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WI: Nazi Victory

lerk

Well-known member
This is one of those scenarios that has been talked about on and on and on and on. But it wouldn't be an AH site without at least one discussion of this topic, and I'd like to see you guys having a crack on this one. The POD I'm going with here is that, for whatever reason, Lord Halifax is made PM after Chamberlain and decides to make peace with Germany after the Fall of France. With Germany now in control of most of Continental Europe, and without a war in the West, they can set their sights on the Soviet Union without much hassle. Most likely now the UK will choose to spend its peace years gearing up for round two, however by the time they are ready it is clear that Germany would be in a much stronger position than they were IOTL, as they did not waste so much blood and treasure fighting the Battle of Britain along with the battles in North Africa and the Balkans. What do you guys think of this scenario?
 
This is one of those scenarios that has been talked about on and on and on and on. But it wouldn't be an AH site without at least one discussion of this topic, and I'd like to see you guys having a crack on this one. The POD I'm going with here is that, for whatever reason, Lord Halifax is made PM after Chamberlain and decides to make peace with Germany after the Fall of France. With Germany now in control of most of Continental Europe, and without a war in the West, they can set their sights on the Soviet Union without much hassle. Most likely now the UK will choose to spend its peace years gearing up for round two, however by the time they are ready it is clear that Germany would be in a much stronger position than they were IOTL, as they did not waste so much blood and treasure fighting the Battle of Britain along with the battles in North Africa and the Balkans. What do you guys think of this scenario?

I'm pretty sure the point of divergence is ASB. Any Prime Minister who tried to make peace after the Fall of France would be immediately ousted. There was no public support for making peace.
 
I'm pretty sure the point of divergence is ASB. Any Prime Minister who tried to make peace after the Fall of France would be immediately ousted. There was no public support for making peace.
This isn't actually true, FWIW, though Halifax would have had a harder job than pulp-AH usually makes out. A ceasefire could have occurred in May 1940, it certainly isn't ASB. A permanent peace is harder.

A several-year truce, followed by Britain (and possibly FDR) breaking it when the Nazis bog down in the Soviet Union, is more plausible than you'd think, based on its rarity as an idea. One might never see a D-Day but an even-further unleashed Bomber Harris laying waste to Germany night after night thanks to a far larger bomber command from an extra few years of peacetime build-up could be a grim 'VE Day, 1946' scenario as the hammer and sickle flies over Calais.
 
. One might never see a D-Day but an even-further unleashed Bomber Harris laying waste to Germany night after night thanks to a far larger bomber command from an extra few years of peacetime build-up could be a grim 'VE Day, 1946' scenario as the hammer and sickle flies over Calais.

The only reason Bomber Command could scale up to the size it did is because Churchill wanted it and Lend-Lease meant we could devote resources to it.

The British didn't have to build naval aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, transport aircraft and fighter aircraft to defend our colonies because the USA was doing that for us.

In this timeline it's stuck with a handful of Halifax and Manchester Squadrons that can't find a target at night.
 
This isn't actually true, FWIW, though Halifax would have had a harder job than pulp-AH usually makes out. A ceasefire could have occurred in May 1940, it certainly isn't ASB. A permanent peace is harder.

A several-year truce, followed by Britain (and possibly FDR) breaking it when the Nazis bog down in the Soviet Union, is more plausible than you'd think, based on its rarity as an idea. One might never see a D-Day but an even-further unleashed Bomber Harris laying waste to Germany night after night thanks to a far larger bomber command from an extra few years of peacetime build-up could be a grim 'VE Day, 1946' scenario as the hammer and sickle flies over Calais.
I agree about the fact a 1940 Ceasefire is doable and that thats a very grim scenario.

The one thing that always gives me pause about "The War starts up again in 1944" scenarios, is that I don't know if "Alright folks remember how bad it was for our boys last time? Time to go again" is actually going to work. Talking people in a Democracy into a war is not an easy feat, its not going to be popular with parents who feel relief that Dick got home from the war in one piece recently and now will come home draped in a flag.
 
I can see it getting widescale public support, but it's reliant on an ever increasing drip of reports of German atrocities. Probably with some suitably impeccable eye-witnesses to fan the 'something must be done' narrative.

Difficult, but possible.
 
If it's in the name of setting something up later on then fine, Halifunkirk scenarios are ten a penny but if it's for the sake of examining plausibility, then it needs fleshing out. The problem is that the "for whatever reason" bears too much of the burden for it to hold up. Halifax just forcing through a peace, when the main goal of him being PM was to act as a consensus leader in a cabinetfilled with anti-appeasers, is extremely unlikely. It would be like the historical fiction of Darkest Hour when Churchill is having to fight his cabinet over carrying on, except in reverse with the characters having their actual views. Chucking them out and forming a Guilty Men Redux cabinet wouldn't survive a hostile parliament. He was encouraged to be there to be a consensus figure as was his nature, partially explaining his love for appeasement in the first place but also why he didn't really want to be PM.
 
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I can see it getting widescale public support, but it's reliant on an ever increasing drip of reports of German atrocities. Probably with some suitably impeccable eye-witnesses to fan the 'something must be done' narrative.

Do the British of 1940-50 really care if foreigners are killing other foreigners, especially if they are Jews, Gypsys, Poles and Communists?

Most Britons would be told the Nazis were doing the world a favour, and a majority would be happy to believe that.
 
Do the British of 1940-50 really care if foreigners are killing other foreigners, especially if they are Jews, Gypsys, Poles and Communists?

Most Britons would be told the Nazis were doing the world a favour, and a majority would be happy to believe that.

Discrimination, exilation, probably not.

Being round up and shot in indiscriminate and brutal fashion is another question.

In fact one of the main reasons for the contemporary scepticism was people assuming it was just the same stories as the Kaiser Bayonetting Belgian Babies- it had worked as propaganda before. It'd be harder but it would also actually be true.
 
Discrimination, exilation, probably not.

Being round up and shot in indiscriminate and brutal fashion is another question.

Given that's been happening in the Soviet Union, China for most of the 1930s, and in Abyssinia too, I suspect the response from the great British public will be a Rothermere-style ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

A sponge doesn't care if it absorbs blood, urine, or champagne.
 
What happens to Imperial Japan in this scenario?
If the Nazis get the Brits to sue for peace in exchange for leaving Britain untouched, the Japanese could do likewise to Britain's colonies and the US (if they have any sense).

With the Congo and Indonesia cut off from their metropoles, they would come under de facto british rule as kingdoms in exile.
IOTL the Brits proposed that the Congo even become "independent" under a white-minority regime during WW2 at one point.
Even in such a limited Nazi victory scenario, Vichy France's empire will either fall to native revolt or Britain
 
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This is one of those scenarios that has been talked about on and on and on and on. But it wouldn't be an AH site without at least one discussion of this topic, and I'd like to see you guys having a crack on this one. The POD I'm going with here is that, for whatever reason, Lord Halifax is made PM after Chamberlain and decides to make peace with Germany after the Fall of France. With Germany now in control of most of Continental Europe, and without a war in the West, they can set their sights on the Soviet Union without much hassle. Most likely now the UK will choose to spend its peace years gearing up for round two, however by the time they are ready it is clear that Germany would be in a much stronger position than they were IOTL, as they did not waste so much blood and treasure fighting the Battle of Britain along with the battles in North Africa and the Balkans. What do you guys think of this scenario?

How about in the event of Subhas Chandra Bose's faction having won out in his power struggle with the Gandhi-led clique in the Congress Working Committee, enabling him to retain his presidency over the Indian National Congress (rather than being forced to resign from the Congress Presidency in April 1939, in spite of Bose having been democratically elected over Gandhi's preferred candidate Pattabhi Sitaramayya)? And then, as he and his followers loudly advocated for IOTL, India seceding from the British Empire and declaring a war of independence under his leadership, over the unilateral decision- made by former Viceroy Lord Halifax's successor, Viceroy Lord Linlithgow- to declare war on India's behalf without consulting the Congress leadership, and reject the Congress' request for a declaration that India would at the very least be given the chance to determine its own future (via an independence referendum) after the war?

Mightn't this POD be one of the most plausible ways to meet these criteria? After all, in that context, with an active Indian War of Independence to violently overthrow British rule in India breaking out, led by Bose as the elected and (largely) undisputed leader of the Indian National Congress (with Gandhi forced to escape in a similar manner to how Bose did IOTL, but fleeing to London rather than to Berlin as Bose did), there's no way that it'd be tenable for Lord Halifax to effectively decline the position of Prime Minister and step aside in favor of Winston Churchill- who had arguably been the most vocal leading figure of opposition to even Dominion status, let alone full independence, for India in the Conservative Party, who'd refused to even meet Bose during his sojourn in England because he was a leftist, socialist politician coming from a colony. In contrast, Lord Halifax had been among the first to accept Bose's invitation to an appointment, and both had left with significantly elevated impressions of one another- Halifax would've believed that he had the greatest chance of achieving peace and ending the new Indian conflict.

Nonetheless, Subhas Chandra Bose's ideologies (describing himself as a leftist and socialist, having called in his book The Indian Struggle for a hypothetical "left-wing revolt" inside the Congress, after which the party will transform and will "stand for the interests of the masses, that is, of the peasants, workers, etc, and not for the vested interests, that is, the landlords, capitalists and money-lending classes", governed by Soviet-style central planning "for the reorganisation of the agricultural and industrial life of the country", having also proposed the adoption of "a synthesis between communism and fascism" throughout the 1930s, and expressed the belief that an independent India needed socialist authoritarianism, along the lines of Turkey's Kemal Atatürk, for at least two decades- as well as advocating a similar non-aggression pact between socialist authoritarian India, under his leadership, and the USSR) would've definitely changed the whole dynamic on that front, in spite of Halifax's pre-existing personal rapport with Bose.

After the culmination of the resulting conflict/crisis in India, even if it ends with the best-case scenario for them (i.e, with a swift end to hostilities, and an 'Irish Solution' whereby a truce is agreed and an 'Indian Free State' is established by treaty), how much weaker, poorer and more divided would the British be for it? And with Bose's government overtly pro-Soviet, how much less popular opposition would there be to the Fascism's 'Anti-Comintern Pact'? Might TTL's Britain, wracked by both the Red and Yellow Scares on overdrive after even a semi-successful Indian War of Independence, and the British Raj falling under the rule of a left-wing nationalist anti-imperialist Marxist regime (akin to that of Josip Broz Tito)- along with the further potential, of not only Stalin's Soviet Union, but Bose's India as well, offering even greater assistance and support to the beleagured CCP earlier on- even contemplate offering nominal support to the Nazis' alliance, against the ever-increasing 'Red Peril'?
 
This isn't actually true, FWIW, though Halifax would have had a harder job than pulp-AH usually makes out. A ceasefire could have occurred in May 1940, it certainly isn't ASB. A permanent peace is harder.

A several-year truce, followed by Britain (and possibly FDR) breaking it when the Nazis bog down in the Soviet Union, is more plausible than you'd think, based on its rarity as an idea. One might never see a D-Day but an even-further unleashed Bomber Harris laying waste to Germany night after night thanks to a far larger bomber command from an extra few years of peacetime build-up could be a grim 'VE Day, 1946' scenario as the hammer and sickle flies over Calais.

That would be a timeline I'd very much like to read.
 
After the culmination of the resulting conflict/crisis in India, even if it ends with the best-case scenario for them (i.e, with a swift end to hostilities, and an 'Irish Solution' whereby a truce is agreed and an 'Indian Free State' is established by treaty), how much weaker, poorer and more divided would the British be for it? And with Bose's government overtly pro-Soviet, how much less popular opposition would there be to the Fascism's 'Anti-Comintern Pact'? Might TTL's Britain, wracked by both the Red and Yellow Scares on overdrive after even a semi-successful Indian War of Independence, and the British Raj falling under the rule of a left-wing nationalist anti-imperialist Marxist regime (akin to that of Josip Broz Tito)- along with the further potential, of not only Stalin's Soviet Union, but Bose's India as well, offering even greater assistance and support to the beleagured CCP earlier on- even contemplate offering nominal support to the Nazis' alliance, against the ever-increasing 'Red Peril'?

This is a great idea, and I would love to read such a scenario.
 
I'm pretty sure the point of divergence is ASB. Any Prime Minister who tried to make peace after the Fall of France would be immediately ousted. There was no public support for making peace.

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In the dark days of late May of 1940, the general opinion of the War Cabinet was to seek terms with only Churchill holding out to see what developments would spring forth from Dunkirk. When directly asked, however, Churchill was largely of the same mind as Halifax, in that he would seek peace and even conceded territory to achieve such. Even after the successful evacuation from Dunkirk, contacts were still made through the Swedish into June and then in Washington Lord Lothian continued direct, off the record talks with his German counterpart into late July. The British "Red Line" was a refusal to accept any military limitations upon themselves, while it was seen as a given they would have to concede Europe to the Axis. The further question of what else they would need to surrender seems to have been a general agreement of returning Germany's 1914 colonies to them, as well as Gibraltar and Malta. These are good terms, which I have no doubt Hitler would accept as it allows him to establish his new Empire effectively in Europe as well as eliminates the last remnant of Versailles by returning the old Colonies.

From June of 1940, Hitler can now turn his focus almost entirely to the East. A formal peace treaty is signed with Vichy France, which concedes Alsace-Lorrain, the old German colonies and Madagascar to the Germans, as well as inducts them into the Axis. Franco, without the threat of Anglo-American economic blockade and the enticement of Gibraltar, is likewise too inducted into the Axis. Mussolini is given control of Malta, which is a political boon for him, and dissuades him from his Greek adventures. The rest of the European powers are forced to kow-tow to the new order, with Turkey and Greece in particular moving to accommodate the new center of power. Yugoslavia either sticks to an accord with the Axis or sees itself invaded and divided among them.

Once war comes to the East, it is a smashing German success. To quote from Denis Havlat (2017) Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part I, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies -

With Britain’s refusal to make peace with Germany, the Luftwaffe was forced to commit substantial forces into the bombing of Britain, and later into the Mediterranean, resulting in costly losses. From 1 July 1940 to 22 June 1941, the Luftwaffe lost 4,313 aircraft, including 1,688 bombers and 1,100 fighters.108 Additionally, not all available aircraft could be used against the USSR. By 22 June 1941 a total of 1,561 German aircraft were stationed at other fronts in Europe and in the Mediterranean fighting against Britain, as compared to 3,104 stationed at the Eastern Front.109 German historian Rolf Dietrich-Müller concludes that if Britain had arranged itself with Hitler in the summer of 1940, the Luftwaffe could have used up to 9,640 aircraft at the start of Barbarossa, which would have resulted in a quick victory over the USSR.110 In the second half of 1941, Luftwaffe losses against the Royal Air Force (RAF) remained far lower than the losses sustained against the Soviet air force; however, they were still substantial. By 27 December 1941 the Germans had lost 2,505 aircraft in the East, while losses on all other fronts since June 1941 amounted to 779 aircraft.111​
The allocation of the majority of the Luftwaffe to the Eastern Front gave Britain the opportunity to build up its bomber force; this meant that with each passing month the RAF grew stronger and more capable of launching largescale bomber attacks against German industry. After British forces had been kicked out of Europe in France and Greece, this form of warfare had remained the only possible way in which Britain could strike against Germany. Another reason for this approach was the hope to aid the Soviet Union by keeping away large German forces, as well as the desire to end the war without the necessity of costly land warfare. The bomb load dropped by the RAF on Germany and German-occupied territories rose from 13,037 tons in 1940 to 31,704 tons in 1941.112 At this stage of the war bombing was still too imprecise and the bomb load too small to cause any substantial damage to German industry; however, fighting over the skies of Western Europe and the Mediterranean resulted in costly losses for the Luftwaffe. During the second half of 1941 the Royal Air Force was responsible for roughly one-quarter of all German aircraft losses; additionally, large numbers of German aircraft were sent to these fronts to replenish and reinforce the Luftwaffe formations fighting the RAF. By October 1941 there were 642 German aircraft stationed in the Mediterranean theater of war alone.113
Continued British resistance after the summer of 1940 denied the Germans the ability to reorganize and replenish their air forces; instead it forced them into a costly campaign that greatly decimated the Luftwaffe. Without British resistance in the year leading up to Barbarossa and the necessity to keep substantial amounts of aircraft in Western Europe and the Mediterranean, the Luftwaffe could have attacked the USSR with a force up to three times as strong as it actually did. On top of that, German stocks of aviation fuel would have been substantially higher because in case of a British withdrawal or surrender, fuel consumption would have stood at a fraction of the historical level. Even in the second half of 1941, at a time when the majority of the Luftwaffe fought in the East, Britain contributed greatly to Soviet survival by engaging and destroying hundreds of German aircraft, thus preventing the Luftwaffe from creating reserves that could have been used to keep up the strength of German air forces in the East.​

Further:

In order to counter possible British landings in Northern France and Norway, the Germans had to keep substantial mechanized forces in these areas. In April 1940 the total German tank stock numbered 3,387 units, of which 2,580, or 76 percent, were used in the invasion of Western Europe.120 By the beginning of June 1941, the German tank stock had increased to 5,639 machines, but only 3,580, or 63.5 percent, were used against the USSR.121 Without British resistance, Germany should have been able to use against the USSR the same percentage of tanks as used against Western Europe, or an additional 700 machines. A thousand German tanks, supported by the hundreds of French, British, and Polish tanks captured during 1939–1940, would have been enough to perform effective occupation duties throughout Europe, had the British been knocked out of the war in 1940.​
With a much stronger Operation Barbarossa, it exceedingly likely the Soviets lose Leningrad, Moscow, and the Donets Basin/Rostov in 1941, which would be a fatal blow and enable the Germans to conduct a successful "mopping up" operation to the A-A Line against the weakened Red Army in 1942. By 1943, I personally have no doubts the Wehrmacht will have succeeded in establishing the envisioned Urals border, with the remnants of the Soviet state east of that line far too weak to ever contest such a development from then on. With the USSR crushed, we thus get an Anglo-American Cold War against the new Axis Empire, which dominates Europe and has a strong presence in Africa as well; depending upon where Japan stands, they could also be strong in Asia, meaning they effectively control Afro-Eurasia as a whole. To quote Adam Tooze, from his Wages of Destruction:

In fact, even before the unsuccessful outcome of the Battle of Britain, Hitler appears to have convinced himself that the military conquest of the Soviet Union in 1941 was the key to ultimate victory in the war as a whole. At the Berghof on 31 July 1940, in conference with the military leadership, Hitler emphasized that the Soviet Union would have to be knocked out of the war, if Britain was to be brought to heel and America's support neutralized.116 'Britain's hope lies in Russia and the United States. If Russia drops out of the picture, America, too, is lost for Britain, because elimination of Russia would tremendously increase Japan's power in the Far East.' Russia, according to Hitler, was the 'Far Eastern sword of Britain and the United States', a spearhead pointed at Japan.117​
Attacking and decisively defeating the Soviet Union in 1941 would rob Britain of its 'dagger on the mainland' and unleash Japan. If Britain did choose to continue the war and if Japanese aggression provoked American entry, complete control of the Eurasian landmass would at least secure for Germany the resources it needed for a true trans Atlantic confrontation. As Hitler put in on 9 January 1941, after the conquest of Lebensraum in the East, Germany would be ready for a 'war against continents'.118 Indeed, he seems to have rated the economic potential of such an empire greater than that of Britain and America combined. And it was this vision of a combined Japanese-German war on Britain and America to which he returned six months later, during the euphoric early weeks of July 1941, when he proposed to the Japanese ambassador an offensive alliance against the United States.119​
 
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