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Democratic Germany foreign policy in the 1930s and beyond

Veles

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I missed a load of the old 'what if Hitler died edition #32423' threads so I apologise if this is rehashing old themes. I see a lot of focus on the initial events but not on the aftermath.

I'm interested in the implications, if a reasonably moderate democratic party (SPD say) was able to achieve stability in the late 1920s/ early 1930s and achieve enough of a hold on politics to govern in some vaguely normal manner.

What are the implications here on foreign policy? Regardless of the party in power, we still have a very complex situation in Europe with various German populations abroad, the Rhineland, Italy, and the growing threat of Soviet power.
 
It’s very easy to blame everything on Hitler, but the truth is that 1930s Germany had a lot of problems that Hitler had nothing to do with (unless you assume he was pulling the strings from 1919, which is obviously impossible.) Germany is still going to be bitter and resentful about Versailles and the Rhineland, as well as everything else. Hitler gave voice and focus to this, which helped him get into power. They won’t go away in a world where Hitler dies in 1924 or even 1918. Someone else may take advantage of the same issues to make a bid for power himself.

It’s possible Germany will resign itself to losing territory after 1918. I don’t know how wedded the average German was to Alsac-Lorrane. I do know that France occupying the Rhineland was a major issue, that the economic crisis of the Great Depression did a lot of damage and that the government would need to address the issues anyway even if we’re talking about a democratic government rather than a dictatorship. Failure to do so would risk being replaced by someone who promises to do so.

Worse, a lot would depend on politics outside Germany. France and Poland have EXCELLENT reasons to fear a resurgent Germany, even without Hitler (remember, in this world, no one would know Hitler’s name, let alone what he did in OTL). They’d do what they could to keep Germany down, breeding more resentment. The Great Depression didn’t start in Germany, but it certainly spread there.

I think to keep a relatively stable government in Berlin would require the West to show a certain amount of sensitivity to German concerns. This might be prompted by the rise of the USSR. In this timeline, the Spanish Civil War might be quickly won by the Republicans, who were strongly influenced by the USSR. We might end up with a united front against Russia, with Germany released from Versailles in exchange for their support against the Russians.

Chris
 
Remilitarization would have happened even without Hitler. France and the UK didn't oppose that anymore.
A democratic Germany may still annex Austria if Austria eventually requests it.
Most Germans did wan Danzig the corridor back but I doubt a democratic Germany would start a war over it.
 
I think people are missing some components regarding relations with the soviets.

Molotov-Ribbentrop was in some ways a continuation of weimar politics rather than some new invention of Stalin and Hitler. And by that I mean the economic cooperation, not the partition of Poland.

Stalin also was a very cautious person militarily, and not the kind to start wars without a firm belief he already had all the cards in hand to win them. For all that soviet power is growing out of his bloody industrialization program and he will look at his weaker neighbours for quick gains, he's also going to be very interested in maintaining ties with Weimar to break the economic encirclement that's sure to come against a soviet union that isn't necessary to fight the nazi.

And while the Germans won't have the nazi's insane revanchism, they're still not going to be very happy with the Versailles impositions.

A potential scenario could thus be one where Stalin doesn't develop the "social fascist" doctrine and push the KPD towards conciliation with the SPD, which could help its center left coalition retain electoral control of the presidency, out of a belief that Weimar Germany is integral to avoiding encirclement. And on Germany's side, without Hitler's ambitions of eastern lebensraum there's no reason to shake up such an agreement.

This political stance in the Stalinized comintern is likely to mean good things for the Spanish republicans too.

Which is probably when the Versailles power are going to start really worrying.
 
Germany's big foreign policy goals will be regaining lost territory and getting their military built up, with a side order of "the USSR scares us" - as the others said, all stuff the Nazis also talked up and Britain & France did mostly allow. Danzig will be a long-running spat. Germany still wants 'its rightful place', just that means normal stuff ITTL and not psychotic blood frenzies.

Austrian relations depend on who's in power in Germany, probably get frosty. I don't see an anschluss without a loud All Germanics Are One Glorious Race movement in power yelling Look At Our Cool Shit We Have This Long Road every day.

EDIT: I could see a war scare(s) over Danzig
 
I'm interested in the implications, if a reasonably moderate democratic party (SPD say) was able to achieve stability in the late 1920s/ early 1930s and achieve enough of a hold on politics to govern in some vaguely normal manner.
I think you might be interested in an old TL by Faeelin at the other place, "Looking Out for a Hero: Gustav Stresemann Survives", which as the title implies, is based on the idea that Stresemann doesn't die prematurely and manages to keep Weimar Germany going--though not without cutting a few democratic corners.
 
The problem with Germany is that, while it seems to have reconciled itself to losing territories to its western neighbours including France, it was not so reconciled to its losses in the east. Even committed German Democrats were open in their contempt for Poland, considering the Poles inferior.and talking of Poland as an ephemeral _Saisonstaat_.
 
The problem with Germany is that, while it seems to have reconciled itself to losing territories to its western neighbours including France, it was not so reconciled to its losses in the east. Even committed German Democrats were open in their contempt for Poland, considering the Poles inferior.and talking of Poland as an ephemeral _Saisonstaat_.

I doubt they would have gone to war, though.
 
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