Own Goal: How the BEF destroyed the balance of power by winning WWI too fast for the Entente

[raharris1973]

What if the French, led by Joffre, at the beginning of the 'race to the sea' battles succeed in getting Sir John French, the Commander of the British Expeditionary Force, to attack into the gap between two German armies, with decisive effect?

Tommy Atkins wins the War by Christmas [Operational concept and explanation battlefield outcome credited to, and quoted from @David Flin from Alternatehistory.com, nickname is mine]

At the start of the Race for the Sea, a huge gap opened up between the German First and Second army, with the BEF in perfect position to go into that gap. Joffre had asked the BEF to move forward, but French sat on his thumbs, and the chance was lost.

Map from Wiki

Had the BEF advanced, the German First Army would have been separated from the rest of the German forces. France had three armies north of the BEF; two to pin the First Army in place, and one to get around the flank. That leaves the German Second Army stuffed. It's either got to force a way through the BEF on broken terrain with artillery support far away in an unprepared attack against time, or it pulls back and leaves the First Army to get screwed.

If the Entente could see "the other side of the hill", things would have been done and dusted on 9 Sept. The French can get armies round the flank of the First Army and onto the supply lines of the German 1st to 5th Armies. No supplies means those five German armies quickly become POWs.

That pretty much wraps things up for Germany. The Western Allies move to liberate Belgium and push up against, and over, the German border. The Russians, even if stung in the forests and lakes of East Prussia, are advancing in Galicia, and with the lack of reinforcements and probable need to transfer some German forces west, the Russians are looking to be able to have another go at East Prussia and Silesia in the winter. Things in the colonial theaters are of course, off to an awful start for Germany, with its Pacific colonies gobbled up by Britain, Japan, and the Dominions.

Togo is grabbed. The Ottomans steer clear of joining the war, and the Italians quite possibly join the war.

I figure at a minimum, the Allied terms imposed on the Germans and Austrians will be:

• France would get Alsace-Lorraine and Togoland.
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• Britain would expect naval restrictions on Germany, German South West Africa to South Africa and German New Guinea to Australia and Western Samoa to New Zealand.
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• Serbia presumably gets Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia.
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• Japan gets Tsingtao and the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands.
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• Russia would get at least eastern Galicia or all Galicia, plus Posen.
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• It is also possible for the endgame to stretch out much longer, with things extending to an occupation of Saar or Rhineland in the west, and East and West Prussia in the East, and Upper Silesia, and potentially the break-up of Austria-Hungary, along with the seizure of German Tanganyika and Kamerun, and the cession of north Schleswig to Denmark.

German militarists and revanchists in this quick defeat will have plenty of reasons to be angry at the Entente powers, like OTL.

However, unlike OTL, they will have fewer bases on which to argue that a) they weren't truly militarily defeated, and b) with just a small correction or two they would have one.

That's because in this timeline, unlike OTL, a) they never get so close to the channel in 1914, b) they never get so close to the channel and Paris *again* with their late war offensive in 1918, and c) they never come to see Russia as weak and degraded, because they never inflict the OTL defeats of 1915-1917 on it, reduce it to revolution, and impose the Brest-Litovsk treaty on it.

I'm not saying German peaceableness towards its neighbors is 100% guaranteed, but the German public, politicians and military leaders are made skeptical of big military plans and promises. And no future regime will contemplate an idea as outlandish as establishing Lebensbraum across the territory of a defeated Russia. Later German military planning about Russia will be focused on countering hypothetical future Russian attacks mainly.

With WWI over by Christmas, or mid-1915, if that's what it takes for the Entente to grind out a harsher settlement and for Germany to yield to it, many things are different in Europe and the world.

Social changes should be significantly less.

The role of women in the factories should be less. There may be less pressure for expanded franchise in Britain, on class *and* gender lines.

France will have changed more because its casualty rates will have been much higher. Those changes will have worked to mobilize industry more.

On the other side of the hill, Germany may have had more of a levee en masse while getting defeated, and its Prussian military establishment is getting discredited.

Russia has not been taken to any kind of breaking point.

 

[raharris1973]

-- The European powers will take a short-term breather after this war, but how long will the Entente victors stay cooperatively aligned?
For their part, the Russians' next ambitions are towards the Ottoman Empire.

Will the two Entente other powers accept Russian encroachment on the straits and Armenia, perhaps in return for their own shares of compensation at Ottoman expense, as the price great power comity? Or will Britain and France instinctively oppose Russian advances against the Ottomans, reviving the old Crimean War coalition?

Or, will the UK and France move in opposite directions, with the UK taking an anti-Russian, pro-Ottoman stand, but France staying pro-Russian? Or vice versa?

Will any of the Entente members seek to make a meaningful rapprochement with Germany and make the offer a good one for Germany?

 

[raharris1973]

EmperorPenguin (user from Historum.com) said:
With a rapid Entente victory (and your scenario means Germany is utterly destroyed by the end of September 1914):

France will take the Rhineland.

Russia will dismantle Austria because no one will be able to stop her. She's also likely to take the Oder line

Britain is irrelevant to a peace treaty. Her six divisions will carry no weight against the 200 plus Franco Russian divisions

The only limiting factor in the Franco-Russian annexations would be to keep a buffer between the two of them. Russia would want Germany strong enough to defeat France but hopeless against a Franco-Russian coalition.

In that scenario: Germany would seek to be on good terms with Russia to prevent an attack while France would need Russia in a war with Germany. Not sure if Russia can pull that one off

Nicholas never had much ambition towards the Ottoman Empire. His policy had always been to leave the Ottomans alone as long as the straits were open for commerce and closed to foreign warships. He flat out told Salisbury he wouldn't occupy Armenia even if the powers gave him a mandate to do it.

See no reason for that to change.

I also wonder what Russia's foreign policy posture toward France, Britain, and Persia would be.

EmperorPenguin said: Depends on how strong Germany is. If its strong enough to threaten France but hopeless against the Franco-Russians, Russia will be quite nasty to the British

Who would the French prioritize having the best relations with, the Russians, or the British?

EmperorPenguin said: Again, how strong is Germany? Do they still need the Russians (who are far more reliable and effective against the Germans)? Then Russia rules Europe

Who would the British prioritize having the best relations with, the French, the Russians, or....the defeated Germans?

EmperorPenguin said: What can Britain offer the Germans? Austria wasn't enough to defeat Russia and France. Britain will never be able to put an army into Europe large enough and fast enough to stop Russia and France

Will Italy walk away a fully satisfied power, or will it feel blocked? If so, by whom?

EmperorPenguin said: Italy might get pretty much all she wants. Her enemy was Austria and Russia had only minimal conflicts with Italy over Serbian expansion in the Balkans (the Russians wanted Serbia to have a port that Russia could use)

Italy could be useful against either Britain or France.

Britain and France will need all the help they can get against the now vastly more powerful Russians. So they might be inclined to give Italy everything

In a short war: Russia will be stronger, France should be much stronger. Italy and Britain will be greatly weakened as their status depended more on their diplomatic position than their military might.

Marathag (user from Historum.com) said: UK wouldn't much care for a French and Russian dominated Europe, either, and for the same reasons they didn't want to see German supremacy.
That effects the post-War era for relations.

EmperorPenguin said: That might be true but the thread assumes Germany and Austria are utterly destroyed militarily by the end of September.

Britain can do nothing against the Franco-Russian Alliance. Germany and Austria fielded close to 150 divisions. Britain had six. France and Russia will laugh at the British if they want anything

And France and Russia now have the Austrian and German navies to add to their own. There's a reason Morley asked "What if the Russians win?"

Because if they do want to get violent, Britain loses.

The British are going to have to do something to protect themselves. Their options aren't that great:

Russia is the main threat to India. Unfortunately for Britain, Russia is free from an attack in the West. She can now build her railroads to the East. Even worse, the internal combustion engine is coming of age. For the first time in the modern era, an invasion of India is a real possibility

Might be able to ally with Japan but the Japanese are getting greedy themselves. Japanese expansion is likely to be opposed by the Americans. That's an unpleasant possibility for the British.

Japan really can't threaten the heart of Russia anyway. The most Japan could do (and it would be really hard to pull it off), is force the Russians to blow the Bakial bridges.

Might try France and Italy. Russia is big and bad. They might just be able to sweep across central Europe to Lisbon. You're looking at the Cold War with the Americans out and the Russians keeping capitalism. Really bad for all the powers of Europe.

And even if you push the Russians back, that just means the French get Germany. That's really bad for the British

Wow! Quite the dramatic conclusion.

So, I see that you lean heavily into the view that if the small but plucky BEF punches above its weight at the crucial point of German vulnerability, becoming the successful allied Schwerpunkt in the west in 1914, this glorious, British-executed and led feat of arms rather soon becomes a strategic 'catastrophic victory' for Britain, by smashing Germany so fast and easy that France and Russia, in an unbreakable alliance, are best able to take advantage, exploit German resources and the post-German strategic vacuum, and use it against Britain.

We should assume French and Russians would divide the German Navy and swallow it allow, and discount the possibility of it being scuttled like OTL, because for some reason the French and Russians will be able to police & control the crews better than the British.

I wonder how English language history in the UK would portray Britain's wartime and prewar policy and diplomacy in the Great War in this world. How America would interpret and perceive the Germans, British, French and Russians, and what the powerful Franco-Russian alliance's relations with the USA would be like in the decades after the Great War.

EmperorPenguin said:
The question for the post war order is Who does France align with?

If Britain, than the British have a shot. But are the French really going to abandon Russia?

The more I look at it, the harder that seems. If Germany can still threaten France, than France will need Russia far more than the British. The Russians just have the same interest in keeping Germany down while Britain doesn't. See British post war policy.

Do you really think the Russians would just let a Hitler grow that powerful? Or that they send a note telling him no arms and he's late on his reparation payments?

But now let's turn to another piece of the puzzle: Italy

Italy has had horrid relations with France for a generation and had good relations with Germany for many years. Her enemy was Austria and Austria is now gone.

If Italy allies with a rump Germany, than the two should be able to handle the French or at least make the French worry. The only way Germany is that weak, is if it is completely splintered into its various kingdoms.

But that leaves Russia completely safe from invasion. The only place to deploy the Russian army becomes the Himalayas, which really is awful for the British.

There are advantages to Britain of a Franco-Russian victory rather than a German one. In a German victory, Germany controls everything so there's no possibility of a split. You can invade Britain from Normandy but not from Russia- though the Russians would be unstoppable in India once the internal combustion engine allows them to move from rails

World War One can only severely damage Britain's position. Far more important than the Navy, it is Britain's ability to play off the two relatively equally matched alliances. With that gone, she better cling to France and hope for the best

 

[Nyvis]

As usual, I'm looking for the leftist angle.

In Britain, I don't think much changes. Labour is still going to rise slowly but it didn't stake its fortune on the war. It could go either way over the loss of position. Maybe Britain overextends in trying to keep its imperial prominence and they get to turn against that and be vindicated by history or they come to power before that turn and are the ones holding the ball when the cost of it has to be paid.

In France, it's quite grim. Pro war socialists are vindicated by the short victory but they tended to be the ones without a very coherent project. The rest of the left is going to be on the sidelines for a long time. On the other hand, no divide over joining the 3rd internationale. I doubt a France with victory disease will avoid disastrous engagements forever and they'll be back for that, maybe in a more coherent form.

In Germany, the empire get to hold the ball as it signs the peace so no stab in the back myth and SPD/KPD split over what follows. The SPD get to stay a nominally united opposition force for one more round. I wonder if they don't end up being the ones exploiting the downturns following the peace treaty, since they aren't forced to govern over the consequences of losing and can freely rail against them.

In Russia it's just a delay on the inevitable explosion I feel. In fact it might make the tsarists feel overconfident. They got their victorious war so nothing needs to change. Until it backfires. Maybe it does so over conflict with Britain as suggested above.

In the US, we don't see the crackdown on US Socialism under the cover of war patriotism. It has its divides but it might end up following an upward course like in Europe, even if it's going to be slow going for a long time.

 

[raharris1973]

In Russia it's just a delay on the inevitable explosion I feel. In fact it might make the tsarists feel overconfident. They got their victorious war so nothing needs to change. Until it backfires. Maybe it does so over conflict with Britain as suggested above.

As a power politics, conflicts, and wars guy, it's naturally Russia and its Totalitarian Proletarians that interest me most.

So, it is very easy to imagine that post victory over the Central Powers, there is Great Power realignment along East West lines like the Cold War, but here of France and Britain versus Russia, and if it gets very intense, especially to hot war, that could easily break the brittle Tsarist system. The struggle itself would exert great stress on society, and Britain and France, just like the Germans, could well be tactically cheerleading and abetting Russian revolutionaries. To make another analogy besides the Cold War, it could be like Crimean War 2, Electric Boogaloo, since the Ottomans are neutral, and perhaps the Russians overreach for some aspiration here, or in Persia.

Of course my interlocutor in the discussion I was quoting was assuming in the aftermath of the war as described, despite Britain and its BEF's plucky and important role in ground combat, the Central Powers at the end of war are totally occupied and controlled by the Allied forces, with the much bulkier French and Russian forces having the overwhelming amount of occupying forces and ground forces in general. And he assuming their mutual interest in keeping down Germany, would keep them tighter than either would be with Britain.

So in duel of Britain versus the Franco-Russian alliance, with the Central Powers already occupied, Britain is *very* weakly positioned to influence the continent, or to even implement a starvation blockade against alliance partners with vast amounts of agricultural land and some decent rail connections and economic complementarities.

Nevertheless, might simply internal stresses and discontents in Russia, plus added issues of greater difficulty of the discontented (ideologically, ethnically, economically) to emigrate, overseas at least, loss of much maritime, especially trans-oceanic trade, and the expense of supporting logistically straining long-distance campaigns through the Caucasus and Central Asia toward Persia and India, and possibly also China and Manchuria, all add up to bring Russia to revolution, even if Russia is getting economic and military/technical support from a French ally?

 

[raharris1973]

What do you think of my question on likelihood of Russian Revolution under different types of external geopolitical pressures postwar, @Nyvis?

 

[Nyvis]

As a power politics, conflicts, and wars guy, it's naturally Russia and its Totalitarian Proletarians that interest me most.

So, it is very easy to imagine that post victory over the Central Powers, there is Great Power realignment along East West lines like the Cold War, but here of France and Britain versus Russia, and if it gets very intense, especially to hot war, that could easily break the brittle Tsarist system. The struggle itself would exert great stress on society, and Britain and France, just like the Germans, could well be tactically cheerleading and abetting Russian revolutionaries. To make another analogy besides the Cold War, it could be like Crimean War 2, Electric Boogaloo, since the Ottomans are neutral, and perhaps the Russians overreach for some aspiration here, or in Persia.

Of course my interlocutor in the discussion I was quoting was assuming in the aftermath of the war as described, despite Britain and its BEF's plucky and important role in ground combat, the Central Powers at the end of war are totally occupied and controlled by the Allied forces, with the much bulkier French and Russian forces having the overwhelming amount of occupying forces and ground forces in general. And he assuming their mutual interest in keeping down Germany, would keep them tighter than either would be with Britain.

So in duel of Britain versus the Franco-Russian alliance, with the Central Powers already occupied, Britain is *very* weakly positioned to influence the continent, or to even implement a starvation blockade against alliance partners with vast amounts of agricultural land and some decent rail connections and economic complementarities.

Nevertheless, might simply internal stresses and discontents in Russia, plus added issues of greater difficulty of the discontented (ideologically, ethnically, economically) to emigrate, overseas at least, loss of much maritime, especially trans-oceanic trade, and the expense of supporting logistically straining long-distance campaigns through the Caucasus and Central Asia toward Persia and India, and possibly also China and Manchuria, all add up to bring Russia to revolution, even if Russia is getting economic and military/technical support from a French ally?

As mentioned earlier, France has very few reasons to play against Russia and quite a few to play with them. The Tsarist regime is still not very stable but it gets a stay on execution.

Britain is the most likely to poke at the bear but I'm not sure how likely it is to play the revolutionary card. Unlike Germany, Britain has an extensive colonial empire that border Russia and the anti imperialist discourse of someone like Lenin is sure to worry it a lot more.

I think the idea of a Franco-Russian alliance has more potential. In that situation, who does Britain look to? I think the answer is pretty obvious: the last guys to give Russia a bloody nose, and the ones who can open another front in the east, Japan.

It's not going to be WW2 by any means. Instead, it's going to be much more of a throwback, with a lot of colonial conflict and not that much movement in Europe, I think. Which means it doesn't even need to have a decisive conclusion.

Russia might have a revolution based on exhaustion with distant conflicts rather than over a land invasion. And this time it might manage to link up with a German revolution against the French-Russian imposed government. On the other hand the continental alliance's armies would be a lot less exhausted and radicalized on the home front so it might have to play the long game instead.

The wildcard here is America. It didn't break its isolationism over WW1 so it could really go any way. Maybe it's also where exiled leftists go to plot, with no purge of the socialists over their pacifism.