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Best case for Zimbabwe post-WWII

The most obvious answer is 'find a way for Garfield Todd's (flawed and limited) program to be implemented successfully,' but the most obvious answer to that is 'the response to that flawed and limited program was retrenchment that produced Ian Smith and the UDI.'

It's a really hard one.

Make the environment tougher for white Rhodesians- a nasty war of decolonisation next door, for instance- and they're likely to panic and retrench faster and further. Yet if you make it easier- more prosperous times, less racial paranoia- they're not going to feel a pressing urge to make concessions.

A tourist gets lost in the Irish countryside, the old joke goes. He asks a farmer: 'How do I get to Dublin?'

Farmer looks at him and says, 'well, if I were you I wouldn't start from here.'

You need a confluence of circumstances that convinces the majority of whites that black majority rules wouldn't be disastrous for their interests and lives.

Avoiding/mitigating the Congo Crisis would be part of this, but only a part.
 
@SinghSong, as I said I think the problem with turning up the political temperature in Africa is that it probably encourages a fortress mentality, perversely discouraging the colonialists to make compromises.

But your suggestion sparked a thought- how about a more successful left in Britain? You probably don’t want a second Attlee government, because they were pretty happy with empire. But how about Suez going even worse- a run on the pound, serious damage to the London Stock Exchange, the government falls and Labour takes over.

In the teeth of the crisis, it’s not the ‘winds of change,’ it’s a hurricane. He new government makes it clear that it wants out of Africa and fast.

The Rhodesians are suddenly faced with the need to get a sustainable political settlement in place before they’re cut off from Empire. Let’s stipulate that, post Suez, there’s not yet any vain hopes of getting any serious backing from an alternative patron like the states.

Maybe that’s how you create the impetus for reform, and a settlement that in turn can be peacefully dismantled a few decades down the line.
 
Rhodesia painted black majority rule as leading to communism so I suspect a communist uprising would have made things worse.
In the short and medium term, no doubt. But in the long run, could it have had the potential to make Zimbabwe a better place by the present day? The kind of 'failed' uprising I was thinking about was either one akin to the Malayan Emergency, aka 'the Anti–British National Liberation War', at around the same time (late 40's to 1960)- in which Southern Rhodesia directly participated on the British side IOTL- or the New JEWEL Movement in Grenada, 'failing' insofar as it succeeds in overthrowing the government and seizing power (perhaps when ZIPRA proceeds with its proposed 'Storming the Heavens' strategy to launch a conventional invasion from Zambia in the late '70s, supported by a limited number of armored vehicles and light aircraft, and with more overt backing from the Soviet Union).

In the 'failed' scenario, they'd prove unable to fight off a subsequent invasion and overthrow of the Communist government by armed means, to reinstall the Rhodesian government (led by South Africa, with the Rhodesian Bush War effectively becoming an extension of the greater Border War conflict in the process- only for the South Africans to be far less capable of 'getting away with it' than the USA did in Grenada IOTL, with their various war crimes and crimes against humanity in the conflict being called to far greater attention, leading to markedly greater sanctions being imposed against them, which greatly accelerate the end of the Apartheid regimes). Of course, this also raises another intriguing possibility- what if the Communist uprising succeeds, with ZAPU seizing the reins of power?
 
The problem is preventing Mugabe. Mugabe got to power because the Black Rhodesian population had been radicalized by years of racist white minority rule. The Internal Settlement was too late. By 1979, the Black Rhodesian population was too radicalized and the Rhodesian Bush War too far along for a deal with the moderate black opposition to work.
If one just wants to do away with Mugabe's rise to power, how about something related to The Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI)-announced in Lusaka, Zambia in October 1971 as a merger of the two principal African nationalist factions in Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), when it was in actuality a breakaway faction of both ZAPU and ZANU, established by members of both groups who had become disaffected due to their rival organisations' incessant internal and external disputes. Its domination by members of the Zezuru, a subgroup of the Shona people, led to accusations that it was merely a tribal grouping and ridicule as the "Front for the Liaison of Zezuru Intellectuals".

FROLIZI's first leaders were Skilkom Siwela and Godfrey Savanhu; and they sought to appoint Robert Mugabe of ZANU as a supposed "unity" leader, though this didn't happen since their plot to try and bring this about ended in failure. FROLIZI's leadership circulated a letter falsely claiming that both ZAPU's leader Joshua Nkomo and ZANU's leader Ndabaningi Sithole had agreed to support Mugabe as the leader of FROLIZI, which would bring together both ZANU and ZAPU. But having learned of the plot beforehand, Sithole circulated a letter denouncing FROLIZI, whilst ZAPU's Deputy National Secretary dismissed FROLIZI as "a haven of refuge for political rejects", with Mugabe choosing to disavow FROLIZI's spurious claims, remaining in ZANU and eventually managing to seize control of the organisation in 1975.

With their plot having failed, Siwela and Savanhu were ousted in 1972, and FROLIZI never managed to establish a presence in Rhodesia, though it sought to ally with the African National Council. It had very few members and no significant armed grouping of its own, though armed members were reported to have infiltrated across the Zambian border in the northern Karoi region of Rhodesia and carried out an attack on a white-owned farm in 1972. It obtained significant outside support for a while, but collapsed in 1973 after being passed over by the Organisation of African Unity's Liberation Committee in favour of the other two principal Zimbabwean liberation movements, with its members mostly going over to ZANU following FROLIZI's demise.

So then, how about simply tweaking FROLIZI's plot a bit? Let's say that ITTL, the letter circulated by FROLIZI also falsely claims that Mugabe had agreed to support them and assume leadership of their group; or alternatively, let's say that Sithole isn't informed of FROLIZI's plot before they circulate their letter and its false claims, and that as such, being unsure of how deeply involved with FROLIZI Mugabe is, he's convinced to denounce and expel Mugabe as well? With Mugabe forced to settle for the leadership role offered by FROLIZI, but with FROLIZI still collapsing in much the same manner as the same time for the same reason that it did IOTL, and Mugabe never managing to come close to seizing the reins of power afterwards?
 
In the short and medium term, no doubt. But in the long run, could it have had the potential to make Zimbabwe a better place by the present day? The kind of 'failed' uprising I was thinking about was either one akin to the Malayan Emergency, aka 'the Anti–British National Liberation War', at around the same time (late 40's to 1960)- in which Southern Rhodesia directly participated on the British side IOTL- or the New JEWEL Movement in Grenada, 'failing' insofar as it succeeds in overthrowing the government and seizing power (perhaps when ZIPRA proceeds with its proposed 'Storming the Heavens' strategy to launch a conventional invasion from Zambia in the late '70s, supported by a limited number of armored vehicles and light aircraft, and with more overt backing from the Soviet Union).

In the 'failed' scenario, they'd prove unable to fight off a subsequent invasion and overthrow of the Communist government by armed means, to reinstall the Rhodesian government (led by South Africa, with the Rhodesian Bush War effectively becoming an extension of the greater Border War conflict in the process- only for the South Africans to be far less capable of 'getting away with it' than the USA did in Grenada IOTL, with their various war crimes and crimes against humanity in the conflict being called to far greater attention, leading to markedly greater sanctions being imposed against them, which greatly accelerate the end of the Apartheid regimes). Of course, this also raises another intriguing possibility- what if the Communist uprising succeeds, with ZAPU seizing the reins of power?

Ah, now I understand what you're getting at. That is intriguing.
 
The problem is preventing Mugabe. Mugabe got to power because the Black Rhodesian population had been radicalized by years of racist white minority rule. The Internal Settlement was too late. By 1979, the Black Rhodesian population was too radicalized and the Rhodesian Bush War too far along for a deal with the moderate black opposition to work.
Here is an idea: What if they had brought ZAPU into the Internal Settlement but not ZANU? The problem is that ZAPU was mostly Ndebele and the Ndebele were a minority and this would probably just turn the Rhodesian Bush War into an ethnic war.
 
There were a couple of roughed out timeline ideas in the WI: Rhodesia Never Became Zimbabwe? over at the Other Place. The first one from TheMann seems a bit on the wank-ish side, whilst the second one from Jonathan Edelstein seems – to my unskilled eye – somewhat more realistic.
Yeah, the Edelstein scenario is interesting - heck, even some more minor fluke cpuld have swung the election the UFP's way, though at the cost of being dependent on the African vote.
 
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