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WI: 'Japanese-Ethiopian Friendship Treaty' allowed to happen?

SinghSong

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IOTL, a historical arrangement between the Ethiopian government and the Nagasaki Echiopia Keizai Chosa-kai Nikkei-Sha (Nagasaki Association for Economic Investigation of Ethiopia) was negotiated by its director Kitagawa Takashi in September 1933, granting the Japanese colonial company authorization to use 500,000 hectares of land in Ethiopia, along with a permit to grow cotton, tobacco, coffee, tea, green tea, rice, wheat, fruit trees, vegetables and ‘medicinal plants’ such as opium, a grant of fifteen hectares of land for each immigrant Japanese family, and 1,000 hectares of land next to Addis Ababa for a Japanese investigation mission to examine which plants could be grown in Ethiopia. And when Lij Araya Abeba, Haile Selassie’s nephew, who’d taken a trip to Japan (having accompanied the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Blattengetta Hiruy Wolde Selassie, on a trip to Japan in 1930 to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the two countries), asserted that "It has been my long-cherished ambition to marry a Japanese lady. Of all first-class nations, Japan has the strongest appeal", Sumioka Tomoyoshi, a Tokyo lawyer, philo-Ethiopian nationalist and Pan-Asian activist, agreed to arrange the marriage, and conducted the search for a suitable Japanese bride to marry into the Ethiopian royal family.

On January 18, 1934, Juo Hyoron [Free Critics] published an article tying the proposed marriage to the international discord. Entitled, "Warning to Ambitions in Ethiopia: 500,000 Yen Spent for the Engagement!", in part it read: “Although we do not have any ambitions in Ethiopia, the countries such as Italy, France, and England which possess close and unalienable interests in Ethiopia, will most certainly understand the royal engagement as a part of Japan's African ambitions, including colonization. Though England and France are unworthy of any trust in a crisis, Italy as well as Germany are still somewhat the allies of an isolated Japan. It would be capricious of Japan to undertake an adventure that could damage Italy's feelings. We should firmly eliminate any ambitions toward Ethiopia and warn against rumors for the sake of the integrity of the Japanese lady who is to be sacrificed for concessions worth only 500,000 yen…”

However, unlike elsewhere, where the Japanese emigrants faced racial prejudice and forced assimilation, Ethiopian progressive intellectuals called “Japanizers” had been arguing that Japan was a good model for modern development, and supported marriage between the upper classes of the two countries. And many Japanese nationalists were also supportive of intermarriage between the proposed Japanese emigrants and Ethiopians, with popular opinion in Japan favoring closer ties with Ethiopia, and many believing in "the necessity of uniting the colored races against the white"- a direct quote from the woman who Lij Araya selected as his first choice in the bridal contest IOTL, in Jan 1934, from at least 20 candidates who'd made the shortlist. Kuroda Masako was the 23yo second-born daughter of Viscount Kuroda Hiroyuki, of the forestry bureau of the Imperial Household, descended from the former Lord of Kazusa, a feudal lord in Chiba. The Kuroda family lived in a tiny suburban house, and she'd graduated from the Kanto Gakuin Higher Girl's School in Yodobashi-ku. She spoke English fluently, having been one of the first Japanese girls to take part in an English oratorical contest and to win a prize. She was also noted as being taller than average (for a Japanese woman- standing 5ft 3in tall). After her enrollment as a candidate for the "prince's bride," she studied the habits and customs of Ethiopia, through books and conversations with those familiar with conditions there. In school, Kuroda Masako had been a keen athlete who enjoyed swimming, basketball, volleyball, and tennis.

In an interview in February 1934, she enthusiastically remarked "I understand that the people of Ethiopia are extremely interested in sports, and I believe that I shall be able to indulge my taste for athletics when I go there. Unfortunately I did not have the opportunity of meeting Prince Abeba when he visited Japan a few years ago, but I have firmly decided to go to his country and I am willing to put up with whatever circumstances come along." However, it was then found that she'd presented her picture and other credentials for the marriage contest without her parents' knowledge, causing a fair bit of turmoil with her family when they found out. She also expressed her desire to increase the ties of friendship uniting Japan and Ethiopia, and she saw herself as the first of many who would emigrate to Ethiopia. Unfortunately for her though, such radical statements attracted a great deal of extra unwanted publicity, and sparked a great deal of alarmist sentiment among the colonial powers in Europe, especially Italy, and France to a lesser extent.

In early 1934, two Japanese gunboats visited Djibouti, the primary maritime door to Ethiopia, and that same year the Japanese government sent Tsuchida Yutaka on an inspection tour of Ethiopia. Although eager to protect Ethiopia's independence from the predations of the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, and optimistic about commercial opportunities, Tsuchida felt that Japan, far from Ethiopia, could not have an effect on imperialist ambitions there, and risked antagonizing the Europeans. As such, both the proposed marriage and investment deal were blocked and forbidden by Japan's Gaimusho (foreign ministry). Difficulties rose to the point where Kuroda Masako, at the end of February 1934, defensively asserted that "I will go to Ethiopia even in the capacity of a private citizen, if the Imperial Household authorities should disapprove of my trip."

At that time, her mother acknowledged that the Imperial Household Department had not yet sanctioned her daughter's betrothal or proposed trip to Ethiopia- with Viscount Kuroda Hiroyuki's employment as a member of the Imperial Household, and his refusal to allow his daughter's marriage to go through unless he could travel to Ethiopia to personally meet and approve of the groom first, allowing them to veto his trip, and thus the proposed marriage, indefinitely. She added that Araya "was scheduled to visit Japan in May of this year, but his trip has been indefinitely postponed. No direct word has been received from the Royal Family of Ethiopia, but Mr. Sumioka, a lawyer, is negotiating the matter." The American embassy in Tokyo agreed, reporting in February 1934 that the Japanese government had provided little information regarding the marriage and disparaged its political significance. The next month, the embassy reported that the marriage was about to fall through because of official Japanese opposition.

Haniyu Chotaro, a businessman from Kamakura, had spent five months in Ethiopia at the Gaimusho's request. Upon his return in April 1934, he publicly discussed the commercial opportunities available in that country. He then declared that "This matter is very delicate from a viewpoint of the international situation, and I do not like to make any comment on it until I have submitted a report to the Foreign Office. Prince Ababa [Araya] is called a Prince only in Japan. In Ethiopia, he is called Lij Ababa, and the word Lij means "lord" in English. There are only three Princes of the Blood in Ethiopia. The Japanese Foreign Office has nothing to do with this marriage. Some time ago, an Italian newspaper sarcastically remarked that Japan intends to invade Africa with "kisses between the dark and the black by having a daughter of a Japanese peer married to an Ethiopian." The Ethiopian press from the outset has been taciturn on the matter. If Miss Kuroda really wants to marry Ababa, she had better, I think, personally inspect the actual conditions of Ethiopia." Demanding a meeting with the new Japanese ambassador to Italy, Sugimura Yotaro, on the 16th July 1934, Mussolini linked the marriage to a number of contentious issues, complaining that "Japan is actively supplying weapons and ammunition to Ethiopia, sending a princess, and a newspaper in Tokyo is vigorously maneuvering Japanese-Ethiopian friendship."

Sugimura, who had represented his government at Geneva at the time of Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, soon thereafter spoke with La Tribuna of Rome; endeavoring to dispel suspicions of conflicting Italo-Japanese interests in Asia and Africa, he emphatically denied that the Japanese Army had sent instructors to Ethiopia as Mussolini had alleged. Regarding economic penetration of Ethiopia by Japan, Sugimura shifted the blame to “Jewish middlemen”, denied that there was any foundation for the rumor of a projected marriage between a Japanese princess and an Ethiopian prince, and offered to break ties with Ethiopia entirely, attempting to find common ground with Italy on business dealings in China; promising not to interfere with Italian interests in East Asia, encouraging importation of Italian wine and an exchange of students and teachers between them. His comments stirred up a furore inside Japan, where there had been popular affinity for the African Empire. And despite popular opinion, when the Ethiopians approached Japan for help on 2 August they were refused, and even a modest request for the Japanese government to officially state its support for Ethiopia in the coming conflict was denied, on the grounds of attempting to facilitate improved relations and increased trade with Mussolini’s Italy. However, there proved to be little to no demand for Italian wine imports in Japan (in contrast with coffee imports, which were far more lucrative, and commanded a higher price in Japan than anywhere else in the world well into the 1960's), and the proposed Italo-Japanese student and teacher exchange never came to pass.

Masako refused to give up though, and kept trying to gather funds for her to travel there alone regardless; but on the night of July 24th 1935, she was allegedly mistaken for a communist, and taken to the Ueno police station in Tokyo. The problem began when a policeman, Tajima Yukio, noted a suspicious-looking woman in black afternoon dress walking up and down the street near Ueno Park for two hours until about 8:00 p.m. The policeman disguised himself as a worker and arrested her. As it turned out, she had earlier reported to him that she had lost her purse containing about ¥5. She had borrowed 20 sen from him but had given a false name--therefore the trouble. Even after she had given her real name, and explained that she had been waiting for a friend, the policeman was still suspicious and took her in. She was, however, shortly released; and afterwards, Kuroda Masako, by then 25, finally caved in to her family's wishes, and gave up on her romantic dream of becoming an Ethiopian Princess IOTL.

So then, what if the Japanese Gaimusho had elected not to block the proposed marriage, and given the Nagasaki Echiopia Keizai Chosa-kai Nikkei-Sha relatively free rein to conclude its foreign investment deal, commence its operations there, and facilitate the establishment of a sizable Japanese diaspora in Ethiopia, in a similar manner to how they freely permitted the Sociedad Colonizadora Japón-México to do so in Chiapas IOTL (which had also been established for the primary purpose of creating coffee plantations for export to Japan)? This could be either by virtue of Kuroda Masako having been slightly less naive and outspoken in giving her interviews, of the Juo Hyoron article having never being published in the first place, or of the OTL's second placed candidate (Kabata 'Chiiko' Shigeko, the 22yo third-born daughter of the Moji-based millionaire businessman Tabata Kametaro, who was fully clued in and on-board with his daughter's candidacy for the bridal contest, having himself been one of the core members of the Nagasaki Association for Economic Investigation of Ethiopia, and a close personal associate of its director) having won the bridal contest instead ITTL. How many Japanese migrants could you envision choosing to migrate to Ethiopia ITTL, and taking the Ethiopian government's grants of free land- a similar or lesser number than those who chose to emigrate to Mexico and/or Brazil in the same time-frame IOTL? And how radically do you feel that they could have altered the course of history, both locally (in Ethiopia) and on a larger scale?
 
If Italy still invades Ethiopia in 1935, would this be enough of a wedge to completely sour the growing relationship between what would eventually become the Axis powers?

I mean the Germans actively armed Ethiopia in that war. You kind of think the axis was a lot of people ignoring previous slights out of pragmatism.

Japan would probably want some reassurance of special treatment for their settlers mind so I guess it depends how Mussolini reacts to that on whether it becomes a major sticking point.

What was Italian Japanese relations even like prior to 1940? There's obviously way more focus on German relations with both but Italy still had territory in China right so they probably had some contact.
 
I mean the Germans actively armed Ethiopia in that war. You kind of think the axis was a lot of people ignoring previous slights out of pragmatism.

Japan would probably want some reassurance of special treatment for their settlers mind so I guess it depends how Mussolini reacts to that on whether it becomes a major sticking point.

What was Italian Japanese relations even like prior to 1940? There's obviously way more focus on German relations with both but Italy still had territory in China right so they probably had some contact.
Italian-Japanese relations weren't good at all- the Italians were perhaps the most alarmist of all the colonial powers regarding the 'Yellow Peril' narrative (with the Japanese Yomuiri newspaper, in January 1934, complaining that Mussolini seemed obsessed with the old "Yellow Peril" theory because of Italy's defeat in African markets at Japanese hands), with the French as a close second, and the Germans up there as well (with Nazi Germany's press in December 1934 also voicing the opinion that Japan's increasing economic and political influence in NE Africa also jeopardized white racial supremacy, and symbolized the West's progressive decline- lamenting that "Yellow dolls of Japanese manufacture" were "replacing white dolls in the hands of Negro children", not only in Ethiopia, but across Asia and Africa, and warning that "the ultimate psychological effect would be enormous").

Here's a direct quote from early 1934, cited from the Italie Marinara, the official publication of the Italian Navy League:
Italy is watching with great interest developments in the Far East and, due to Japan's recent energetic invasion of Italian markets not only in Italy itself but in the Colonies and in the smaller countries bordering the Mediterranean, her attitude is not what might be called pro-Japanese.
A bit of an understatement, but it helps to give the gist of what Italian-Japanese relations were like at that time...
 
I wonder if it would be possible for things to deteriorate badly enough that Japan declares war on behalf of Ethiopia and sends in troops & guns? And I guess by that I mean "would it be logistically possible for Japan to do that". (Sending airmen and planes down and even some modern guns seems like it'd throw a massive monkeywrench into Mussolini's plans, if he doesn't have air supremacy and the Ethiopians have modern guns during their Christmas offensive)
 
I wonder if it would be possible for things to deteriorate badly enough that Japan declares war on behalf of Ethiopia and sends in troops & guns? And I guess by that I mean "would it be logistically possible for Japan to do that". (Sending airmen and planes down and even some modern guns seems like it'd throw a massive monkeywrench into Mussolini's plans, if he doesn't have air supremacy and the Ethiopians have modern guns during their Christmas offensive)
Perhaps- though it depends on the circumstances which lead to such a thing happening. IOTL, for instance, even in spite of the Japanese Gaimusho having blocked the deal itself, along with the proposed wedding (with 'Nikkei-Sha' having still managed to obtain some agricultural concessions from the Ethiopian government regardless, but failed to find the necessary capital, and been forced into dissolution by March 1934, due in no small part to official Japanese opposition), the Osaka Mainichi newspaper, and Shoji Yanosuke (who had been preaching racial unity uniting Ethiopians and Japanese since 1931, asserting that "It is uncontroversial that the Ethiopian people a very long time ago had racial connections to some extent with the Japanese people", and rallying many right-wing populist Japanese groups' support for the Ethiopian cause) still sponsored a round table discussion in Addis Ababa in August 1935, to which they invited several prominent Ethiopians, including Ethiopia's foreign minister, Blaten Geta Herui. And in September, with the outbreak of war with Italy imminent, Araya suggested that Japan obtain concessions in Ethiopia, stating that Ethiopia would gladly grant concessions to Japan for industrial and military development, with The Emperor ready to approve such grants and Araya offering his services as an intermediary.

By this stage, though, of course it was far too late, and the Japanese government was far too busy offering rapproachement to the offended Italians (which included transforming its newly created Legation in Addis Ababa into a Consulate General, in return for Italy's foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, promising to protect Japanese interests there- whilst also simultaneously citing the proposed marriage, and the Ethiopians' desire to draw closer to Japan, as critical concerns which still had to be assuaded by the Japanese). In an ATL where the Japanese government hadn't blocked the Nikkei-Sha organisation's original efforts though, and Nikkei-Sha had still been fully operational, you'd imagine that at the very least they'd have been intermediaries for arms sales to Ethiopia, in the build-up to the conflict. Preventing these from getting to Ethiopia would at the very least required a trade embargo from the France (blocking the transit of Japanese military aid via Djibouti, which they didn't do for the 16,000 rifles, 600 machine guns, 3 airplanes, and 10 million rounds of ammunition supplied via Djibouti by Nazi Germany IOTL), which would've been seen by both the Italians and the rest of the world as the French staunchly taking Italy's side.

IMHO, it'd be extremely unlikely for the Japanese migrant settlements, the merchant vessels exporting their produce, and/or the Japanese naval vessels escorting them (once the conflict goes hot) not to come under attack from the Italian expeditionary force. And whether it'd be logistically possible or not for Japan to send troops to Ethiopia itself (certainly would be possible to send guns, though- and planes, and ammo, in much the same manner that the Nazi Germans did IOTL, with a markedly smaller naval force projection capacity than the Imperial Japanese), it certainly would have been able to declare war on behalf of Ethiopia, and send in an invasion force against Italian Tientsin. Which, at the time (1934-35) "was becoming the most popular centre for the palatial residences of retired Chinese militaries and politicians", and enjoying a small economic boom, fueled by rich Chinese who moved to live in the Italian area escaping the Japanese invasion of China (following the Mukden Incident), and by Italy's roaring trade exports of "bomber planes, fighter planes, aerobatic aircraft, and all the support material they needed to China, such as armaments, spare parts and educational material to train both ground and on-board personnel. Fiat even supplied a wind tunnel to the University of Nanjing, and in 1933 also obtained an order for twenty-four "Fiat CR.32" for training purposes..."

This included the creation of the Sino-Italian National Aircraft Works (SINAW, predecessor of Hongdu Aviation), which was established in December 1934 in Nanchang, as a joint venture between the Republic of China and the Kingdom of Italy, after Chiang Kai-shek had signed an agreement with Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini a year before, with factories built at Qingyunpu Airport (then known as Sanjiadian) and Laoyingfang Airport in 1935- with the new sea transport services via Tientsin inaugurated in 1932 having allowed Fascist Italy's arms exports to amiable KMT China to overtake those of all the other Western powers, the UK, Germany and France included. With the following telegram, from the Chinese in August 1934 (shortly after the Japanese had ordered the Nikkei-Sha to disband and cease their interference over in Ethiopia IOTL, but pretty much the exact same time their operations would have otherwise been getting up and running), providing a fair bit of extra context in this regard:

I ask Your Excellency to meet the Generalissimo personally, to thank him for his expressions of esteem and to tell him that I agree with his contentment and his work in general to implement his government plans in lines with the Italian politics, this will only give undoubted advantages to the two countries. By adapting China's requirements to the principles of the Fascist State, the body of the Republic will be strengthened, able to acquire real control over the whole country and meet the needs of defense in foreign policy. The importance of these results, that can generate even greater Italian-Chinese collaboration, certainly does not escape to Chiang Kai-shek, who knows how such collaboration is conducted with the most friendly sentiment and spirit of equality [...] finally Your Excellency will warn, in a very reserved and prudent way, Chiang Kai-shek about the serious
suspicions of intent between Germany and Japan, well-substantiated suspicions, I would say almost about the nature of things, as it is natural that Germany wants to loosen Russian pressure at the eastern borders. If the Generalissimo considers prudent to replace military advisers and turn to Italy, we will be happy to meet him in this field as well.


Given such a cassus-belli, with the effective moral backing of the League of Nations behind them- even if the Japanese government itself didn't give a crap about actually directly intervening to help the Ethiopians, over in East Africa (and likewise, even if Imperial Japan's flow of military support and exports to Ethiopia don't prove much more useful than Fascist Italy's to KMT China), would the Japanese have turned down the opportunity to go to war with the Italians, and seize Tientsin for themselves (or at the very least, blockade it), thereby cutting Chiang Kai-Shek off from his greatest political ally and source of inspiration (until the Generalissimo fell out with Mussolini over the sudden withdrawal and repatriation to Italy of Colonel Roberto Lordi, previously the commander of the Italian military air force delegation at Nánchāng and a close personal military advisor to Chiang, and "the serious defect of formal behavior" shown by Il Duce in not having informed him of the change beforehand), as well as cutting off KMT China's logistical links to its leading supplier of arms, weapons systems, military aircraft and military training? And how damaging could this have been for the Fascist Italian economy- less so or more so than anything the Japanese (or anyone else) could do to cripple them in the Horn of Africa? One has to wonder...
 
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