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British Governor and Rhodesian military chiefs arrest Ian Smith during UDI

S

Strategos' Risk

Active member
What if Sir Humphrey Gibbs, Governor of Southern Rhodesia, opposed UDI to the extent of ordering the arrest of Ian Smith?

There was a previous thread that discussed British military intervention in Rhodesia in response to UDI. As part of the discussion, I found this thesis paper that is focused on British responses to the Rhodesian Crisis:


The full excerpts I quoted in this post, but here's the relevant setup. Scenario in bold:

In November 1965, [Rhodesian Air Vice Marshal Harold] Hawkins actually advised Johns that UDI was imminent and, further, ‘he had told his stations that he would not issue any illegal orders i.e. orders would be confined to those necessary for the country’s security.’ This might be considered slightly ambiguous, but Hawkins also referred to the hard-liners in the Rhodesian Front as ‘madmen’, which is a reasonable indication of his hostility to UDI.71 The attitude of the Rhodesian Service Chiefs, even after the purge of Anderson and Bentley, might therefore have helped to prevent a full-scale confrontation between British and Rhodesian forces.

Attitudes among senior Rhodesian Army officers were not sympathetic to the Rhodesian Front regime. On the morning of UDI the Governor in Salisbury, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, received a visit from four Army officers who arrived armed at Government House. They informed Gibbs that if he provided them with a warrant for the arrest of Smith as a rebel against the Queen, they would do their duty. The Governor refused, and the soldiers left. In Gibbs’ obituary Patrick Keatley commented that ‘This was the fatal moment of hesitation.’72 The Governor had in fact considered the possibility of resisting UDI. He consulted Ken Flower, Chief of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), to ascertain his views. Flower recalled in his memoirs:

"Although I considered that the loyalty of the Chiefs of Staff, Putterill and Hawkins, was not in doubt and that many of their senior officers would follow their lead, I advised Gibbs that an appeal for their support would put them in an almost impossible position, between the government that paid them and an overseas Queen to whom they owed their allegiance."73

Flower also advised that the possibility of bloodshed could not be discounted because the attitude among middle and junior ranks was more belligerent, especially in the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), which Flower said ‘would willingly “jump into the Makabusi (a muddy river on the outskirts of the city [Salisbury]) for Smith, even if this meant going against their seniors.’ Some former RLI troops have since expressed a view that they would, without question, have fought against British troops or any other invading force. Victor Lee Walker, a Captain in 1RLI who at the time of UDI was seconded to the Military Intelligence Section of the CIO, has commented:

"The general feeling within the RLI, and other Rhodesian Defence organisations was one of intense loyalty to the country and its government and all members were prepared to fight for Rhodesia (this was later proved during the terrorist campaign). I was prepared to resist any intervention in our country’s affairs as were all my fellow officers who were still serving in 1RLI."

The Rhodesian Front could also have counted on the support of the Territorial Force and reservists, who reflected the political mood of the European population in Rhodesia and were therefore likely to offer some resistance to British military intervention.
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67 Putterill told the Chief of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation that he would support the Governor if so requested. Ken Flower, Serving Secretly. An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964-1981 (London: John Murray, 1987), p. 56. When Putterill retired, he joined the multi- racial Centre Party in protest against the Rhodesian Front’s racial Constitution of 1969; he also opposed the regime’s efforts to make Rhodesia a republic. See Elaine Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 28; and Good, UDI, p. 57.

72 Patrick Keatley, Obituary of Sir Humphrey Gibbs, Guardian Weekly, 18 November 1990. Quoted in Alan Megahey, Sir Humphrey Gibbs: Beleaguered Governor (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 110-11. In his autobiography Wilson’s security adviser, George Wigg, suggests that he was in favour of demanding Ian Smith’s arrest. George Wigg (London: Michael Joseph, 1972), p. 326.
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Suppose that the Rhodesian senior military leadership convinces Gibbs to arrest Smith. Do they receive a revolt among the rank and file? Does this result in a quick young officers-style coup of the Rhodesian military? Or could it lead to a full-blown civil war among the white population of Rhodesia, already in the context of a larger civil war? What side does Ken Flower, opportunist spymaster extraordinare, take?

Also, what is the legal implications of this? Did Gibbs have the authority to order an arrest of Smith? Do the revolting pro-Rhodesian Front soldiers have a right to protest it by overthrowing their leadership? Does Ian Smith use this opportunity to take on greater powers in an autogolpe type situation? How does this impact Rhodesian attitudes towards the Crown? International attitudes towards the Rhodesians?
 
That is a fascinating POD, though sadly I don't know enough to consider it in detail.

My instinct is this plays into Smith's hands, if the UDI comes in response to his arrest and a revolt. It makes it look like Wilson started it which would hurt him domestically.
 
ForceA1 said:
@Sulemain specialises in this subject, I'd be interested to hear his views on it.
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Actually, not my speciality to be precise: that's interwar Southern Rhodesia. But my Master's degree examined the UDI Period-although more from the British side, so I can comment on that in some detail.

The issue was in providing British reinforcements to back up the Governor-General in a prompt manner before the RF attempts some sort of counter-coup. In 1965, Rhodesia was surrounded on most sides by allies-British reinforcements would have almost certainly had to come from the North, and this after travelling a long way. And it would have been the Paras we sent in, and from all I've gathered the Regiment itself was reported at being "iffy" on the project. The British General Staff themselves worried over the issue as well, both in practical terms and also over the idea of going into combat with "kith and kin", as the terminology went at the time. Remember, in 1965 white Southern Rhodesians were, despite all that had changed, still regarded in a lot of parts of Britain-both in the halls of power and without, as fundamentally loyal British subjects in a British political and cultural system. So you might have ended up with the Paras being deployed reluctantly, fighting reluctantly against people who were reluctant to fight them.

On the flip side, the attitude of the lower ranks of the RLI speaks to a part of the basis of the Rhodesia Front, and that was in the lower classes of the dominant white caste in Southern Rhodesia. The Rhodesia Front was a white populist regime of a kind that hadn't really existed before in Southern Rhodesia (although they had done so in South Africa, and white populism was part of the pro-Apartheid coalition). Most of the previous governments of Southern Rhodesia had been various kinds of conservative, although of a kind of (White) One-Nation variety. Todd was a liberal, but he was an exception. The white populism of the RF also meant they were tied more closely to S. Rhodesia's Afrikaner population than previous governments, and I've read that the RLI was dominated by Afrikaners much more than other parts of the Rhodesian Security Forces.

In summary, the RF under Smith was very different in ideology and outlook to the previous S. Rhodesian governments under which the senior officers had previously served. Maybe a senior officer coup could have succeeded temporarily, but I have a nasty suspicion that the sort of white populism that the RF was based on could lead to a counter-coup by white labour and militant junior officers and enlisted personnel.

And that's just the white population. I suspect in such a scenario, those leaders of black political and union movements who weren't in prison would come out swinging, sensing an opening as the facade of white unity comes apart. Almost like the 4 stages of the Haitian Revolution, to draw another historical example.
 
To sketch a loose AH outline:

Stage 1: Smith and the RF issue UDI.
Stage 2: White senior officers launch a coup using trusted units.
Stage 3: White senior officers ask for assistance from Britain.
Stage 4: The paras and CGS balk at the order for various reasons, and dispatching troops is delayed.
Stage 5: White labour and junior officers/enlisted personal start striking/disobeying orders/mutinying/looking for senior officers who agree with them.
Stage 6: Black African wildcat industrial action breaks out on a mass scale, as do more overtly militant acts of resistance.
Stage 7: The white senior officers at this point almost certainly chose their ethnic-racial identity over their political allegiances, Smith is restored and a bloodbath ensues as he attempts to put down black strikers and so forth with security services who have become totally radicalised.
 
Sulemain said:
Actually, not my speciality to be precise: that's interwar Southern Rhodesia. But my Master's degree examined the UDI Period-although more from the British side, so I can comment on that in some detail.
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What do you think would have happened if Britain had decided to intervene en masse with military force?
 
Coiler said:
What do you think would have happened if Britain had decided to intervene en masse with military force?
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If they could have got there in time and in enough numbers? Sporadic white armed resistance, but not much. The RSF is disarmed and/or brought up under British military control, and London takes S. Rhodesia under Direct Rule only until a new constitution guarantees majority rule (almost certainly including "protections" for the white minority and their property) is drawn up, supervises new elections and then leaves. Someone like Josiah Gondo might serve as interim PM in the meantime, but the election is probably won at that point by someone like Joshua Nkomo if not the man himself. What happens next is anyone's guess. A much more hopeful start then OTL Zimbabwe, but the position of the new state will be precarious for a great many reasons.
 
Sulemain said:
If they could have got there in time and in enough numbers? Sporadic white armed resistance, but not much. The RSF is disarmed and/or brought up under British military control, and London takes S. Rhodesia under Direct Rule only until a new constitution guarantees majority rule (almost certainly including "protections" for the white minority and their property) is drawn up, supervises new elections and then leaves. Someone like Josiah Gondo might serve as interim PM in the meantime, but the election is probably won at that point by someone like Joshua Nkomo if not the man himself. What happens next is anyone's guess. A much more hopeful start then OTL Zimbabwe, but the position of the new state will be precarious for a great many reasons.
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I can imagine the mess that would be with Britain pulling out only after securing guarantees for the white minority's property (and thus ability to keep exploiting the black majority).

I don't think it's that much more hopeful, the militant black organizations probably stay semi underground because they'll see any regime agreeing to those provisions as illegitimate and refuse to commit to maintaining them to compete.
 
Nyvis said:
I can imagine the mess that would be with Britain pulling out only after securing guarantees for the white minority's property (and thus ability to keep exploiting the black majority).

I don't think it's that much more hopeful, the militant black organizations probably stay semi underground because they'll see any regime agreeing to those provisions as illegitimate and refuse to commit to maintaining them to compete.
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I meant more on the lines of willing buyer willing seller like OTL South Africa, but as you say there's space for numerous cock ups.
 
The UK did sustain an air bridge for Zambia from December 1965 to October 1966, so there was some airlift capacity.

In the 1960s there was a requirement for the capability to airlift an Infantry Brigade to Singapore within 7 days, which was the main driving force behind the procurement of transport aircraft in that period, however this was dependent on existing stockpiles of equipment.

There was an additional, fairly significant problem of Arab and African Governments refusing to grant overflight rights to RAF Transport Aircraft, a situation described by the Air Staff as "The Barrier", mainly introduced in reaction to Britain's behaviour during the Suez Crisis. One plan to get round this was to route the flights via Portuguese-occupied Anglola and Mozambique, and South Africa, but obviously these countries would be allied with Rhodesia, and so would not be available in this crisis.

Given that this was a situation where Britain would be intervening against an attempt to create a White-minority controlled state, would the various African states be more willing to grant overflight rights, to prevent this situation from coming about? The restrictions of "The Barrier" weren't always absolute, and RAF Transport Aircraft could fly over some countries if the aircraft few at certain speeds and altitudes, but that possibly locks out Hastings, Beverleys and potentially Argosies from being used, although the Comets and Britannias are still available (which, fortunately make up most of the long-range airlift capacity) but I wouldn't want to perform any kind of opposed air landing operation with them.
 
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I've talked about this elsewhere, and I'll reemphasise it here: the great difficulty in avoiding autocracy in post-colonial Africa is a) the deliberate lack of developed democratic institutions and infrastructure on the one hand and b) active sabotage on the other. The RF did both of these things-I think it's hard the overstate the extent to which Smith was by the late 70s doing Downfall On The Veldt, controlling little outside the major cities, all while the security forces detained more and more people, tortured more and more innocents.
 
Sulemain said:
The RF did both of these things-I think it's hard the overstate the extent to which Smith was by the late 70s doing Downfall On The Veldt, controlling little outside the major cities, all while the security forces detained more and more people, tortured more and more innocents.
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Every substantial military history I've read of the Bush War takes note of how little territory the Rhodesian regime actually controlled by the late 70s. And how more and more whites were either leaving or trying to leave each year.
 
Coiler said:
Every substantial military history I've read of the Bush War takes note of how little territory the Rhodesian regime actually controlled by the late 70s. And how more and more whites were either leaving or trying to leave each year.
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Fools and racists will rant on about Fireforce and all that but utterly fail to recognise that all that tactical nuance was in service of impossible strategic/political ends.

It says something about Smith that even with all that in mind he still tried for a compromise political settlement. In 1979!
 
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