raharris1973
Well-known member
I found this a really interesting scenario to speculate about https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Saigon_(1955), but I can't take credit for it. Credit has to go to our own @Japhy, who posted the idea on another forum over a dozen years ago. It got one thoughtful reply, but not a discussion doing it justice.
I would note that since that idea was originally posted, I've read an account by UC San Diego scholar Kathryn Statler, Replacing France, that corroborates the general storyline of vicious internecine struggle between the USA and France, mainly between the CIA and SDECE and their military advisory missions in South Vietnam, and their diplomatic missions in Laos and Cambodia, for influence. A quote she cites at the beginning of the book was from a French official writing in the mid-50s, "It took our Viet Minh "enemies" nearly 10 years to drive us French out of North Vietnam, it only took our American and Vietnamese "allies" one year to drive us French out of the rest of Indochina."
It strikes me that if the French win the struggle they are in sort of the odd position of "the dog that caught the car". Just what are they going to do with their South Vietnamese and greater Indochinese sphere of influence in 1955, 1956, and beyond?
The French have struggled with the US for influence, at some cost and risk to themselves and their relationship with the USA. Yet, in 1955, Algeria's independence war is fast becoming France's number one, even all-consuming, foreign policy concern. Next year, 1956, will add the Suez Crisis to the list, though of course that is unknown at this moment in 1955. What is already known though in 1955 is, according to the Geneva Accord document France already signed, but the "State of Vietnam" did not, there is to be an all-Vietnam election in July 1956. The French also knew they'd already lost at Dien Bien Phu, failed to militarily defeat the Viet Minh in a protracted war, and had a French PM elected on the promise to end the war, so fighting a second war to stay was not really going to be an option. Yet the Americans and Catholic groups, probably some of which were supported by France, did not act like the zonal partition was merely temporary, and had invested in supporting mass movement of Catholics, other anti-Communist dissidents and traditional friends of France from northern to southern Vietnam from 1954 to 1955.
So were the French in Paris, and their diplomats, attaches, and SDECE men in Saigon, and Binh Xuyen allies, planning in mid-1955 to have one glorious year as an opium dealing client state of France, only to participate in all-Vietnam elections in July 1956 that would see the Vietnamese Workers Party win nationwide executive and legislative power, based on the north's superior population alone*? [*that discounts the real support, running into at least some millions, the Vietnamese Workers Party had in the south]. The party's over, time for the Party? How did they expect to continue their vice business and sectarian militias under a new, nationally elected Communist regime? Or were they planning to run for the exits before the inauguration date of the new regime?
Or, were the French, and especially their regional allies like the Binh Xuyen, and potential allies like Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, and most of all, the northern Catholic refugees and collaborationist refugees, hoping to somehow put off or get away with not having nationwide Vietnamese elections altogether, and trying to maintain the south as a separate State of Vietnam? It's nice to have aspirations and stretch goals, but France, as previously stated and for obvious reasons, was not in a position, or willing, to fight another war to preserve its remaining clients in South Vietnam or any other part of Indochina like Laos or Cambodia, as I alluded to before. And since the obvious reasons, Dien Bien Phu, the support for Mendes-France's end the war promise, and the Algerian War, were as clear to outsiders as Frenchmen, the French were not in a great position to deter North Vietnam by bluff. The only "card" the French and non-communist Vietnamese would have left to bluff with would be the threat that if North Vietnam got violent enough to drive the French out or threaten the southern government, they could invite the Americans in, and the Americans might be crazy enough to fight it out with the North Vietnamese. That's not a bad card. Although even it would be a bit weakened by the French having squashed America's favored son client, Diem.
So, by the end of the summer of 1956, or the end of the year, the situation in French-client South Vietnam should be trending in the direction of one of three outcomes:
1) France has basically worked out a negotiated surrender, departure deal with North Vietnam. It's clear what North Vietnam wants, national political unification and control and French military out and political/intel non-interference. They would want some reconstruction aid, tech transfer, "reparations", trade if they can get it. What would the French want? They seem to have a thing for having their language be taught as part of school curricula and people sent to their schools. They would want trade access for their firms. Other things might include perhaps right to free emigration of Vietnamese to France, French Empire/French Union countries, either perpetually, or a generously lengthy time period, as a way to "do right" by their servants and collaborators from colonial times? France might come to an acceptance of such a deal on time for the aspirational July 1956 elections goal from Geneva, or possibly only after a later shock, like after the Suez intervention turned into a debacle with the USA pulling the rug out from under the tripartite interveners.
2) France is trying to maintain a special relationship with a client state in South Vietnam, at an affordable cost, and a peaceable relationship with North Vietnam. It tries to maintain this delicate balance by exploiting Hanoi, Beijing, Moscow's fears that the US will fill France's role, aggressively, if France leaves, and exploiting North Vietnam's preoccupation with internal agricultural and industrial development, building of socialism, and its healing process from the missteps and overreach of agrarian reform.
3) France, within a of "beating" the Americans in the battle of Saigon, gets buyer's remorse, and begs Washington to take Saigon off its hands, and Washington, stupidly, accepts.
In the longer run of 1957 and the years beyond, #2 could be turned into #1 or at any time, like, for instance, after the Algerian situation makes things ripe for a) De Gaulle's takeover (1958), b) his decision to release the Sub-Saharan African colonies from formal French sovereignty (1960), or (c) his decision to let Algeria go (1962), or into #3, although I think post-1958, Gaullist pride would tend to preclude direct handovers to the USA.
Even a scenario of a fairly small difference, a #3 scenario, where Diem is killed, but within a year or so, the French yield the field to US's greater level of commitment and interest while getting increasingly absorbed themselves in Algeria, could be interesting to speculate upon, because it creates a situation where the USA needs to figure out how to work with a South Vietnam without Diem from the middle 50s instead of from 1963, which is already pretty divergent from OTL's situation.
I would note that since that idea was originally posted, I've read an account by UC San Diego scholar Kathryn Statler, Replacing France, that corroborates the general storyline of vicious internecine struggle between the USA and France, mainly between the CIA and SDECE and their military advisory missions in South Vietnam, and their diplomatic missions in Laos and Cambodia, for influence. A quote she cites at the beginning of the book was from a French official writing in the mid-50s, "It took our Viet Minh "enemies" nearly 10 years to drive us French out of North Vietnam, it only took our American and Vietnamese "allies" one year to drive us French out of the rest of Indochina."
It strikes me that if the French win the struggle they are in sort of the odd position of "the dog that caught the car". Just what are they going to do with their South Vietnamese and greater Indochinese sphere of influence in 1955, 1956, and beyond?
The French have struggled with the US for influence, at some cost and risk to themselves and their relationship with the USA. Yet, in 1955, Algeria's independence war is fast becoming France's number one, even all-consuming, foreign policy concern. Next year, 1956, will add the Suez Crisis to the list, though of course that is unknown at this moment in 1955. What is already known though in 1955 is, according to the Geneva Accord document France already signed, but the "State of Vietnam" did not, there is to be an all-Vietnam election in July 1956. The French also knew they'd already lost at Dien Bien Phu, failed to militarily defeat the Viet Minh in a protracted war, and had a French PM elected on the promise to end the war, so fighting a second war to stay was not really going to be an option. Yet the Americans and Catholic groups, probably some of which were supported by France, did not act like the zonal partition was merely temporary, and had invested in supporting mass movement of Catholics, other anti-Communist dissidents and traditional friends of France from northern to southern Vietnam from 1954 to 1955.
So were the French in Paris, and their diplomats, attaches, and SDECE men in Saigon, and Binh Xuyen allies, planning in mid-1955 to have one glorious year as an opium dealing client state of France, only to participate in all-Vietnam elections in July 1956 that would see the Vietnamese Workers Party win nationwide executive and legislative power, based on the north's superior population alone*? [*that discounts the real support, running into at least some millions, the Vietnamese Workers Party had in the south]. The party's over, time for the Party? How did they expect to continue their vice business and sectarian militias under a new, nationally elected Communist regime? Or were they planning to run for the exits before the inauguration date of the new regime?
Or, were the French, and especially their regional allies like the Binh Xuyen, and potential allies like Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, and most of all, the northern Catholic refugees and collaborationist refugees, hoping to somehow put off or get away with not having nationwide Vietnamese elections altogether, and trying to maintain the south as a separate State of Vietnam? It's nice to have aspirations and stretch goals, but France, as previously stated and for obvious reasons, was not in a position, or willing, to fight another war to preserve its remaining clients in South Vietnam or any other part of Indochina like Laos or Cambodia, as I alluded to before. And since the obvious reasons, Dien Bien Phu, the support for Mendes-France's end the war promise, and the Algerian War, were as clear to outsiders as Frenchmen, the French were not in a great position to deter North Vietnam by bluff. The only "card" the French and non-communist Vietnamese would have left to bluff with would be the threat that if North Vietnam got violent enough to drive the French out or threaten the southern government, they could invite the Americans in, and the Americans might be crazy enough to fight it out with the North Vietnamese. That's not a bad card. Although even it would be a bit weakened by the French having squashed America's favored son client, Diem.
So, by the end of the summer of 1956, or the end of the year, the situation in French-client South Vietnam should be trending in the direction of one of three outcomes:
1) France has basically worked out a negotiated surrender, departure deal with North Vietnam. It's clear what North Vietnam wants, national political unification and control and French military out and political/intel non-interference. They would want some reconstruction aid, tech transfer, "reparations", trade if they can get it. What would the French want? They seem to have a thing for having their language be taught as part of school curricula and people sent to their schools. They would want trade access for their firms. Other things might include perhaps right to free emigration of Vietnamese to France, French Empire/French Union countries, either perpetually, or a generously lengthy time period, as a way to "do right" by their servants and collaborators from colonial times? France might come to an acceptance of such a deal on time for the aspirational July 1956 elections goal from Geneva, or possibly only after a later shock, like after the Suez intervention turned into a debacle with the USA pulling the rug out from under the tripartite interveners.
2) France is trying to maintain a special relationship with a client state in South Vietnam, at an affordable cost, and a peaceable relationship with North Vietnam. It tries to maintain this delicate balance by exploiting Hanoi, Beijing, Moscow's fears that the US will fill France's role, aggressively, if France leaves, and exploiting North Vietnam's preoccupation with internal agricultural and industrial development, building of socialism, and its healing process from the missteps and overreach of agrarian reform.
3) France, within a of "beating" the Americans in the battle of Saigon, gets buyer's remorse, and begs Washington to take Saigon off its hands, and Washington, stupidly, accepts.
In the longer run of 1957 and the years beyond, #2 could be turned into #1 or at any time, like, for instance, after the Algerian situation makes things ripe for a) De Gaulle's takeover (1958), b) his decision to release the Sub-Saharan African colonies from formal French sovereignty (1960), or (c) his decision to let Algeria go (1962), or into #3, although I think post-1958, Gaullist pride would tend to preclude direct handovers to the USA.
Even a scenario of a fairly small difference, a #3 scenario, where Diem is killed, but within a year or so, the French yield the field to US's greater level of commitment and interest while getting increasingly absorbed themselves in Algeria, could be interesting to speculate upon, because it creates a situation where the USA needs to figure out how to work with a South Vietnam without Diem from the middle 50s instead of from 1963, which is already pretty divergent from OTL's situation.