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2001 Restoration of the Afghan Monarchy
- Thread starter Milo
- Start date
Francisco Cojuanco
Sometime traitor to his class
- Location
- Arizona
Problem from Washington's POV is in the Iraqi context much of the Naqshibandi formed a component of the InsurgencyA state run by celibate ascetic Sufi Orders would be … something
Radac
Too young, too simple, sometimes naïve
- Location
- Pentapotamia
- Pronouns
- he/him
The problem with this is that the majority of Afghan monarchists belonged to the Rome Group, a group largely made up of emigres in Italy. The Rome Group was disunited, unpopular, and mistrusted the King, viewing him as a puppet of his former general Abdul Wali. Nobody wanted a frail, old, and weak man to lead, even if Karzai himself had hoped for him to begin an uprising in his homeland, and the King himself said he had no intention of a restoration of the monarchy or his appointment as King.
Fundamentally, this would require Zahir Shah not to be old. Which is pretty hard to do.
Fundamentally, this would require Zahir Shah not to be old. Which is pretty hard to do.
Ricardolindo
Well-known member
- Location
- Portugal
The problem with this is that the majority of Afghan monarchists belonged to the Rome Group, a group largely made up of emigres in Italy. The Rome Group was disunited, unpopular, and mistrusted the King, viewing him as a puppet of his former general Abdul Wali. Nobody wanted a frail, old, and weak man to lead, even if Karzai himself had hoped for him to begin an uprising in his homeland, and the King himself said he had no intention of a restoration of the monarchy or his appointment as King.
Fundamentally, this would require Zahir Shah not to be old. Which is pretty hard to do.
Zahir Shah said he would take the throne if asked.
Radac
Too young, too simple, sometimes naïve
- Location
- Pentapotamia
- Pronouns
- he/him
He said he wouldn’t later onZahir Shah said he would take the throne if asked.
Actually, now that leads to a banter timeline where the wrong lessons are learnt and to the general horror of every expert, the US restores the Hashemites to Baghdad.
Now there's a true AH challenge!
Cheers,
Ganesha
heraclius
Well-known member
- Location
- New Forest, Hampshire, England, UK
There's another problem if the US did restore the Hashemites - which as the main line of their dynasty in Iraq was extinct in the male line would mean bringing in one of the princes from the Jordanian branch, ie the line of first Iraqi king Faisal (ruled 1921-33)'s brother, the first king Abdullah of Transjordan/ Jordan (ruled 1921-49) who was grandfather to king Husain and great-grandfather to the present king. The Saudi royal family had been their long-term foes ever since Saudi founder Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud took over the Hejaz , with the Holy Cities, in the mid-1920s from the previous - Hashemite- emir, Ali, the brother of Faisal and Abdullah, and the Hashemites had been long-term rulers of this region under Ottoman suzereignty before 1914.
The two rival families both claimed the rule of the Mecca region, but until 1925-6 the Saudi royal family had been sultans of Nejd in central Arabia and their takeover notched the rivalry up to another level. If the Hashemites are put back in charge in Baghdad - where they had no traditional historical links and the British put them there in 1921 to face tribal Sunni and Kurdish resistance - the tribal leaders of the Sunni rural districts and the Shi'a South-East are not going to be likely to accept it, and probably the US would have to rely on the senior military and civil service figures in Baghdad to get any backing in the country at all - which means no de-Baathification or else an even worse civil war. Then add Saudi opposition to the new king to this, even if the king (or 'Emir' to add to his religious legitimacy?)can claim to be a descendant of the Prophet and from the family of the old pre-1926 governors of Mecca, and a probable Shi'a breakaway sponsored by Iran...
Given the way that the post-1968 'modernising' Baathist one-party state in Iraq had turned into a one-man personality cult by Saddam in OTL, with rivals cowed or shot, the lack of any 'support in depth' for the military regimes of 1963-8 that had preceded the July 1968 coup, and the 'one-man' military dictatorship of General Qassem before that in 1958-63 that replaced the Iraqi monarchy, there was not even the degree of legitimacy that Zahir Shah had in Afghanistan for any pre-2003 Iraqi figure who could be put back in power by the US as a local client. Nor would any 'opposition' secular or religious Shi'a figure be acceptable to the Sunni tribes, who would be easy prey for any Sunni-led opposition revolt in the far West - in OTL, a spillover from the Sunni radical revolt against the Syrian regime across the frontier.
The best solution might have been if there had been more of a collective leadership among the Ba'ath high command for longer and less time for Saddam to turn his regime into a personal one, eg a later takeover by Saddam than in 1979 or him in less complete control of the state - logically due to a more fractious and multi-faction coalition running the Party. Less of a Stalinist 'top-down' machine , and possibly a need to conciliate local political and military 'barons' to keep the state running - due to a stronger and continual military threat of Kurdish revolt tying down the Iraqi army after the end of the exhaustive Iranian war? Or else a split in the regime's leadership over what to do in 1991 when the US invaded Iraq after Saddam invaded Kuwait - ie a (failed) mutiny against Saddam by some top generals who then had to flee the country and ended up in exile as US clients. They could then be held in reserve as the US choice to replace Saddam if needed while their local Sunni tribal soldiers in W Iraq kept in touch with them, and there would be a chance for the US to decide to install them in power in 2003 as less costly than complete 'de-Ba'athification'. But would the neo-cons in the Bush junior White House ever accept this given their ideology of 're-making the Middle East', even if it was the cheaper option? It would depend on who had the President's ear at the right moment.
The two rival families both claimed the rule of the Mecca region, but until 1925-6 the Saudi royal family had been sultans of Nejd in central Arabia and their takeover notched the rivalry up to another level. If the Hashemites are put back in charge in Baghdad - where they had no traditional historical links and the British put them there in 1921 to face tribal Sunni and Kurdish resistance - the tribal leaders of the Sunni rural districts and the Shi'a South-East are not going to be likely to accept it, and probably the US would have to rely on the senior military and civil service figures in Baghdad to get any backing in the country at all - which means no de-Baathification or else an even worse civil war. Then add Saudi opposition to the new king to this, even if the king (or 'Emir' to add to his religious legitimacy?)can claim to be a descendant of the Prophet and from the family of the old pre-1926 governors of Mecca, and a probable Shi'a breakaway sponsored by Iran...
Given the way that the post-1968 'modernising' Baathist one-party state in Iraq had turned into a one-man personality cult by Saddam in OTL, with rivals cowed or shot, the lack of any 'support in depth' for the military regimes of 1963-8 that had preceded the July 1968 coup, and the 'one-man' military dictatorship of General Qassem before that in 1958-63 that replaced the Iraqi monarchy, there was not even the degree of legitimacy that Zahir Shah had in Afghanistan for any pre-2003 Iraqi figure who could be put back in power by the US as a local client. Nor would any 'opposition' secular or religious Shi'a figure be acceptable to the Sunni tribes, who would be easy prey for any Sunni-led opposition revolt in the far West - in OTL, a spillover from the Sunni radical revolt against the Syrian regime across the frontier.
The best solution might have been if there had been more of a collective leadership among the Ba'ath high command for longer and less time for Saddam to turn his regime into a personal one, eg a later takeover by Saddam than in 1979 or him in less complete control of the state - logically due to a more fractious and multi-faction coalition running the Party. Less of a Stalinist 'top-down' machine , and possibly a need to conciliate local political and military 'barons' to keep the state running - due to a stronger and continual military threat of Kurdish revolt tying down the Iraqi army after the end of the exhaustive Iranian war? Or else a split in the regime's leadership over what to do in 1991 when the US invaded Iraq after Saddam invaded Kuwait - ie a (failed) mutiny against Saddam by some top generals who then had to flee the country and ended up in exile as US clients. They could then be held in reserve as the US choice to replace Saddam if needed while their local Sunni tribal soldiers in W Iraq kept in touch with them, and there would be a chance for the US to decide to install them in power in 2003 as less costly than complete 'de-Ba'athification'. But would the neo-cons in the Bush junior White House ever accept this given their ideology of 're-making the Middle East', even if it was the cheaper option? It would depend on who had the President's ear at the right moment.