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Erin's Erfurt III Experience

I reckon the CDU will end up doing better in the Erststimmen than they do in the Zweitstimmen.
Yeah, there's got to be some personal votes there for some incumbents.
Pretty much guaranteed, yeah. In 2017 the CDU and SPD both did about 4-5 points better in 1st votes than 2nd. In general, 1st votes don't tend to swing as much as 2nd votes, especially when incumbents are involved. There are a lot of constituencies where the 1st vs 2nd vote winners are different - a lot of SPD seats were like this in the last election. It's also how the AfD won the most 2nd votes in Saxony in 2017 but only 3 of 16 constituencies.
 
1970 & 1971 Austrian federal elections (OTL)
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Using a modified template of the 2017 Austrian legislative election map by SD604 on Commons.

The 1970 National Council election was the 8th and final election held using the 1945 electoral law. This system divided the country into 25 constituencies – 7 in Vienna, 5 in Upper Austria, 4 in Lower Austria, 4 in Styria, and at-large for the remaining five states – which elected between 3 and 11 deputies each. The allocation of seats was updated with each census, and reflected the total population of the constituency area. In the election itself, seats were distributed through party lists in each constituency using the Hagenbach-Bischoff system. Unfilled seats were pooled together in four regional constituencies (Vienna, Lower Austria, Upper Austria/Salzburg/Tyrol/Vorarlberg, and Carinthia/Styria/Burgenland). Residual votes from the constituencies were tallied at the regional level and used to fill the remaining seats, acting as a soft leveling mechanism.

This produced a reasonably proportional system, though it was not without flaws. Minor parties such as the KPÖ and later FPÖ struggled to win seats at the constituency level, and the regional seats were rarely sufficient to properly compensate, leaving them underrepresented. The boundaries of the constituencies themselves were not necessarily equitable to all parties – rural constituencies in Upper and Lower Austria and the south of Styria often handed disproportionately large majorities of seats to the ÖVP. Further, using the total population to calculate apportionment of seats between constituencies gave greater weight to regions with fewer eligible voters. These tended to be rural areas where families had many children, and these areas tended to vote ÖVP. These factors, though subtle, added up to give an advantage to the ÖVP, who were consistently overrepresented by a couple of percentage points throughout the 1945–1971 period. In 1953 and again in 1959, they won the most seats despite winning fewer votes than the SPÖ.

In 1966, the ÖVP under Chancellor Josef Klaus campaigned on ending the grand coalition which had governed the country since 1945. For his efforts he received a majority with 85 seats, and the largest percentage point lead over the SPÖ since the end of the war at 5.8%. Ironically, both the ÖVP and SPÖ leadership got cold feet about the prospect of returning to adversarial politics and negotiated yet another coalition, but the SPÖ membership rejected the agreement. The ÖVP were thus forced to honour their election promise and govern alone.

Four years later, former foreign affairs minister Bruno Kreisky led the SPÖ to a relative landslide victory, winning 48.4% of the vote and coming up two seats short of a majority. He rejected the prospect of a new grand coalition and instead secured the external support of the Freedom Party, then a liberal party, who had one key demand: electoral reform. The electoral system had left the FPÖ substantially underrepresented for years. The SPÖ, dissatisfied with the system's biases toward the ÖVP, were happy to oblige.

The 25 constituencies were abolished and replaced by a system of state-based proportional representation, greatly increasing district sizes and ensuring a higher degree of proportionality. The four regional districts were consolidated into two broad regions (Vienna/Lower Austria/Burgenland and the rest of the country), enabling them to more effectively function as leveling seats. The method of allocating seats between states was also tweaked: it now counted eligible voters instead of the total population. Finally, the size of the National Council was increased from 165 seats to 183. Kreisky called a fresh election just 18 months later and secured an outright majority of both seats and votes, ushering in the era of SPÖ dominance in federal politics.

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Using a template of the 2017 Austrian legislative election map by SD604 on Commons.

The new electoral system lasted until 1994, when the current three-tiered electoral system was legislated. This reintroduced a system of local constituencies, but retained state-level seat distribution while replacing the regions with a national leveling list.
 
2016 Austrian presidential & federal elections
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The victory of Norbert Hofer in the Austrian presidential election sent shockwaves across the world. For the first time in the modern era, a European nation had elected a far-right president. Though often considered a symbolic office, little known to most observers ahead of the election, the President is invested with a great degree of power: the ability to appoint and dismiss the Chancellor and cabinet at will, sign and veto laws, and rule by emergency decree under some circumstances. Austria's status as a parliamentary, rather than semi-presidential, nation is largely a result of convention and tradition. During the campaign, Hofer called for early parliamentary elections to be held. One need look no further than opinion polls, which throughout 2015-16 placed the Freedom Party clearly in first place, to find his motives. The President also has the power to dissolve the National Council at the request of the cabinet, and as soon as he took office, Hofer began negotiations with the government to do just that.

The SPÖ, led by new Chancellor Christian Kern on just this third month on the job, were starting to see a recovery in their popularity, while their junior partner the ÖVP were staring down the barrel of a historically bad result. Neither were particularly keen. But with Hofer taking such strong initiative, all were wary of what could happen if they refused. FPÖ leaders began to suggest that Hofer could dismiss the government and simply appoint another which would request the dissolution. The SPÖ and ÖVP proposed that an election be held ahead of schedule the next year, but Hofer refused to accept a compromise. He threatened to veto the government's legislation if they did not relent. Faced with a brewing constitutional crisis and the prospect of gridlock for the remainder of the term, and hoping that Hofer's antics had soured the public against the FPÖ, Kern and the SPÖ took the gamble. The ÖVP were scathing, accusing the Social Democrats of throwing in with Strache, but they were powerless to prevent it.

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While the Freedom Party saw a small dip ahead of the election, circumstances failed to avert catastrophe. Hans-Christian Strache led them to a sweeping victory with just under a third of the vote. Most of their new support flowed from disgruntled ÖVP voters and former supporters of Team Stronach and the BZÖ, as well as non-voters. They won a plurality in seven of the nine federal states, with only Vienna and Burgenland remaining stalwart for the SPÖ. The Social Democrats managed to avoid total disaster, recording a slight improvement from 2013, but nonetheless finishing a relatively distant second. On the other hand, the ÖVP's worst fears were realised as they crashed to below 20%. The Greens remained steady on 12%, and NEOS improved to 6.5%.

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Government formation was anything but straight-forward. The FPÖ were quickly forced to admit that, like Haider before him, nobody would accept Hans-Christian Strache as Chancellor. Some demanded that Hofer appoint him anyway but, despite his success in wrecking the previous government, the President found himself constrained in building one responsible to a parliamentary majority. The SPÖ had made tentative moves toward reconciliation with the Freedom Party ahead of the election, and stated that they were open to discussions. A series of constellations excluding the FPÖ were ruled out by various parties, most significantly the ÖVP, who resolved to retreat to opposition and leave the Social Democrats to clean up the mess. Reinhold Mitterlehner was immediately jettisoned and, to the surprise of few, succeeded by foreign minister Sebastian Kurz. With alternatives exhausted, long and difficult negotiations began between the FPÖ and SPÖ. They forged a compromise reminiscent of the modern FPÖ's first stint in government under Wolfgang Schüssel, with Christian Kern remaining Chancellor while the FPÖ took a majority of cabinet posts; Strache also remained outside of cabinet.
 
Bundestag electoral reform
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Everyone is debating ways to limit the size of the Bundestag, ranging from reasonable (reduce the number of constituencies) to embarrassing (forgiving overhang seats). Because incremental change is boring, I've come bearing my own new and innovative idea: scrap MMP altogether! Instead of single-member constituencies, list seats, and all the complicated arithmetic of calculating overhang and leveling seats, I propose a comparatively simple system of open list proportional representation in multi-member constituencies. I also reduced the size of the Bundestag to 500 seats, because if we're trying to make it smaller, why not go a bit further, right?

There are 73 electoral districts in total, ranging from huge to tiny, rural to urban, rich to poor; representing the breadth and depth of German geography and society. Most have between 6 and 8 seats, and overall they range from 4 to 11, based on population. This system is intended to preserve and enhance the benefits of MMP while avoiding its disadvantages. While the existing system of constituencies provide local representation, members are rarely elected for any reason other than party affiliation, and any genuine connection between localities and elected representatives is limited. While this disconnect is somewhat unavoidable in a country of 80+ million with highly party-centric politics, regional constituencies and open lists provide the option of greater engagement without confusing those who'd rather just put a cross next to a party and leave it at that. They also ensure a balanced geographic spread of representatives, even more so than the current system, where a majority of MdBs come from closed state lists.

The distribution of seats would be calculated nationally to ensure overall proportionality, just like the present system, with seats handed out to parties in districts based on their relative strength. This system is used in a number of countries, including Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. In practice, local proportionality takes a hit - major parties should be represented reasonably fairly everywhere, but minor parties will be underrepresented in areas where they perform poorly, and overrepresented where they perform well. This balances out to a proportional Bundestag overall. And compared to the current system, there are no overhang or leveling seats to inflate parliament, and it's highly unlikely that any region or area will be represented by only a single party. Everyone will have a diverse host of voices to speak for them - the party and candidate(s) which they voted for as well as several representatives from their constituency.

Simple supplementary maps:

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That’s a nice idea, I think, but to comply with past BVerfG rulings on proportionality, you’d probably need to have some sort of levelling system. I’d propose adding 100 seats for that purpose - you wouldn’t have to have national lists, you could follow the Swedish model and have them assigned to local constituencies based on underrepresentation. I realise part of your point was to reduce complexity, but I think the key issue - the Bundestag growing with each successive election - would still be solved.
 
2001 & 2004 Australian federal elections (OTL)
With some prompting from someone on Commons I finally helped give Wikipedia some proper maps for the 2001-2010 elections. I think they look reasonably good so I'm posting them here too.

The 2001 election was held two months after September 11, and the key issues were terrorism and immigration. The Coalition government under John Howard had come out in strong support of the US's brewing War on Terror, and equally fierce opposition to refugees who sought asylum in Australia. Two major incidents relating to the latter issue - the "Children Overboard" affair and Tampa affair - consumed national attention in the months before the election, highlighting the government's hardline, albeit popular, stance. The government had only been narrowly re-elected in 1998 against a resurgent Labor Party, who even managed to win the two-party-preferred vote. The opposition, under Kim Beazley, held a lead in the polls for most of the 1998-2001 period, but the flurry of events between August and November gave the Coalition a decisive advantage, and they ultimately grew their majority from 80 to 82 seats.

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Beazley resigned in the aftermath of the 2001 election and was replaced by Simon Crean. Labor subsequently suffered from major leadership strife, with Beazley becoming something of a backbench wrecker as Crean performed poorly in the polls. He was unsuccessfully challenged in June of 2003, ultimately resigning in December. Shadow Treasurer Mark Latham beat Beazley by a hair in the caucus vote to replace him. To compare the two men, Beazley was respectable, experienced, and charming; retrospectively, he has sometimes been described as "the greatest Prime Minister we never had" and was later appointed Governor of Western Australia. By contrast, Latham was brash, unrefined, sometimes aggressive, and after retiring from politics he came back in 2017 to join Pauline Hanson's One Nation, and today is one of Australia's foremost racists.

Nonetheless, his strategy after becoming leader of the opposition was highly successful, and by early 2004 his approval rating was sky high. Things began to turn as the election drew closer and the government targeted his weaknesses, pointing out his lack of ministerial experience and hammering on Labor's supposed incompetence on economic policy. Other factors included Labor's tense relationship with the US, who they frequently criticised over the Iraq War. The final blow, according to some, took place on the eve of the election. In the now-infamous handshake incident, Latham and Howard crossed paths at the ABC studios. Howard extended his hand to Latham, who grasped it with substantial force and tugged hard on the Prime Minister's arm; Howard refused to budge, however, and Latham loomed over him, chest to chest. This made headlines and was a serious PR blow for Latham, whose image became that of an aggressive and even physically violent man.

Regardless of what the deciding factor was, the Coalition grew major momentum during the campaign, and ultimately increased its majority to 87 seats and 52.7% of the two-party vote.

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2007 & 2010 Australian federal elections (OTL)
Labor were pessimistic in the aftermath of 2004, believing they were stuck in electoral purgatory with little hope of escape in the near future. Their leadership woes continued: bewilderingly, Latham declined to resign post-election, though the party clearly had no confidence in him. Things worsened as polls indicated he was desperately unpopular, but it took until mid-January for him to admit the inevitable. He announced that he would step down from politics altogether, dubiously citing ill health. With no obvious alternatives in sight, Beazley returned as leader unopposed. While voters clearly preferred him to Latham, the lustre quickly wore off, and his approval sank to record lows. Believing that Beazley was simply not capable of producing an acceptable election result, at the end of 2006 two MPs stepped forward with a long-awaited challenge: Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard.

Both had been subject to leadership speculation for some time. Polling indicated that either of them would massively improve Labor's popularity. Both had a high public profile, with Rudd considered a particularly effective public speaker. In fact, Rudd may have sought the leadership in 2005 if he had not been overseas at the time of Latham's resignation. In any case, with the election within sight and Beazley freshly dogged by a number of gaffes, Rudd and Gillard decided to join forces to challenge him. Rudd would seek the leadership and Gillard would become his deputy. They were successful, with Rudd triumphing 49 votes to 39, and Gillard elected unopposed in the subsequent ballot for deputy.

On the other side of the aisle, John Howard was well past his use-by date. Speculation had been rising since before 2004 about how long he would stay on as Prime Minister, with most believing he would step aside for his Treasurer Peter Costello. The situation worsened in mid-2006 when an alleged deal between Howard and Costello was publicised, according to which Howard would have handed over leadership during his second term. He was now in his fourth and didn't seem to have any retirement plans - as the election approached, he declared he would seek a fifth. The Coalition as a whole had also taken a number of blows to its public image, owing to various developments such as the oil-for-wheat scandal and the Iraq War as a whole, controversial statements from ministers, and most especially the deeply unpopular WorkChoices industrial relations reform. The economy had also begun the flag and interest rates were rising, which was particularly damaging to a government who ran a scare campaign against interest rate hikes in the 2004 election.

Rudd's Labor promised change: to boldly bring Australia into the modern era, leading the world in climate policy, education, technology, infrastructure, and just about everything else. The "Kevin 07" campaign was sleek, effective, appealed to young voters, and remains arguably the most memorable since Whitlam's "It's Time" campaign or, for other reasons, Joh for Canberra. The government mostly offered weak attacks in return, and seemed interested in little beyond clinging onto power. Polls narrowed somewhat throughout the campaign, but Labor swept to government in a landslide, with 52.7% of the two-party-preferred vote giving them a net shift of 23 seats and a majority of 83. In a once-in-a-lifetime moment, Howard spectacularly lost his own seat of Bennelong to Labor's Maxine McKew.

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Once in opposition, it was the Coalition's turn to suffer leadership woes. Howard, by virtue of no longer being an MP, had no choice but to resign. He was widely expected to be replaced by Costello, even endorsing him in his concession speech, but Costello unexpectedly declined the leadership and said that he probably wouldn't even serve his full term as an MP. This left the party room to battle it out. Brendan Nelson emerged victorious against Malcolm Turnbull, 45 votes to 43. There is very little worth saying about Nelson because he was only leader for ten months before he was rolled in a leadership spill. He did, however, set some notable records as the least popular opposition leader in history, trailing Rudd as preferred PM with an almost impressively low 7% (yes, seven percent) in March 2008. He was challenged and defeated by Turnbull in September.

Turnbull was a well-known and generally liked politician. He was chair of the Australian Republican Movement during the 1999 referendum, and was one of the nation's most prominent republicans. He had long been affiliated with the Liberal Party, but was hardly considered a "party man" - he was canvassed as a potential Labor candidate after their 1996 defeat, and gave it serious consideration, but chose to back out. He ultimately sought the Liberal nomination in blue-ribbon Wentworth in 2003 and won preselection over the incumbent MP. Turnbull was very much a small-l liberal, aligned strongly with the moderate wing of the party. Though he was popular among voters, the same could not necessarily be said for his party colleagues.

Labor had a prosperous honeymoon period, ratifying the Kyoto protocol, repealing WorkChoices, giving a much overdue apology to the Stolen Generations, and launching the NBN. Most significantly, the government launched an ambitious response to the global financial crisis, passing three stimulus packages which successfully prevented Australia from falling into recession. It wasn't all sunshine and roses, though - the government was plagued by its fair share of controversy and scandal, including the Home Insulation Program, which resulted in the deaths of four people. The opposition hammered on anything they could find, which worked well enough until Turnbull made allegations in parliament based on an email which was later found out to be fake. This was embarrassing, but it didn't cost the leader of the opposition his job. What did, however, was his belief that the Coalition should negotiate with the government over its proposed emissions trading scheme. Within the Coalition it was controversial enough to admit that climate change existed, much less suggest that something should be done about it. Turnbull was rolled after just 14 months as leader. In a twist of fate, he was replaced by former director of Australians for Constitutional Monarchy, Tony Abbott, with whom he clashed many times in the 90s.

Abbott was a staunch conservative, resolute in his belief that climate change is not real, women belong in the kitchen and homosexuals make him uncomfortable (his sister is a lesbian, by the way.) He was the subject of Julia Gillard's famous misogyny speech. As leader he embarked on an unrelenting campaign of absolute opposition to the government, attacking and obstructing as much as possible. With hope for a bipartisan solution to the emissions trading scheme dead, Labor had to negotiate it through the Senate crossbench. The Greens criticised it as not going far enough, while the rest criticised it for being too radical, and in the end they all voted against it. The government sought to pass it again and failed again. This gave them a trigger for a double dissolution election, but Rudd ultimately announced in April 2010 that they would defer the policy until after the Kyoto protocol expired. This was an embarrassing defeat for one of Labor's flagship policies, and was a major motivating factor in what happened next.

While the government held a commanding lead in polls throughout 2008-09, things began to change as their troubles compounded and Abbott became leader of the opposition. Still, an election wasn't due until the end of the year, and while their polling numbers were down, the situation was not particularly dire. Nonetheless, the party had grown dissatisfied with Rudd's leadership. Rumours abound about the specifics, but allegedly he was highly controlling and prone to outbursts of anger against dissenters, and centralised decision-making to a "Gang of Four" comprising himself, Gillard, the treasurer, and the finance minister. Early in the year, factional powerbrokers began canvassing support for a spill. Things came to a head on 23 June, when Julia Gillard entered the Prime Minister's office and requested that he call a ballot for the party leadership. It's still not clear exactly why Gillard chose to turn on her erstwhile ally, but nonetheless she did. Rudd initially said he would stand, but withdrew after determining that he didn't have the numbers to win, and Gillard was elected unopposed as leader. She became the first female Prime Minister.

A media storm immediately engulfed the country. A sitting Prime Minister who had been in office for less than three years had been knifed for incredibly vague reasons. Gillard's image was forever tarnished, though the immediate impact of the spill was a boon for Labor. Gillard was more popular than Rudd, the polls reversed, and they seemed ready to repeat their 2007 landslide. Three weeks after taking office, she announced an early election to be held in August.

The campaign was a relative disaster for the party. A stark contrast to the smooth, rehearsed Kevin 07, Gillard's campaign was disorganised and sluggish. The warm approachability which had endeared her to voters was suddenly absent, and she came across as stiff, impersonal, and prone to gaffes. Abbott and the opposition attacked the government relentlessly, particularly on the so-called proposed "carbon tax" - a moniker which Gillard bafflingly decided to embrace - and the increasingly pressing issue of refugees. Not to mention, questions about the leadership spill simply wouldn't go away. Up to the eve of the election, polling indicated that Labor would retain government by a comfortable albeit reduced margin. However, one final Newspoll indicated a nailbiter, with Labor leading by just 0.2%.

The real result was even closer. Labor won an incredibly slim 50.12% of the two-party-preferred vote and, incredibly, both Labor and the Coalition were tied on 72 seats - the first hung parliament since the war. The balance of power was shared by six unaffiliated crossbenchers, including Adam Bandt of the Greens, Tony Crook of the Western Australian branch of the Nationals (which operates independently of the Coalition), and four independents of various different leanings. After 17 days of suspense and tense negotiations, four of the crossbenchers - Bandt, Andrew Wilkie, Rob Oakeshott, and Tony Windsor - announced they would support a Labor minority government. Tony Crook and certified crocodile hater Bob Katter chose to support the Coalition, leaving the balance of power at 76 Labor to 74 Coalition. Australia was in for a rocky three years.

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2018 Württemberg state election
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Like most other German states, the People's State of Württemberg has developed and cultivated its own unique party system ever since the revolution of 1918-19. On the left, things initially looked familiar: industrial cities gave strength to the SPD, and rural Catholics ensured the Zentrum a strong presence. The DDP also found favour among the progressive bourgeois. On the right, however, the leading force was the Württemberg Farmers' and Vintner's League (WBWB), a independent agrarian party, which quickly became the leading conservative force. They were complemented by the Württemberg Citizens' Party, the state association of the DNVP which never quite saw eye to eye with the federal party. From the beginning, the WBP struggled to find a significant base, and thus formed a common Landtag group with the WBWB. This arrangement found success with the 1924 election, after which they wooed the Zentrum into a coalition and began a long period of conservative governance.

In the ensuing decades, the symbiotic relationship between the two grew: the Citizens Party represented the bourgeois in the towns and cities while the WBWB looked out for farmers, landholders, and peasants. It was an effective formula. In time, this became a formal alliance. As the party system solidified, the various smaller parties were absorbed into either the Rural-Citizen axis or the SPD, which eventually rebranded as Württemberger Social Democracy. The WBWB likewise took on the catchier moniker of the Landvolkspartei. All the while, the Zentrum held onto its faithful base, but found itself marginalised by the dominant Rural-Citizen alliance and their Protestant outlook. As they began consistently securing majorities, the Zentrum returned to opposition and began to align more closely with Social Democracy.

Today, Württemberg maintains a competitive four-party/two-alliance system, though the Rural-Citizens hold government most often.
 
2021 Saxony state election
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The Free State of Saxony has been a bastion of socialism since the 1890s and, despite the passage of time and many changes, this remains true to this day. Nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in the state Landtag, which since the 1930s has been dominated by two parties: the Socialist Workers Party (SAP) and the Social-Democratic People's Party (SDV). Though both arose from the workers' movement, their substance has shifted over the decades. The SAP is the successor of the Saxon branch of the SPD, closely tied to the trade unions and workers. Traditionally dominant in the state, its power was diminished due to intra-party clashes during the 20s, which caused it to lose power to an opposition coalition led by a splinter party in 1926. In response, the party rejected the establishment orthodoxy of its sister parties in states like Prussia, and pursued closer detente with the Communist Party and the more radical workers' movements. This was not immediately successful, and the party found itself politically isolated and bleeding from the centre. However, after the Saxon Communists collapsed due to factionalism in the late 30s, most of the Communist workers and unions rallied to the SPD, which adopted the Socialist Workers' moniker and stormed to victory in the 1941 election.

The Social-Democrats grew out of the opposition front which dethroned the SPD in 1926. The Old Social Democratic Party, ASPD, was founded by leaders of the SPD centre wing. In their early years, they embraced German identity in opposition to SPD internationalism and tended toward conservative positions and, at times, völkisch nationalism. They held balance of power in the 1926 election and used this leverage to broker a deal to take over the Minister-Presidency in a coalition with the various conservative parties. As a nominally Marxist party aligned firmly with the conservative political family, they held a unique position, and their ability to attract a consistent albeit small group of working voters made them a valuable asset in the proletarian heartland of Saxony. Though they lost leadership of the coalition to the DVP in 1929, the ASPD remained the glue which held the government together throughout the 30s.

Things changed after the SAP success in 1941. After 15 years of conservative government, the socialists hit the accelerator on constructing a robust welfare state and codifying workers' rights, and their popularity soared. The opposition struggled to respond to an increasingly desperate string of defeats throughout the 40s and 50s. However, as the 60s rolled on, the SAP began to wane, exhausting its policy goals and facing difficulties with the changing economy and culture. In response, they sought to grow their base beyond only the working class, softening their socialist rhetoric and easing pressure on businesses. Though this led to increased investment in the state, it came at the cost of public expenditure and damaged the government's reputation with their traditional voters. Ultimately, the strategy was a disaster. They were ousted in 1973 on a wave of discontent.

The conservative cartel had finally returned to power after more than three decades. For their part, they had spent that time redefining themselves in a country where socialism had become entrenched and the monarchist and völkisch movements had both failed. Starting from the 50s, the ASPD began a slow march toward conservative-liberalism, while the DNVP dwindled to a small minor partner and the DVP became standardbearers for the conservative mainstream. The DDP remained the centre element in the coalition. A major shift took place in the 60s as an increasing number of people from countries such as Turkey began immigrating to Germany and settling in the cities. The trade unions did not take kindly to the new workers who they viewed as competitors, leaving an opening for the conservatives, who happily embraced them. This newfound base of working-class support, combined with disillusionment among the wider population, combined to deliver them victory in 73. Once in government, they engaged in a very careful approach to fiscal policy, expanding the pro-business policies initiated by the SAP while taking a social liberal outlook on the welfare state. They expanded freedoms for immigrants, making it easier to earn voting rights, which conveniently expanded their own base.

The SAP's defeat severely shook the party, who responded by changing tack dramatically in the aftermath. The "favourable" attitude of the new government toward immigrants saw the trade unions double down on their nativism, and the SAP followed suit. At the same time, their rhetoric began to shift away from the traditional class focus toward German identity. The 1977 election delivered a bare majority for the conservatives, but the writing on the wall was clear. The SAP had finally found a successful strategy to appeal beyond the working-class, attracting middle- and even some upper-class support. The conservatives' second term went less smoothly than the first. With a razor-thin margin in the Landtag, any factional dispute could easily spill into parliament and threaten to bring down the government. The DNVP in particular began to take issue with the pro-immigrant positions of the coalition. Four years of angry disputes later, the SAP returned to power in a landslide. The DNVP fellow below the 4% threshold for entry into the Landtag, delivering the SAP a clear majority. The DVP, ASPD, and DDP were left to pick up the pieces.

The 1981 election was a turning point for Saxon politics. During their time in opposition, a war had broken out within the SAP between the so-called "populist" and "leftist" factions. The former supported the anti-immigrant stances pushed by the unions, and believed primary goal of the party should be a return to power, regardless of ideological squabbles. The latter faction favoured a traditional class struggle approach to politics, and pleaded with the unions to reverse their position and unite the working class. By 1981, the had populists won decisively, and they dominated the party leadership. Their pragmatic approach to politics lended itself to some underhanded tactics. They keenly noted the damage the DNVP's defeat had done to the conservatives and, soon, electoral reform was all the rage in the SAP party room. In 1984, the government passed legislation to lift the electoral threshold to 8%. This number was calculated: it posed an existential risk to both the DNVP and DDP, who rarely broke this barrier, while the ASPD floated dangerously close during its low periods. In short, the entire conservative cartel risked a wipeout in a bad year.

The opposition raged in the face of this blatantly politicised move, but nothing could be done. They were forced to adapt. Ahead of the 1985 election, the DVP, ASPD, and DDP announced they would run on a joint list dubbed the "Bürgerliste". Crucially, the DNVP rejected their invitation and chose to compete separately. This proved a fatal mistake. Despite a decline in the SAP's vote, they retained a majority despite winning fewer votes than the combined conservative forces, with the DNVP again falling short of the threshold. Now, only three groups were represented in the Landtag: the SAP, Bürgerliste, and the Lusatian List, which won a single seat (as a fig leaf, the reform had granted parties representing national minorities an exemption from the threshold.)

After this, an era of sharp polarisation began to take shape. The conservative cartel responded by formalising the Bürgerliste into a perpetual alliance and, from 1990, forming a joint parliamentary group. As the SAP leaned harder into populism to counter dissatisfaction with the economy, the Bürgerliste responded by aggressively embracing the opposite. Moving into the 90s, they were increasingly seen as the champions of social justice and minority rights. In the media, they were referred to sardonically as the party of "Freiheit und Minderheit" , which some representatives openly embraced. Their popularity in the cities grew as post-industrialisation hollowed out the SAP's base; the workers' party became increasingly rural. After the 1993 election delivered another narrow SAP majority, the Bürgerliste took the final step: unification.

After two years of planning and negotiations, the Social-Democratic People's Party (SDV) was founded in 1995. Their goal: to end SAP dominance once and for all. During the 1997 campaign they appealed to voters to reject the backwards SAP, embrace modernity and progress, and vote to turn around the stagnant economy and create a vibrant Saxony for all. The new image was a smashing success, and the opposition won in a landslide. Helma Orosz became first Minister-President for the Social-Democrats and the first female Minister-President from the conservative side of Saxon politics.

The new government was decidedly normal. The SDV held together without major incident, passing a number of bills, some of which were well-received and others not. Notably, they declined to reduce the electoral threshold, happy to maintain the two-party system the SAP had forced into place. Orosz led them to two further victories before resigning in 2008 over a corruption scandal from her ASPD days. The SAP, for their part, faced a reckoning in opposition. The zenith of working class political power was already long past, but the final straw came when the SDV passed legislation to significantly curtail the power of the trade unions. With their electoral coalition broken, the old leadership became disgraced and discredited. A new and more diverse generation of party activists began to rise to positions of power and, slowly but surely, purged the party of xenophobia and nativism. By the time of the 2011 election, the SAP had acknowledged parts of their past policy as racist. At the same election, they returned to power after 14 years.

Today, the Saxon political landscape is something of a curiosity. Both parties proclaim their commitment to progressivism, though the Social-Democrats are generally viewed as more legitimate claimants. The SDV has also taken environmentalism and inter-state coordination as planks of its platform. The SAP is increasingly improving its standing in urban areas and among minority groups, with its recent victories attributed to a renunciation of nativism and continued commitment to left-wing economics. The party is noted as retaining a clear populist streak, however. The Landtag's 8% threshold is the highest in the country and ensures an unusually strong duopoly for the major parties, though third parties remain relatively popular, particularly for protest voters in 2021, the right-wing Saxon Alliance and centre-left People's Alliance each received over 5% of the vote.

TLDR: The Saxon political landscape has been dominated by the left-wing Socialist Workers' Party (SAP) and the centre-right Social-Democratic People's Party (SDV) since the 1990s. The SAP was formed after the collapse of the Communist Party at the end of the 30s which sent radical workers rallying to the SPD. The SAP governed until the 70s, during which time they were opposed by a broad front of the ASPD (a conservative splinter of the SPD formed in 1926), the DVP, DDP, and DNVP. The first three merged into the SDV in 1995, while the DNVP remained separate. From the 70s onwards, the SDV and its predecessors embraced Turkish-German immigrants and social justice, while the SAP took a populist and xenophobic outlook along with protectionist trade unions. This only began to reverse in the 2000s as the SAP diversified and renounced its racist policies. The modern two-party system is maintained by an artificially high 8% electoral threshold (minority parties are exempted), implemented by the SAP to damage the right-wing parties before the SDV merger, which has been maintained by both parties since then.
 
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2019 Rhineland state election
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Historically, the defining characteristic of the Rhineland has been its devout Catholicism. Long the heart of the political Catholic movement in Germany, the province is the traditional heartland of the Centre Party. Though its most dominating majorities came from the rural areas, even the liberal cities were prone to handing majorities to the party. Locally, control of the cities was generally contested between the Catholic Centre and the secular liberals and socialists, though their prerogatives were limited until the federalisation of Prussia in 1941. This newfound autonomy began a long and steady divergence between the Centre Party and its Rhineland branch. While the national leadership fought to open the tower to Protestants, the Rhenish associations saw little reason to follow their lead - indeed, they frequently chided Adenauer and his ilk for pursuing this "misguided and fruitless endeavour". Tensions eventually reached a boiling point when they announced, without the approval of the national executive, their plan to rebrand as the Rheinische Volkspartei to align with the international Catholic Christian democratic movement. The federal leadership accused them of abandoning party unity, the local branch accused them of abandoning the faith, and the ensuing row lasted several years and resulted in a permanent break. The Volkspartei agreed to support the Centre in national elections, and the Centre agreed not to run in the province, and to permit the Volkspartei to continue using the "Z" abbreviation.

In the meantime, the Rhineland was evolving. While its Catholic rural roots remained, in truth, it had long been one of the most well-developed and modern provinces in Germany. Köln was among the country's largest cities, while the industrial Ruhr basin to the north bled across state borders to form a bustling polycentric metropolis. As the mines and factories roared to life in the 19th century, the area grew exponentially and with growth came diversification: first Protestants from across the country as well as Polish migrants from the eastern territories and then, postwar, foreign workers from other European nations and, later still, beyond. While in 1925, Catholics made up two-thirds of the Rhineland's population, by 1980 this fell to below half.

In the early years of the republic, a now-familiar tripartite division developed between the rural Catholics, the industrial proletariat, and the liberal bourgeoisie. However, things were not quite so simple as they looked on paper. Workers in the rural towns and smaller cities tended Social Democrat, while the industrial workers in the dense Ruhrgebiet tended toward radicalism and lent their support to the Communists. This bitter division meant that the left struggled to wield their potentially significant influence. Likewise, the bourgeoisie were split on their choice of political party. Industrialists and conservative Protestants backed the well-funded and well-connected DNVP, while the smaller entrepreneurs and intellectuals supported the DDP and DVP. The DNVP despised the former for their association with republicanism and and their prominent Jewish members, while they resented the latter for their cooperation with the Zentrum and DDP. All this contributed to the continued dominance of the Volkspartei despite their declining demographic strength.

Nonetheless, the natural governing party was spooked by their seemingly inevitable demise. In the 1970s, as they were again forced to expand their coalition to reach a majority, they sought a remedy in the form of electoral reform. The new law was a system of compensatory mixed-member PR, with 60% of the Landtag elected from single-member constituencies and 40% from party lists. Their hope was that, though their electoral power was increasingly shallow, it remained as wide as ever, and they would be able to dominate most of the state's constituencies.

Their plan was largely successful. With a divided opposition and no mechanism for correcting overhang seats, Z found itself consistently overrepresented. This forced the other parties to change tack. Realising that their position as the party of the towns was no longer tenable, the SPD began an aggressive campaign in the cities, leveraging their connections with the trade union movement to undermine the Communists. The now-ingrained mistrust of the Social Democratic label in the Ruhr caused them to reluctantly rebrand as the Labour Party of the Rhineland, A. This approach saw near-immediate success as the Communists suffered a major swing against them and A collected a healthy second-place finish, even snatching seats from Z in some places.

The bourgeois camp, meanwhile, split in two. The moderates merged into The Liberals, while the DNVP and right-wing elements of the DVP formed the National Party. As with the division on the left, one party was at an immediate advantage: the Liberals won over most of the capitalists and entrepreneurs and ran circles around the Nationals throughout the 80s and 90s. The latter were left with little more than a segment of wealthy Protestants and were forced to continuously bring new forces aboard to stay afloat, eventually consolidating into the United Right in 2003. This new endeavour finally saw some success, striking a chord with the traditionalist electorate on moral and social issues, and even carving out a small niche among the more conservative urban Catholics.

Moving into the modern phase of Rhenish politics, new forces began to emerge. Devout Catholics became disillusioned with Z who they viewed as a cynical system party who had lost sight of their mission, to represent the faith, and now played the game of politics and power for its own sake. The Party of Catholics was launched in 1982 to some fanfare. They failed to dislodge Z, but successfully established themselves as a parliamentary party, winning as much as 5% in 1987. Today they retain a small but consistent presence in the Landtag and take hard stances against the government when it contravenes the Vatican's line.

At the same time, the other end of the political spectrum was suffering a shakeup of its own. A's shift to an urban worker's party had in many ways left it stretched too thin, and the regional towns which had been the party's bedrock for decades were left feeling neglected. Enter the Alternative List. Influenced by the rising environmental movement and led primarily by middle-class activists, they set out to represent the "forgotten middle" of Rhenish society with a mixture of populism and progressivism. Simultaneously, an awakening was taking place in the cities. The Rhineland had been struck by the student movement as much as anywhere else, and going into the 1980s, New Left activists began to strike out on their own in municipal elections to challenge the establishment parties. On the other hand, many young Catholics were influenced by the Christian left movement in Latin America and called for a new start for the Christian democratic movement in Germany. In this atmosphere, new parties began to spring up; some achieved great success in local elections, but they were scarcely able to make a mark in the Landtag. Along with the Alternative List, these new groups began to be referred to as the alternative movement, and it didn't take long to find common ground. They federated into the People's Alliance, V, in 1991, adopting a common platform based on humanism, respect for nature, solidarity, social responsibility, and decentralisation. Over time, they have added support for morally progressive causes such as feminism and queer rights. Their electoral strength remains in regional towns and the more affluent and progressive quarters of cities, where they often compete with the Liberals.

These forces have had a steady presence in the Landtag since the 1990s. However, the Landtag has an unusually low threshold of 0.67% - just enough to win two seats - and a continuous stream of parties trickle in and out of parliament. Homeland was founded in 2007 and has won seats four elections running, representing the Muslim minority in the Rhineland. In 2010, the Socialist Left split from the Communists and drew dissidents from A; it remains a minor force on the left. The Emancipatory Candidacy is the current incarnation of long tradition of radical democratic parties who oppose the moralistic influence of the Church on the state. They champion civil and individual rights above all else. The European Movement propose the establishment of a pan-European association, and the reform of German federalism to hand some responsibilities to trans-national organisations.

Despite numerous challenges and changes, Z have retained the post of Minister-President for almost the entire period since 1919. Their strength has waned to the point where the electoral system grants them a slight advantage at best. Since the turn of the century they have more and more often formed minority governments, relying on support from L, R, V, or A. In 2015 they formed a black-red coalition with A, which faced significant controversies but lasted its full term. The 2019 election was a victory for V, who achieved one of their best results to date and claimed over 15% of votes, sweeping most of the regional towns and even achieving a plurality in Köln. L improved to fourth position while R slipped to 8%, attributed to a crime-focused campaign which failed to resonate with voters. Post-election, Z opted not to continue the black-red coalition, instead turning to L and V for support. Elisabeth Winklemeier was subsequently re-elected as Minister-President, leading a single-party Z minority government.

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That's one big Landtag.

One point on the German party names - "Einheitsrecht" sounds more like "right to unity". I would suggest "Vereinigte Rechte" to translate as "united right", or possibly something like "Bürgerliche Einheit" or "Bürgerliche Vereinigung" - the word "Rechte" is a bit frowned on in modern Germany, although that might not be the case ITTL assuming the Nazis never took over and ran the country into the ground.
 
Interesting read, I'm looking forward to Hannover/Thuringia )) What happened with Ruhrpolen and how did they vote?

Thanks! The Ruhr Poles remain a significant and active community in the region. They lean toward the Labour Party because of their working-class roots, as well as the Liberals and Alliance because of their support for minority rights. Some more devout Polish Catholics support for Party of Catholics because the People's Party and Zentrum in general have historically privilieged ethnic Germans over Poles. Nonetheless, a lot of middle-class Poles in the current day do support the People's Party.

That's one big Landtag.

One point on the German party names - "Einheitsrecht" sounds more like "right to unity". I would suggest "Vereinigte Rechte" to translate as "united right", or possibly something like "Bürgerliche Einheit" or "Bürgerliche Vereinigung" - the word "Rechte" is a bit frowned on in modern Germany, although that might not be the case ITTL assuming the Nazis never took over and ran the country into the ground.

Thanks, my German is very lackluster. You're right that there was no Nazi regime ITTL, they petered out before coming to prominence (as did the wider völkisch movement a bit further down the line.) So "Rechte" and nationalism in general would be a lot more acceptable.
 
How would you think Austria would be in this "surviving Weimar Republic" scenario? I can see the cleavage on the right between Austrian nationalists and German nationalists survive or at least last longer.

Does Homeland Party, being social liberal and therefore, i assume, centrist economically, have a predominantly middle class base of white-collar workers and business owners or still has equal success with working class Muslims?
 
How would you think Austria would be in this "surviving Weimar Republic" scenario? I can see the cleavage on the right between Austrian nationalists and German nationalists survive or at least last longer.

Does Homeland Party, being social liberal and therefore, i assume, centrist economically, have a predominantly middle class base of white-collar workers and business owners or still has equal success with working class Muslims?
I haven't really considered the international (or even national) ramifications really, but yeah, pan-Germanism would definitely be a more powerful and lasting force into the present than it was post-WW2. Would be interesting to explore the Austrian political system.

Heimat's base are indeed mainly white-collar and entrepreneurs, but they draw votes from all groups. In general, the more closely someone identifies with their background or faith, the more likely they are to vote Heimat. That said, their platform is reasonably comprehensive and they attract a not-insignificant group of non-Muslim voters who just like their general outlook.
 
2022 Berlin state election
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Berlin is the capital city of Germany, a metropolis of over six million people, ranking among the largest cities in Europe. It has a long and proud tradition of art, culture, science, architecture, and enough history to fill volumes. And for the last century, it has earned an enduring nickname - Red Berlin.

The transformation of Berlin from the relatively modest seat of Hohenzollern power to a world-class metropolis began after the unification of Germany in 1871. As the city became increasingly industrial, working-class neighbourhoods began to develop around the city centre. The new residents were forced to live in cramped tenements and subsist off starvation wages. In this environment, trade unions and the labour movement thrived, and the Berlin working-class developed a strongly socialist consciousness; the Social Democrats won some of their early Reichstag victories in Berlin. By the turn of the century, the party dominated the city in national elections. On a local level however, the three-class franchise stifled the power of the electorate, and they were mostly powerless to influence the course of their city's governance.

Berlin was granted the status of a province within Prussia in 1881, having previously only been a municipality within Brandenburg. At the time of the revolution, it already contained two million within its borders and was close to bursting, with satellite suburbs spilling into the Brandenburg countryside. With the revolution came universal suffrage and proportional representation, and the first round of municipal elections in 1919 set the tone for the next century: the Independent Social Democrats narrowly edged out the SPD for a plurality of 33%. The city limits were greatly expanded by the Greater Berlin Act passed in 1920, which doubled the city's population to four million by taking in the surrounding towns and a swath of countryside for good measure. This proved a wise decision as the city continued to grow relentlessly in the following decades, developing a nearly contiguous urban area across its territory, broken only by the many lakes and green spaces which lace their way through the outskirts of the city.

Though it cultivated a reputation for decadence and excess during the early republic, many of Berlin's residents still suffered chronically poor living and working conditions - as evidenced by the sharp rise of the Communist Party, who established the city as their centre of operations. This was especially true in the traditional working-class areas where the SPD had put down roots decades earlier; Wedding and Neukölln became known for their communist activism and the red banners flying from apartments. The party's popularity only grew as it sharpened its opposition to the republic and the Social Democrats, reflecting the Bolshevik orthodoxy which was increasingly hostile to the European socialist mainstream. In the 1929 elections, they became the second-largest party on the city council with almost 25% of the vote.

The ascendancy of the Communists pushed the local Social Democrats, who were closely tied to the moderate Prussian government of Otto Braun, closer to the parties of the centre and right. As Berlin had only a small Catholic presence, this mainly meant the DVP and DDP. Though the parties of the left held a clear majority overall, the opposition of the Communists meant that the SPD were unable to garner the support to lead the city government. They were instead forced to give their support to an increasingly awkward minority administration of the liberal parties. Nonetheless, the prerogatives of the municipal government were limited, with most power residing with the state government. That changed in 1941.

Though the Communist Party largely opposed Prussian federalisation due to the centralist orthodoxy of the Bolsheviks, the Berlin branch had pushed hard for it, knowing that they stood a real chance of taking power in the future. If Berlin acquired the status of a federal state, the Communists had the opportunity to reshape one of the continent's biggest cities in accordance with their goals - at least the little ones that didn't involve revolution. The other parties were keenly aware of this and, while the liberals and conservatives generally supported federalism on principle, it mostly remained a theoretical until the SPD officially switched their position in 1938.

It was now only a matter of time until federalisation became a reality. The clock had started ticking. Alarm bells began ringing throughout the Berlin establishment. From then until Prussia officially federalised three years later, the SPD and the bourgeois parties devoted most of their energy to devising a scheme to prevent the Communists from achieving power, ideally forever. They knew that, at the very least, they would be able to shape the new state constitution. They ultimately settled on a unique solution, inspired by the Swiss model of consensus governance: the city government would be a microcosm of the parliament, with its partisan makeup determined by the votes each party received in the general election. Meanwhile, the Mayor would be elected by absolute majority vote in parliament. This meant that, even if the Communists broke into government, they would be forced to share power - and, in all likelihood, would never be able to claim the mayoralty for themselves. In most other aspects, the constitution was in line with others across Prussia, though it also adopted the Hanseatic styling of the existing German city-states, with the city government dubbed the Senate and ministers known as Senators. The parliament, however, retained its traditional name Stadtverordnetenversammlung (which in English is loosely but mercifully translated as the Berlin Assembly.)

The inaugural state elections finally delivered a plurality for the Communist Party, but it was too late. The new constitution went into force and they won just four spots in the eleven-member Senate. After deliberation between the other parties, Karl Trucksaess of the DVP was elected Mayor. The Communists decried it as an outrage to democracy and staged demonstrations. The SPD performed poorly in the elections, falling to second place with under a quarter of the vote, but the DNVP too had suffered losses, with the liberal parties emerging as the main winners. Still, the SPD held balance of power in the Senate and found the new arrangement more than satisfactory, able to secure desirable cabinet positions during negotiations. Years of cooperation with the right-of-centre had brought all the parties closer together, and they soon found themselves emulating the Swiss to a greater extent than originally planned. Berlin, long the centre of political chaos and violence in Germany, found itself governed by one of the country's most harmonius coalitions.

The anti-communist majority did their best to give the Communists the most worthless portfolios they could find: on one occasion, KPD co-chairman Paul Schwenk was assigned the sole duty of overseeing the maintenance of public parks. For their part, the Communists spent most of their time seething at the opportunity they had been robbed of and at the trouble that the whole debacle had caused with the national party leadership, who viewed the Berlin association as an embarrassment. "An outrage to democracy"? Are you joking? You sound like you've been reading fucking Kautsky. You want into the Rotes Rathaus? What for, so you can order the next Blutmai? Jesus Christ, get a grip.

And so things carried on throughout the 40s and into the 50s. Despite constant reprimands from the national executive, the Berlin Communists held onto the dream of getting into government for real. But this approach was flawed - as a party who marketed themselves as opposing the system, their apparent desperation to take part in it soured their appeal. Their performance sank as radical workers switched their allegiance or, more often, stopped voting altogether. Attendance at the Communists' famed mass demonstrations dwindled. The situation was not helped by conflicts in the German communist movement which caused the effective dissolution of the national KPD in the late 50s, leaving the Berlin branch marooned.

With the Communists sinking, the 50s and 60s were dominated by simultaneous competition and cooperation between the Assembly majority. The SPD clawed back its position as the largest party in the city, leveraging its influence as the voice of the workers in the Senate. They supported moderate reforms to the city's structure, delegating some competences to the borough administrations, though making sure that Communist power remained curtailed. Like the Communists, the monarchist and völkisch movements collapsed during this period, leading the Berlin DNVP to split between a conservative mainstream and a radical minority who quickly fell into irrelevance. The new Bürgerliche Partei (Civic Party) drew a wide swath of affluent voters, significantly damaging the DVP, whose national-liberal flavour no longer seemed so novel. By the late 60s, it appeared that the city was shaping up to become a two-horse race between the SPD and Civics, complemented by the floundering KPD and the small DDP representing the social liberal centre. But history had other plans.

The emergence of the student movement irreversibly transformed Berlin politics. As a continental hub for education, arts, and youth, the city erupted with a fervor seen in few other places in Europe. The established parties, dominated by older generations, struggled to respond. In the 1970 election, protest and student lists won 25% of votes between them, to the detriment of almost everyone. While the new deputies quickly fell into bickering and obscurity, the true ramifications of the movement were still over the horizon. As demonstrations and activism cooled, the New Left began to emerge as a new political current. This had a profound influence on two groups in particular: the Communist Party and the Alliance for Peace and Justice, later the Justice Party.

The latter came directly out of the grassroots movement. After most of the other groups crashed and burned, the more reform-oriented leaders among the New Left were joined by a handful of experienced dissidents from established forces. Their joint list debuted at a modest 6% in the 1975 election. They won no Senators, but the result was a breakthrough and they brought new perspectives to the Assembly - not just sentiment, but concrete proposals. They championed municipalism and delegation of powers to the city boroughs, which the existing parties largely opposed, and called for sustainable and ecological development. In the following years they added women's and queer rights to their list of causes. The most significant factor in their success, however, was outreach among the increasingly diverse Berlin electorate. They explicitly appealed to non-ethnic Germans and non-Christians, who by this point made up a significant minority of the population but remained unrepresented in politics. This enabled them to grow rapidly and build a community presence rivaling that of the major parties.

The Communists looked on in envy as the newcomers accomplished what they had been slowly losing the ability to do for decades. The older veterans, embittered by the party's many failures, had long resigned themselves to irrelevance. By this point the party held two Senate positions and were on the brink of falling to just one. But the younger generation who still believed in the cause were electrified by student movement and the rise of the New Left, adamant that the Communist Party could become a mass movement once more. From the beginning of the 70s they passionately argued their case before the leadership, insisting that this was their last chance to turn things around. Eventually the elders relented and granted the activists responsibility for local election campaigning in boroughs like Neukölln and Kreuzberg. They engaged directly with voters, holding events and meetings, campaigning not for proletarian revolution but better living and working conditions, social security, and wages. They called out the Social Democrats for their collaboration with the bourgeois parties and abandonment of the workers. They promptly achieved their best results since the 50s.

Their success was undeniable. The young activists began picking up prominent positions in the party. In the 1975 state election, they helped pioneer an engagement-based campaign and achieved a modest swing after years of terminal decline. Then, in a break with tradition, they took part in cabinet formation talks for the first time. This was a source of major contention both within the party and among the conservative parties, but the SPD were open to it, hoping that they could secure an ally on the left to support their proposals. The Communists were given modest portfolios, but entrusted with real responsibility for the first time. And to their credit, the new Red Senators committed themselves to constructive governance and carried out their tasks dutifully. The new arrangement was not without its issues - the Communist Senators were no longer pariahs, but they were still outcasts and firebrands. They caused no shortage of headaches for the government and were frequently decried them as impossible to work with. But the experiment was a success, and the cabinet completed its full term without crisis. The Communists counted a few small victories during that time, particularly in cooperating with the SPD to block conservative proposals and secure funding for public housing projects.

By the time of the 1979 election, things had noticeably changed in Berlin. The Communist and Justice parties surged at the expense of the major parties. Though the weakened Social Democrats remained in first place, Berlin was now a fluid multi-party system. The Assembly subsequently voted to expand the Senate to 13 members to accommodate, giving the Justice Party two members and balance of power. In the following years, the Communists pushed for left-wing reforms while the SPD settled into the role of a facilitator of centre-left compromise. The bourgeois parties defended the rich and business, while the Justice Party served as the voice of the maligned and downtrodden minorities. The slow erosion of the liberal vote by the Civic and Justice camps compelled the DDP and DVP to merge into the Berlin Democrats, who immediately began going toe to toe with the Civic Party.

The five-party system has remained largely stable ever since, sharing power with varying degrees of harmony. Enduring population growth caused the government to expand the Senate again to 15 members at the turn of the millennium. The Communist Party has continued to moderate with time and has long left behind their revolutionary Bolshevik roots. The party holds solidly left-wing positions and particularly champions public housing, welfare, and healthcare. Their popularity grew alongside election turnout during the 1990s, they have been the most popular party in most elections since 1994. Despite this, and a consistently left-wing majority in the Assembly and Senate, they remain something of a black sheep among the other parties and have only held the mayoralty on two brief occasions. Instead, the more moderate left parties typically head the government during high points of left-wing popularity. This role has been increasingly filled by the Justice Party since the late 2000s, as their popularity continues to grow and their agreeable social-liberal economic platform draws approval from the Democrats and Civic Party.

During the 2017-22 period, the Democrats led the Senate with their mayor Christoph Meyer, supported by the Civic and Justice parties. The 2022 election delivered a clear plurality for the Communists, while the Justice Party moved into second place and the Democrats, Civic Party, and SPD all declined, with the latter recording their worst ever result. Much of these losses flowed to Capital Interest, a new populist party founded by Köpenick mayor Oliver Igel. It is primarily concerned with delegating more powers to the boroughs and investing in the suburban areas of the city, particularly in the east. Its economic positions are comparable to those of the Justice Party and Democrats. During government formation, the Democrats ceded the Mayor's seat to Antje Kapek of the Justice Party. The Communists extracted favourable cabinet positions due to their first-place result but ultimately voted against Kapek for Mayor, while Capital Interest abstained.

The consensus system gives Berlin politics a unique dynamic among German states. Parties rarely put forward lead candidates, instead relying on reputation, policy accomplishments, and the profiles of their Senators to attract votes. The administrative borders of the city have remained largely static since the passage of the Greater Berlin Act. The city is divided into twenty boroughs, which also double as electoral districts, with seven located in the old city proper and the remainder sprawling out in various directions. The electoral system uses open lists, giving voters a greater degree of control over the Assembly to make up for their relative lack of influence over the Senate. The model of consensus governance has been studied extensively by scientists and observers who consider it a curiosity in a country where politics often remains polarised. While many remain dissatisfied with the lack of competition, the established parties view the risks of constitutional reform as greater than the benefits, fearing the consequences if they were to give up their perpetual voice. Other states have at times considered adopting a similar system for their cabinets, but none have yet done so.

TLDR: the Communist Party's strength in Berlin compels the SPD to band together with the conservative parties to craft a constitution specifically designed to screw the Communists out of power by dividing cabinet positions based on vote share. After a few decades of being shunned and sinking, the Communists reform into a progressive socialist party influenced by the New Left and begin working within the system to become the strongest party in the city. Meanwhile, the social-progressive Justice Party becomes a major force around the same time, competing with the liberal Democrats and conservative Civic Party, as well as the Social Democrats, who have lost much of their popularity. In the current day, the consensus government is a messy but functional system which generates an endless stream of inter-party machinations.

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