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WI: The Cold War never ended? What would be the impacts on Pop Culture, Technology, and World Politics?
- Thread starter TheKennedyMachine
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As @napoleon IV very rightly said, the problem is how to get here. The army in particular is an interest group that has massively captured the party and government to the extent that something like that is hard to do. I'm not sure there's an easy solution to it; the army and the KGB probably simply remain massive stakeholders in the success of the Union and get a much lighter touch than the rest of Soviet society in the austerity period. Again, the apples and oranges of the Soviets and China, it's unlikely that they remain subservient to the Party; and more likely that they essentially capture it fully (to some extent, you can argue that already began to happen before Gorbachev).
In the timeline I mentioned (which, having described this now lol, I've decided to start going back to) this is essentially what I had happen. In the USSR and much of the Eastern Bloc, the distinction between The Party and the armed forces is increasingly blurred; only in East Germany where the Stasi remains subersvient is the communist party in de facto control. In the USSR, the KGB (naturally, led by a young up-and-coming law graduate from Leningrad State University) heavily manipulates the party's choice of General Secretary (though it's very clear that this position is not as teethy as it used to be) and other things like this. One can only imagine how Kremninology develops in this timeline, too.
But again, to bring it back to the impact on pop culture; with all this shadowy KGB influence over the Soviet Union, I could see some sort of HYDRA plotline developing, maybe? Perhaps not in the MCU, but in the Bond universe or something like that. A shadowy secret organisation engineering the rise and fall of political leaders seems like the perfect backdrop/big bad for a spy flick.
Ultimately, we're back to Stalin having built a system only Stalin could lead properly. The only way to "fix" it through the institutions is through similar amount of power consolidation and cowing of the special interests or a grassroot push that forces in new blood before the grassroots become hostile to the project itself. Gorbachev tried to go for the second option but by then it was way too late to salvage people's trust in the possibility to fix the union.
JesterBL
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Stephen Cohen in one of his books actually gives a couple of options- I don't have a copy on hand, but he argued essentially that a Gorbachev more willing to use traditional mechanisms of power on people like Yeltsin and more willing to mend bridges with the conservative wing of his reformists could have shepherded the Soviet Union forward. That Soviet Union would look very different than a Kruschev Triumphs Soviet Union or any of the other examples given here, and wouldn't even really look like Deng's PRC but it would be an option.
Communism remains seen as something “foreign” and the idea of socialism/a mixed economy in the US gains less traction as it is more easily tarred as soviet communism without the memory of the Soviet Union to be used against it.
Popular culture is big-without the Soviet union’s collapse, you don’t have the American triumphalism-Star Trek looks very different for example. A lot of spy thrillers as mentioned have very different plots. How this looks genre to genre, franchise to franchise is impossible to say-sci fi is probably less optimistic in some ways, and maybe more in othere
Modern American conspiracism of the Alex Jones/black helicopter variety remains on the fringe, and is marginalized even in right wing circles.
Pat Buchanan and American isolationism also remains marginalized-basically the bipartisan consensus of the Cold War foreign policy goes unchallenged. Though depending on exact conditions, a lighter footprint in some areas might occur.
China’s rise I don’t see why should be hampered. Soviet-Chinese ties probably slowly thaw, or at least if current American foreign policy continue. Maybe not. But I don’t see a permanent Sino-American alliance in the long run.
The internet probably remains, though the exact contours of what companies become household names might change.
A lot of it depends if the Cold War enters some sort of detente, and thus fades in the public mind, or it remains “warm” with flashpoints and saber rattling constantly in the news.
This could change in thirty plus years, many times in fact. A continuing Cold War zeitgeist in 2022 and one in 2001 will look very different.
Beyond the internet, consumer technology I don’t see changing much. Maybe there are some slight improvements, with tech derived from military research, or maybe it’s held back for the same reason.
World politics really depends-I don’t see the same pink wave in Latin America, Africa is a lot less peaceful, with more ongoing proxy wars, the Middle East is hard to say. Iran’s role might be more of a third power-it could compete with the UsSR for influence in the Central Asia, or seek to undermine soviet power in the region through state sponsored terrorism and rebellion. Turkey remains tied to the west, someone like Erdogan or the man himself may come to power, but he or they wouldn’t have the same room to maneuver as Erdogan has had. The Arab spring I can’t really say, maybe. Maybe not.
The influence of western NGOs in the developing world probably continues, but I don’t see the same infrastructure of “aid” and peacekeeping that emerged in the post Cold War era.
There may not even be a 9/11, and if so the rise of cultural movements such as New Atheism, as well as a revived Christian fundamentalism in the US-will likely not occur, or be more sedate.
Really it’s hard to say what is a product of post Cold War social and ideological conditions, and what is something that goes further back in understanding the history of the last thirty one years.
I do think American society will be very different, definitely. I can’t say as much about Europe specifically but left and right political polarization in the western world either doesn’t happen at all, or it occurs at a more glacial and unseen pace. For this reason American society in particular will likely be less divided.
Popular culture is big-without the Soviet union’s collapse, you don’t have the American triumphalism-Star Trek looks very different for example. A lot of spy thrillers as mentioned have very different plots. How this looks genre to genre, franchise to franchise is impossible to say-sci fi is probably less optimistic in some ways, and maybe more in othere
Modern American conspiracism of the Alex Jones/black helicopter variety remains on the fringe, and is marginalized even in right wing circles.
Pat Buchanan and American isolationism also remains marginalized-basically the bipartisan consensus of the Cold War foreign policy goes unchallenged. Though depending on exact conditions, a lighter footprint in some areas might occur.
China’s rise I don’t see why should be hampered. Soviet-Chinese ties probably slowly thaw, or at least if current American foreign policy continue. Maybe not. But I don’t see a permanent Sino-American alliance in the long run.
The internet probably remains, though the exact contours of what companies become household names might change.
A lot of it depends if the Cold War enters some sort of detente, and thus fades in the public mind, or it remains “warm” with flashpoints and saber rattling constantly in the news.
This could change in thirty plus years, many times in fact. A continuing Cold War zeitgeist in 2022 and one in 2001 will look very different.
Beyond the internet, consumer technology I don’t see changing much. Maybe there are some slight improvements, with tech derived from military research, or maybe it’s held back for the same reason.
World politics really depends-I don’t see the same pink wave in Latin America, Africa is a lot less peaceful, with more ongoing proxy wars, the Middle East is hard to say. Iran’s role might be more of a third power-it could compete with the UsSR for influence in the Central Asia, or seek to undermine soviet power in the region through state sponsored terrorism and rebellion. Turkey remains tied to the west, someone like Erdogan or the man himself may come to power, but he or they wouldn’t have the same room to maneuver as Erdogan has had. The Arab spring I can’t really say, maybe. Maybe not.
The influence of western NGOs in the developing world probably continues, but I don’t see the same infrastructure of “aid” and peacekeeping that emerged in the post Cold War era.
There may not even be a 9/11, and if so the rise of cultural movements such as New Atheism, as well as a revived Christian fundamentalism in the US-will likely not occur, or be more sedate.
Really it’s hard to say what is a product of post Cold War social and ideological conditions, and what is something that goes further back in understanding the history of the last thirty one years.
I do think American society will be very different, definitely. I can’t say as much about Europe specifically but left and right political polarization in the western world either doesn’t happen at all, or it occurs at a more glacial and unseen pace. For this reason American society in particular will likely be less divided.
Jackson Lennock
Well-known member
The Cold War ended in 1989 but the USSR collapsed in 1991.
Just because the USSR is still around doesn't mean the Cold War continues.
You need somebody with a firmer hand who can purge forces within the state opposed to change. Gorbachev wasn't this guy. Maybe Putin could be this guy, since he was basically a technocrat his first decade in power (then a generic conservative the second decade, then an ultranationalist in his third decade which we are currently in).
Basically ... maybe Gorbachev meanders through for a decade but Putin somehow rises through the ranks, purges internal dissent, but continues a path of reform?
If China rises in a manner similar to OTL, it's going to be much much much more awkward for the USSR. They're gonna have a China with a billion people and a bigger economy than them. The USSR without the baby collapse and emigration still has 300 to 320 million people.
What are the borders of the USSR here? Is it the 'New Union' USSR? If so, then the Baltics, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia have left. But the rump USSR under Putin using Transnistria, Gagauzia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia as justifications for forcing Georgia and Moldova those countries back into the Russia orbit and demanding a Finlandization of the Baltics seems like a possibility. The USSR could pressure Armenia into its sphere again. The USSR taking the Serbian side in the Yugoslav wars also could trigger conflict.
Just because the USSR is still around doesn't mean the Cold War continues.
You need somebody with a firmer hand who can purge forces within the state opposed to change. Gorbachev wasn't this guy. Maybe Putin could be this guy, since he was basically a technocrat his first decade in power (then a generic conservative the second decade, then an ultranationalist in his third decade which we are currently in).
Basically ... maybe Gorbachev meanders through for a decade but Putin somehow rises through the ranks, purges internal dissent, but continues a path of reform?
If China rises in a manner similar to OTL, it's going to be much much much more awkward for the USSR. They're gonna have a China with a billion people and a bigger economy than them. The USSR without the baby collapse and emigration still has 300 to 320 million people.
What are the borders of the USSR here? Is it the 'New Union' USSR? If so, then the Baltics, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia have left. But the rump USSR under Putin using Transnistria, Gagauzia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia as justifications for forcing Georgia and Moldova those countries back into the Russia orbit and demanding a Finlandization of the Baltics seems like a possibility. The USSR could pressure Armenia into its sphere again. The USSR taking the Serbian side in the Yugoslav wars also could trigger conflict.
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Jackson Lennock
Well-known member
Without the Collapse of the USSR, I don't think there'd be the expansion of the EEC into the east. Sweden, Finland, and Norway may stay out.
A Baltic/Nordic Pact of North European countries not in the EEC might be possible. Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
A Baltic/Nordic Pact of North European countries not in the EEC might be possible. Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Pretty sure you're right, Brussells would be leery about potentially getting into a spat with the USSR that way
History Learner
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It's honestly extremely simple to save the USSR, to quote from Gorbachev vs. Deng: A Review of Chris Miller’s The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy:
As oil prices fell, Gorbachev tried to maintain living standards which resulted in major growth in the budget deficit. Before Gorbachev came to power, the budget was balanced or even had a small surplus. In 1985, the deficit grew to 2% GDP, by 1990, it reached 10% GDP. In 1991, the last year of the Soviet Union, the deficit exceeded astronomical 30% GDP (p. 152).
The fiscal crisis was partly explained by a collapse in global oil prices but was partly handmade. First, Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign reduced revenues from excise taxes. Second, in order to keep the industrial and agricultural lobbies happy, the government continued to subsidize their inputs and raise prices for their outputs. At the same time, in order to pacify the general public, consumer prices were kept low. Gorbachev also avoided cutting expenditure on public goods and tried to maintain living standards. He decided that–unlike Deng–he would not use force to suppress protesters and therefore tried to avoid the situation where people took to the street to voice their economic grievances.
To fund the deficit, the government resorted to borrowing. The foreign debt increased from 30% of GDP in 1985 to 80% of GDP in 1991 (p. 152). As the markets were growing increasingly reluctant to lend, the government funded the deficit by printing money. The official prices were still controlled, so the monetization of budget deficit resulted in “repressed inflation”, increased shortages and higher prices in black markets. Eventually Soviet Union ran out of cash and collapsed.
You either need to have Gorbachev decide to tackle Price Reform first before anything else, as that alone would mostly cover the budgetary hole. He may have to delay his wider reform package as a result, but that works out better because by the time he starts it, oil prices should be rising again.
napoleon IV
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I mean, if we just ignore the fundamental argument of Chris Miller's The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy that's a perfectly reasonable idea. But if we actually look at Miller's argument his point is that Gorbachev initially tried to do economic reforms, but was unable to because extremely powerful interest groups (Miller lists the energy industry, agriculture, and the military as the big three vested interests) refused to go along. Gorbachev then turned to glasnost and perestroika as a way to get the public more involved and create more transparency so as to weaken the interest groups, but that backfired and killed the Soviet Union. Basically, if we imagine a world where Gorbachev has all the power and can do whatever he wants it's really simple, but once we get into the real world where Gorbachev has a ton of institutional constraints it becomes obvious why he didn't just do that.
History Learner
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I think that leaves out a lot of context of what Miller argues, the most prominent in my mind being the fact Miller directly states that by 1990 the USSR was about as deeply reformed as China was/had been. If reform was completely impossible, then how do you reconcile such things?
It wasn't that reform was impossible (Miller states most recognized reform in general was needed, even) or that Gorbachev had to wait for Perestroika, but rather that it came with the cost of needing to buy off interest groups with subsidies that ultimately led to repressed inflation. Perestroika, in essence, was an attempt to get around this constraint but it need not have been the only path to reforming the USSR. Miller directly covers the benefits of Price Reform, shows how Gorbachev and others were intimately aware of it, and why they didn't pursue it at first. It's worth noting it was brought up seriously in 1988 and that it was one of the first acts of the new Russian Federation after the collapse.
So, why didn't Gorbachev do such? He was already pursuing economic reforms and associated policies, and was afraid Price Reform could be used to turn the public against his main policies. Thus, that takes me back to my suggestion, of doing Price Reform first and then attempting wider policies once oil prices recover in the early 1990s or so. The Soviets would likely be running a surplus by then, and could thus afford the subsidies needed to buy off interest groups without causing repressed inflation. By the late 1990s or early 2000s, such policies would probably be paying for themselves with increased growth.
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History Learner
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Interesting factoid I learned recently, which I think fit this point well: Russian language publications had surpassed Ukrainian publications within the Ukrainian SSR in the mid 1980s, for the first time since the 1920s. Same had happened back in the 1970s with Belarus which, taken together, I think shows just how much of a perfect storm the late 1980s where in terms of causing Soviet collapse when most of the trend lines pointed in the opposite direction. I remember a post from The Other Place, which I think further illustrates this:
In 1989 the Soviet Union's GDP amounted to 2.5 Trillion US Dollars. GDP per Capita amounted to 8.700 US Dollars.
In 2013 the countries of the former Soviet Union had a combined GDP of 2.75 Trillion US Dollars. GDP per Capita amounted to 9.503 US Dollars.
Between 1980 and 1985 the USSR's annual average GDP growth amounted to 2.0%. The failure to embrace a model of intensive economic growth, high military spending, bad harvests, declining oil prices, and the war in Afghanistan can be blamed for the relatively low rate of growth during the early 1980s, as compared to the 1970s. It can be presumed that the rate of growth would've increased once again during the 1990s, following the inevitable end of the arms race, better harvests, higher oil prices and the eventual ending of the war in Afghanistan.
However, for the sake of argument, let's say that the annual average GDP growth of 2.0% continues until 2013. Let's assume that the annual average population growth rates of the early 1980s remain stable as well (0.8%). The total population I'm 1985 amounted to 277.8 Million). By 2013, the Soviet Union's GDP would have increased by 56%, compared to 1985 (it amounted to 2.2 Trillion US Dollars during that year). If we stick with these estimates, the hypothetical GDP of the USSR in 2013 would have amounted to 3.4 Trillion US Dollars. The hypothetical population in 2013 would have amounted to 340.0 Million. The USSR's hypothetical GDP per Capita would have amounted to exactly 10.000 US Dollars (3.4 Trillion ÷ 340 Million = 10.000).
To conclude:
In 2013 in OTL, the total population of the FSU amounted to 289.37 Million. GDP per Capita amounted to 8.700 US Dollars.
In 2013 (using this quite pessimistic model), the population of the USSR would have amounted to 340 Million. GDP per Capita would have amounted to 10.000 US Dollars.
Jackson Lennock
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Because the established interests Miller addresses could have been willing to put up with some degree of reform but not more (such as the sort that occurred in the 90s)?
It isn't reform or not to reform, but also how much to reform and what to reform and what to reform first.
But even if the USSR is saved - that isn't the same as continuing the Cold War. The Cold War was defined by a bipolar world between the two Superpowers, with the USSR have a belt of occupied satellite states and the two sides aggressively competing with one another on the margins (ergo, the Third World which wasn't the US-aligned first world or Soviet-aligned second world ... and the very idea of the third world simply being an 'other' reflects the principally bipolar nature of global politics). The dismantling of the Iron curtain, freeing of the Captive East bloc states, and of hostilities as a more general matter, and emergence of other powers such as China make the firm idea of the bipolar Cold War untenable.
Even if the USSR doesn't implode like OTL - I think it just means a decade or two of it primarily focusing upon getting its own internal house in order before stomping around on the world stage again around the same time Putin started doing so OTL.
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History Learner
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The budget cuts the Russian Federation enacted in the 1990s certainly were out of Gorby's means, and Yeltsin was able to achieve them because of the collapse of the Communist Party, through which the three industries previously exercised influence. Price Reform and Gorbachev's historical slate of reforms were acceptable to them, however, with the main check on the former being considerations of popular opinion as it relates to the latter.
I'd highly recommend the book, it's a great read and goes over it in detail. Of note to me was that it revealed China, not the West, was the actual model for Soviet reform efforts in the 1990s.
If Gorbachev or someone else, say Grigory Romanov, is able to stabilize the position of the USSR, then it's likely the Iron Curtain says up and the East Bloc remains. There might be détente in the 1990s, as the Soviets begin reform efforts, but then later on the hostilities and competition would resume. Sino-Soviet relations were starting to thaw and as Western Power reaches its zenith in the 1990s, it's likely this would accelerate. In a sense, it would be a return to the Cold War of the 1950s, just with the power dynamics between China and the USSR more equal but increasingly leaning more towards China.
Jackson Lennock
Well-known member
I'm skeptical that the USSR even could totally crack down on the Eastern Bloc states. If they tried, my suspicion is there'd be complete social revolt in most of those countries and massive resistance both violent and nonviolent. Poland in particular seems impossible to suppress without a massive commitment to the use of force by the Soviets of a sort that would put a big hole in the the USSR's budget.
East Germany could plausibly be a Belarus-style holdout in the heart of Central Europe, but its being surrounded by more liberal and prosperous countries would make such a regime difficult to maintain. If North Korea of OTL cannot keep people from getting out and others from smuggling media in, how would East Germany of TTL?
This is more or less what I said. Further reforms seem to have required established interests within the Communist party to be gone. I don't see how Gorbachev can rid of them unless he's willing to be a strongman of a sort Gorbachev was plainly unwilling to be.
So it would require somebody other than Gorbachev; and other than that, more or less what I said?
East Germany could plausibly be a Belarus-style holdout in the heart of Central Europe, but its being surrounded by more liberal and prosperous countries would make such a regime difficult to maintain. If North Korea of OTL cannot keep people from getting out and others from smuggling media in, how would East Germany of TTL?
This is more or less what I said. Further reforms seem to have required established interests within the Communist party to be gone. I don't see how Gorbachev can rid of them unless he's willing to be a strongman of a sort Gorbachev was plainly unwilling to be.
So it would require somebody other than Gorbachev; and other than that, more or less what I said?
History Learner
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If they wait until 1989 or such to intervene, sure, but a USSR that is stable over the course of the 1980s is one that can preclude such by stabilizing its puppets. A lot of the root cause was Poland, Hungary, etc took on loans that over the course of the 1980s they could no longer make payments on to fund their imports; a familiar story, to be sure. A USSR that is fiscally secure can step in and manage this state of affairs, I would think.
Well, if you take Miller's account, by 1990 Gorbachev had managed to enact deep reforms without the deep budget cuts that Yeltsin later imposed. He did, however, do this by extensive and deep subsidies to the industrial-political blocs to buy their loyalty. The problem was this created hyper inflation that ultimately undid the Union; Gorby thought the reforms would prevent this by provoking higher growth rates first, basically in a race against time.
Had he done Price Reform first, and/or waited for Oil prices to rise again after the late 1980s glut, this budgetary hole would've been prevented. He could've funded his reforms without creating hyperinflation.
I think it was possible under Gorbachev, had he decided to go after Price Reform first and delayed the rest of his reforms. Certainly, Miller makes the case he understood Price Reform as a whole and that the situation in 1985 was stable enough to do such. Grigory Romanov is someone who I think would do something like this too, so there is that, but I've also considered before an earlier Gorbachev. There's evidence Andropov intended him as his direct successor and in such a case I think Gorbachev would've been more cautious and dependent on support bases to strengthen his early rule. Instead of rocking the boat so much with extensive reforms straight off, he'd seek Price Reform and maybe compromise on the Anti-Alcohol campaign before going after deeper reforms later in his reign, having become secure and sufficiently skilled in his role.
TheKennedyMachine
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Returning to this relic — a TL on alternatehistory.com once proposed an idea where Brezhnev dies in 1979, leading to Suslov to succeed him before dying in 1982, which leads to Andrei Gromyko being the leader of the Soviet Union from 1982 - 1989, all of this is topped off by Boris Yeltsin succeeding him in 1989.
That could be a possible way to allow the Soviet Union to survive.
That could be a possible way to allow the Soviet Union to survive.
History Learner
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Honestly, I don't see how the USSR could survive with Yeltsin in power. Do you have a link to this TL? I'd love to read it to get an idea of the author's arguments. Personally I think a Gorbachev in '83 (Allegedly what Andropov wanted) would be better than the historical '85 one, as an aside. Grigory Romanov has also struck me as someone that would've been better in the role, if he had defeated Gorby in the OTL competition.
I always thought that people will eventually get bored. Seventy-eighty years of “Fighting Communism” rhetoric from one camp and “Fighting Imperialism” rhetoric from the other is bound to eventually wear itself out. Then again the Arab and Muslim world still hates Israel even after all these decades so who knows. At the very least it’ll probably enter a new era in a way, either a new flavor of hard leftism takes control of the Eastern Bloc, the Western Bloc gets taken over by literal fascists, or something else.