or whom? A lot of expansion was driven by fear of French and Russian influences, which wasn't as legitimate as they thought but still possible.

Chris

Probably not so much in the 1820s though. Yes if we were talking about the 1700s, the French and the Dutch would be seen that way, and the Russians later on, but I don't think they were on the horizon vis-a-vis India in the 1820s. In some ways this was the peak of British global sea dominance and therefore colonial dominance, with everyone else still recovering from the Napoleonic Wars; almost the only reason anyone else had any colonies left was because the British government had decided to acquiesce to it, e.g. the Dutch East Indies.

 

[Thande]

Probably not so much in the 1820s though. Yes if we were talking about the 1700s, the French and the Dutch would be seen that way, and the Russians later on, but I don't think they were on the horizon vis-a-vis India in the 1820s. In some ways this was the peak of British global sea dominance and therefore colonial dominance, with everyone else still recovering from the Napoleonic Wars; almost the only reason anyone else had any colonies left was because the British government had decided to acquiesce to it, e.g. the Dutch East Indies.

Which also means it's arguably the ideal time for an Indian revolt that won't just result in someone else immediately moving in and taking over, though that's probably only noticeable in hindsight.

 

[SinghSong]

Probably not so much in the 1820s though. Yes if we were talking about the 1700s, the French and the Dutch would be seen that way, and the Russians later on, but I don't think they were on the horizon vis-a-vis India in the 1820s. In some ways this was the peak of British global sea dominance and therefore colonial dominance, with everyone else still recovering from the Napoleonic Wars; almost the only reason anyone else had any colonies left was because the British government had decided to acquiesce to it, e.g. the Dutch East Indies.

Which also means it's arguably the ideal time for an Indian revolt that won't just result in someone else immediately moving in and taking over, though that's probably only noticeable in hindsight.

With the French, not so much (though the British were still pretty nervy about French diplomatic involvement on the sub-continent); but the 'Great Game' with the Russians had just about already started to kick off in the early 1820s (see https://forum.sealionpress.co.uk/index.php?threads/wi-aga-mehdi-survives.4941/). And there's another party bordering the theater who may be of note- what'd happen with Qing China? This was just at the tail-end of the High Qing Era, when Imperial China had been at the peak of its power; immediately preceding the Afaqi Khoja revolts led by Jahangīr Khoja, early in the reign of the Daoguang Emperor. And if you look at the historical context of the First Opium War, the primary cause can be traced back to the ending the British East India Company's monopoly over the tea trade, under the Charter Act of 1833, ending the need for merchants to comply with the royal charter for trade in the far east and opening the British-China trade to private entrepreneurs.

And the British East India Company itself led the way in turning to the highly profitable opium trade ITTL, explicitly on account of the loss of its tea monopoly, to try and get it of its ongoing economic crisis (caused by the First Anglo-Burmese War which had started in 1824); with it being the most ideal and lucrative commodity to focus upon in the immediate aftermath of the Charter Act of 1833, on account of the BEIC still retaining its monopoly on the opium trade from India. Prior to its dissolution in 1825, the British Levant Company had had a monopoly on the opium coming out of the Ottoman Empire, the only other major producer of opium, but this was limited strictly for importation to Europe and the Americas, on account of the BEIC's monopoly on trade to China; all poppy growers in India under Company rule had been forbidden to sell opium to competitor trading companies since 1793, the transit of any other non-BEIC opium through the Company's territories had been banned since 1805, and throughout the early and mid-1820's, the BEIC signed treaties with all of the Indian princely states of India to procure all of the opium cultivated within their territories exclusively for the company (as well as imposing ever-increasing trade duties upon their opium exports).

So then, one does have to wonder- with a Great Indian Rebellion taking place in 1824, and the BEIC most likely already dead and buried, along with its trade monopolies and exclusive export agreements, how differently would things pan out with regards to the balance of world trade, particularly the Opium Trade, and everything else which went down the way it historically did IOTL as a direct result of said trade? Sure, there probably won't be too much risk of other European empires coming in to annex vast swathes of territory in India for themselves, as the British had; but without the total monopolies imposed by the BEIC upon opium cultivation, production and exports from India, couldn't all of the other European Empires with pre-established trading missions in India (the French, Portuguese, Dutch and Danish) also greatly enrich themselves by breaking into the Opium Trade, and making their own Indian colonies far more lucrative in the process? Perhaps even enough to persuade the Swedish and Prussians that it might be worthwhile reviving their own Indian trading companies?

And they wouldn't be the only ones; the American Fur Company's most profitable venture wasn't actually the North American Fur trade. In the aftermath of the War of 1812, when the British had captured his trading posts, John Jacob Astor and several other American merchants had joined the Levant Company (the purview of which had been thrown open to free trade in 1754, with the Levant Company looked upon as a drain on the resources of Britain; but which still continued its activities until its dissolution in 1825), and begun smuggling operations, purchasing Ottoman-produced opium and shipping the contraband to Canton. IOTL, after the revival of his fortunes in the fur trade, with the U.S. Congress passing a protectionist law that barred foreign fur traders from U.S. territories, Astor left the Chinese opium trade, and switched to exporting Turkish opium solely to supply the European market in England (which had become more lucrative, due to the massive increase in opium production and exports from India, being directed exclusively to China by the BEIC).

But ITTL, with the BEIC basically set to fall at around the same time that the Levant Company did IOTL, there'd be no BEIC monopoly left to stand in his or anyone else's in the way; especially with several of the remaining independent kingdoms of India free to export to, and through, whoever they want. Sindh in particular emerged in the 1830's IOTL as the primary alternative export route for independent Indian Kingdoms' maritime trade, and its own wealth having been estimated to have been so much greater than it actually was by the BEIC's officials, in part due to most of these smaller kingdoms having made the move to adopt opium as their primary export commodity, and independent Indian merchants favoring trade routes via Sindh to bypass British territory and avoid the increasingly exorbitant trade duties imposed by the Company. And indeed, without the BEIC to effectively act as a one-way valve, sending all of those Indian opium exports China's way and all of the profits generated by it back to Britain, mightn't we see the opium trade becoming far less of a 'Anglo-wank, India & China-screw' thing than it was IOTL?