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There Shall Be a Scottish Assembly - Yes in 1979

RyanF

Most Likely atm Enjoying a Beer
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NYC (né Falkirk)
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1978Assembly.jpg
Whit are ye daein?

Hello to you to.

Whit for ye postin this here for insteid o yon scrievin forum?

Well, I want to look at this from an alternate history perspective rather than from a writing or storytelling perspective. This place could do with a few more half-arsed attempts at TLs.

Sae ye're juist repostin this here frae the auld place?

No, it's a redux of the first attempt. Based on feedback received I've sort of reviewed a few things and added a few more things.

Will thare be an unnecessar scene at a French plantin?

No, not that sort of redux.

But whit aboot aw thae ither thingmies ye hivna stairtit yet? The white heat forever thing, the 1919 thing, an aw thae vignettes? Bit daft tae dae this whan thare's real scrievin tae be duin?

Yes, and I've nothing on this weekend so intend to spend it doing real content, but I have good reason for redoing the posts from the attempt at this on the old place.

Aye?

I was meant to go to the pictures tonight but it was cancelled at short notice. Had time to spare.

Thare's juist ane mair thing A dinna unnerstaund...

Yes?

Hou dae A speak richt and ye dinna?

...
 
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The 1979 Devolution Referendum
Background

The ratification of the Act of Union in 1707 between the Kingdom of Scotland and the Kingdom of England was not without its opponents, and since that time there have been those advocating the reinstatement of some Scottish legislature. At the time of ratification their were anti-Union riots in major Scottish cities, a generation later lingering opposition went some way to gathering the Young Pretender support in Scotland, before a century had passed the Scottish poet Rabbie Burns had decried the Scottish parliamentarians who signed the act in Such a Parcel of Rogues in a Nation, but it would not be until the twentieth century that the people of Scotland would first get the chance to vote on some measure of devolution from London to Edinburgh.

It was during the debates on Irish home rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the notion of Scottish home rule was first discussed as a serious possibility. In 1871 the Liberal Prime Minister, William Ewart Gladstone, in a meeting held in Aberdeen stated that any measure of home rule in Ireland should also apply to Scotland. In 1912 the then Liberal MP for Dundee, Winston Churchill, in a speech in his constituency proposed devolution to Scotland and to the regions of England should Irish home rule become a reality. By the summer of 1913 a Government of Scotland Bill had passed its second reading, but did not progress any further due to the outbreak of the First World War.

After the tumultuous departure of most of Ireland and the problems of the 1920s, 1930s, and eventually the Second World War the cause of devolution took a back seat from the pressing issues of the day. Aside from the formation of the Scottish National Party in 1934 from several prior pro-independence and pro-devolution organisations, at first advocating the establishment of a devolved legislature before switching to independence in the 1940s. This change in the goals of the SNP saw the resignation of its National Secretary, John MacCormick. Instead he founded the Scottish Covenant Association, which gathered over two million signatures in favour of devolution. Despite this, the cause of devolution withered, and it again fell to the back-burner by the late 1950s.

Actions speak louder than words, and votes speak louder than signatures. In 1967, after the resignation of the former Labour MP Tom Fraser, a by-election was held in the Lanarkshire constituency of Hamilton. At the last general election in 1966, Fraser had taken 71% of the vote against his sole Conservative opponent. The SNP put forward solicitor Winnie Ewing as their candidate, its leadership instructing her to “try to come a good second in order to encourage the members”. They had not won a seat since the 1945 Motherwell election. Mrs Ewing won the seat with a majority of 1,779 votes over the Labour and Conservative candidates; she famously told a crowd after her declaration “Stop the World, Scotland wants to get on.”

Following the Hamilton by-election, itself coming after Gwynfor Evans’ breakthrough for the Welsh nationalist Plaid Cymru at the Carmarthen by-election the year before, the Labour government of Harold Wilson established the Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1969. By the time it reported in 1973 that the formation of a devolved Scottish Assembly was recommended, Ted Heath’s Conservative government was dealing with much more pressing issues of industrial disputes, the UK’s entry to the European Economic Community, and the violence in Northern Ireland; a Scottish Assembly would still not be implemented.

In the second general election of 1974, the SNP took 30% of the vote in Scotland, and Labour had one a small majority of three seats across the UK. By 1976 a series of by-election losses lost James Callaghan’s government its majority; they reached out to both the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru, in return for the two parties’ support in Commons votes, legislation would be instigated to allow for the devolution of political powers from Westminster to Scotland and Wales.

Scotland Act 1978

The Scotland and Wales Bill was introduced in November 1976, but the Labour Party was bitterly divided on devolution – even more so than it had been on the EEC in prior years. The Conservative Party, under their new leader, and despite still having devolution as part of their manifesto, were more concerned with opposing the Labour government than seeing through legislation to provide for something they had previously championed. Progress slowed to a crawl, and in early 1977 the government was forced to withdraw the Bill.

New bills were published in November 1977, separate ones for Scotland and Wales, but both still faced considerable opposition. The precedent for referenda had been set by the Labour government with the 1975 referendum on membership of the EEC, and when the idea was revived for the new bills on Scottish and Welsh devolution its place in British politics was confirmed. A number of Labour MPs, including Robin Cook, Edinburgh Central, were prepared to vote for the Scotland Act only on the understanding that they would be able to campaign against it in a referendum. The Leader of the House of Commons, Michael Foot, Cabinet sponsor of the Bills, agreed to this in order to bring rebellious Labour MPs in line, and with the support of the Liberals the Scotland Bill received Royal Assent on 31 July 1978. The day prior, one of the major proponents of devolution, John Mackintosh, Berwick and East Lothian, died of a brain tumour – his statue now stands outside New Parliament House in Edinburgh.

The Scotland Act 1978 proposed the establishment of a Scottish Assembly with limited legislative powers. A Scottish Executive headed by a First Secretary would take over some functions of the Secretary of State for Scotland. The Assembly would have the power to introduce primary legislation in its areas of responsibility; education, the environment, health, home affairs, legal matters, and social services. Agriculture, fisheries and food were to be shared between the Assembly and the UK government; all other matters would be reserved to the UK government, including the electricity supply.

The referendum, asking “Do you want the Provisions of the Scotland Act 1978 to be put into effect?”, would differ from the previous EEC referendum in two main respects. Firstly, a simple majority of the voters would not be enough to see the legislation put into effect. The Cunningham Amendment, after its proposer George Cunningham, Islington South, required 40% of the total electorate to vote in favour of the Assembly. This amendment incensed many on those in favour of devolution, who argued that the older the register the more out of date it was likely to be and therefore the more difficult it would be to obtain the threshold. The date of the referendum was set for 1 March 1979, to allow for the new registers due in February to be used; the extended period between the act and the referendum would also give both campaigns ample time to prepare. Secondly, where as in the EEC referendum there were two campaigns offering an obvious choice, in the devolution referendum there would be numerous bodies campaigning for either Yes or No.

Yes Campaign

The main campaign groups for the Yes vote were the Labour Movement Yes Campaign, the Scottish National Party, the Scotland Says Yes, the Alliance for an Assembly, the Liberals, and the Communists. Later groups emerged still during the campaign. This fragmentation was perhaps an inevitable result of the many distinct reasons these groups had for supporting devolution.

The Labour Movement Yes Campaign – formed from the Labour Party, the Co-operative Party, and the Scottish Trades Union Congress – saw the establishment of an Assembly as a way of answering the desire for Scots to have more say in their own affairs without going so far as to secede from the UK per the desires of the SNP. Labour used devolution as an effective platform against the SNP in three by-elections in 1978 that they might have lost otherwise – Glasgow Carscadden, Hamilton, and Berwick and East Lothian. After some thought to conducting a short campaign of General Election length, the Labour Movement instead decided to begin their campaign shortly after the Christmas and New Year holidays in 1979. Where the Labour Movement was most successful was in getting genuine support from shop stewards throughout the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. The Transport and General Workers went as far as to print a full-colour broadsheet encouraging its officials at all levels to take part in the campaign. The strong Yes vote in Strathclyde owed much to the efforts of shop stewards. Though it was always debatable just how important devolution was to the Labour Party, the leadership encouraged most members to campaign for either side, with a view of it being a rehearsal for the General Election due before October of that year.

The Nationalists supported the Assembly as the first step on the road to independence, they held a special one-day conference in January to adapt their current policies for an independent Scotland to the limits of what could be achieved in the Assembly. They campaigned on what they would do if they ran the proposed Assembly, but this deflected some effort in winning support for its establishment in the first place. In some ways they were campaigning for elections to the Assembly before it was even established. This odd style of campaign may have arisen from the divided enthusiasm for the Assembly from the SNP. The gradualist wing of the Party, including George Reid, Clackmannan and East Stirlingshire, and Margo MacDonald, Depute Leader, saw the Assembly as an essential step towards independence. Others, including Gordon Wilson, Dundee East, and Douglas Henderson, East Aberdeenshire, saw any devolution as a distraction to independence and only campaigned half-heartedly. There was even a minority in the party who saw devolution as an end in itself.

The divergence between the Labour Movement and the Nationalists saw a refusal by Labour to take part in any joint campaign. Several public disagreements between the two campaigns in January led to an agreement between them that if they would not share a platform they would at least not hold conflicting platforms. This ceasefire led to both campaigns rarely campaigning in the same area on the same day when delivering leaflets, holding meetings, and canvassing. Though there was the obvious contradiction between the Labour Yes campaign campaigning that Yes would not lead to a breakup of the UK and the SNP urging a Yes vote as a means to independence, the mutual agreement not to campaign in the same area meant campaigners were never called to debate the matter between themselves. Though George Robertson, Hamilton, stating the Assembly would “kill Nationalism stone dead” still managed to incense many on the SNP campaign.

Of the smaller campaigns, Scotland Says Yes was set up by Lord Kilbrandon, who had chaired the Royal Commission on the Constitution. Though supposedly an all-party group, it had been boycotted by Labour because it contained nationalists; and its principle campaigners were Margo MacDonald and George Reid of the SNP, and Jim Sillars, Ayrshire South, leader of the Labour splinter Scottish Labour Party. Its association with nationalism convinced Alick Buchanan-Smith, Angus North and Mearns, of the Conservative Party to launch his own cross-party group, the Alliance for an Assembly, with Donald Dewar, Glasgow Garscadden, of the Labour Party, Russell Johnston, Inverness, of the Liberal Party, and Malcolm Rifkind, Edinburgh Pentlands, also of the Conservative Party. The Liberals and Communists contributed to both cross-party campaigns at the local level, but did not launch their own. Scotland Says Yes, in line with the nationalist campaign, also campaigned on what the Assembly would be able to do once established, for women, the social services, and education.

With all the campaigns launched in January, the questions of many undecided voters were would the Assembly lead to a breakup of the UK, would it mean more bureaucracy and more government, and would it cost more. Though the question of whether devolution would lead to a breakup of the UK was a difficult one with the various Yes campaigns holding various views on the matter, most of the Labour Yes campaigners adopted the rhetoric of it offering a greater say by Scots in their own affairs thus negating the need for independence, though not the same bombastic phrasing as George Robertson the view was the same. The basic statement that an Assembly would cost more and mean more bureaucracy was met with the argument that by controlling the bureaucracy the Assembly would be able to reduce cost. In addition to confronting these issues head on, the Yes campaign also campaigned strongly on the democratic argument that the Assembly would make Civil Servants in the Scottish Office more accountable and more responsive to public opinion.

The Yes campaign was also helped by the party-political broadcasts, of which three were in favour of devolution (Labour, Liberal, and the SNP) were in favour of devolution and only one (Conservative) was opposed. An attempt by the No campaign to stop the Church of Scotland from issuing a pastoral message in favour of devolution was only stopped when it turned out many ministers had already read the message; the Church had been a long supporter of devolution and it was further felt that to not issue the message would have been contradictory to their established position.

No Campaign

The No campaign was slightly less fragmented than the Yes campaign, consisting of Scotland Says No and Labour Vote No. Though the campaigns did not formally cooperate, there was not the same level of disagreement as there was between the Yes campaigns – at least one member of Labour Vote No, Robin Cook, would appear on a Scotland Says No platform. Scotland Says No also attempted to avoid duplication of effort by leaving some campaigning efforts to the labour Vote No, to the extent of keeping a record of their meetings and providing information on them when asked.

Scotland Says No was an organisation that dated back to 1976 under the previous names of Keep Britain United and Scotland is British, eventually rebranding as Scotland Says No in November 1978. Its leading lights including Iain Sproat, Aberdeen South, a Conservative, Baron Wilson of Langside, of the Labour Party, the Very Rev Andrew Herron, former Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. It also included the support of organisations such as the Confederation of British Industry and some Chambers of Commerce. The support of management organisations donated money and distributed No campaign material – some firms put them in employees pay packets. However, Scotland Says No was hindered by the Labour Movement Yes Campaign having a virtual monopoly on well-known names, and were unable to dictate the issues on which the campaign was to be fought.

Labour Vote No was chaired by Brian Wilson, the Labour candidate for Ross and Cromarty in the October 1974 election. It enjoyed some success in persuading local activists to not take part in the campaign, but after encouragement by the Party leadership for members to campaign for either side it found that those who would be in favour of a No vote were much less enthusiastic about campaigning than those in favour of a Yes vote. They were also unsuccessful in persuading the Party to adopt two party political broadcasts for each campaign, after previous attempting to have the Court of Session stop them entirely. The most fervent anti-devolution campaigner for Labour Vote No was Tam Dalyell, West Lothian, though the leadership underestimated him he addressed an unprecedent number of meetings during the campaign.

Though the Conservative Party did not launch its own official No campaign, as desired by Teddy Taylor, Glasgow Cathcart, it did take part as a supporter of Scotland Says No. This was to allow members in favour of devolution to campaign with their consciences. Though devolution was still technically Conservative Party policy they knew that a No vote would severely damage the Labour government, possibly even to the extent that the SNP would withdraw support for the government. To this extent several members of the Shadow Cabinet, including the Leader of the Opposition, appeared on platforms for Scotland Says No to campaign in the referendum. This was against the wishes of Teddy Taylor, who rightly predicted the appearance of too many English politicians would have the opposite effect on the No campaign than what was desired. The Conservative Party took the wrong lesson from these failed interventions, and late in the campaign they failed to convince Lord Home, the former Prime Minister, to speak out against the Assembly. Believing that any Conservative politician would hinder the efforts of the No campaign as opposed to just English Conservatives.

The No campaign fought part of the campaign on the fact the Assembly proposed by the Scotland Act would have no economic powers, with the main preoccupations of voters being prices and jobs it was thought any body that would not be able to deal with these concerns would not encourage voters reason for turning out. They also enjoyed some late success when several Yes campaign speakers, principally Jim Sillars, began to dwell at length on the unfairness of the Cunningham Amendment, the finances of Scotland Says No, and the appearances of English Conservative politicians. Despite this, by the time the polls closed on 1 March 1979, Scotland had voted in favour of the Scotland Act 1978 – but there was still the question of would it be enough to meet the requirements of the Cunningham Amendment?

Results

Polls in 1978 showed 60% in favour of devolution against 20% against; the referendum in 1979 showed these to be only half-right. 1,591,227 voted in favour of the Scotland Act, representing 59.29% of valid votes; compared with 1,092,576 voting No, representing 40.71% of valid votes. 3,747,112 voted in total, representing 71.81% of the total registered voters in Scotland. By less than 2,000 votes, the requirements of the Cunningham Amendment had been met.

With four exceptions, every region of Scotland voted Yes. The two regions bordering England, the Borders and Dumfries and Galloway, both had no majorities of less than 5%. The results in the Orkney and Shetland Islands, both voting by more than 30% against the Scotland Act being implemented, were reflective of the very different campaign fought their compared with the rest of the country. Both of the northern isles wanted a constitutional convention on their status within the UK, some seeing the crown dependencies of Guernsey, Jersey, and Mann as a model for themselves. They had at one point been promised one should a Scottish Assembly be set up. With all the political manoeuvring on the Scotland Act during its committee stage there were many in the Orkney and Shetland islands who were unsure if they should vote Yes or No to get the Commission.

The Labour government accepted that the requirements of the Scotland Act had been met, and that therefore devolution would be introduced for Scotland. This was not without acrimony from either side. Some proposed that the four regions that voted no be left out from the remit of any devolved Assembly – this brought harsh laughter from several Northern Irish MPs. The SNP and the SLP seemed to argue constantly that since the Assembly was not set up instantly after the referendum result that the government was reneging on its promises. The more pressing concern for the Labour government was the general election due in October, as the first elections to the Assembly were to come in 1980, by first-past-the-post in two or three-member seats based on the current Westminster constituencies. By the time the first elections to the Assembly were held there would be a knew Prime Minister, and she would have a long history of mutual incomprehension with the devolved legislature.



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The 1979 General Election
The simultaneous referendums on devolution in Scotland and Wales, the former succeeding and the latter failing in getting the approval of the electorate for a devolved deliberative assembly, would be amongst the last major events of the Callaghan government. Though there would be one last attempt at major legislation in the weeks following the devolution referendums. With the profits from North Sea Oil now on the horizon the government had hoped the introduce a sovereign wealth fund in which to invest the tax revenue from the oil companies. It was hoped that the SNP would support such a move, but that party’s MPs soon became intransigent with demands that Scotland get a disproportionate share of any fund, falling back on there 1974 slogan “It’s Scotland’s oil.” Sensing blood in the water, the Leader of the Opposition tabled a motion of no confidence against the government in late April 1979.

It would prove to be one of the most dramatic nights in the history of Parliament, and the survival of the Labour government would come right down to the wire. The Labour Party (and Labour Co-Operative) would of course vote No. The Conservative Party would of course vote Aye. The rest of the parties were split in how they would vote. The Liberal Party would support a motion of no confidence and would thus vote Aye, and all attempts at a rapprochement by the Labour Party were rebuffed. Plaid Cymru were able to extract some concessions from the government and would vote No. The SNP, after failing yet again to get a guarantee of a better share of any sovereign wealth fund than Scotland’s population would dictate, would vote Aye with the Conservatives – Prime Minister Callaghan would quip it was “the first time in recorded history turkeys have been known to vote for an early Christmas.” The Northern Irish Unionist parties (the Ulster Unionist Party, the Popular Ulster Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, and one independent Unionist) would mostly vote Yes, but two UUP MPs would be convinced to vote No. Of those remaining, the seven vacant seats and the four tellers (two each from Labour and the Conservatives) would not be included in the totals. There would be two abstentions, one being the Speaker of the House, George Thomas, another was Gerry Fitt, Belfast East, of the Social Democratic and Labour Party. Fitt had abstained stating he could not support a government with Roy Mason, Barnlsey, as Northern Ireland secretary. The last MP to make up his mind was Frank Maguire, Fermanagh & South Tyrone, an independent republican who rarely attended the Commons but had flown in the “abstain in person”. Despite the efforts of Gerry Fitt, Maguire, travelling alone to London, would be wooed by the Labour government to walk through the No lobby. The final result was 311 Ayes, 311 Nos, with 2 abstentions. Thomas would follow the Speaker Denison’s rule, and cast his deciding vote with the government. Like December 1978 the Labour government had survived a vote of no confidence, this time not actually being able to muster a majority of MPs to endorse them.

In June of 1979, the first direct elections to the European Parliament would result in a landslide for the Conservative Party, winning over 50% of the vote and topping the polls in Scoltand, but on a very low turnout of 35% of the electorate. By the time Parliament was finally dissolved in September, fears of a fresh recession, memories of the Winter of Discontent, and the recent assassination of Lord Mountbatten on the same day twenty British Army soldiers were killed in an ambush – both by the Provisional Irish Republican Army – all contributed to the sombre mood in the country that had persisted for much of the decade.

The Labour campaign would focus on their continuing commitment to the National Health Service and full employment, led by Prime Minister Jim Callaghan. The Conservative campaign, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, focused on the economic issues that had plagued the country in recent years. Controlling inflation was a major part of this, combined with reining in the power of trade unions and allowing council house tenants the right to buy their homes – the last two aimed at winning the support of working class voters from the Labour Party. A series of articles written by former Labour cabinet ministers appeared in The Sun supporting the Conservatives in the election. The advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi was employed by the Conservatives, the same agency that was behind the famous Labour Isn’t Working poster from earlier in the year.

Concerns were raised over MPs security when early in the campaign a car bomb was discovered by chance attached to Airey Neave’s car, planted by the Irish National Liberation Army. Neave was the Conservative spokesman on Northern Ireland, and it was thought he was targeted because the INLA predicted a Conservative victory in the election.

Of the other parties, the Liberals were hampered by the recent trial of former leader Jeremy Thorpe for conspiracy of murder – although he had already been acquitted by the time of the election. The Scottish National Party lost some support to the Conservatives, a combination of their own success in the having the government introduce the Scotland Act 1978 and having propped up an unpopular Labour government for several years. Plaid Cymru would also a slight decrease in their vote and the loss of one of their seats. Former Labour MP Jim Sillars would lose his South Ayrshire seat for his breakaway Scottish Labour Party. In Northern Ireland, Belfast East would go from the UUP to the DUP, and Maguire would lose his Fermanagh and South Tyrone seat to the UUP when the SDLP stood their candidate Austin Currie against him. Much was made of his “propping up an imperial parliament” when he voted for the Labour government in April.

The election would see a 4.7% swing from Labour to the Conservatives, the largest swing between them since the Labour landslide in 1945. In spite of this, the Conservatives would only be returned with a majority of 14 seats over the Labour Party, with 325 seats (up 48 from the last general election). The Labour Party would return to the Opposition benches with a loss of 41 seats, returning 278 MPs – for the moment it looked like Callaghan would continue as Leader of the Opposition. The Liberal Party would lose two seats and return 11 MPs. The SNP would lose 4 of their 11 seats and return 7 MPs (the same number they had won in February 1974). Plaid Cymru would likelwise lose their October 1974 gain and return only 2 members. In Northern Ireland, there were 11 Ulster Unionist members returned, 3 Democratic Unionist, 1 United Ulster Unionist, and 1 independent Unionist. The only Irish nationalist returned was Gerry Fitt of the SDLP in Belfast West. Margaret Thatcher had made history by becoming the UK’s and Europe’s first elected female head of government. Her government would face its first electoral test only six months after her general election victory, when the first elections to the Scottish Assembly were due to take place.



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The 1980 Assembly Election
The first elections to the Scottish Assembly would be held on Thursday the 1st of May 1980; on the same day as the district council elections. The elections, and the concurrent local elections in England and Wales, were the first electoral test of the Thatcher ministry – elected seven months previously in October 1979. From polls conducted in March, sixty percent of respondents were dissatisfied with the Conservative government, and Labour were already ahead in the polls (still led by Thatcher’s predecessor as Prime Minister, James Callaghan) so soon after losing the general election. With an unpopular Conservative government in the middle of a recession, and an apparently ascendant Labour Party, few were expecting anything other than the Labour Party to win a majority and form the inaugural Executive of the Scottish Assembly.

In accordance with the terms of the Scotland Act 1978, the first election was to be held using the existing constituencies used for Westminster elections. Of those 71 constituencies, those that were over 125 percent of the electoral quota would elect three members (of which there were seven instances), and the remaining constituencies would elect two members each with two exceptions – the Westminster constituency of Orkney and Shetland would be split into two constituencies of Orkney and Shetland, each electing a single member; and the Western Isles constituency would likewise elect a single member. There would therefore be 148 initial members of the Assembly, each elected as with Westminster elections by first-past-the-post (technically block voting in the multi-member constituencies), again per the provisions of the Scotland Act 1978.

The Labour Party campaign was little different from the general election campaign they had run in October, highlighting the party’s support for social services and full employment, adding this time that their warnings of job losses and public spending cuts under a Conservative government had been proven. The Labour campaign was officially led by the former Scottish Secretary and current Shadow Scottish Secretary Bruce Millan – ambivalent at best towards devolution his leadership was a placeholder for the Labour champion of devolution from the previous year’s referendum, Donald Dewar, who was seen by many within the party as too inexperienced for the leadership role, only having returned to Parliament in 1978 after losing his Aberdeen South seat to the Conservatives in the 1970 general election and never having held any ministerial post. The campaign bore this out, with Dewar making almost twice as many appearances during the campaign as Millan. In most constituencies, the Labour candidate from the 1979 general election stood again for the same seats. Only those most opposed to devolution (including Robin Cook, Edinburgh Central; Tam Dalyell, West Lothian; Peter Doig, Dundee West; and Robert Hughes, Aberdeen North) and those who wished to focus more on their career at Westminster (John Smith, North Lanarkshire) did not stand for the Assembly elections. The Labour Party would nominate a full slate of candidates in every seat.

To the surprise of many, the Conservative campaign was not led by Yes campaigners Alick Buchanan-Smith, North Angus and Mearns, or Malcolm Rifkind, Edinburgh Pentlands, but instead by arch anti-devolution and anti-marketeer Teddy Taylor. Taylor was expected to serve as Thatcher’s Scottish Secretary, but the slight swing from the Conservatives to Labour in Scotland caused him to lose his Glasgow Cathcart seat to John Maxton of the Labour Party. He desired to return to Parliament, but with no by-elections upcoming and the Conservatives unwilling to have a sitting MP resign to allow Taylor to contest the by-election, in addition to the Prime Minister privately confiding to him that a cabinet position would probably be out of the question for the foreseeable future, convinced him to run instead for the new Assembly. With Buchanan-Smith and George Younger, Ayr, both having ministerial duties at Westminster, Taylor was Thatcher’s preference over Rifkind to lead the party in the first elections for the Assembly. The Conservative campaign made the unusual choice to go over many of the same arguments as the No campaign from the referendum, at times seeming almost to be campaigning on a platform of abolition of the Assembly. This incensed many within the Scottish party, especially Buchanan-Smith and Rifkind, who soon began to wonder how Taylor could be replaced. As with the Labour Party, a lot of Conservative MPs and candidates from the last general election fought the same seats.

The Scottish National Party accused both Labour and the Conservatives of not intending to use the Assembly to provide better governance for Scotland, but instead of another source of income for both parties’ MPs and failed candidates. This ignored the fact that every MP and ex-MP of the SNP would contest for the same seats as they held until 1979. Their campaign was separate from the Labour and Conservative campaigns in being fought on what they would do within the powers of the Assembly. This served to highlight divisions within the party on governance between left and right, and between the gradualist and fundamentalist wings of the party. William Wolfe, having led the SNP to their greatest success at Westminster elections and through the referendum, had been reconfirmed as leader at the party’s national conference in September 1979 – despite initially announcing his intention to stand down. There were those within the party who still wished for him to move aside for new leadership, especially on the right of the party and amongst the fundamentalist wing. Wolfe was seen by some, including former Depute Leader Gordon Wilson, Dundee East, as being too encouraging of the nascent left-wing movement in the Party amongst younger members. The SNP had hoped to stand a full slate of candidates in every constituency, but dwindling finances from the referendum and the general election campaign the year before forced them to stand only a single candidate in each seat. A decision met with some derision by those who felt that standing candidates everywhere in Scotland should have been sacrificed for standing multiple candidates in seats where they were likely to top the poll.

The Liberal Party campaign was led by the leader of the federal Scottish Liberal Party, Russell Johnston, Inverness. Despite this, Liberal Party leader David Steel would stand as a candidate for his equivalent Westminster seat of Roxburgh, Selkirk, and Peebles. This was intended to maximise the personal votes of the Liberal MPs; the Party never having achieved the same success in Scotland as they had in England during the 1970s. To this end, the seat of Orkney was contested by the Orkney and Shetland MP, and former party leader Jo Grimond; the Shetland seat was contested by his wife, Laura Miranda Grimond. The Liberal campaign focused on the need for the Assembly Executive to counter the cuts to services by the Westminster government, and for the need of the electoral system used for the Assembly to be reformed as soon as possible. The Assembly election coming so soon after the general election forced the Liberals to only stand a single candidate in each constituency.

Of the smaller parties, the Scottish Labour Party would contest only a single seat, Ayrshire South, where party leader Jim Sillars had come close to retaining the seat at the general election six months previously. The Communist Party of Great Britain, the Ecology Party, and the Workers Revolutionary Party would also stand a few candidates. The election was ignored by the National Front.

When the results came in overnight, no one was surprised that the Labour Party had won a majority of seats – winning 91 of the 148 seats and topped the polls in 44 of the 72 constituencies. The Conservatives won the next most seats, with 35. The SNP won 12 seats to the disappointment of many in the Party, only one more than their best result at a Westminster general election, and causing questions to be raised over Wolfe’s continuing leadership. The Liberals returned 9 members. Jim Sillars succeeded at being elected in South Ayrshire for his Scottish Labour Party, but he did not top the poll in the constituency. The SNP and Liberal candidates in several constituencies served to split the votes from Labour and the Conservatives, resulting in several split seats in the central belt. Turnout was seen as a disappointment from the referendum and previous general election. Despite these setbacks, the Labour Party would form the first Scottish Executive with a majority of 32 in the Assembly – but by their October conference relations within the Labour Party in Scotland and throughout the UK would be much less harmonious.



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The Woes of the Labour Party
For a party that had spent more of the past two decades in government than in opposition, the Labour Party found themselves very quickly in several internal disputes over their record in government and future direction since returning to the Opposition benches following the October 1979 election. There were several reforms proposed to the operating of the Party in the tail end of James Callaghan’s leadership intended to hold any future Labour government accountable to the Party. These included the manifesto being drawn up by the national executive committee, that all MPs would have to face reselection procedures in between general elections, and that the party leader would be elected by the entire movement rather than MPs alone.

These reforms were disconcerting to many of the Party’s MPs, who saw them as eroding their status as independent representatives of their constituents (or as much as the whips office would let them) and effectively making them delegates of their local party. Such a thing had previously been rejected in the history of Labour politics – by Keir Hardie in 1902. They were also seen as emblematic of a growing leftward tilt in those making up the Labour Party members. There had been number of instances in the 1970s of constituency Labour Party’s deselecting moderate MPs they saw as not being left-wing enough, including Reg Prentice, Newham North East, who had defected to the Conservatives and was now serving as a Minister of State for Social Security under in the current government. These new Labour members tended to be young, without family commitments, often without work commitments, and completely dedicated to attending political meetings. A contrast was drawn between those older Labour members, who would head off to the pub after meetings, and the new breed, who would bring flasks and sandwiches and preferred to continue the meeting until the wee hours of the next morning – a comparison drawn by an Islington councillor. It was in this climate that the changes to the leadership elections were to be made, and to James Callaghan, who had held on since the election in the hope of providing a clear run for his chosen successor – Denis Healey, Leeds East. The conflicts that had reared their heads since the election made that untenable, and the only hope would be to trigger an election before the changes were brought into place.

Healey was seen as the obvious choice by many in the country, serving as Chancellor under Callaghan and enjoying the support of 70% of the nation according to opinion polls. The standard bearer of the left Tony Benn, would not stand, ostensibly because it was felt holding an election before the changes were in place would be illegitimate but mainly because he would not be likely to command support of enough MPs. It fell to long-time Parliamentarian Michael Foot, Ebbw Vale, to stand for the left against Healey; even if he his stature amongst the left had been tempered by his unwavering support for the Callaghan government. John Silkin, Lewisham Deptford, and Peter Shore, Stepney and Poplar, rounded out the candidates, both were also of the left. Both were also quickly eliminated. In the run-off between Healey and Foot, to the surprise of many, Michael Foot would become leader of the Labour Party with the votes of 9 more MPs than Healey. There were those who had voted for Foot, and by extension the left, in order to have a quieter existence than with the left battling a Healey leadership; there were more who had voted for Foot because Healey had rubbed them the wrong way telling them they had nowhere else to turn if they did not vote for him. There were even those who were actively looking for somewhere else to turn.

The growing threat from the inside that the leftward swing of the membership represented was not the only threat the Labour Party faced at the time. There was a threat from the right that was slightly more external. Roy Jenkins had left the Commons and the Labour government to become President of the European Commission, and he was due to leave the position in January 1981. In the year prior to this he began to make interventions on British politics; calling for proportional representation and a radical centrist party against the excesses of the left-wing socialism of Labour and the monetarist reforms of the Conservatives. However, after a few visits to Labour meetings where he was roundly ridiculed and the description from his allies in the Commons of the new adversarial nature in that chamber, made him reconsider a return to active politics. Jenkins had previously discussed with David Steel, Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles, leader of the Liberal Party on the possibility of Jenkins joining the Liberals, but both believed a substantial split from the right of the Labour Party might have greater effect than a few defections. Upon his return to Britain in 1981, Roy Jenkins repeated his calls for proportional representation and radical centrism, condemned the extremism of both Labour and the Conservatives, the new nature of politics this had brought, and announced that he had allowed his membership of the Labour Party to expire, instead joining the Liberal Party. He was followed by his few allies within the Labour Party, but no MPs – many of whom considered Jenkins a remote, patrician figure, having no great love for the Liberals, and many having their own plans.

Ever since the Wembley Conference in 1979 there had been three former cabinet ministers who were quite outspoken in their disagreements with the party direction on the EEC, NATO, and the economy. Their leading light was David Owen, Plymouth Devonport, and included Shirley Williams, who had lost her seat in the 1979 election, and Bill Rodgers, Stockton-on-Tees. All three were members of the Manifesto Group led by MP and Scottish Assembly AM, Dickson Mabon, Greenock and Port Glasgow, who were opposed to the leftward shift of the party in the 1970s. In January 1981, shortly after Jenkins announced his defection to the Liberals to much press speculation and a muted response from his former party colleagues, the Labour Party returned to Wembley. Their conference this time committed the party to unilateral nuclear disarmament and withdrawal from the European Economic Community. This was the final straw for the Gang of Three, and the very next day they launched the Council for Social Democracy in what became known as Limehouse Declaration. Though they announced they were leaving the Labour Party they had not announced a new party, this would come soon enough as more and more MPs defected to the new group. Those Scottish MPs that defected also took with them their seats in the Scottish Assembly, and there were several more AMs who were not MPs and defected. In Opposition this was embarrassing, for the Scottish government it was realised thing could quickly prove difficult. After much discussion, the defectors chose a name that would be evocative of their commitment to the form of social democracy practiced on the continent and their commitment to Europe – the Social Democratic Party was born.
 
Very interesting so far. I don't know if you know but there was an aristocratic funded campaign in 1978 calling for Proportional Representation to be the electoral system of the proposed Scottish Assembly. I believe their plan was to keep campaigning once the devolution referendum was won so perhaps they may end up as minor players in the Devolution battles that follow. (Though I can imagine the main battle will be with Thatcher in England!)
 
Very interesting so far. I don't know if you know but there was an aristocratic funded campaign in 1978 calling for Proportional Representation to be the electoral system of the proposed Scottish Assembly. I believe their plan was to keep campaigning once the devolution referendum was won so perhaps they may end up as minor players in the Devolution battles that follow. (Though I can imagine the main battle will be with Thatcher in England!)

I have to admit I have not, do you have any further info on this? The cause of electoral reform will rear its head in a short while in the Assembly, for one reason or another, and a group like that could really help add some further depth.
 
I have to admit I have not, do you have any further info on this? The cause of electoral reform will rear its head in a short while in the Assembly, for one reason or another, and a group like that could really help add some further depth.

Alas I don't have any more information than that I'm afraid. I saw their leaflet once when researching the subject but I seem to lack any record I can find.

My gut feeling is that they were the Liberal Lords who pushed for this amendment to the Scotland Act of 1978:

"The members of which shall be elected by that system of proportional voting specified under this Act."

I cannot find the link to the Lords in Hansard online, only to the House of Commons debate that followed.

https://api.parliament.uk/historic-...scottish-assembly#S5CV0953P0_19780706_HOC_266
 
It’s an interesting counterfactual to explore. The question goes back a little further than I do, so I don’t know the issues inside out. But I would say that looking at what happened to the Greater London Council when it went against Thatcher’s government shows what Thatcher’s instincts were regarding opposition from devolved government.

I would say that Scotland would be able to go further than the Greater London Council did before getting shut down, though. Largely because when Ken Livingstone did a publicity stunt or brought in a policy clashing with the government, everyone could see it and the press made a lot out of it. The fact that the Greater London Council was physically based across the road from Westminster and that Margaret Thatcher had to walk past Livingstone’s giant unemployment count billboard every morning has a lot to do with what happened.
Of course, the Scottish Assembly would have been established with popular consent, putting it one up on the GLC. It would also have the advantage of not being right where Fleet Street could see it. However, the Scottish Assembly would have faced the same issue today’s Scottish Parliament does, which is that under the sad excuse for a constitutional arrangement the UK has, the devolved governments can be abolished at the whim of Westminster. The state itself is not constituted on the basis of popular sovereignty but rather the idea of the Crown-in-Parliament, and we don’t yet know how far that can be pushed against popular opinion.
I’d say that early Thatcher wouldn’t have tried to shut Scotland down over anything short of it trying to run a separate foreign policy. The relations between Westminster and wherever the Assembly would have sat would have been dominated by arguments over oil revenues, the block grant and tax raising powers for most of her time in office. But late Thatcher, believing her own propaganda and being willing to push any policy however unpopular over the objections of her own government? Perhaps in this alternate history, her government collapses amid pro-Scottish Assembly demonstrations north of the border rather than anti-poll tax riots.
 
It’s an interesting counterfactual to explore. The question goes back a little further than I do, so I don’t know the issues inside out. But I would say that looking at what happened to the Greater London Council when it went against Thatcher’s government shows what Thatcher’s instincts were regarding opposition from devolved government.

I would say that Scotland would be able to go further than the Greater London Council did before getting shut down, though. Largely because when Ken Livingstone did a publicity stunt or brought in a policy clashing with the government, everyone could see it and the press made a lot out of it. The fact that the Greater London Council was physically based across the road from Westminster and that Margaret Thatcher had to walk past Livingstone’s giant unemployment count billboard every morning has a lot to do with what happened.
Of course, the Scottish Assembly would have been established with popular consent, putting it one up on the GLC. It would also have the advantage of not being right where Fleet Street could see it. However, the Scottish Assembly would have faced the same issue today’s Scottish Parliament does, which is that under the sad excuse for a constitutional arrangement the UK has, the devolved governments can be abolished at the whim of Westminster. The state itself is not constituted on the basis of popular sovereignty but rather the idea of the Crown-in-Parliament, and we don’t yet know how far that can be pushed against popular opinion.
I’d say that early Thatcher wouldn’t have tried to shut Scotland down over anything short of it trying to run a separate foreign policy. The relations between Westminster and wherever the Assembly would have sat would have been dominated by arguments over oil revenues, the block grant and tax raising powers for most of her time in office. But late Thatcher, believing her own propaganda and being willing to push any policy however unpopular over the objections of her own government? Perhaps in this alternate history, her government collapses amid pro-Scottish Assembly demonstrations north of the border rather than anti-poll tax riots.

Another thing to keep in mind is that the Labour Party in Scotland has never been an especially left-wing body compared with many of their voters and at times the UK Labour Party at the whole. Millan or, to everyone's complete lack of surprise, Dewar are unlikely to enact some of Livingstone-esque policies like declaring Scotland a nuclear-free zone, calling the police National Front, allowing anti H-block protesters to camp out on the steps of the Royal High School during the royal wedding, stating the Falklands rightly belong to the Argentinians at the height of the War, or meeting with Gerry Adams. Also, being considerably removed from Thatcher's immediate concerns in Scotland rather than the body to which she paid her rates might also help keep attention off them.

Of course, there was something of a left-wing strand brewing in Scottish Labour, perhaps they have a few elected representatives in the Assembly, maybe with the defection of a few members to the SDP they might try and be a burden for the Millan/Dewar government, causing them to turn to... oh, but I've said too much.
 
I think if the Scottish government were to be too troublesome for Thatcher, although I agree it's unlikely - if they were she would not fight to abolish them, she would choke their money.
 
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