What if the USSR of October 1925 is ISOT'ed 20 years in the past?

[raharris1973]

On 1 October, 1925, the entire Soviet Union is ISOT'ed back in time 20 years to October 1st, 1905. This is a few weeks after the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth concluded the Russo-Japanese War.

The back-timed Soviet Union is grieving the loss of Lenin, and CPSU Party General Secretary Joseph Stalin is politically and bureaucratically in the strongest position within party leadership but by no means is a dictator within the ruling party collective leadership. The Soviet Union has made strides recovering from the Civil War and famines of 1921-1922 with the help of the New Economic Policy and gone a long way to restore agricultural and industrial production almost to 1913 levels. The Red Army is strengthening and absorbing the lessons of the Civil War. It has recently reoccupied northern Sakhalin island, recently evacuated by the Japanese.

The satellite Mongolian People's Republic and Tannu Tuva republics are not back-timed. So across the formal Soviet border, it is the 1905 Qing Empire Mongolian provinces.

West of the 1925 Soviet border, are the Tsarist Empire governorates covering the territory that in OTL 1925 had become Finland, the Baltic States, the majority of Poland, the Bessarabia region of Romania, and the Kars Ardahan region of the Turkish Empire.

Upon realization of the international situation, the USSR government and security forces are able to reduce the downtime fringe territories to obedience without too much difficulty, interference, or trouble.

The Germans and French are locked in the Morocco Crisis, although both have agreed to resolve the politics of the dispute at an international conference starting in 1906.

However, there was even in OTL, some military posturing over the winter, including a German call-up of reserve units on December 30, 1905 and French reinforcement of the border on January 3rd, 1906.

Add to this volatile mix, a completely new Russian state, recalling and replacing its diplomats, and proclaiming from its new capital, Moscow not St. Petersburg, that it is a revolutionary workers state that repudiates its foreign debts and alliances with France. It is also lampooning the upcoming great power diplomacy over Morocco and denouncing the imperial meddling in the Moroccan people's affairs.

Regarding the tense Franco-German rivalry that threatens war, Moscow's propagandists are busy raising questions and doubts about the eagerness and motives of special capitalist interests in each country to fight over Morocco at the price of conscripting or taxing workers.

Beyond Europe, the Soviet authorities are aware of local instabilities and revolutionary trends where history could perhaps be given a nudge with some preparation. Coming up next is the late 1905 protests in Persia culminating in the Constitutional Revolution of January 1906.
After that is the Young Turk, CUP revolution in Ottoman Turkey of 1908. Then 1911 will bring China's Xinhai revolution overthrowing the Qing, and the Mexican revolution against Porfirio Diaz.

What's going to happen with this volatile mix. The back-timed Soviets with their news from the future won't be the only ones getting a vote. Downtime Germans, Austrians, French, and British will have to set their own priorities too and see how many potential adversaries they can try to gain advantages over at once.

Your thoughts?

-------

2nd option - A variant on the original idea -

On July 1, 1923, the entire USSR is ISOT'ed back in time 20 years to July 1, 1903. Differences? For the USSR, Lenin is still alive, there's been less recovery from famine. From a 1903 world perspective, this is before the Russo-Japanese war. The Russians and Japanese were still negotiating. I think the Soviets will diplomatically yield to Japanese positions and renounce untenable interests in Korea and Manchuria in order to avoid war with Japan, and to make a propagandistic show of being anti-imperialistic friends of the Chinese and Korean people. The Soviets should be able to lock down and control the downtime Tsarist areas on the western fringes. Most other aspects of the scenario are similar to above, except the Moroccan crisis had not started, and Russia has not been militarily or navally humbled before the world. It is still destabilizing that it is pulling itself outside of the alliance system and proclaiming itself a revolutionary state.

 

[Nyvis]

One of the interesting situations is that the 2nd internationale hasn't been split by the questions of social patriotism versus revolutionary defeatism and reform versus revolution yet. None of the bad blood of the German post war mess is in, the French socialists are still united and the reformist social democrats haven't seen the Russian revolution first hand, they just get the result popping out instead of Tsarist Russia. The uptime soviet union comes with a lot of tools to get a better rerun of the revolutionary period of the early 20th century too, both in experience and in material assistance.

I'm not sure Stalin is going to be ascendant because the question of foreign policy is a lot more open. Can he play Bukharin and Trotsky agaisnt each other when they're less likely to diverge on revolutionry potential abroad in the face of a fresh rerun of the period with the most potential for it? Can he play on fears of the foreign threats when they just gained a 20 years headstart? Instead I feel like his own caution in the face of such an opportunity might lead to the rest of the party finding him too conservative for the situation, and they still have the power to do so.

I also wonder how they handle the nationality question, especially in the territories assimilated from Tsarist Russia. Some of those haven't really had an opportunity to rebuild their nationalism yet, but others like Poland have already been resisting on that basis. Do they try for SSRs all around or do they have a more flexible approach?

On the other hand the soviets could easily fumble some of those situations because the party orthodoxy is already firmed up and 1925 is too early for them to have seen the failures of their strategies.

 

[raharris1973]

One of the interesting situations is that the 2nd internationale hasn't been split by the questions of social patriotism versus revolutionary defeatism and reform versus revolution yet. None of the bad blood of the German post war mess is in, the French socialists are still united and the reformist social democrats haven't seen the Russian revolution first hand, they just get the result popping out instead of Tsarist Russia. The uptime soviet union comes with a lot of tools to get a better rerun of the revolutionary period of the early 20th century too, both in experience and in material assistance.

These are all good points. Socialists around the world and radicals of other stripes, will have an unquenchable curiosity about this new self-proclaimed Socialist state. At this point in time, during the NEP they would find there is less to socialism in the economic realm than meets the eye, with private farming and retail operations ongoing throughout the country, but the state will be a new thing to behold, with the "commanding heights" of banking and heavy industry under state control, a worker's party in political control, a mass literacy campaign going on, and significant cultural experimentation and change pushed by the state.

I'm not sure Stalin is going to be ascendant because the question of foreign policy is a lot more open. Can he play Bukharin and Trotsky agaisnt each other when they're less likely to diverge on revolutionry potential abroad in the face of a fresh rerun of the period with the most potential for it?

Maybe. Along with opportunities, there will still be challenges and dangers and room to disagree.

Can he play on fears of the foreign threats when they just gained a 20 years headstart?

Yes, foreign threats cannot be dismissed - the Soviet state has an initial challenge reclaiming the Russian imperial borderlands, and European powers, then at peace with each other, may ally to form a cordon sanitaire or even to attack a self-proclaimed socialist, atheist, anti-monarchist state.

Instead I feel like his own caution in the face of such an opportunity might lead to the rest of the party finding him too conservative for the situation, and they still have the power to do so.

Perhaps. But perhaps conservatism will be warranted because a capitalist siege may happen. Or, if it is broken easily because of Soviet strength, or capitalist weakness or intra-capitalist divisions, Stalin may grow into the requisite boldness. But indeed, him emerging the undisputed top man is not inevitable, there are chances for leadership debates and power balances to work out differently.

I also wonder how they handle the nationality question, especially in the territories assimilated from Tsarist Russia.

These are very important questions -

I took it for granted in my OP that the Soviets would want to inherit and incorporate all downtime residual Tsarist territory and would succeed with relative speed and ease. But perhaps we cannot count on that.

Absorbing these would seem to be simplest solution and would liquidate any army/bureaucracy/officials with a completing claim to govern Russia. It would be a morale-building extension of the revolution without, in theory, committing to a major foreign war with a peer power. Felix Dzherzhinsky would really want a Polish SSR or fraternal Socialist republic.

But, if a hostile coalition forms quickly against the Soviet state, the western territories could be bargaining chips or bribes used to encourage defections of countries like Romania from the coalition (for Bessarabia). Or if foreigners support downtime Tsarist troops in Poland, the Moscow regime may want to bogged down these adversaries by supporting the very rebellious Polish nationalism of 1905-1907 period and granting Polish independence.

 

[Nyvis]

These are very important questions -

I took it for granted in my OP that the Soviets would want to inherit and incorporate all downtime residual Tsarist territory and would succeed with relative speed and ease. But perhaps we cannot count on that.

Absorbing these would seem to be simplest solution and would liquidate any army/bureaucracy/officials with a completing claim to govern Russia. It would be a morale-building extension of the revolution without, in theory, committing to a major foreign war with a peer power. Felix Dzherzhinsky would really want a Polish SSR or fraternal Socialist republic.

But, if a hostile coalition forms quickly against the Soviet state, the western territories could be bargaining chips or bribes used to encourage defections of countries like Romania from the coalition (for Bessarabia). Or if foreigners support downtime Tsarist troops in Poland, the Moscow regime may want to bogged down these adversaries by supporting the very rebellious Polish nationalism of 1905-1907 period and granting Polish independence.

I don't think this is merely determined by how much they struggle or how much they want to bargain it for abroad. I expect the world would be too surprised to mount much of a defense of those areas, and would be wary of picking a fight with an unknown they'd logically expect to be at least roughly equal to the downtime Russia it replaced.

On the other hand, there's going to be significant ideological disagreement in the party over what to do. Some of the areas include ones the soviet were already set on making SSRs, like Ukraine, but also areas they historically didn't under Stalin like Poland. If Stalin stays in charge I expect he'd still be the cautious foreign policy actor he was OTL and that might influence some of the moves here. And even if he loses control, there may be interest in harnessing some of those areas' own nationalism to constructive ends, which would be harder by forcing them into the union. If you think a war with Germany and Austria-Hungary is inevitable (and a lot of the party will think so), you might want to favour left leaning Polish nationalists you will be able to aim at the Polish areas of those countries in the future rather than make an enemy of Polish nationalism. On the other hand, the soviets are still operating under the NEP, which means they can offer something the Polish peasantry might enjoy over a more nationalist solution that keeps them under the landlord boot, unlike the later soviet who would be exporting a model more antagonistic to the peasantry's aspirations.

Thinking about it, I expect Poland is likely to be the only area where the question will seriously be raised though.

 

[raharris1973]

I expect the world would be too surprised to mount much of a defense of those areas, and would be wary of picking a fight with an unknown they'd logically expect to be at least roughly equal to the downtime Russia it replaced.

Oh, the "boys with their toys" on alternate-timelines, alternatehistory.com, and the sietch, would beg to differ. The main line of response to this proposal on those forums is how the capitalist world powers are going to see a new revolutionary power as a threat, unite to quash it, and succeed in doing so because it's evil, evil, evil and still tired from WWI and the Russian Civil War and post-Civil War famine.

Of course they might be projecting their own anti-communist passions or self-inserting their backward-looking from the Cold War perspectives into their analysis, and it could be skewing their estimates of what the 1905 or 1903 powers would do in unrealistic directions?

Or perhaps your token Marxism is leading you to ignore downtime capitalist reactions and focus on the Party and intra-Party ideological debates as being in the driver's seat of events?

 

[raharris1973]

Someone on another forum looked into where the big names were on October 1, 1905. Stalin, Trotsky, Kamenev and Bukharin were on the territory of the future USSR. Nicholas II, Sergei Witte, Lenin and Zinoviev were not. So, among other things, this implies a meeting of the two Zinovievs and the lowest possible legitimacy of the Soviet Union in the in the eyes of the world.

Nicholas II and his family were traveling on a yacht with stops in Björkö, Saaremaa and Vyborg, and Witte arrived with a report. And Lenin was just about to leave Switzerland for Russia because of the Russian Revolution of 1905.

What happens with Nicholas and the royal/imperial family depends a lot on who is getting information first, and how frequently the Tsar's yacht is getting news updates.

On land, the Soviets should have a news/knowledge advantage, and on discerning the date, will start planning how to kill the royals on the imperial yacht or in port. Either using the duo Dzerzhinsky-Trilsser to set up a hit squad probably in Tsarist disguise, to greet and kill the royals, or via the blunter method of using one or more of the Red Navy's scarce submarines and patrol boats to torpedo it, sink it, and strafe any survivors to death.

Now if Nicholas II gets warning that there is a usurper regime in control of the lion's share of his country before getting assassinated, and beefs up his Naval or ground security escort with loyal downtime forces, I imagine him telegraphing, and radio'ing appeals to supporters and the other governments of Europe at every opportunity.

His correspondence with Kaiser Willy could get interesting: "Dearest Cousin Nicky, so today you want to be my friend, once again. It reminds me of when we met this summer right up there around Bjorko and we signed a pact before God to be Allies forever. Then a couple a couple days later after talking to Witte and thinking your amis francaises, you decided you didn't think much of your pledge to me in front of God was very important. And now you've lost your country and your estates. How very unfortunate. I wonder if God is saying what he thinks of you? I'll have to talk things over with him a bit before I can see if there's anything we can do for you..." Then if the Tsar is lucky, Willy may write back saying that he can help him out but only in return for a series of humiliating and exclusive concessions to Germany, dropping the French alliance, etc.

....

Here is my projection of what happend with Lenin - The Politburo or Central Committee, will assign Felix Dzerzhinsky https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Felix_Dzerzhinsky and his foreign operations specialist Mikhail Trilsser https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Trilisser to shadow Lenin on his journey with a security detail, and advise him to make the shortest, safest route from Swiss territory to uptime Soviet territory via rail/surface travel through Austria-Hungary to the Ukrainian SSR, to bypass any reactionary-held/contested downtime areas.

 

[Nyvis]

I guess this is an opportunity to test how relevant the Tsar without an empire would be.

My expectation is not very. If the anti communist forces manage to grab a little bit of ex-Russian territory they might set him up as a puppet to rail against the communists but that's about all I see it amounting to. He's not even a martyr considering he's very much alive.

I doubt downtime Germany has the means to get him back his realm even if he made all kinds of concessions. An alliance of all the anti communist powers in Europe maybe but they couldn't agree on who get to benefit from it, I expect.

 

[BBadolato]

I mean the thing is killing the Tsar might not even matter to be important, this is after Nicholas got the epithet of Bloody Nicholas after Blood Sunday happened to say nothing of the fact he still has Alexandria with him who no one liked either. I just think Nicholas would be off in exile, because who would honestly want him back?

 

[Nyvis]

I mean the thing is killing the Tsar might not even matter to be important, this is after Nicholas got the epithet of Bloody Nicholas after Blood Sunday happened to say nothing of the fact he still has Alexandria with him who no one liked either. I just think Nicholas would be off in exile, because who would honestly want him back?

Yeah exactly, it's not like the guy really oozes legitimacy and he's short a power base so everyone will probably politely ignore him.

 

[raharris1973]

Let's grant all of your assumptions Nyvis:

• The outside world really does not pose any serious objective counter-revolutionary threat to the USSR itself, or to the USSR's inheritance of imperial Russian territory.

  I expect the world would be too surprised to mount much of a defense of those areas, and would be wary of picking a fight with an unknown they'd logically expect to be at least roughly equal to the downtime Russia it replaced.

• The Tsar in exile, dead or alive, isn't that important
• Germany won't be making a move to restore Tsarism.

  I doubt downtime Germany has the means to get him back his realm even if he made all kinds of concessions. An alliance of all the anti communist powers in Europe maybe but they couldn't agree on who get to benefit from it, I expect.

• The Soviet Union will take over the Baltics and Finland, easy peasy lemon squeezy; Congress Poland might be different - The Soviets may grant it independence under left-wing Socialist nationalists in the hopes they will look on the USSR as an ally and Germany and Austria-Hungary as their main enemies. - Alternatively, Congress Poland may just remain a highly autonomous SSR relatively content under the NEP policies.

  there may be interest in harnessing some of those areas' own nationalism to constructive ends, which would be harder by forcing them into the union. If you think a war with Germany and Austria-Hungary is inevitable (and a lot of the party will think so), you might want to favour left leaning Polish nationalists you will be able to aim at the Polish areas of those countries in the future rather than make an enemy of Polish nationalism. On the other hand, the soviets are still operating under the NEP, which means they can offer something the Polish peasantry might enjoy over a more nationalist solution that keeps them under the landlord boot, unlike the later soviet who would be exporting a model more antagonistic to the peasantry's aspirations. Thinking about it, I expect Poland is likely to be the only area where the question will seriously be raised though.

Then going from there, what will the USSR's international diplomatic and revolutionary strategy be, and how successful or unsuccessful will it appear by about 1920 or so?

I think the Soviets and world Socialist movements are going to remain most preoccupied with Europe and will know most about it. But they won't neglect other parts of the world. The next country due to have acute revolutionary crisis, indeed, having one already, is Persia in 1905-1906 with its constitutional revolution. I imagine the USSR will position itself as a friend of Persian sovereignty and constitutional development and a principled opponent of British capitalist exploitation, without any selfish imperial designs of its own. What is the most the USSR could make of the situation in Persia? Essentially just work as a counter-weight to support whatever resistance to British puppeting that comes up, and provide resources for Persian self-defense?

The other powers would not really have any time to plan for events in Persia or a Russian factor.

How could and would the USSR publicly and privately exploit the Morocco Crisis to make imperialist powers look bad and make Socialism look good? Wouldn't an ideal situation from a Soviet point of view be if imperial powers could be brought to the brink of war, but with Soviet support, workers strike actions actually stop the war in its tracks?

What about USSR relations with the Ottoman Empire in the years after 1905? The USSR could make propaganda of renouncing special capitulations and extraterritoriality, and, as an atheist state, abandon religious pretexts for interference in Ottoman affairs. While that abandons certain types of influence networks, it could clear the way for somewhat improved official relations between the Soviet state and Ottoman state at the state level. At the same time, Soviet atheism would resist Abdul Hamid and Ottoman cleric's extraterritorial claims towards influence over Soviet Muslims, which would cause tension with them.

The Soviets would also be aware of the clandestine network of the CUP or Young Turks and its ambitions to take over the country. Could it try to sponsor or shape the thinking of any of its members in more ideologically congenial, socialistic ways, and exert influences in the direction of Ottoman-Soviet cooperation after a possible Young Turk revolution in 1908? Possibly so, but Abdul Hamid, and all world powers, will by now be more alert yo revolutionary conspiracies, so things might be rendered more difficult for the Young Turks in the first place.

Similar questions apply again in the case of China's secret revolutionary societies, especially Sun Yat-sen's Tongmenhui, and the anti-Qing dynasty movement. The powers may be more alert to revolutionary threats and more committed to propping up the Qing or ensuring a succession they can influence, but the Soviets may want to do their best to shape the revolutionary ferment that led to the October 1911 anti-Qing revolution, and shape it's aftermath in historically progressive ways.

Likewise Mexico, barring blockage of butterfly effects, is due for revolutionary upheaval in 1911, that should be prolonged. Of all the Mexican revolutionary figures, Emiliano Zapata seems the most radically progressive, but he has a lot of odds stacked against him. Portugal is due for its revolution in 1910 as well.

Your thoughts?

 

[Nyvis]

I think a critical factor remains what happens in the second international. The social patriotic/revolutionary defeatist split hasn't happened yet, and the soviet presence means WW1 is not going to come on schedule either. And anti-revolutionary socialists get to interact with the result of a revolution without having to live through the traumatic period where the sausage was made. Neither the soviets nor the social democrats have immediate reasons to start pushing for a hard split right away. The social democrats are out of power anyway so they don't have the SPD/KPD feud factor of trying to run a liberal democracy versus wanting to exit one yet. What they have is the soviets' existence demonstrating how deadly a major European war can be for a country. Even the British and French might listen because while their countries emerged well out of WW1, their left wing didn't have the easiest time of it either. Will they believe the soviets when they tell them how pointless the waste of life was? Will the soviets put the goal of avoiding the social patriots takeover of the 2nd internationale over the goal of immediately forming communist copycat parties independent of broader social democracy? I think the combination of being barely out of their own bruising set of wars and the general unreadiness of European politics for that radicalization is likely to make them do that investment. Those social democratic organizations are still pretty far from power but if they stand united they can probably gum up any build up to global war.

Not sure how much they want to normalize and play the great game with non socialist actors though. I feel like 25 is early enough for their foreign policy to remain quite ideological. Instead of being a backward empire broken by war, they now have a 20 years headstart and a world that didn't see how bloodily the revolutionary sausage was made.

Because of the party's national liberation theses (which set them apart from the 1905 socialist movement quite a bit), they're likely to be much more willing to work with non explicitly socialist partners away from Europe than at its heart. I can totally see European political analysts claiming the Russian revolution made them an Asian power, which would be hilarious even if racism would play a significant role in it.

Something to consider is that a French government might be a lot more afraid than eager for a war with Germany without Russia looming on the other front.

One thing to consider is that most nations are also going to get a very muddled answer as to how revolution happened in Russia. The soviet answer to the query is likely to be too ideological for non socialists to accept at face value. So every country's own vision of that question is likely to influence their actions a lot.

Funnily, it's also possible for the soviets to get relatively friendly with the US. If they decide to invest in a strong anticolonial policy, the US probably wouldn't be opposed to opening up markets for itself by messing with the old empires' exclusive backyards. But as you suggest, south and central America are also good options which would be opposed to that kind of friendly relation.

Meanwhile in Europe, Germany is probably going to take the lead in organizing defensive alliances on the soviet border. Unlike France or the UK which would be intellectually concerned in what that revolution means, Germany is much more practically concerned by their new neighbour. They're also occupying quite a bit of land populated by poles, as is AH, and the soviets could easily play that angle too.

You talked about the Ottoman and soviet involvement there, but I could totally see the reactionary powers decide to make some overtures to make life easier for them in exchange for keeping the straits closed to the soviets, so the first to get involved and change the situation might not be our new arrivals.

 

[raharris1973]

Very thoughtful response.

 

[raharris1973]

Another aspect of this ISOT is that the Americas, the Antipodes, Western Europe, Britain, and Palestine lose out on the good decade of substantial emigration streams of Ukrainians and Jews that came in the 1905-1914 period from the areas that became the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs and Crimea. Those people vanish from history on both ends. And if as we assume, the Soviets are taking total effective control over Finland, the Baltics, and Bessarabia, I would expect them to soon limit emigration by Gentiles and Jews from those areas, so it ends up less than OTL. An independent Poland would probably keep free emigration for Jews and Gentiles, but if Congress Poland too becomes a fully incorporated SSR emigration from there may be much restricted within a couple years.

Also, the composition of the Russian, especially "White Russian", emigre community will significantly change, and shrink, compared to OTL. In OTL it was a community built up by people displaced or deliberately fleeing in the chaos of war who had an identity based on hatred of what they were running away from. Although they had internal feuds, they had a pretty broadly shared animosity to the Soviet state they were all running away from. They were able to leave the country with varying levels of resources.

In this ATL, the Soviet Union just materializes as an accomplished fact, so OTL's emigre community just vanishes from from history. The Russian diaspora ends up being a much smaller group of Tsarist diplomats and Russian businessmen and tourists overseas who, based on the news from Russia, determine they have no home to go to and stay in exile. These will on average be a less military and political (except for the diplomats) grouping and generally people who are richer, or were richer, but assets they possessed in Russia are gone into thin air. Other Russian "emigres" on the low end may be seasonal laborers working in the west who for whatever reason decide Socialist atheist Russia can't work for them and they decide to not make the seasonal migration back.

 

[Nyvis]

Yeah there's basically no white Russian emigres unless they were busy running things in the Russian empire periphery and manage to flee ahead of the soviets claiming those areas.

Not sure how many seasonal workers you'd find, Russia is quite distant from the other countries they could have found work in. You'll get sailors though.

As I said previously, no one TTL get exposed to how messy the Russian revolution was. They just get the result, and that includes the absence of refugees speaking about the fighting.

 

[lordroel]

On 1 October, 1925, the entire Soviet Union is ISOT'ed back in time 20 years to October 1st, 1905. This is a few weeks after the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth concluded the Russo-Japanese War.

The back-timed Soviet Union is grieving the loss of Lenin, and CPSU Party General Secretary Joseph Stalin is politically and bureaucratically in the strongest position within party leadership but by no means is a dictator within the ruling party collective leadership. The Soviet Union has made strides recovering from the Civil War and famines of 1921-1922 with the help of the New Economic Policy and gone a long way to restore agricultural and industrial production almost to 1913 levels. The Red Army is strengthening and absorbing the lessons of the Civil War. It has recently reoccupied northern Sakhalin island, recently evacuated by the Japanese.

The satellite Mongolian People's Republic and Tannu Tuva republics are not back-timed. So across the formal Soviet border, it is the 1905 Qing Empire Mongolian provinces.

West of the 1925 Soviet border, are the Tsarist Empire governorates covering the territory that in OTL 1925 had become Finland, the Baltic States, the majority of Poland, the Bessarabia region of Romania, and the Kars Ardahan region of the Turkish Empire.

Upon realization of the international situation, the USSR government and security forces are able to reduce the downtime fringe territories to obedience without too much difficulty, interference, or trouble.

The Germans and French are locked in the Morocco Crisis, although both have agreed to resolve the politics of the dispute at an international conference starting in 1906.

However, there was even in OTL, some military posturing over the winter, including a German call-up of reserve units on December 30, 1905 and French reinforcement of the border on January 3rd, 1906.

Add to this volatile mix, a completely new Russian state, recalling and replacing its diplomats, and proclaiming from its new capital, Moscow not St. Petersburg, that it is a revolutionary workers state that repudiates its foreign debts and alliances with France. It is also lampooning the upcoming great power diplomacy over Morocco and denouncing the imperial meddling in the Moroccan people's affairs.

Regarding the tense Franco-German rivalry that threatens war, Moscow's propagandists are busy raising questions and doubts about the eagerness and motives of special capitalist interests in each country to fight over Morocco at the price of conscripting or taxing workers.

Beyond Europe, the Soviet authorities are aware of local instabilities and revolutionary trends where history could perhaps be given a nudge with some preparation. Coming up next is the late 1905 protests in Persia culminating in the Constitutional Revolution of January 1906.
After that is the Young Turk, CUP revolution in Ottoman Turkey of 1908. Then 1911 will bring China's Xinhai revolution overthrowing the Qing, and the Mexican revolution against Porfirio Diaz.

What's going to happen with this volatile mix. The back-timed Soviets with their news from the future won't be the only ones getting a vote. Downtime Germans, Austrians, French, and British will have to set their own priorities too and see how many potential adversaries they can try to gain advantages over at once.

Your thoughts?

-------

2nd option - A variant on the original idea -

On July 1, 1923, the entire USSR is ISOT'ed back in time 20 years to July 1, 1903. Differences? For the USSR, Lenin is still alive, there's been less recovery from famine. From a 1903 world perspective, this is before the Russo-Japanese war. The Russians and Japanese were still negotiating. I think the Soviets will diplomatically yield to Japanese positions and renounce untenable interests in Korea and Manchuria in order to avoid war with Japan, and to make a propagandistic show of being anti-imperialistic friends of the Chinese and Korean people. The Soviets should be able to lock down and control the downtime Tsarist areas on the western fringes. Most other aspects of the scenario are similar to above, except the Moroccan crisis had not started, and Russia has not been militarily or navally humbled before the world. It is still destabilizing that it is pulling itself outside of the alliance system and proclaiming itself a revolutionary state.

You just gave a reason for the United Kingdom, France, Italy, German Empire, Austria-Hungary and others to unite against.

 

[raharris1973]

Not sure how many seasonal workers you'd find, Russia is quite distant from the other countries they could have found work in.

There should be plenty seasonal workers, several thousand in Germany by this point, helping with harvest work. And up to at least several hundred wealthy Russian tourists and businessmen traveling through or visiting the west by about this time.

 

[raharris1973]

@Nyvis, @BBadolato, et al

Have you seen my thread on this topic? WI Stalin from August 1938 SI's into himself in January 1926 | Sea Lion Press | Forum

Any thoughts on that subject?

 

[Nyvis]

@Nyvis, @BBadolato, et al

Have you seen my thread on this topic? WI Stalin from August 1938 SI's into himself in January 1926 | Sea Lion Press | Forum

Any thoughts on that subject?

That's a lot less interesting to me, which is usually why I don't answer to threads (I read nearly everything, having way too much time).

 

[raharris1973]

I wonder about the "ripeness" of Russia's poor, small, unequal, and still very feudal neighbor, Romania, for a social revolution, that Communists could end up hijacking under the circumstances of the OP.

I would think of Bulgaria and Serbia as being a bit more resilient to such social revolution and leftist subversion because of broad peasant landownership in those countries, despite the various cultural affinities they have with Russia.

 

[Nyvis]

I wonder about the "ripeness" of Russia's poor, small, unequal, and still very feudal neighbor, Romania, for a social revolution, that Communists could end up hijacking under the circumstances of the OP.

I would think of Bulgaria and Serbia as being a bit more resilient to such social revolution and leftist subversion because of broad peasant landownership in those countries, despite the various cultural affinities they have with Russia.

I think that would require the Bolsheviks accepting that peasant revolutions can be a thing they can play on rather than them thinking it's a sad circumstance they got forced into. They might consider pushing for it if they're being successful in Ukraine and getting close though.