Glhermine's maps and data

[glhermine]

RN:

Generally the familiar modern patterns of today's far-right, weak in cities but increasingly strong throughout the rest of the country - the RN now pulling upwards of 30-35% in parts of central Brittany, the southwest and the Massif Central is something, reflecting how national the party's vote has become. Compared to Panzergirl's first round showing in 2022, the RN vote is up everywhere, with the biggest increases usually in the eastern and central half of the country, along the Mediterranean (likely regaining votes from Zemmour) and the distant Parisian exurbs, with more limited gains in the major cities. Compared to 2019, the RN vote is actually down in Seine-Saint-Denis and the 'quartiers nord' of Marseille -- probably the result of differential turnout with the left (LFI) doing a much better job at mobilizing the immigrant vote than in 2019 -- and stagnant in downtown cores of major cities, like Paris. However, it doesn't show up well on national maps, but in the details, the RN did comparatively well in affluent conservative areas (like Neuilly but also other affluent suburbs of Lyon, Lille etc) despite zemmourista competition.

Ensemble:

The general look of it is similar to the 'modern' macronista map (i.e. Macron's 2022 map), with an obvious concentration in the northwest, particularly the inner west, with outcrops in the affluent western areas of Paris and its suburbs, the Lyon/Savoie area, Alsace and elsewhere, similar in parts to the historical Christian democratic/centre-right maps. However this year the macronista vote was rather evenly distributed throughout the country at low levels (over 200 constituencies between 13% and 17%), and the best result only being a bit under 26% (in comparison, Macron's best constituency in 2022 gave him over 46%). There was a small favourite son vote for the top candidate, Valérie Hayer, in Mayenne, with the best constituency being where she's from (Mayenne-2, 25.9%). Still did well in affluent areas, but less strikingly so than in 2019 or 2022, with some of the affluent vote returning in small numbers to LR.

PS-PP:

The map of today's PS is a mix of old Socialist strongholds in the southwest, 'deuxième gauche' add-ons (Brittany most obviously) and urban areas, particularly the more well-off and dynamic ones (Paris, Lyon, Rennes, Nantes, Bordeaux, Toulouse etc.). In contrast, the PS is now very weak in what would have been its past strongholds in the north, most obviously in the Pas-de-Calais, but also in Mitterrand's Nièvre. As a sign of how different the PS vote is now, the PS vote was marginally higher in Maine-et-Loire (historically very conservative and clerical part of the inner west) than in the Aude (an old Socialist stronghold, now with a very high RN vote), and also higher in the constituencies covering Neuilly and Paris' 16e than in the constituencies covering Lens and Liévin in the Pas-de-Calais.

LFI:

The LFI map is now very strikingly urban - like Mélenchon's vote in 2022 - while being very weak outside of urban areas. Compared to 2019, LFI mobilize the left-wing, low-income and likely predominantly immigrant electorate base extremely well, which explains its very impressive results in Seine-Saint-Denis as well as northern Marseille. Likely the war in Gaza, which was a big part of LFI's campaign, likely helped to mobilize a younger, Muslim/immigrant electorate that hasn't typically turned out in EP elections.

LFI vote share change since 2019:

This map illustrates very well the changes in the LFI vote since 2019 - it's also similar to the evolution of Mélenchon's vote from 2017 to 2022 - with big gains basically all coming from urban areas, particularly Ile-de-France, while losing ground elsewhere, particularly in less urban regions, including old left-wing regions. The gains in urban areas are stronger in lower-income, immigrant-heavy banlieue and the like, but the map also shows that LFI's vote went up in basically all urban areas, including in more well-off parts of urban metropolises.

LFI vs. PS-PP:

This map compares the LFI and PS vote, and is particularly interesting in Ile-de-France, which illustrates the different kinds of urban electorates that both lists drew on (this is also clear, but less massively so, in the Lille, Lyon, Marseille insets).

LR:

LR's map is now a collection of old right-wing strongholds (specifically: rural, more Catholic/clerical regions, and affluent urban-suburban areas) along with other constituencies where a LR deputy boosts the vote (in the Orne, parts of Brittany, Cantal and Haute-Loire).

EELV:

Nothing particularly unusual about the Greens' map, although at a much lower level now than in 2019.

Zemmourismo:

Like in 2022, the zemmourista vote is very 'retro' 80s far-right, with good results in affluent areas (western Paris stands out again), along with the old fash Mediterranean coast (to a limited extent, Panzermiss probably helped a bit here, especially in Vaucluse) and the outline of the Garonne valley. You can also see good results in conservative, more or less affluent geriatric coastal resort areas: Arcachon, the Vendée coast, Biarritz, La Baule and Deauville).

'Alliance rurale':

This was Jean Lassalle's list, allied with Willy Schraen, the president of the national hunters' federation, from the Nord. Lassalle's rural vote in the southwest is obvious (and Corsica), including his favourite son effect which got him 15.8% in his constituency, and still his rural vote still carries the outline of the Occitan language boundaries. The alliance with the hunters got him over 8% in Somme-3, which includes the waterfowl hunting grounds of the Somme estuary, where CPNT usually got some of its best results back in the day.

PCF:

The much weakened PCF vote is returning, in a way, to the original 'archipelago' map of the PCF vote in the 1920s - isolated strongholds. The PCF's vote remains high now in old rural communist regions, and constituencies with PCF deputies, with the list getting its best result, 12.4%, in Fabien Roussel's constituency. As a result of demographic changes and LFI's electoral base, the Red Belt around Paris but also outside Lyon is much less visible.

Animalist Party:

The Animalist vote, like in 2019, has almost nothing in common with the Green vote, and really shows a strong protest vote (or other vote of general discontent with all other lists, falling back on 'let's vote for the party of cute cats and dogs'), as made obvious with the strong concentration in eastern/northeastern quadrant. In general, the Animalist vote is also higher in regions where animal husbandry or other intensive animal farming is not a major industry, in other words where humans' relations with animals is different. This includes the outer suburbs of Paris, in the Seine-et-Marne, southern Essonne etc., where pets are common as part of the suburban lifestyle.

 

[glhermine]

Results of the May 1946 constitutional referendum in Brittany.

The May 1946 referendum rejected the Socialist-Communist draft constitution of April 1946, which would have created a parliamentary system with a powerful unicameral legislature and weak ceremonial presidency, with no real checks to the legislature's power. The constitutional draft was supported by the left (SFIO and PCF, some dissident left-wing Radicals) and opposed by the centre and right (MRP, right, most Radicals). Its opponents said it would have created a 'régime d'assemblée' (all-powerful legislature crushing other branches) or 'régimes des partis' (rule by parties).

Nationally, the no won with 52.8%. The 1946 referendum is often considered as one of the best snapshots of the left-right divide in the immediate postwar era.

In Brittany, the no won in every department - with 71.6% in Loire-Inférieure (Loire-Atlantique), 65.4% in Ille-et-Vilaine, 63.8% in Morbihan, 55.8% in Finistère and 50.1% in Côtes-du-Nord (Côtes-d'Armor). As a whole, Brittany was still a largely conservative region dominated by the Christian democratic MRP (in the 1945 constituent elections: 16 MRP, 5 right, 7 PCF, 7 SFIO, 2 Radicals, 1 UDSR).

The no vote was carried by its huge margins in the most traditionally conservative-clerical regions: much of rural Loire-Inférieure, the eastern half of Ille-et-Vilaine (politically and socially similar to neighbouring Maine and Anjou), the eastern Vannetais and the very clerical 'theocratic' Léon. Lots of communes in these ultra-conservative strongholds voted over 90% no. The major cities largely voted no: Nantes (with over 60%), Rennes, Vannes, Saint-Brieuc and Quimper as well as smaller towns such as Fougères, Vitré, Saint-Malo, Saint-Servan, Redon, Ploërmel, Dinan, Guingamp and Lannion.

Only the cities of Brest, Lorient and Saint-Nazaire with their left-wing traditions and large working-class populations in heavy industries (arsenals, shipyards, steelworks) voted yes, and the yes came close in some of the working-class communes in the Loire estuary outside of Nantes (it only won in Indre).

The yes vote was concentrated in the traditional left-wing regions of Brittany: the 'red countryside' of the Trégor and Haute-Cornouaille, including the Monts d'Arrée, perhaps the most solidly leftist region in Brittany, was well as small industrial areas (the Blavet valley, with the Hennebont steelworks, the woodcutters of Camors in Morbihan, the powder mills in Pont-de-Buis or even the declining slate quarries in Coësmes and Thourie in Ille-et-Vilaine), and with more isolated pockets in the eastern half of the Côtes-du-Nord. You can also note, in some areas, notably in the Finistère (Basse-Cornouaille) and coastal Morbihan (ria d'Étel, Lorient area) the yes strength in several coastal communes/fishing ports with large sardine canneries including Douarnenez, Concarneau, Audierne, Guilvinec, Penmarc'h, Étel etc., which of course had a long history of left-wing (communist) agitation and politics (Douarnenez is sometimes considered to have elected one the first Communist mayors in France, in 1921). Siegfried had devoted an entire chapter to the 'republican' (left-wing) political attitudes of the coastal 'maritime' population, as opposed to the conservative politics of the rural inland agricultural population, in 1946 there were still visible remnants of this (seemingly in the more 'working-class' fishing ports with sardine canneries). With demographic changes, and the decline of fisheries and canneries, some of these coastal communes would shift to the right later on.