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Max's election maps and assorted others

And here's Devon (except for the Lyme Regis area) and West Somerset. Paler shades of a major railway's colours indicate independent lines leased to that railway, so for instance, the Liskeard and Looe was operated by the GWR but still owned by a local company. Most of these were amalgamated outright with their "parent" railways in 1922, but I think it's interesting to show them because it indicates how fractured the British railway system used to be and how incomplete the consolidation process was at this point.

I also went ahead and removed the station icons for stations not named, and added the tramway icon from the Swedish map to towns that had them. Going to be interesting to see how many insets we'll need as we head up towards the properly industrialised regions - I'm almost certain the South Wales Valleys will need one, for example.

1704227328628.png
 
Speaking of Centre Parties...

I came across a map of interwar Estonia's administrative divisions on Wikimedia Commons the other day, and as one does, I was struck by an overwhelming desire to draw over it. So here's the situation as of 1937:

View attachment 8298

On independence, Estonia created a local government system that was pretty clearly inspired by Sweden and Finland, with eleven provinces (singular maakond, plural maakonnad) partially based on the old Russian uyezds (subdivided in some places) and 365 parishes (vald/vallad) below them alongside twenty towns (linn/linnad) and fifteen boroughs (alev/alevid) covering urban areas (all numbers stated are as of 1937 - my understanding is that there were about 380 parishes on independence). These all had councils, with provincial councils led by provincial elders (maavanem/maavanemad), larger town councils led by mayors (linnapea/linnapead), smaller town and borough councils led by town elders (linnavanem/linnavanemad), and parish councils by parish elders (vallavanem/vallavanemad).

The parishes were all based on old ecclesiastical parish lines, which were essentially "what if you take the worst aspects of Swedish/Finnish parish boundaries and throw in some German nobles". Because if there's one group of people who know how to draw sensible lines on a map, it's German nobles. The result was a staggering number of exclaves, particularly in what had been Livonia - these are pictured below. Towns and boroughs are all coloured white to avoid confusion - none of them had any exclaves, thank God.

View attachment 8299

Now, these boundaries as well as the small size of some parishes posed administrative problems, so when Konstantin Päts brought in authoritarian rule through a self-coup in 1934, one of the many changes he brought in was a thorough reform of parish boundaries. Started in 1935, passed into law in 1938 and coming into force on 1 January 1939, the reform lowered the number of parishes to 248, most of which had above 1500 inhabitants, and all of which had regular, exclave-free boundaries. Which made things more logical, but frankly also a great deal more boring.

The towns were unchanged by the reform, except insofar as all the boroughs (except Narva-Jõesuu for some reason - it may have been raised, deprived of town status under the Soviets and then elevated again, I wouldn't know if so) were elevated to town status.

View attachment 8300
hi, may i use this basemap for mapping out some old census results?
am estonian and this is some awesome work :D
was planning to trace over stuff i found on wiki to make my own basemap
 
hi, may i use this basemap for mapping out some old census results?
am estonian and this is some awesome work :D
was planning to trace over stuff i found on wiki to make my own basemap
Absolutely, feel free.
would you mind linking it?
ive found some info as well but it doesnt seem to have much more than tables
Got it from DIGAR, here. The link on Wikipedia is dead, but it seems to work fine to just search "riigikogu valimised" plus the year you want.
 
Got it from DIGAR, here. The link on Wikipedia is dead, but it seems to work fine to just search "riigikogu valimised" plus the year you want.
thanks, seems to be the same thing that i found
i might try mapping out the other years they have data for as well :D
the last election before soviet occupation used single member districts apparently but unfortunately i havent found data for that yet
 
And here's Devon (except for the Lyme Regis area) and West Somerset. Paler shades of a major railway's colours indicate independent lines leased to that railway, so for instance, the Liskeard and Looe was operated by the GWR but still owned by a local company. Most of these were amalgamated outright with their "parent" railways in 1922, but I think it's interesting to show them because it indicates how fractured the British railway system used to be and how incomplete the consolidation process was at this point.

I also went ahead and removed the station icons for stations not named, and added the tramway icon from the Swedish map to towns that had them. Going to be interesting to see how many insets we'll need as we head up towards the properly industrialised regions - I'm almost certain the South Wales Valleys will need one, for example.
Commenting on this a bit late, but I notice you've omitted the Bideford, Westward Ho! and Appledore Railway. Now where are you going to get a station on the map with an exclamation mark in the title? 😛
 
Russia 2003
I made this in more or less a blind overnight rush after discovering the data's more readily available than I thought it was, with a list of constituency results having been posted on Russian Wikipedia. No such thing is really available for any of the previous elections, but 1995 and 1999 both seem to have good spreadsheets available through the Wayback Machine, so they should be doable even if they end up taking slightly longer.

The 2003 legislative election was the great realigning election of post-Soviet Russia. The previous situation had seen a relatively stable and powerful presidency, throughout the 1990s held by Boris Yeltsin and then, after Yeltsin's forced retirement following a heart and/or brain scare in 1999, by Vladimir Putin, checked by a chronically unstable State Duma dominated on the one hand by the Communist Party and on the other by a disunited bloc of oligarchs and local independents. This situation had allowed Yeltsin and his liberal allies to push through a series of reforms privatising and deregulating the economy in the early-to-mid-90s, but then faded into complete dysfunction when it came time to figure out how to solve the myriad social problems caused by this sudden economic shock. By the time Yeltsin resigned, he and his government were almost universally despised by the Russian people (some polls put his approval rating as low as 2%).

When Putin took over the reins, he was determined to avoid repeating Yeltsin's mistakes, but more in the sense of safeguarding his own reputation and that of Moscow's political establishment than in the sense of actually addressing Russia's problems on a deeper level. He became convinced that bringing the Duma into line was key to this, and after winning the 2000 presidential election by a healthy margin, set about uniting the different "pro-administration" factions into a unified political force. The core of this new party would be the pre-existing Unity (Единство/Yedinstvo) party, founded in 1999 as basically a previous attempt to do the same thing, bolstered by a merger with the Fatherland-All Russia (Отечество-Вся Россия/Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya) movement led by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. They were soon bolstered by a number of smaller factions, most notably the remnants of Our Home - Russia (Наш дом – Россия/Nash dom - Rossiya), the party of Gazprom chairman and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (one of the quintessential 90s Russian oligarchs - the party was nicknamed "Nash dom - Gazprom" because it was seen as such a naked big-business vehicle), which had fallen on hard times after Chernomyrdin's dismissal as PM left it without direct institutional power. The new party was initially dubbed "Unity and Fatherland", but after its founding congress in 2001, it settled on the somewhat snappier name United Russia (Единая Россия/Yedinaya Rossiya).

United Russia's message was quite simple. Russia had gone through a decade of chaos and instability, with poverty, crime, corruption and border wars. Everyone was sick of change, and now, with Putin at the helm, it was time for the change to stop. There wouldn't be one more heave of neoliberal reforms to finally fix everything and bring Russia into the West, nor would the reforms be reversed and Russia returned to socialism. The current owners of the country would be kept in place, they just wouldn't rotate in power quite as often. The fact that this message resonated - because it clearly did - is... both sad and understandable. As a Windows user, I quite understand the feeling that every new change only makes things worse and that it would be nice if they could just stick with the current version, and that is sort of what Putin and United Russia promised in the 2003 State Duma election.

It was effective enough, and the local strongman network that ran much of provincial Russia was united enough, to deliver United Russia a popular voteshare of 38%, the highest of any party since the fall of the Soviet Union, and 223 seats - three off from an overall majority. For all intents and purposes, however, United Russia did win a workable majority in the new Duma, because a large portion of the independent bloc - larger than any actual party except UR itself - was elected with UR's de facto endorsement and didn't meaningfully oppose their programme in government. The same was true of the People's Party, which had been founded by a group of independents in the previous Duma as a pro-Putin faction outside of United Russia and won 17 seats in 2003, only a handful of which were opposed by UR candidates. Several popular and/or pliable Communist deputies were given a similar treatment, as were the two remaining representatives of the theoretically left-wing Agrarian Party of Altai governor Mikhail Lapshin. The two right-wing blocs in the new Duma - the Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the National-Patriotic Movement "Rodina" - were both also close to the government to various degrees, and the latter in particular faced accusations of having been set up by the Kremlin to prevent nationalist voters from going to more radical or anti-government parties.

In short, the 2003 election left precious few real opposition forces in place. There was Yabloko, a centre-left liberal party that had enjoyed some success during the Yeltsin years, but which was now reduced to just four deputies, not enough to form an official group in the Duma. In theory, there was the Union of Rightist Forces, a coalition of neoliberal true believers left over from Yeltsin's early governments, but all three of their elected deputies left for United Russia soon after the new Duma met. The Communists and LDPR, two of the biggest factions in the new Duma, were somewhat in question, but all the other factions were pro-administration or tightly controlled opposition. And this has been the state of the Duma in every subsequent election - only a few of the names have changed.

val-ru-2003.png
 
As a Windows user, I quite understand the feeling that every new change only makes things worse and that it would be nice if they could just stick with the current version, and that is sort of what Putin and United Russia promised in the 2003 State Duma election.
This metaphor is chillingly apt.

Putin's Russia is one of those lab computers still running XP.
 
I made this in more or less a blind overnight rush after discovering the data's more readily available than I thought it was, with a list of constituency results having been posted on Russian Wikipedia. No such thing is really available for any of the previous elections, but 1995 and 1999 both seem to have good spreadsheets available through the Wayback Machine, so they should be doable even if they end up taking slightly longer.

The 2003 legislative election was the great realigning election of post-Soviet Russia. The previous situation had seen a relatively stable and powerful presidency, throughout the 1990s held by Boris Yeltsin and then, after Yeltsin's forced retirement following a heart and/or brain scare in 1999, by Vladimir Putin, checked by a chronically unstable State Duma dominated on the one hand by the Communist Party and on the other by a disunited bloc of oligarchs and local independents. This situation had allowed Yeltsin and his liberal allies to push through a series of reforms privatising and deregulating the economy in the early-to-mid-90s, but then faded into complete dysfunction when it came time to figure out how to solve the myriad social problems caused by this sudden economic shock. By the time Yeltsin resigned, he and his government were almost universally despised by the Russian people (some polls put his approval rating as low as 2%).

When Putin took over the reins, he was determined to avoid repeating Yeltsin's mistakes, but more in the sense of safeguarding his own reputation and that of Moscow's political establishment than in the sense of actually addressing Russia's problems on a deeper level. He became convinced that bringing the Duma into line was key to this, and after winning the 2000 presidential election by a healthy margin, set about uniting the different "pro-administration" factions into a unified political force. The core of this new party would be the pre-existing Unity (Единство/Yedinstvo) party, founded in 1999 as basically a previous attempt to do the same thing, bolstered by a merger with the Fatherland-All Russia (Отечество-Вся Россия/Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya) movement led by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. They were soon bolstered by a number of smaller factions, most notably the remnants of Our Home - Russia (Наш дом – Россия/Nash dom - Rossiya), the party of Gazprom chairman and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (one of the quintessential 90s Russian oligarchs - the party was nicknamed "Nash dom - Gazprom" because it was seen as such a naked big-business vehicle), which had fallen on hard times after Chernomyrdin's dismissal as PM left it without direct institutional power. The new party was initially dubbed "Unity and Fatherland", but after its founding congress in 2001, it settled on the somewhat snappier name United Russia (Единая Россия/Yedinaya Rossiya).

United Russia's message was quite simple. Russia had gone through a decade of chaos and instability, with poverty, crime, corruption and border wars. Everyone was sick of change, and now, with Putin at the helm, it was time for the change to stop. There wouldn't be one more heave of neoliberal reforms to finally fix everything and bring Russia into the West, nor would the reforms be reversed and Russia returned to socialism. The current owners of the country would be kept in place, they just wouldn't rotate in power quite as often. The fact that this message resonated - because it clearly did - is... both sad and understandable. As a Windows user, I quite understand the feeling that every new change only makes things worse and that it would be nice if they could just stick with the current version, and that is sort of what Putin and United Russia promised in the 2003 State Duma election.

It was effective enough, and the local strongman network that ran much of provincial Russia was united enough, to deliver United Russia a popular voteshare of 38%, the highest of any party since the fall of the Soviet Union, and 223 seats - three off from an overall majority. For all intents and purposes, however, United Russia did win a workable majority in the new Duma, because a large portion of the independent bloc - larger than any actual party except UR itself - was elected with UR's de facto endorsement and didn't meaningfully oppose their programme in government. The same was true of the People's Party, which had been founded by a group of independents in the previous Duma as a pro-Putin faction outside of United Russia and won 17 seats in 2003, only a handful of which were opposed by UR candidates. Several popular and/or pliable Communist deputies were given a similar treatment, as were the two remaining representatives of the theoretically left-wing Agrarian Party of Altai governor Mikhail Lapshin. The two right-wing blocs in the new Duma - the Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the National-Patriotic Movement "Rodina" - were both also close to the government to various degrees, and the latter in particular faced accusations of having been set up by the Kremlin to prevent nationalist voters from going to more radical or anti-government parties.

In short, the 2003 election left precious few real opposition forces in place. There was Yabloko, a centre-left liberal party that had enjoyed some success during the Yeltsin years, but which was now reduced to just four deputies, not enough to form an official group in the Duma. In theory, there was the Union of Rightist Forces, a coalition of neoliberal true believers left over from Yeltsin's early governments, but all three of their elected deputies left for United Russia soon after the new Duma met. The Communists and LDPR, two of the biggest factions in the new Duma, were somewhat in question, but all the other factions were pro-administration or tightly controlled opposition. And this has been the state of the Duma in every subsequent election - only a few of the names have changed.

View attachment 78455

Sounds to me like Russians should have ditched their Windows system and gone Apple. And now that I have that joke out of my system, very very impressive!
 
I made this in more or less a blind overnight rush after discovering the data's more readily available than I thought it was, with a list of constituency results having been posted on Russian Wikipedia. No such thing is really available for any of the previous elections, but 1995 and 1999 both seem to have good spreadsheets available through the Wayback Machine, so they should be doable even if they end up taking slightly longer.

The 2003 legislative election was the great realigning election of post-Soviet Russia. The previous situation had seen a relatively stable and powerful presidency, throughout the 1990s held by Boris Yeltsin and then, after Yeltsin's forced retirement following a heart and/or brain scare in 1999, by Vladimir Putin, checked by a chronically unstable State Duma dominated on the one hand by the Communist Party and on the other by a disunited bloc of oligarchs and local independents. This situation had allowed Yeltsin and his liberal allies to push through a series of reforms privatising and deregulating the economy in the early-to-mid-90s, but then faded into complete dysfunction when it came time to figure out how to solve the myriad social problems caused by this sudden economic shock. By the time Yeltsin resigned, he and his government were almost universally despised by the Russian people (some polls put his approval rating as low as 2%).

When Putin took over the reins, he was determined to avoid repeating Yeltsin's mistakes, but more in the sense of safeguarding his own reputation and that of Moscow's political establishment than in the sense of actually addressing Russia's problems on a deeper level. He became convinced that bringing the Duma into line was key to this, and after winning the 2000 presidential election by a healthy margin, set about uniting the different "pro-administration" factions into a unified political force. The core of this new party would be the pre-existing Unity (Единство/Yedinstvo) party, founded in 1999 as basically a previous attempt to do the same thing, bolstered by a merger with the Fatherland-All Russia (Отечество-Вся Россия/Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya) movement led by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. They were soon bolstered by a number of smaller factions, most notably the remnants of Our Home - Russia (Наш дом – Россия/Nash dom - Rossiya), the party of Gazprom chairman and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (one of the quintessential 90s Russian oligarchs - the party was nicknamed "Nash dom - Gazprom" because it was seen as such a naked big-business vehicle), which had fallen on hard times after Chernomyrdin's dismissal as PM left it without direct institutional power. The new party was initially dubbed "Unity and Fatherland", but after its founding congress in 2001, it settled on the somewhat snappier name United Russia (Единая Россия/Yedinaya Rossiya).

United Russia's message was quite simple. Russia had gone through a decade of chaos and instability, with poverty, crime, corruption and border wars. Everyone was sick of change, and now, with Putin at the helm, it was time for the change to stop. There wouldn't be one more heave of neoliberal reforms to finally fix everything and bring Russia into the West, nor would the reforms be reversed and Russia returned to socialism. The current owners of the country would be kept in place, they just wouldn't rotate in power quite as often. The fact that this message resonated - because it clearly did - is... both sad and understandable. As a Windows user, I quite understand the feeling that every new change only makes things worse and that it would be nice if they could just stick with the current version, and that is sort of what Putin and United Russia promised in the 2003 State Duma election.

It was effective enough, and the local strongman network that ran much of provincial Russia was united enough, to deliver United Russia a popular voteshare of 38%, the highest of any party since the fall of the Soviet Union, and 223 seats - three off from an overall majority. For all intents and purposes, however, United Russia did win a workable majority in the new Duma, because a large portion of the independent bloc - larger than any actual party except UR itself - was elected with UR's de facto endorsement and didn't meaningfully oppose their programme in government. The same was true of the People's Party, which had been founded by a group of independents in the previous Duma as a pro-Putin faction outside of United Russia and won 17 seats in 2003, only a handful of which were opposed by UR candidates. Several popular and/or pliable Communist deputies were given a similar treatment, as were the two remaining representatives of the theoretically left-wing Agrarian Party of Altai governor Mikhail Lapshin. The two right-wing blocs in the new Duma - the Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the National-Patriotic Movement "Rodina" - were both also close to the government to various degrees, and the latter in particular faced accusations of having been set up by the Kremlin to prevent nationalist voters from going to more radical or anti-government parties.

In short, the 2003 election left precious few real opposition forces in place. There was Yabloko, a centre-left liberal party that had enjoyed some success during the Yeltsin years, but which was now reduced to just four deputies, not enough to form an official group in the Duma. In theory, there was the Union of Rightist Forces, a coalition of neoliberal true believers left over from Yeltsin's early governments, but all three of their elected deputies left for United Russia soon after the new Duma met. The Communists and LDPR, two of the biggest factions in the new Duma, were somewhat in question, but all the other factions were pro-administration or tightly controlled opposition. And this has been the state of the Duma in every subsequent election - only a few of the names have changed.

View attachment 78455
The fact that votes against all candidates won a constituency really says a lot about Russian democracy (such as it is/was).
 
I made this in more or less a blind overnight rush after discovering the data's more readily available than I thought it was, with a list of constituency results having been posted on Russian Wikipedia. No such thing is really available for any of the previous elections, but 1995 and 1999 both seem to have good spreadsheets available through the Wayback Machine, so they should be doable even if they end up taking slightly longer.

The 2003 legislative election was the great realigning election of post-Soviet Russia. The previous situation had seen a relatively stable and powerful presidency, throughout the 1990s held by Boris Yeltsin and then, after Yeltsin's forced retirement following a heart and/or brain scare in 1999, by Vladimir Putin, checked by a chronically unstable State Duma dominated on the one hand by the Communist Party and on the other by a disunited bloc of oligarchs and local independents. This situation had allowed Yeltsin and his liberal allies to push through a series of reforms privatising and deregulating the economy in the early-to-mid-90s, but then faded into complete dysfunction when it came time to figure out how to solve the myriad social problems caused by this sudden economic shock. By the time Yeltsin resigned, he and his government were almost universally despised by the Russian people (some polls put his approval rating as low as 2%).

When Putin took over the reins, he was determined to avoid repeating Yeltsin's mistakes, but more in the sense of safeguarding his own reputation and that of Moscow's political establishment than in the sense of actually addressing Russia's problems on a deeper level. He became convinced that bringing the Duma into line was key to this, and after winning the 2000 presidential election by a healthy margin, set about uniting the different "pro-administration" factions into a unified political force. The core of this new party would be the pre-existing Unity (Единство/Yedinstvo) party, founded in 1999 as basically a previous attempt to do the same thing, bolstered by a merger with the Fatherland-All Russia (Отечество-Вся Россия/Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya) movement led by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. They were soon bolstered by a number of smaller factions, most notably the remnants of Our Home - Russia (Наш дом – Россия/Nash dom - Rossiya), the party of Gazprom chairman and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (one of the quintessential 90s Russian oligarchs - the party was nicknamed "Nash dom - Gazprom" because it was seen as such a naked big-business vehicle), which had fallen on hard times after Chernomyrdin's dismissal as PM left it without direct institutional power. The new party was initially dubbed "Unity and Fatherland", but after its founding congress in 2001, it settled on the somewhat snappier name United Russia (Единая Россия/Yedinaya Rossiya).

United Russia's message was quite simple. Russia had gone through a decade of chaos and instability, with poverty, crime, corruption and border wars. Everyone was sick of change, and now, with Putin at the helm, it was time for the change to stop. There wouldn't be one more heave of neoliberal reforms to finally fix everything and bring Russia into the West, nor would the reforms be reversed and Russia returned to socialism. The current owners of the country would be kept in place, they just wouldn't rotate in power quite as often. The fact that this message resonated - because it clearly did - is... both sad and understandable. As a Windows user, I quite understand the feeling that every new change only makes things worse and that it would be nice if they could just stick with the current version, and that is sort of what Putin and United Russia promised in the 2003 State Duma election.

It was effective enough, and the local strongman network that ran much of provincial Russia was united enough, to deliver United Russia a popular voteshare of 38%, the highest of any party since the fall of the Soviet Union, and 223 seats - three off from an overall majority. For all intents and purposes, however, United Russia did win a workable majority in the new Duma, because a large portion of the independent bloc - larger than any actual party except UR itself - was elected with UR's de facto endorsement and didn't meaningfully oppose their programme in government. The same was true of the People's Party, which had been founded by a group of independents in the previous Duma as a pro-Putin faction outside of United Russia and won 17 seats in 2003, only a handful of which were opposed by UR candidates. Several popular and/or pliable Communist deputies were given a similar treatment, as were the two remaining representatives of the theoretically left-wing Agrarian Party of Altai governor Mikhail Lapshin. The two right-wing blocs in the new Duma - the Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the National-Patriotic Movement "Rodina" - were both also close to the government to various degrees, and the latter in particular faced accusations of having been set up by the Kremlin to prevent nationalist voters from going to more radical or anti-government parties.

In short, the 2003 election left precious few real opposition forces in place. There was Yabloko, a centre-left liberal party that had enjoyed some success during the Yeltsin years, but which was now reduced to just four deputies, not enough to form an official group in the Duma. In theory, there was the Union of Rightist Forces, a coalition of neoliberal true believers left over from Yeltsin's early governments, but all three of their elected deputies left for United Russia soon after the new Duma met. The Communists and LDPR, two of the biggest factions in the new Duma, were somewhat in question, but all the other factions were pro-administration or tightly controlled opposition. And this has been the state of the Duma in every subsequent election - only a few of the names have changed.

View attachment 78455

No colour scale for the LDPR?
 
The fact that votes against all candidates won a constituency really says a lot about Russian democracy (such as it is/was).
They won three - one in Yekaterinburg, one in Saint Petersburg and one in Ulyanovsk. What the "against all" option actually did was leave the seat vacant pending a by-election, but I don't know if the original candidates were allowed to stand for the seat again or if the wording was actually taken seriously.
No colour scale for the LDPR?
The LDPR, for their part, did not win a constituency seat, nor did they win a single raion in the proportional vote. It's pretty much always been a very spread-out party, even in 1993 when they topped the polls they only won five constituencies. They've only started winning constituency seats in recent years because United Russia has given them a free run in a couple of areas in the Far East.
 
Russia 1993 (referendum)
Ideally, I would like to map every post-Soviet Russian election going back to 1990, but it's quite hard to find information on that one for what should be obvious reasons. 1993, too, is frustrating, because the Internet was still quite new when it happened, and so the results presentation made available at the time was quite lacklustre by any sort of modern standards. I will have some work ahead of me to get constituency results for that one, but what I do have are subject-level results for both it and the attendant constitutional referendum.

You can't really make sense of this election cycle without understanding the events of "Black October" 1993. President Boris Yeltsin had spent the previous months locked in conflict with the Congress of People's Deputies (as the legislature was then called), which had been elected back in 1990, when the Soviet Union still existed and seemed like it was going to keep existing. When the USSR collapsed and Yeltsin announced his economic reforms, the country was initially supportive, but then a very bad economic crisis hit, and resistance started to entrench itself first in the bureaucracy and then in the legislature itself. After a series of disputes over appointments and proposed constitutional revisions, Yeltsin signed a decree in late September 1993 that declared the Congress (as well as the Supreme Soviet, which still existed as a standing committee of the Congress) dissolved. According to the 1978 Russian Constitution, which was still in effect despite the USSR's dissolution, this was beyond the President's authority (though it would be allowed under Yeltsin's draft constitution), and the Congress responded by impeaching Yeltsin for abuse of power. Neither side was willing to back down, and so for ten days, both Yeltsin and the Congress remained in their positions of power, neither recognising the other's legitimacy and both trying to influence the people of Moscow to make a decisive show of support for their side.

What resolved the impasse, as in so many such cases throughout history, was the presidential monopoly on the use of force. On the 4th of October, called to action by Yeltsin, the Army rolled tanks into the streets of the capital, marshalled outside the White House (the meeting place of the Congress of People's Deputies, in which its members had barricaded themselves following the impeachment vote), and opened fire. Official estimates place the death toll from both the shelling of the White House and the attendant protests at 147, with another several hundred wounded. It was, for all intents and purposes, a self-coup by Yeltsin, carried out unconstitutionally to support an unconstitutional decision, but none of that mattered in the end. A poll taken shortly after the events showed that 70% of the Russian people backed Yeltsin's actions, and while this would change dramatically later on, he was safe in office for the time being and the Congress would not be able to reconvene. Just over a week after the shelling of the White House, Yeltsin signed a decree calling for new parliamentary elections and a referendum on the draft constitution, both of which would be held on the 12th of December.

This was a daring calculus. On the one hand, even Boris Yeltsin recognised that ruling by decree for an extended period of time would not be acceptable, and electing a new legislature alongside the constitutional referendum rather than later on showed willingness to abide by democratic norms. On the other hand, it all hinged on the referendum passing - if it didn't, the new legislature would presumably continue to operate under the 1978 constitution, and that risked recreating the situation preceding the self-coup. Getting the broader powers provided by the draft constitution was a higher priority for Yeltsin than electing a supportive legislature, and so his administration focused its efforts on campaigning for a "Yes" vote in the referendum.

The rules for the referendum required a simple majority of votes cast, as well as a minimum 50% turnout. Both of these requirements were met according to the official tally - the result reported was 58.4% approval on 54.4% turnout. However, in a pattern that would repeat itself more than once in post-Soviet Russia, ballots and related paper trails were very quickly destroyed after the official tally was published. A group of observers from opposition parties later claimed that ballots had been stuffed and that turnout had in fact only been around 46%, but their findings were immediately rejected by the government and by most foreign observers, including John McCain, who led the US observer delegation and praised Yeltsin's commitment to the democratic process.

Whatever the truth of the rumours, even if we take the official results at face value, even they showed only 31% of the total Russian electorate voting in favour of the draft constitution. It was far from the mass show of approval Yeltsin might have wanted, and he would continue to face an uphill battle convincing the Russian people to support his policies. Even more alarmingly, the regional governments of Tatarstan and Chechnya, both autonomous republics within the Russian Federation, resisted holding the referendum on their territories. The Tatarstan government was satisfied to call for a boycott while allowing the referendum itself to be carried out, but the Chechen government of Dzhokhar Dudayev, which had already declared itself an independent state back in 1991, would not allow the Russian election authorities into their territory at all.

ref-ru-1993.png
 
France 1968
I found out someone on French Wikipedia has done incredible work cataloguing old election results, so here's the 1968 election.

The Gaullist bloc had lost its majority in the 1967 legislative elections, so there was already a degree of instability in the government even before May 1968 happened. As the protests and strikes began to die down, de Gaulle and Pompidou decided the time was right to call on the silent majority to rally to the defence of the Republic, and immediately declared the National Assembly dissolved pending elections in late June. The result was devastating to anyone who had hoped 1968 would herald a new beginning for France - the left was routed on a level not seen since the previous "crisis election" in 1958, and unlike then, the Gaullist movement was now organised enough to reap the benefits all on its own. The Union for the Defence of the Republic, a bloc of Gaullists and independents formed specifically to contest the elections, won an outright majority in the Assembly, and nearly a majority of the popular vote as well.

Along with their abysmal performance in the following year's presidential elections (which no one knew about at this point), this election marked an existential crisis for the French centre-left, which had barely managed to keep its leaders from electoral defeat. At a series of congresses held in various Parisian suburbs between 1969 and 1971, the SFIO and FGDS (the organisational and electoral arms, respectively, of the centre-left) transformed into the new Socialist Party, which soon managed to unite everyone in the old centre-left bloc, except a few Radicals who nonetheless continued their electoral alliance with them. It's not easy to tell based on this election result, but the left would soon be back in business.

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