Able Archer '83: The Aftermath

[History Learner]

With all that said and done, let's squash some myths:

• Mexico does fine: Not a chance. Mexico City will be a pile of ashes. As the war escalates, the superpowers will have greater incentives to hit countries friendly to their adversary. Leaving a neutral intact, even if they're only vaguely inclined towards the other guy, runs the risk of giving your adversary a headstart on recovery. Expect the usual wish-fulfilment neutrals (Mexico, Brazil, Sweden, Finland, et al) to eat at least one major warhead each.

Other major neutrals are also in the firing line; if you're too neutral, you're clearly up to something and could pose a threat to either/both crippled superpowers once the dust settles. India, Iran, Egypt can expect to receive doses of instant sunshine.​

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Even if not every major centre is targeted, at the very least striking a capital with a reasonably-sized 550KT warhead will both throw a non-nuclear state into disarray, burden them with casualties, and limit their capacity to organise and support your primary adversary.​

• US takes over Mexico: Haha, good one! ...wait, you're serious? Okay, even assuming the Sovs forget to nail Mexico, the Mexican Government will not only have their hands full with the domestic situation (the PRI has been in power for over 50 years at this point, and was already at the 'comical election-rigging to stay in power' stage), but also be disinclined to admit a tide of refugees, much less to just let the gringos waltz in and start calling the shots. Forget it.
• South America does fine: Mixed bag. Strategic incentives are strong to target at least Brasilia and Mexico City. Venezuelan petrochemical industry likely targeted, possibly Trinidad depending on presence of SSBN in the neighbourhood. The Panama Canal will get absolutely hammered. However, Chile and Argentina might actually make it through in one piece, which is good news for the young democracy in Buenos Aires. Now they just have to figure out how to replace their oil imports.
• Australasia ascendant: In 1983? Nope. NZ and Aus both lose at least their capital and a major city apiece. Both are still in ANZUS at this time and would be safe harbours for the USN. Strong incentive to take them out.
• Africa: South Africa loses at minimum Cape Town, Jo'burg, and Pretoria. They're massively pro-US and engaged in a brutal series of proxy wars involving Cuban and Sov advisors, not to mention all those strategic minerals. Nigeria and Angola present petrochemical targets, and are not outside the realms of possibility. Outside of that, all the states who were reliant on external food aid are in for a hell of a hard landing.

The extent to which a 1980s full-scale exchange would absolutely devastate the industrialised world shouldn't be understated.

The entire strategic arsenal of the USSR is around 2,000 ICBMs, with all but a handful of said weapons having ranges at or under 11,000 kilometers. Mexico, City, Brasilia, Canberra, etc are all well beyond 11,000 km range from the USSR and if the Soviets are lobbing weapons there, that is at the expense of non-targeting of sites in the United States or NATO partners. Simply put, the weapons and capabilities you are asserting here did not exist in 1983, even with the heighted stockpiles of the Cold War era.

 

[Yossarian]

The entire strategic arsenal of the USSR is around 2,000 ICBMs, with all but a handful of said weapons having ranges at or under 11,000 kilometers. Mexico, City, Brasilia, Canberra, etc are all well beyond 11,000 km range from the USSR and if the Soviets are lobbing weapons there, that is at the expense of non-targeting of sites in the United States or NATO partners. Simply put, the weapons and capabilities you are asserting here did not exist in 1983, even with the heighted stockpiles of the Cold War era.

Sure, the USSR can't hit all of these targets with ICBMs. Luckily for them, there's more than one way to deliver a warhead. Not every target in CONUS requires a dedicated ICBM for a few reasons:

• Targets within 5000km of Soviet bases can be hit with IRBMs (IRNFT won't be signed until 1987/88). That covers European NATO, the Middle East, and North America as far as the Pacific NW.
• MIRVs mean not all 2000 of the warheads targeted at the US in this scenario require a separate missile, especially missile fields and densely-packed targets (there were IIRC about 7000 warheads loaded on the ICBM force in the mid-to-late 80s). That allows you to make a few efficiencies.
• Soviet Long Range Aviation was integral to nuclear planning until the end of the Cold War, especially for countervalue targets that you can wait 5 or 6 hours to hit after the first strike nails the key C3 targets. Even if a Bear is a lumbering target that can be intercepted easier than an SS-18, a few squadrons of those loaded out with Kh-20s still gives you leeway to hit a lot of second-tier targets, particularly if the DEW Line and USAF interceptor bases have been hit in the first wave. The Backfires (M1.5 strategic bomber with a good 7000km range) are an even better bet, and there's a few hundred of them.
• SLBMs have a pretty impressive range in this era - about 7000km for the R29 deployed on the Delta III boats - and even if kickoff happens quickly in an AA83 scenario and a lot of the sub force is at anchor, that gives contingency options for more targets within range on coastlines.

Given the above, I think it's a perfectly rational calculation for the Sovs to make to allocate a relative handful of their 2,000 ICBMs for isolated strikes on limited numbers of key targets in a range of major neutrals and allies further afield. The strategic logic of prioritising Canberra and Brasilia over Rochester and Las Vegas starts to look pretty good once you've already hit the rest of the US.

The value proposition of sacrificing maybe 40 or 50 ICBMs (again, out of two thousand) is: disrupting NATO-allied/-adjacent response (Seventh Fleet can't berth at Sydney if it no longer exists); neutralisating potential threats from major non-aligned powers; limiting the ability of NATO-friendly states to give aid and comfort to NATO remnant forces (highly-centralised regimes like PRI Mexico or the Brazilian junta will be in a very poor position to do anything if their capital is hit), and; cutting off access to key resources that will allow NATO to survive and rebuild post-war (if you hit Caracas or Lagos, how much government will be left to administer the oilfields?).

 

[Charles EP M.]

I also think you're taking "merger" to mean President Reagan becomes the leader of Mexico or something; I am using merger in the sense that the U.S. formally dissolves itself while granting everything to Mexico in exchange for accepting exile Americans with guarantees of their safety and well being.

That's not really a merger to create a new hybrid state and confederation, as you originally said - it's just Mexico saying "we want this" and what's left of the US going "here it is, boss" in exchange for refuge.

 

[rfmcdonald]

Problem with the submarine missiles is the same as ICBMs; range and even more limited numbers in this case. The Barents Sea (GIUK Gap) and Pacific launch points are too far from South Africa but, likewise, priority is on the U.S. and associated NATO targets for obvious reasons. Total ICBM and SLBM estimates for the Soviets in the early 1980s puts them around 2,000+ missiles, which sounds like a lot until you consider the following:

What we have been saying is that South Africa is likely to be a rather higher priority target than, at least, some of the second- or third-tier nuclear targets in the United States.

Again, South Africa is a loudly pro-Western state with a well-armed military that includes nuclear weapons that has been actively waging multiple wars against Soviet allies across the south of the African continent. Australia and New Zealand might well be targets because of ANZUS, but at least the Australasians are not so actively hostile to Soviet interests in the distant South Pacific. Were there any, even?

There may be a chance of a relatively remote Australasia escaping heavy damage. This chance does not exist for South Africa. Just a few nuclear weapons--one for Cape Town, one for Simonstown, one for Johannesburg, perhaps one for Pretoria--would be enough to break a hostile power.

Given the above, I think it's a perfectly rational calculation for the Sovs to make to allocate a relative handful of their 2,000 ICBMs for isolated strikes on limited numbers of key targets in a range of major neutrals and allies further afield. The strategic logic of prioritising Canberra and Brasilia over Rochester and Las Vegas starts to look pretty good once you've already hit the rest of the US.

The value proposition of sacrificing maybe 40 or 50 ICBMs (again, out of two thousand) is: disrupting NATO-allied/-adjacent response (Seventh Fleet can't berth at Sydney if it no longer exists); neutralisating potential threats from major non-aligned powers; limiting the ability of NATO-friendly states to give aid and comfort to NATO remnant forces (highly-centralised regimes like PRI Mexico or the Brazilian junta will be in a very poor position to do anything if their capital is hit), and; cutting off access to key resources that will allow NATO to survive and rebuild post-war (if you hit Caracas or Lagos, how much government will be left to administer the oilfields?).

Largely agreed. I am inclined to think that the Soviets will be more inclined to distinguish between loudly pro-Western countries and ones more inclined to neutralism, to say nothing of matters like geography; South Africa is an obvious threat in a way that (say) Nigeria is not, while the Caribbean basin is bound to come to Soviet attention in a way that the Southern Cone may plausibly not.

EDIT: Going back to your original post, the scenario you describe--of an autarkic South Africa surviving intact and going on to displace Soviet allies and proxies throughout southern Africa--is exactly the reason why the Soviets would target the country.

It's likely SADF would institute a military government to control the situation, which was well within their capabilities to do and is aided by the Apartheid-era autarky policies that would minimize the economic damage of the nuclear war. The removal of Soviet and Chinese support to Black African states means SADF can only achieve decisive results in its border conflicts, instituting UNITA control in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique, probably also toppling Mugabe in Zimbabwe.

The Soviets are not waging nuclear war simply because they want to destroy; they are waging nuclear war in order to fulfill their aims. An outcome that would see hostile South Africa survive intact and go on to destroy Soviet allies at the very time when (even in a best-case scenario) the Soviets will be too preoccupied with rebuilding to be able to meaningfully counter South Africa is something they will try to avert. The South Americans and Australasians might manage to survive relatively intact because of their sheer distance from Soviet interests, but South Africa is a different matter.

 

[rfmcdonald]

Who exactly is going to be in a position to claim the U.S. debt or charge the Mexican dominated union with war crimes? Pretty much anyone who fits that criteria is dead or so reduced in capabilities as to be ignored while being seriously outweighed by the benefits; let the remnants of the USSR whine, so to speak, while the Mexican Army bathes itself in the Great Lakes. I also think you're taking "merger" to mean President Reagan becomes the leader of Mexico or something; I am using merger in the sense that the U.S. formally dissolves itself while granting everything to Mexico in exchange for accepting exile Americans with guarantees of their safety and well being. The "merger" aspect is in the fact that tens of millions of American refugees would certainly change Mexico culturally, by introducing English and American culture directly as opposed to the indirect way it is done nowadays by popular media and tourists.

I think it deeply unlikely, frankly, that there would be much by way of an American government of unchallenged legitimacy that would be able to hand over the United States to Mexico, even if there was this inclination.

Merging with Canada does nothing to aid in the rebuilding of the destroyed United States or secure the safety of its exile populations elsewhere; Mexico offers that chance.

Even if Mexico escapes targeting--something that is imaginable, perhaps, given the relatively friendly Soviet-Mexican relationship during the Cold War--I do question whether even an intact Mexico would be capable of rebuilding the United States. Mexico in the early 1980s was certainly a relatively successful newly industrialized country, but it was also still a relatively small and poor country that would be facing unprecedented strains. Would this be affordable?

Mexican-Soviet relations, 1958-1964: The Limits of Engagement

In CWIHP e-Dossier No. 65, author Vanni Pettinà explores the relationship between Mexico and the Soviet Union in the tumultuous period of late 1950s and early 1960s Latin America.

www.wilsoncenter.org

As for the protection of exile populations, I think that no one will be able to do that. Perhaps refugee Americans may, to varying degrees, find safety and even secure legal status in Mexico; perhaps Mexico, if it remains intact, will be able to project its sphere of influence northwards, perhaps protecting surviving American populations in this sphere of influence. Anything like a grand bargain strikes me as deeply unlikely: Even if Mexicans were interested, their country could just not support it.

 

[rfmcdonald]

With regards to targeting, I do have issues with the list here. Much does depends on how the Soviets respond with nuclear weapons to ABLE ARCHER, and with what aims. If they think that this is a controllable catastrophe they are likely to respond more moderately than they are to something that they believe to be their inescapable end.

Emotions like revenge are likely to become increasingly important as the war goes on. I would be surprised if they defined the war plans, though. If the Soviet Union decided to fight a nuclear war, it would be for relatively rational reasons, to try to engineer however disastrously a scenario where the Soviet state and Soviet Communism would survive with the least damage possible and in the most advantageous position possible relative to Soviet enemies.

Mexico does fine: Not a chance. Mexico City will be a pile of ashes. As the war escalates, the superpowers will have greater incentives to hit countries friendly to their adversary. Leaving a neutral intact, even if they're only vaguely inclined towards the other guy, runs the risk of giving your adversary a headstart on recovery. Expect the usual wish-fulfilment neutrals (Mexico, Brazil, Sweden, Finland, et al) to eat at least one major warhead each.

Other major neutrals are also in the firing line; if you're too neutral, you're clearly up to something and could pose a threat to either/both crippled superpowers once the dust settles. India, Iran, Egypt can expect to receive doses of instant sunshine.

Even if not every major centre is targeted, at the very least striking a capital with a reasonably-sized 550KT warhead will both throw a non-nuclear state into disarray, burden them with casualties, and limit their capacity to organise and support your primary adversary.

I am honestly unsure about Mexico. Attacks and n petrochemical facilities are certainly possible and even likely, but the sorts of more indiscriminate attacks that would leave Mexico City in ashes (say) seek less so. Soviet-Mexican relations in the Cold War were distant but generally friendly, industrializing and nominally radical Mexico tending to be seen as a useful partner.

Would Soviet war planners think Mexico would need to face a more general devastation? It is not clear to me that they would. For all we know, they might think that a relatively intact Mexico could be a useful partner in the future against a weakened United States.

The European neutrals, I fear, are likely to be doomed. Is a Sweden that is functionally almost part of NATO and that has been a Russian rival for centuries really going through face a different fate from Denmark or Norway? I wonder if Yugoslavia might fare less badly.

As for neutrals and non-aligned countries around the world, everything matters on their particulars. A Venezuela that at this point is a strongly pro-Western country with an oil industry geared towards the West is not likely to escape lightly. An India that is a world power with a relatively well-armed and competent military that includes nuclear weapons, now, could do well. South America as a continent may fare lightly overall, because of its distance and its relative detachment from the Cold War alliance system, in a way that Australasia may not.

US takes over Mexico: Haha, good one! ...wait, you're serious? Okay, even assuming the Sovs forget to nail Mexico, the Mexican Government will not only have their hands full with the domestic situation (the PRI has been in power for over 50 years at this point, and was already at the 'comical election-rigging to stay in power' stage), but also be disinclined to admit a tide of refugees, much less to just let the gringos waltz in and start calling the shots. Forget it.

Agreed entirely. I would add to this that if Mexico did escape mostly or entirely from the war, the last thing I would imagine its government would do would be to merge with the United States in a new continental colossus. What action could make it a more likely target in a second round?

South America does fine: Mixed bag. Strategic incentives are strong to target at least Brasilia and Mexico City. Venezuelan petrochemical industry likely targeted, possibly Trinidad depending on presence of SSBN in the neighbourhood. The Panama Canal will get absolutely hammered. However, Chile and Argentina might actually make it through in one piece, which is good news for the young democracy in Buenos Aires. Now they just have to figure out how to replace their oil imports.

Of all the major countries in South America, I expect a pro-Western Venezuela with its oil industry to do the least well.

Of all the major countries in South America, I think an Argentina that was a major grain exporter even under the junta that had just fought a major war with a key NATO power to do the least badly.

Between these extremes, I think that the continent will trend towards Argentina rather more than towards Venezuela. The continent is sufficiently remote from Soviet interests, with anti-Communist governments that are still useful partners, to escape. Brazil with its great power pretensions in the South Atlantic might get negative attention, or not; Brazil did recognize the MPLA in Angola, after all. It could be relatively spared.

Australasia ascendant: In 1983? Nope. NZ and Aus both lose at least their capital and a major city apiece. Both are still in ANZUS at this time and would be safe harbours for the USN. Strong incentive to take them out.

Largely agreed.

Africa: South Africa loses at minimum Cape Town, Jo'burg, and Pretoria. They're massively pro-US and engaged in a brutal series of proxy wars involving Cuban and Sov advisors, not to mention all those strategic minerals. Nigeria and Angola present petrochemical targets, and are not outside the realms of possibility. Outside of that, all the states who were reliant on external food aid are in for a hell of a hard landing.

South Africa is definitely doomed.

Nigeria might well escape, if only because it is a regional power not obviously at odds with Soviet power.

Angola, now, is an example of a country that might be nuked by the US; the MPLA controlled the coastal areas, Luanda, and the oil-producing districts. IIRC UNITA was limited to the interior.

 

[SinghSong]

Question mark- which do you think would be the most populous nations in the world to have escaped relatively unscathed? Indonesia hasn't gotten a mention yet, and it was the fifth most populous nation at the time; behind only China, India, the USA and the Soviet Union, and ahead of Brazil. Do you reckon that it'd be more or less likely to be relatively spared (or perhaps even spared entirely) than Brazil?

 

[rfmcdonald]

[O]ne could also envision a very different MERCOSUR emerging from the Latin American Integration Association, which still existed at that time. IOTL's MERCOSUR, Mexico's been an observer state from the very beginning, but never joined, largely due to the dominance of trade with the USA, and diplomatic pressure from the USA not to join- ITTL, one could easily imagine the LAIA giving rise to a 'Latin American Union'/alternate version of CELAC instead, in the immediate aftermath of WW3, with a pledge towards 'ever greater union', and with Mexico electing to be one of its founding members...

Something like this is imaginable.

Again, unless the Soviets shift at some stage into a "kill everybody" mode, I do think Latin America has a reasonable chance of surviving mostly intact. It is a relatively developed area of the world with governments that the Soviets have mostly been able.to deal productively with that have exports the post-war Soviets will need. Most notably, if the Soviets are planning (as I would expect) to emerge the most functional of the combatants after the other war, they will need agricultural imports. I very much doubt that North America or western Europe or even Australasia will be in a position to fill Soviet shortfalls.

Question mark- which do you think would be the most populous nations in the world to have escaped relatively unscathed? Indonesia hasn't gotten a mention yet, and it was the fifth most populous nation at the time; behind only China, India, the USA and the Soviet Union, and ahead of Brazil. Do you reckon that it'd be more or less likely to be relatively spared (or perhaps even spared entirely) than Brazil?

I do think India has a chance of surviving relatively intact. The Soviets are not going to nuke this friendly country, I doubt the Americans will, and the Pakistanis lack the bomb. Will the Chinese preemptively nuke their neighbour? Maybe, maybe not.

Indonesia was relatively disengaged from the Cold War, pro-American but not deeply involved in Southeast Asian conflicts. Against this, at this point it was a notable oil exporter, and Singapore is nearby. I expect it has a chance of surviving relatively intact.

More so than Brazil? Anyone's guess. I would expect Indonesia to be lower on the list of Soviet priorities than Brazil, but I do not think Brazil that high.

 

[Charles EP M.]

This discussion has made me realise you could do a pastiche of The Peshawar Lancers but it's about an American regiment in post-Able Mexico ("The Sonora Rednecks")

 

[Warthog]

Bantu-Zulu ethnic conflict

Not sure what this is meant to refer to, in terms of ethnic conflict in the early 1980s. Zulu people are Bantu.

South African can achieve a White plurality or even majority

Black Africans made up 17 out of 23 million in 1983. So not likely

removal of Soviet and Chinese support to Black African states

Buy also removal of Constructive Engagement support from the US for Pretoria, so.. As it was the economic cost of the wars was bleeding the apartheid govt

South Africa does suffer a half-dozen bombs aimed at key military, industrial, and government targets,

South Africa loses at minimum Cape Town, Jo'burg, and Pretoria.

Probably Pelindaba, which would get Pretoria if the blast radius was big enough, else a second one for the military complex south of the city (Valhalla and Voortrekkerhoogte).

Then Simonstown and or Cape Town. Maybe Johannesburg would be unnecessary

 

[rfmcdonald]

Not sure what this is meant to refer to, in terms of ethnic conflict in the early 1980s. Zulu people are Bantu.

Quite.

Probably Pelindaba, which would get Pretoria if the blast radius was big enough, else a second one for the military complex south of the city (Valhalla and Voortrekkerhoogte).

Then Simonstown and or Cape Town. Maybe Johannesburg would be unnecessary

What I mentioned about the Soviets likely wanting to create as Soviet/Communism-friendly a post-war situation as I mentioned holds.

For all we know, they would want to engineer a situation where an ANC insurgency could take over Africa's leading industrialized country.

 

[Warthog]

For all we know, they would want to engineer a situation where an ANC insurgency

So just hit Pelindaba and see what happens maybe

 

[History Learner]

Sure, the USSR can't hit all of these targets with ICBMs. Luckily for them, there's more than one way to deliver a warhead. Not every target in CONUS requires a dedicated ICBM for a few reasons:

For the most part, you actually do need dedicated ICBMs for most targets in CONUS. See this post here which explains it quite well:

The poster who keeps referring to Managing Nuclear Operations should look closer at the material.​

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The idea is that the Russians would launch a preemptive strike hitting US silos, and then force a surrender. There are several issues with this scenario. I will tackle them one at a time.​

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1) Number of warheads.​

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The Russians currently have about 1500 strategic warheads in service. The number fluctuates to some degree, due to maintenance cycles and other issues, but 1500 is a good place to start.​

The US has 450 MM III silos in service. It is a common misconception that you need 450 warheads to attack this force. You actually need many more. When you develop an attack option, your first task is to determine how sure you need to be of a target's destruction. For something like an early warning radar you might only need a 70% probability that the target will be destroyed.​

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For a silo, it is probably 90%.​

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So the Russian planner will look at his weapons and their capabilities, and use a mathematical formula to determine how many warheads he needs to send. You look at the WLS (warhead lethality score) to see if the warhead, given its yield, can even destroy the target, if it goes off on target. You also look at the overall reliability of the weapon, it's probability of pre-launch survival, its ability to penetrate enemy defenses, and many other factors. A simplified version of this formula can be found in Managing Nuclear Operations, Page 380.​

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It is: DE=PK*PTP*PLS*PRE​

Where DE is Damage Expectancy​

PK is Probability of killing the target (given CEP, yield, HOB, target hardness)​

PTP is the probability of penetrating defenses​

PLS is Prelaunch survivability.​

PRE is Probability of reliable function.​

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So lets look at a typical Russian counterforce weapons the SS-18 with its 800Kt warhead.​

Pk is 1 because it will destroy the target.​

PTP is .9 because it is possible that US ABM defenses get a kill​

PLS is 1 because this is a first strike​

PRE is .8 based on what we know of Russian rockets. They are pretty reliable.​

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This gives us a DE of .72, far below the .9 we need to provide. So we add another warhead.​

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The upshot of all this is that those 450 silos will each need between 2 and 3 warheads (depending on the system) giving us between 900 and 1350 warheads needed. Lets split it, and say we need 2.5 warheads per silo to reach out goal. 1,125 warheads. Leaving the Russians with 375 in reserve.​

Should be plenty, right?​

Well, lets see...​

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2) Time needed to respond.​

On page 136, MNO gives us a timeline of how long it takes for the NCA to make a decision and for the decision to be carried out. It shows that the US ICBMs will be launching right as the Russian warheads arrive. Does this mean that retaliation is pointless?​

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No.​

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There are several factors that affect the arrival time of RV's. The primary concern is that of fratricide. MIRVs are limited to an area where all their warheads must land. This is called the footprint.​

The Footprint is different for each weapon but it is an oval and can be 100 km on its long side.​

It is likely that you will have several targets nearby in a given ICBMs footprint. If one warhead goes off on its target, it can damage or destroy the other nearby warheads. Even if you wait, you have issues, because following RVs will have to pass through the turbulent hot air from previous explosions. RVs are at the mercy of physics. They are unpowered and guided only by the calculations of gravity and drag. Introducing the turbulent and unpredictable environment of a mushroom cloud will have negative consequences for your accuracy.​

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Lower accuracy means lower Pk, which means we are adding even MORE warheads.​

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Those 375 reserve warheads are dropping like sentry gun ammo on LV-426.​

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Back to timing.​

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So we now know that the warheads can not arrive all at the same time, making it extremely likely that a significant portion (perhaps as much as 50%) of the US ICBM force has survived and is now on its way to Russia​

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So now lets pause and look at the situation.​

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The 200 or so remaining Russian nuclear forces are on submarines and cruise missile aircraft.​

The US has about 110 (25% of US ICBMs escaped. Lets give the Russians a break here) warheads on their way to Russia. They will be targeted at Russian command and control systems. The reason that this response is picked is because the best option for the US was to cut the Command and Control links between their subs and the Russian leadership.​

The US retains about 128 ready SLBMs (the rest are in port and will require between 2 hours and 7 days to make ready) with about 500 warheads.​

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In the scenario, the Russian leader now calls the US and asks for surrender? Why?​

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Actually, no, he doesn't.​

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3) Depressed trajectory​

The US attack option would also order the deployed US SSBNs to fire a large number of their missiles at command and control targets. The SLBMs can use a technique called depressed trajectory to decrease flight time at the expense of range and accuracy. Since the targets in this case will not be silos, the accuracy loss is not a major concern.​

The other advantage is the short flight time of these weapons. The Russians will have about 3 minutes from detection to the first detonations on top of their command centers.​

It is unlikely the Russian leadership will even have a chance to pick up the phone to ask the US president for surrender, before his communications are disrupted. If he is not killed.​

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In short, the idea that the Russians could execute a first strike that would be effective in crippling the US nuclear forces and forcing a surrender is not grounded in reality.​

Even if we assume that the US does not deploy its SLBMs, the US is still in possession of a major warhead advantage, an intact command and control network, and the ability to launch a DT attack using those SLBMs that the Russians would have little time to react to.​

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The Russian situation is dire. Their surviving nuclear weapons are in submarines that patrol in protected bastions hear their coasts and are unable to deliver DT type attacks. Their command and control systems have been disrupted by the surviving US ICBMs, and they have not accounted for NATO at all.​

At this point, the Russians would be better off calling the US to surrender, rather than to demand it themselves.​

Targets within 5000km of Soviet bases can be hit with IRBMs (IRNFT won't be signed until 1987/88). That covers European NATO, the Middle East, and North America as far as the Pacific NW.

Which still means you have the issues of range and limited ICBMs for targets in CONUS and outside of that; Moscow will probably want to hit places like Clark AFB in the Philippines and Diego Garcia in the Pacific, for instance. That they can hit targets in Europe with IRBMs doesn't address the fundamental issue already pointed out, given I've only been talking for the most part about American strategic targets.

MIRVs mean not all 2000 of the warheads targeted at the US in this scenario require a separate missile, especially missile fields and densely-packed targets (there were IIRC about 7000 warheads loaded on the ICBM force in the mid-to-late 80s). That allows you to make a few efficiencies.

Except, as already pointed, MIRVs don't enable such efficiencies in targets like Silos, which is why the Soviets had specifically designed ICBMs for such purposes given Silos are hardened. See the above citation which goes over this nice.

Soviet Long Range Aviation was integral to nuclear planning until the end of the Cold War, especially for countervalue targets that you can wait 5 or 6 hours to hit after the first strike nails the key C3 targets. Even if a Bear is a lumbering target that can be intercepted easier than an SS-18, a few squadrons of those loaded out with Kh-20s still gives you leeway to hit a lot of second-tier targets, particularly if the DEW Line and USAF interceptor bases have been hit in the first wave. The Backfires (M1.5 strategic bomber with a good 7000km range) are an even better bet, and there's a few hundred of them.

Which are also limited in range, numbers and capabilities; Soviet long range aviation was already long on the backseat to ICBMs and SLBMs by the 1980s, they never had a capability like SAC and this also runs into the issue it takes 30 minutes or less for an American ICBM or SLBM to destroy said bases before the bombers can take off.

SLBMs have a pretty impressive range in this era - about 7000km for the R29 deployed on the Delta III boats - and even if kickoff happens quickly in an AA83 scenario and a lot of the sub force is at anchor, that gives contingency options for more targets within range on coastlines.

And their bastion areas were before the GIUK and Kuriles, given NATO supremacy at sea with their attack submarines and ASW forces. Said bastion areas are outside the range of hitting South Africa or Australia, for example.

Given the above, I think it's a perfectly rational calculation for the Sovs to make to allocate a relative handful of their 2,000 ICBMs for isolated strikes on limited numbers of key targets in a range of major neutrals and allies further afield. The strategic logic of prioritising Canberra and Brasilia over Rochester and Las Vegas starts to look pretty good once you've already hit the rest of the US.

Not really, given the U.S. is a nuclear power with global military capability while Australia and Canberra aren't, even before you factor in the strategic difficulties of such targeting. For what it's worth the Aussies have declassified their Cold War files, which revealed they had no intelligence to suggest the Soviets ever targeted their cities.

The value proposition of sacrificing maybe 40 or 50 ICBMs (again, out of two thousand) is: disrupting NATO-allied/-adjacent response (Seventh Fleet can't berth at Sydney if it no longer exists); neutralisating potential threats from major non-aligned powers; limiting the ability of NATO-friendly states to give aid and comfort to NATO remnant forces (highly-centralised regimes like PRI Mexico or the Brazilian junta will be in a very poor position to do anything if their capital is hit), and; cutting off access to key resources that will allow NATO to survive and rebuild post-war (if you hit Caracas or Lagos, how much government will be left to administer the oilfields?).

Beyond the fact ICBMs can't even reach those targets? What is the distance from Kiev to Brasilia?

 

[History Learner]

That's not really a merger to create a new hybrid state and confederation, as you originally said - it's just Mexico saying "we want this" and what's left of the US going "here it is, boss" in exchange for refuge.

Much of the new Mexican military being former U.S. Armed Forces members and millions of American refugees isn't going to have an effect on Mexico politically, culturally, and economically? Never mind strategically.

I think it deeply unlikely, frankly, that there would be much by way of an American government of unchallenged legitimacy that would be able to hand over the United States to Mexico, even if there was this inclination.

Given the extensive preparations the United States had been making for decades at this point to ensure continuity of government after a Nuclear exchange, to what aspect do you see this? If it's POTUS or VPOTUS, with the backing of a rump Congress, signing a treaty and the end result for surviving Americans in CONUS is aid to survive, do you really think that won't hold legitimacy or at the least, pragmatism would win over?

Even if Mexico escapes targeting--something that is imaginable, perhaps, given the relatively friendly Soviet-Mexican relationship during the Cold War--I do question whether even an intact Mexico would be capable of rebuilding the United States. Mexico in the early 1980s was certainly a relatively successful newly industrialized country, but it was also still a relatively small and poor country that would be facing unprecedented strains. Would this be affordable?

Mexican-Soviet relations, 1958-1964: The Limits of Engagement

In CWIHP e-Dossier No. 65, author Vanni Pettinà explores the relationship between Mexico and the Soviet Union in the tumultuous period of late 1950s and early 1960s Latin America.

www.wilsoncenter.org

Over several decades, and having absorbed the former assets of the United States, yes, particularly when you have the support of the surviving legal authorities in the United States via treaty. For example, say Idaho State Government survives, the U.S. had formally dissolved into Mexico and Mexico City offers food aid once it is viable; do you really see Idaho turning that down or doing everything it can to advance the Mexican interest here since it is mutually beneficial?

As for the protection of exile populations, I think that no one will be able to do that. Perhaps refugee Americans may, to varying degrees, find safety and even secure legal status in Mexico; perhaps Mexico, if it remains intact, will be able to project its sphere of influence northwards, perhaps protecting surviving American populations in this sphere of influence. Anything like a grand bargain strikes me as deeply unlikely: Even if Mexicans were interested, their country could just not support it.

Safety and secure legal status in Mexico is protection for exile populations, I'm not really sure what else you could classify that as?

 

[Charles EP M.]

Much of the new Mexican military being former U.S. Armed Forces members and millions of American refugees isn't going to have an effect on Mexico politically, culturally, and economically? Never mind strategically.

Yes, it would, but that's not a new merged state, that's a large wave of immigrants and countries have had those. The UK didn't became a whole new state merged with the West Indies, India, Poland etc; Germany took a million Syrians, that'll have a long term effect but it's still Germany and not a whole new state merged with Syria; America's large hispanic immigrant communities haven't turned America into a hybrid of its former self and Mexican political systems.

 

[rfmcdonald]

Given the extensive preparations the United States had been making for decades at this point to ensure continuity of government after a Nuclear exchange, to what aspect do you see this? If it's POTUS or VPOTUS, with the backing of a rump Congress, signing a treaty and the end result for surviving Americans in CONUS is aid to survive, do you really think that won't hold legitimacy or at the least, pragmatism would win over?

I note that you have neglected to consider the issue of Mexican agency in all of this. Why would the Mexicans want this? Among many, many issues, the transformation of the United States into a new polity dominated by Mexico would obviously leave Mexico terribly vulnerable. If Mexico survived this Able Archer exchange mostly intact because the Soviets thought Mexico neutral, Mexico certainly could not count on that in a second round.

Why would any significant number of Mexicans want this, particularly after seeing the ruin of the US next door and quite likely after Mexico having suffered significant damage itself?

Safety and secure legal status in Mexico is protection for exile populations, I'm not really sure what else you could classify that as?

That can be simply achieved through Americans refugees gaining some sort of legal status in Mexico. There is no need for a Mexican-American political union to achieve that end.

Certainly you could get a Mexico-dominated North America at the end of all this, depending on how things go. This, though, is hardly a predetermined end, not inevitable. What interest do Mexicans have in getting sovereignty over Idaho?

 

[rfmcdonald]

Not really, given the U.S. is a nuclear power with global military capability while Australia and Canberra aren't, even before you factor in the strategic difficulties of such targeting. For what it's worth the Aussies have declassified their Cold War files, which revealed they had no intelligence to suggest the Soviets ever targeted their cities.

This is an argument suggesting that Australasia might indeed escape with relatively light damage, perhaps the lightest damage of any world region closely partnered to the United States. One might broaden from this to the Southern Hemisphere generally: South America might actually escape pretty substantially, especially since even its right-wing dictatorships were relatively disengaged from the international Cold War (Argentina selling grain to the USSR, Brazil supporting the MPLA), though I would fear for Venezuela with its oil and its geography.

This argument does not extend to South Africa, a country that is practically speaking as vulnerable to the Soviets as Israel.

This argument also does not extend to Mexico, which directly adjoins the United States. (Tijuana, surely, is doomed; I do not see the Soviets sparing San Diego.) Mexico may well not be attacked, substantially or even at all, but if this is the case it will be because Soviet war planners do not think Mexico a Western asset or an American ally.

 

[rfmcdonald]

Yes, it would, but that's not a new merged state, that's a large wave of immigrants and countries have had those. The UK didn't became a whole new state merged with the West Indies, India, Poland etc; Germany took a million Syrians, that'll have a long term effect but it's still Germany and not a whole new state merged with Syria; America's large hispanic immigrant communities haven't turned America into a hybrid of its former self and Mexican political systems.

I can imagine that in the longer run, if you have an intact Mexico bordering a devastated United States, you might well easily get some significant border changes in Mexico's favour. This might especially he the case if the United States lacks a strong military, most especially a nuclear deterrent; I do not see any plausible Mexican government that survived one nuclear war nearby deciding to risk an exchange itself. This might also be the case if the United States falls apart, something not implausible given the likely scale of the devastation. If I am a Californian, I might well think Mexico more trustworthy than the shambles of a United States that led the world into an unparalleled catastrophe.

This does not mean that Mexico will actually do any.of this. The early 1980s is a time before Mexican opted decisively for a North American orientation through NAFTA, and the postwar world is going to be one where a relatively intact South America can function as a partner in a way Mexico's northern neighbours cannot. (Cuba, too, is sure to be levelled.) Mexico might simply want to keep its distance from the mess north of its borders, and not face any of the risks that would come from (say) trying to support the reconstruction of North America.

Mexico is going to act in the interests of Mexicans. It might be convenient for the survivors of the United States if Mexico did what Americans wanted them to do, but unless we have a scenario where the US somehow manages to force Mexico to do what it wants (surviving American forced conquer Mexico, or force it into compliance?) Mexico is not going to do that. I suppose you can say in the abstract that a tight Mexican-American partnership could work out in the favour of everyone, but that is very abstract. The reality would be that Mexicans would be faced with a neighbour they never really trusted that had just played a key role in a world-devastating nuclear war. France and West Germany after the Second World War started with rather more.