Balfour, The Washington Treaty, The Battleship Holiday and the G3 Battlecruiser design

[ForceA1]

I stumbled on this forum post regarding minutes of discussions for what became the Washington Treaty. An interesting point that was raised was that in return for the scrapping of the Ajax, Centurion, King George V, Erin and Tiger, then a pair of what were then termed "Super-Hoods" in excess of 43,000 tons could be built. Alternatively (the option which was chosen by Balfour) only 4 of the earlier Battleships could be scrapped and a pair of new design 35,000 ton Battleships could be built.

Had the first option been taken, and assuming that the Washington Treaty limit for new build Battleships (aside from the concessions ton Britain for the G3s) remains at 35,000 tons*, what sort of influence would the G3s have upon entering service in the late 1920s. Britain would have pair of ships which would be equal to any new-build Treaty Battleship which could be built when the Battleship Building Holiday ends on the 12th November 1931 (assuming no London Naval Treaty), and yet is considerably faster than them**.

Will something like the 1930 London Naval Treaty be negotiated, and if not, which, if any, nations will build 35,000 ton slow Battleships?

Will they instead use their Battleship tonnage to build large cruiser-killers capable of exceeding the speed of the 32-knot G3s (much like the French Croiseur de Bataille de 37 000t drawn up in 1927)?

How will this effect the design of Treaty Cruisers***?

Will they lobby for the Treaty restrictions to be lifted earlier, withdraw from the Treaty (requiring 2 years notice), or wait until it expires on the 31st December 1936?

It should be noted the the Lexington class were to exceed the Treaty limits for carriers when they were completed, both America and Japan were able to complete or convert a small amount of their pre-Treaty construction, whilst as explained above, Britain was allowed to complete 2 new ship, the Nelsons, incorporating the experience of the First World War, so I don't think this scenario is entirely out side the grounds of reality.

OTL the completion of the Nelsons led to the rejection by the Americans of a British proposal for a 25,000 ton 12in gun limit at Geneva in 1927. How would the construction of two slightly more powerful and faster ships affect 1920s and 30s attempts at arms control?

*the above link includes discussion haggling over tonnage, ranging from 43,200 tons, 38,000 tons and the 35,000 ton displacement which was later selected as the Washington Treaty limit.

**proposals for new-build Battleships within Britain, the US and Japan in the run up to the end of the Building Holiday in the late 1920s were all limited to around 21-23 knots for American Designs, 23-25 knots for British designs and 23-26 knots for the Japanese designs.

***The first generation of 10,000ton Treaty Cruisers were poorly-balanced, essentially unprotected ships built to outrun the pre-Treaty Battlecruisers, with later generations only gaining more protection as a combination of improved machinery and lowered requirements for speed enabled the tonnage to be used otherwise. With the G3s and potential construction of cruiser-killers, would Treaty Cruisers get heavier protection, or would the improvements in machinery that led to improved protection OTL instead be used to eke out even more speed?

 

[Delta Force]

I stumbled on this forum post regarding minutes of discussions for what became the Washington Treaty. An interesting point that was raised was that in return for the scrapping of the Ajax, Centurion, King George V, Erin and Tiger, two of what were then a pair of "Super-Hoods" in excess of 43,000 tons could be built. Alternatively (the option which was chosen by Balfour) only 4 of the earlier Battleships could be scrapped and a pair of new design 35,000 ton Battleships could be built.

The only one of those five ships that was retained was HMS Tiger, and even then it was retired without replacement in 1932. The G3 proposal would allow Tiger to be replaced and expand the battlecruiser force by an additional ship.

Had the first option been taken, and assuming that the Washington Treaty limit for new build Battleships (aside from the concessions ton Britain for the G3s) remains at 35,000 tons*, what sort of influence would the G3s have upon entering service in the late 1920s. Britain would have pair of ships which would be equal to any new-build Treaty Battleship which could be built when the Battleship Building Holiday ends on the 12th November 1931 (assuming no London Naval Treaty), and yet is considerably faster than them**.

Will something like the 1930 London Naval Treaty be negotiated, and if not, which, if any, nations will build 35,000 ton slow Battleships?

The Nelson class didn't upset the balance of power because Imperial Japan and the United States already had comparable battleships, but a fast battleship armed with 16 inch guns would be adding a new capability, especially since the United States had no battlecruisers at all. Imperial Japan and the United States would likely want to complete their comparable battlecruisers as originally designed if the United Kingdom is given a concession for the G3 class.

Will they instead use their Battleship tonnage to build large cruiser-killers capable of exceeding the speed of the 32-knot G3s (much like the French Croiseur de Bataille de 37 000t drawn up in 1927)?

How will this effect the design of Treaty Cruisers***?

Cruiser killers aren't really needed for fighting treaty cruisers as they tend to lack protection against their own armament. Most countries just built larger cruisers with more proportional armor once freed from treaty restrictions.

Will they lobby for the Treaty restrictions to be lifted earlier, withdraw from the Treaty (requiring 2 years notice), or wait until it expires on the 31st December 1936?

Nothing would change the fact that the United Kingdom and United States don't want to spend much money on their navies and France and Italy can't afford to do so. Imperial Japan would have done better with the other powers artificially limited by treaty, but it's still the only major power with an interest in challenging the status quo.

It should be noted the the Lexington class were to exceed the Treaty limits for carriers when they were completed, both America and Japan were able to complete or convert a small amount of their pre-Treaty construction, whilst as explained above, Britain was allowed to complete 2 new ship, the Nelsons, incorporating the experience of the First World War, so I don't think this scenario is entirely out side the grounds of reality.

OTL the completion of the Nelsons led to the rejection by the Americans of a British proposal for a 25,000 ton 12in gun limit at Geneva in 1927. How would the construction of two slightly more powerful and faster ships affect 1920s and 30s attempts at arms control?

Imperial Japan might actually be interested in a treaty that limits ships to 45,000 tons displacement and 16 inch guns. It would give a lot more wiggle room for them to play with when violating it.

 

[ForceA1]

The only one of those five ships that was retained was HMS Tiger, and even then it was retired without replacement in 1932. The G3 proposal would allow Tiger to be replaced and expand the battlecruiser force by an additional ship.

Tiger was discarded as a result of the London Naval Treaty, a full decade in the future whilst the Washington Treaty negotiations were ongoing.

The Nelson class didn't upset the balance of power because Imperial Japan and the United States already had comparable battleships, but a fast battleship armed with 16 inch guns would be adding a new capability, especially since the United States had no battlecruisers at all. Imperial Japan and the United States would likely want to complete their comparable battlecruisers as originally designed if the United Kingdom is given a concession for the G3 class.

As pointed out in the linked post, it was more or less a coin-flip decision between the option to sacrifice 5 old ships and build the G3s, or sacrifice 4 old ships and build what became the Nelson class. That decision to provide these options may have been later regretted by the other Treaty signatories, but it was an option that was available.

Cruiser killers aren't really needed for fighting treaty cruisers as they tend to lack protection against their own armament. Most countries just built larger cruisers with more proportional armor once freed from treaty restrictions.

In the late 1920s, Italy and France both considered using their Battleship tonnage to build cruiser-killers. With the 35,000 ton limit in place, the US and Japan can only build ships that, at best, match the G3s in protection and armament, whilst being inferior in speed (thus allowing the G3s to dictate engagement ranges, retreat, or pursue any Treaty Battleship at will). With the G3s having this advantage, and being unable to leave the Treaty system for political and economic reasons, would the major powers come to the same conclusion?

Nothing would change the fact that the United Kingdom and United States don't want to spend much money on their navies and France and Italy can't afford to do so. Imperial Japan would have done better with the other powers artificially limited by treaty, but it's still the only major power with an interest in challenging the status quo.

Imperial Japan might actually be interested in a treaty that limits ships to 45,000 tons displacement and 16 inch guns. It would give a lot more wiggle room for them to play with when violating it.

Interestingly enough, in the lead up to the end of the Battleship holiday, the various designs considered remained within the limits, the largest being 35,000 tons and armed with 16-inch guns, and designs as small as 20,000 tons and armed with 12-inch guns were considered, whereas in 1928 US designs were only designed around the 16-inch, 35,000 ton limit, with no smaller designs being prepared (the US did eventually draw up smaller battleship designs in the early 1930s).

 

[Paulo]

As pointed out in the linked post, it was more or less a coin-flip decision between the option to sacrifice 5 old ships and build the G3s, or sacrifice 4 old ships and build what became the Nelson class. That decision to provide these options may have been later regretted by the other Treaty signatories, but it was an option that was available.

I'm struggling to think why on earth they didn't take the first option. The gulf in capability between the two classes was huge. The knockon effects down the line…
G3s were seen as battlecruisers by foreign navies, who didn't really understand just how well armoured they were. The RN having two additional modern, fast ships able to perform the role of BC (but are really fast-BB) allows for better refit schedules for the remaining BC. Likely Hood gets her much needed refit before any WW2 comes around. The KGV class as we know it is dead, they are significantly inferior to a modernised G3 class, and having both the two more capable ships AND the likelihood of at least Hood being properly rebuilt, means the government is more likely to take the risk of enacting the escalator clause and going for bigger guns. The fact that they will have the G3 to template off will speed the design phase anyway.

 

[Death's Companion]

I'm struggling to think why on earth they didn't take the first option. The gulf in capability between the two classes was huge. The knockon effects down the line…
G3s were seen as battlecruisers by foreign navies, who didn't really understand just how well armoured they were. The RN having two additional modern, fast ships able to perform the role of BC (but are really fast-BB) allows for better refit schedules for the remaining BC. Likely Hood gets her much needed refit before any WW2 comes around. The KGV class as we know it is dead, they are significantly inferior to a modernised G3 class, and having both the two more capable ships AND the likelihood of at least Hood being properly rebuilt, means the government is more likely to take the risk of enacting the escalator clause and going for bigger guns. The fact that they will have the G3 to template off will speed the design phase anyway.

I think the foreign navies not understanding played a part in it. Britain was of the view that it *needed* the treaty and hopefully its successors to go well and become the new normal. It had the most to lose out of the involved nations as it could not afford to keep up with all its major rivals if they went for broke. So it was leery of cheating or being perceived to cheat. Big political question overriding the pure military needs.

There were probably other reasons as well but I'd not be surprised if they went with the inferior choice partly so no one could cry foul. Naval power at the time could probably be seen as modern nuclear diplomacy. Sometimes having an advantage is as destabilizing as being in the weaker position and needing to catch up.

 

[perfectgeneral]

Could two G3 (more like F3 to fit 35,000tons) and a further two "converted" to aircraft carriers, to more closely match the Saratoga and Lexington, be accepted if the five listed were scrapped?

 

[ForceA1]

Could two G3 (more like F3 to fit 35,000tons) and a further two "converted" to aircraft carriers, to more closely match the Saratoga and Lexington, be accepted if the five listed were scrapped?

The plan drawn up by Balfour was to build 2 G3s (up to their full displacement of 48,000 tons) and then would agree to the 35,000 ton limit in any future battleship designed after the end of the Battleship Holiday.

Furious was already intended to be fully converted to a carrier by this point, the decision to do so being made in July 1920. A second conversion had already been decided upon, Glorious being selected in July 1921 (the conference began in November 1921). Unlike the Lexington, Saratoga, Akagi or Amagi (Kaga was eventually converted after the latter was damaged in the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake) none of the G3s had already been laid down, so there was nothing to convert. Part of the reason why Balfour suggested that Britain should be allowed to build a pair of G3s was that a significant amount of design and experimental work had already been done, and that it would be a waste if something were not built as a result of it. Designing a new ship would only duplicate this work, and any Carriers based upon this design could go over the 33,000 ton limit for Aircraft Carriers based upon converted Capital Ship Hulls (new-build Carriers were limited to 27,000 tons).

In any case, the the total allowable Capital Ship Tonnage (525,000 tons) and Carrier Tonnage (135,000 tons) was not transferable, so Britain could not build two large carriers at the expense of building two smaller Battleships.