AHC: The Dreyfus Affair leads to French Civil War, Dictatorship, Revolution or some sequence of 2 of the 3

[raharris1973]

There's much casual talk about how the Dreyfus Affair of the mid-1890s, and not fully resolved until 1906, was highly divisive in French society, and with some saying it put the French left and right 'on the brink of civil war'. What would it take for France to go over the brink into actual civil war, or political violence which if not long, is of such intensity it leads to dictatorship or revolution? How could things get bad enough France experiences 1 or even 2 or 3 of these things all in the space of a single decade? And what would be the consequences for Europe and the world?

 

[Ricardolindo]

@LSCatilina

 

[LSCatilina]

At this point in time, French political and civilian society is as stable as it was during the late XIXth and the early XXth : although there are, lesser known but very important, political crises in this period, the republican regime isn't really contested by the bulk of political and especially civilian society in spite of the very real influence of nationalists (themselves not having crossed an anti-Republican rubicon yet, which the Drefyus Affair will actually provide for), anti-semitism and anti-progressists especially in the traditionally conservative corps of society, especially the army.

A general improvement of social, cultural and economical situation for both elites and the popular classes is a factor, but as well a lasting democratization and involvement of civilian society : French press, which would play a pivotal role in the affair, have amongst the highest readership in Europe, political debates and discussions are everywhere along with the constitution of relatively stable and self-defined political blocs (conservative, radicals, progressives etc.) not impaired by an executive power whose theoritical constitutional powers were shackled pretty early on.

I'd say a less democratic IIIrd Republic would have been fragilized alrerady by two decades of successive political crises as Boulanger or Panama and the 1900's are not really a point where, as trust in institutions were overall as high level in spite of growing contestation from nationalists or anarchists, it would have easily turned up to street violence, not even considering full blown civil war.
Now, a less democratic regime could as well be fragilized by the Dreyfuss Affair, but I'd rather consider that there was actually an affair to begin with specifically because there was a democratic civilian and political society for allowing it to exist.

 

[raharris1973]

At this point in time, French political and civilian society is as stable as it was during the late XIXth and the early XXth : although there are, lesser known but very important, political crises in this period, the republican regime isn't really contested by the bulk of political and especially civilian society in spite of the very real influence of nationalists (themselves not having crossed an anti-Republican rubicon yet, which the Drefyus Affair will actually provide for), anti-semitism and anti-progressists especially in the traditionally conservative corps of society, especially the army.

A general improvement of social, cultural and economical situation for both elites and the popular classes is a factor, but as well a lasting democratization and involvement of civilian society : French press, which would play a pivotal role in the affair, have amongst the highest readership in Europe, political debates and discussions are everywhere along with the constitution of relatively stable and self-defined political blocs (conservative, radicals, progressives etc.) not impaired by an executive power whose theoritical constitutional powers were shackled pretty early on.

I'd say a less democratic IIIrd Republic would have been fragilized alrerady by two decades of successive political crises as Boulanger or Panama and the 1900's are not really a point where, as trust in institutions were overall as high level in spite of growing contestation from nationalists or anarchists, it would have easily turned up to street violence, not even considering full blown civil war.
Now, a less democratic regime could as well be fragilized by the Dreyfuss Affair, but I'd rather consider that there was actually an affair to begin with specifically because there was a democratic civilian and political society for allowing it to exist.

Your post speaks credible-sounding truths. In the end, the casual remarks about the dangers of the Dreyfus Affair 'tearing the country' apart were hyperbole. The affair is cited as a source of embitterment by the French right and 'deep state' in the Army and bureaucracy that led to some of those forces expressing themselves in the Vichy State in WWII. Even if this theory of some kind of connection has some truth in it, which I do not know, the crucial driver of the Vichy situation was the defeat in WWII itself and the accumulated wounds of the Great War and Great Depression and interwar right-left class conflict.

Interesting that you point to the Boulanger and Panama crises as points of greater danger for the republic.

The Boulanger affair has often been discussed on these types of forums, but just how badly could the Panama Affair have devolved for the Third Republic? Could it have become a Republic-shattering event? How so?

Had Boulanger come 'on horseback' to become dictator of France, for how long would this have likely eclipsed democracy and liberalism in France?

 

[LSCatilina]

Interesting that you point to the Boulanger and Panama crises as points of greater danger for the republic.

Not necessarily in the sense it would cause the republican regime to collapse, although we could argue the Boulanger crisis could have this effect if things went immensely bad, that they were confidence crisis in republican institutions (and notably the Chambre des Députés and the parlementarian regime) that were still fairly recent and debated in the 1880's, giving a lot of momentum to illiberal, authoritarian (moreso than anti-republican) or nationalist movements.

With the wrong events at the right time, there's nothing preventing the nascent IIIrd Republic to have turned sour, these likely in a republican form but one that would at least turns the clock back to 1875, that is by enforcing the constitutional powers of the president and of the Chambre (the engineered presidential incompetence and the dominance of the Chambre were not set in the constitution, but a matter of informal constitutional agreement) : and that's a minimum, as you could end up with a fully executive semi-democratic republic (in the sense of Imperial Germany), a fragilized and staunted civilian society (as with Italy), watered-down bonapartism, etc.

Had Boulanger come 'on horseback' to become dictator of France, for how long would this have likely eclipsed democracy and liberalism in France?

To be honest, I don't think that's a vraisemblable outcome : boulangisme was more of a standard for a very diverse and self-contradictory ensemble of revendications ranging from semi-bonapartism, nationalism, socialism, monarchism, etc. (basically anything but radical and liberal republicanism) that would prevent a massive popular and institutional support for a full blown military coup. Although a failed boulangist coup in 1889 could have interesting consequences.

An electoral victory for boulangisme, by staunting the radical/moderate counter-fire of 1889, however... That would be an interesting view insofar socialist movements weren't well defined or distinct from overall populist movements by then and would have an hard time challenging a boulangiste, semi-bonapartist, bloc in which monarchists, bonapartists and anti-radical/moderates could recognize themselves in while banking on successive confidence crises (corruption, antisemitism, etc.)

Notwithstanding the likeliness of a successful boulangiste coup, you could expect populist values to be much more important in contemporary French political life. Not necessarily to the point of caudillismo, but certainly challenging parlementarian and liberal values.

 

[Hendryk]

Now, a less democratic regime could as well be fragilized by the Dreyfuss Affair, but I'd rather consider that there was actually an affair to begin with specifically because there was a democratic civilian and political society for allowing it to exist.

That's an important and often overlooked point. A Jew being framed and unfairly sentenced in late 19th century Europe would normally have been a dog bites man story, considering the entrenched antisemitism of the time. That it grew into a national crisis was because it took place in a democratic society where enough people were willing to push back against blatant injustice.

 

[Redolegna]

That's an important and often overlooked point. A Jew being framed and unfairly sentenced in late 19th century Europe would normally have been a dog bites man story, considering the entrenched antisemitism of the time. That it grew into a national crisis was because it took place in a democratic society where enough people were willing to push back against blatant injustice.

Yes and no. The very reason he was resented and a convenient scapegoat was that he was doing an internship at the HQ of the Ministry of War, probably would have made general if his career hadn't been interrupted, considering his superiors' esteem for him. Good luck finding a single Jewish officer of whatever rank in the German army even twenty years later.

 

[iainbhx]

Yes and no. The very reason he was resented and a convenient scapegoat was that he was doing an internship at the HQ of the Ministry of War, probably would have made general if his career hadn't been interrupted, considering his superiors' esteem for him. Good luck finding a single Jewish officer of whatever rank in the German army even twenty years later.

Yes and No.

Bayern and Hamburg had Jewish officers of full equal standing from Napoleonic times onwards. The Prussian army (and probably others) didn't allow it, but got around it in a number of ways. The very talented Menno Burg, who would have probably reached colonel level without discrimination became a 1st Lt in 1826 in the Prussian army, but his followup promotions to Captain (1836) and to Major (1847) were rather odd, he was appointed an Armoury Captain which came below all the other captains and only became a proper artillery captain with the proper privileges in the 1844 and that was due to an intervention by the Kaiser. When he was promoted to Major, it was as a Charakter als Major der Artillerie rather than a proper promotion. He was also discriminated against with military awards, but not so much with civilian ones. He was given a state funeral after dying in a cholera epidemic and 60,000 people attended.

But there were no officers above the rank of major until WWI was in full flow and whilst things got better in the 1880's onwards, there was still a lot of discrimination and Jewish officer were few and far between.

 

[raharris1973]

To be honest, I don't think that's a vraisemblable [='plausible', but in French] outcome : boulangisme was more of a standard for a very diverse and self-contradictory ensemble of revendications [=claims, but in French]ranging from semi-bonapartism, nationalism, socialism, monarchism, etc. (basically anything but radical and liberal republicanism) that would prevent a massive popular and institutional support for a full blown military coup. Although a failed boulangist coup in 1889 could have interesting consequences.

Interesting - like what?

An electoral victory for boulangisme, by staunting the radical/moderate counter-fire of 1889, however... That would be an interesting view insofar socialist movements weren't well defined or distinct from overall populist movements by then and would have an hard time challenging a boulangiste, semi-bonapartist, bloc in which monarchists, bonapartists and anti-radical/moderates could recognize themselves in while banking on successive confidence crises (corruption, antisemitism, etc.)

Notwithstanding the likeliness of a successful boulangiste coup, you could expect populist values to be much more important in contemporary French political life. Not necessarily to the point of caudillismo, but certainly challenging parlementarian and liberal values.

How could you see anti-semitism and illiberalism becoming more normalized in French politics and culture? How far could it go, how enduring would it be, and what would be the wider effects on France, its empire, its foreign policy, and the wider European and world scene?

 

[Death's Companion]

Yes and No.

Bayern and Hamburg had Jewish officers of full equal standing from Napoleonic times onwards. The Prussian army (and probably others) didn't allow it, but got around it in a number of ways. The very talented Menno Burg, who would have probably reached colonel level without discrimination became a 1st Lt in 1826 in the Prussian army, but his followup promotions to Captain (1836) and to Major (1847) were rather odd, he was appointed an Armoury Captain which came below all the other captains and only became a proper artillery captain with the proper privileges in the 1844 and that was due to an intervention by the Kaiser. When he was promoted to Major, it was as a Charakter als Major der Artillerie rather than a proper promotion. He was also discriminated against with military awards, but not so much with civilian ones. He was given a state funeral after dying in a cholera epidemic and 60,000 people attended.

But there were no officers above the rank of major until WWI was in full flow and whilst things got better in the 1880's onwards, there was still a lot of discrimination and Jewish officer were few and far between.

Wasn't one of the objections to raising military spending in the era to match the threat of a two front war was that a larger army would require a larger officer corps that would certainly involve a higher middle class membership and quite probably Jews as well?

 

[Roger II]

Yes and no. The very reason he was resented and a convenient scapegoat was that he was doing an internship at the HQ of the Ministry of War, probably would have made general if his career hadn't been interrupted, considering his superiors' esteem for him. Good luck finding a single Jewish officer of whatever rank in the German army even twenty years later.

You know, this makes me wonder what his career would have looked like if he'd avoided being scapegoated and made general. He did serve in WWI and was in artillery.