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Erin's Erfurt III Experience

1919 German federal election with 1918 electoral reform
In Andreas Schulz's book How would the 1919 National Assembly elections have turned out if absolute majority voting had been retained?, he models the results of the 1919 election using the Reichstag electoral system as reformed in August 1918. The Imperial Reichstag was elected via single-member constituencies using the two-round system, with the top two candidates proceeding to a runoff. The electoral boundaries were first drawn up in the 1860s-70s and had remained almost completely unchanged since. The constituencies, which had never really been particularly equal in terms of population to begin with, became absurdly malapportioned in the following decades. By 1912, the smallest constituencies comprised around 60,000 residents while the largest, Teltow-Beeskow-Storkow-Charlottenburg south of Berlin, had over 1.3 million. A similar pattern was found across the country; in general, more urbanised areas were underrepresented compared to rural areas. This had a particular impact on the SPD, the party of the urban working class. As such, despite taking the largest share of votes in every election since 1890, it wasn't until 1912 when they finally won a plurality of seats in the Reichstag.

Reform to the electoral system had been discussed for many years, but disagreements over what should be done and opposition from the conservatives and Centre prevented action. By the time the Great War began, the critical importance of the government securing passage of its budgets allowed the Social Democrats and left-liberals, who were in a strong position after the 1912 election, to force a deal in exchange for their support. At the beginning of 1917 a draft reform bill was published. The fundamentals of the electoral system were to remain; most seats would still be elected via the two-round system, and the constituency boundaries were left almost untouched. However, in constituencies with over 300,000 residents, additional seats were to be added, elected via proportional representation using the largest remainder method. Large cities were also unified into single constituencies with multiple members. Berlin, previously comprising six constituencies which massively underrepresented the populous working-class suburbs, was to comprise a ten-member constituency. Meanwhile, the Teltow-Beeskow-Storkow-Charlottenburg constituency would have seven seats. A similar pattern followed across the country; a total of twenty-six multi-member constituencies were specified. The bill also provided for additional seats to be added automatically as constituencies grew beyond 300,000 people, and for every additional 200,000 residents.

This was not a radical change to the system - indeed, the vast majority of seats remained the exact same as they had been previously. Only affording additional seats to cities with over 300,000 residents, while most other constituencies contained half as many or fewer, still left urban areas severely underrepresented. Likewise, the use of proportional representation actually aided the non-socialist parties by giving them a chance to win seats in previously impregnable Social-Democratic strongholds. Nonetheless, the greater weight given to urban areas was a win for the SPD, and the mere fact that they had secured the reform was a significant concession from the liberal-conservative establishment. Proportional representation also gave them the security of guaranteed representation, whereas previously they were often frustrated by the runoff system which allowed the anti-socialist parties to unite behind an opposing candidate to deny them seats. The electoral reform bill was passed in August 1918 with strong support; it was opposed by the Conservatives, Poles, and USPD.

Of course, this system was never used. Only a few months later, the November Revolution saw the dissolution of the Empire and proclamation of a new republic. The provisional Council of People's Deputies legislated a new electoral system under which the entire parliament was to be elected via party-list proportional representation. The use of "pure PR" is often cited as a weakness of the Weimar Republic, leading to weak governments and instability, which contributed to its downfall. Andreas Schulz explores what would have happened if the reformed Imperial electoral system had been used for the 1919 election. Would the SPD have won an outright majority? Would a more stable government have been possible?

It's not easy to translate the results to a series of single-member constituencies, and there is a high degree of uncertainty about how things would have turned out. Factors such as individual candidate choices and joint nominations are impossible to account for. Likewise, predicting the results of runoffs proved extremely difficult. Schulz relies as much as possible on the actual results data, assuming for simplicity that the strongest and second-strongest party in each constituency sends a candidate to the runoff. He then projects the outcome based on the relative strength of the parties, leanings of the electorate, and history of the constituency. Due to the inherent uncertainty of the task, however, he puts forward two models for the election. Model A ssumes a high degree of success for the socialist parties in runoffs, with Social Democrats managing to win support from much of the left-liberal electorate as well as minority voters, and the SPD and USPD support one another. Model B is just the opposite: the socialist parties are marginalised, left-liberals are more likely to support nationalist and Centre candidates, or stay home. In practice, this means that whenever the outcome is at all in doubt, Model A predicts a victory for the more left-leaning candidate and Model B predicts a victory for the more right-leaning candidate. Lack of granularity in the data also means some multi-member constituencies have divergent results in the two models, following a similar logic.

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1940 German federal election
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Since I gained access to so much data recently, as well as a good lot more knowledge, I decided to remake the scenario I did last year. To recap, this is an exploration of Weimar-era SPD activist Carlo Mierendorff's ideas about constitutional and electoral reform, namely instituting majority voting to encourage a more stable political system based on alliance-building.

The republic goes through a rocky period in the early 30s with the rise of the Nazi Party and ascendancy and reactionary nationalism, but ultimately survives by pure historical coincidence. The SPD does some soul-searching and seizes upon the ideas of the young radicals like Mierendorff, Haubach, and Leuschner. They hammer on the self-obsessed and power-hungry reactionary and Nazi parties, pledge an economic transformation to relieve the working classes, and a wide-reaching constitutional reform to repair and strengthen the republic. They reach out to form a broad front in defence of the republic, bringing together the socialist and trade union movement, liberals, Catholics, and dissident communists under the banner of the Iron Front. Mobilising their full strength to engage and energise citizens, they storm to victory and work to institute the promised reforms. Federalism is overhauled, the presidency weakened, civil service and judiciary purged, and the millitary brought under civilian control. A majority voting system is also instituted for the Reichstag, with 500 members elected via first past the post, supplemented by a very limited system of 50 leveling seats distributed on a regional level.

As the economic and political situation begins to ease, fresh elections in 1936 deliver a landslide for the Iron Front. The right-wing is hopelessly divided between the Nazis, DNVP, DVP, agrarian parties, and other minor factions, who suffer a crushing defeat. The Centre Party, working with its estranged sister the BVP, put on a strong performance. The Communists are weakened by the surge in grassroots support for the republic and suffer for their stance against it.

Ahead of the 1940 election, the right-wing work hard to put together a conservative coalition capable of challenging the Iron Front. Almost all forces agree to come on board, with the major exception of the Nazis. Around this time, both the Iron and newly-christened National Front coalesce around their central poles. The Iron Front comprises four primary groups. Foremost is the SPD, the classic party of the working-class and engine of the alliance, providing much of its leadership and organisation. The Republican Centre Union (RM-Bund) brings together the liberals and republicans of the centre and centre-left. The United Workers' Electoral League (VAWB) acts as a proxy of the trade union federation, allowing them to run candidate directly from the unions. Lastly is the "Left SPD", comprising dissident socialists and communists who agree to return to the fold for the sake of the republic.

The National Front's three main components represent its three pillars: nationalism, bourgeois conservatism, and agrarianism. The United National Party (VNPD) was formed by the merger of the DNVP with other right-wing nationalist groups such as the Pan-German League and Stahlhelm who were united by their distaste for Nazism and ties to the more traditionalist, aristocratic right. The DVP manages a comeback via merging with other bourgeois groups such as the Wirtschaftspartei. Their association with industrial magnates and conglomerates ensure the alliance is well-financed and well-connected. They also provide a competitive edge in regions such as the Rhineland and urban cities. Finally, numerous agrarian groups compete within the bloc. They largely operate on a local or regional level; the Landbund and Deutsches Landvolk (DLV) comprise the two largest federations. Together, these three groups are competitive across virtually all of Germany.

The 1940 election saw the mood of the country swing decisively away from Nazi populism and toward the two major alliances. Together they capture almost two-thirds of the votes and 70% of the seats. The National Front is a great success, capturing over 160 seats and substantially improving their vote share compared to 1936. The Iron Front also sees an upswing in support, but a substantial loss of seats due to the newfound consolidation of the right-wing. The Centre Party take a small hit as marginal seats, particularly in the Rhineland, fall to the National Front. The Communists also suffer from continued decline, though a strong showing in leveling seats somewhat stems the bleeding. The Nazis face a meltdown, however, losing half their voteshare and most of their seats.

The lesson seems clear: broad alliances bear fruit, while appeals to narrow interest groups and grievance politics are going out of style. A country once known for its political division and chaos seems to have successfully remade itself with, unity, preseverance, and stability taking centre stage.

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Since I gained access to so much data recently, as well as a good lot more knowledge, I decided to remake the scenario I did last year. To recap, this is an exploration of Weimar-era SPD activist Carlo Mierendorff's ideas about constitutional and electoral reform, namely instituting majority voting to encourage a more stable political system based on alliance-building.

The republic goes through a rocky period in the early 30s with the rise of the Nazi Party and ascendancy and reactionary nationalism, but ultimately survives by pure historical coincidence. The SPD does some soul-searching and seizes upon the ideas of the young radicals like Mierendorff, Haubach, and Leuschner. They hammer on the self-obsessed and power-hungry reactionary and Nazi parties, pledge an economic transformation to relieve the working classes, and a wide-reaching constitutional reform to repair and strengthen the republic. They reach out to form a broad front in defence of the republic, bringing together the socialist and trade union movement, liberals, Catholics, and dissident communists under the banner of the Iron Front. Mobilising their full strength to engage and energise citizens, they storm to victory and work to institute the promised reforms. Federalism is overhauled, the presidency weakened, civil service and judiciary purged, and the millitary brought under civilian control. A majority voting system is also instituted for the Reichstag, with 500 members elected via first past the post, supplemented by a very limited system of 50 leveling seats distributed on a regional level.

As the economic and political situation begins to ease, fresh elections in 1936 deliver a landslide for the Iron Front. The right-wing is hopelessly divided between the Nazis, DNVP, DVP, agrarian parties, and other minor factions, who suffer a crushing defeat. The Centre Party, working with its estranged sister the BVP, put on a strong performance. The Communists are weakened by the surge in grassroots support for the republic and suffer for their stance against it.

Ahead of the 1940 election, the right-wing work hard to put together a conservative coalition capable of challenging the Iron Front. Almost all forces agree to come on board, with the major exception of the Nazis. Around this time, both the Iron and newly-christened National Front coalesce around their central poles. The Iron Front comprises four primary groups. Foremost is the SPD, the classic party of the working-class and engine of the alliance, providing much of its leadership and organisation. The Republican Centre Union (RM-Bund) brings together the liberals and republicans of the centre and centre-left. The United Workers' Electoral League (VAWB) acts as a proxy of the trade union federation, allowing them to run candidate directly from the unions. Lastly is the "Left SPD", comprising dissident socialists and communists who agree to return to the fold for the sake of the republic.

The National Front's three main components represent its three pillars: nationalism, bourgeois conservatism, and agrarianism. The United National Party (VNPD) was formed by the merger of the DNVP with other right-wing nationalist groups such as the Pan-German League and Stahlhelm who were united by their distaste for Nazism and ties to the more traditionalist, aristocratic right. The DVP manages a comeback via merging with other bourgeois groups such as the Wirtschaftspartei. Their association with industrial magnates and conglomerates ensure the alliance is well-financed and well-connected. They also provide a competitive edge in regions such as the Rhineland and urban cities. Finally, numerous agrarian groups compete within the bloc. They largely operate on a local or regional level; the Landbund and Deutsches Landvolk (DLV) comprise the two largest federations. Together, these three groups are competitive across virtually all of Germany.

The 1940 election saw the mood of the country swing decisively away from Nazi populism and toward the two major alliances. Together they capture almost two-thirds of the votes and 70% of the seats. The National Front is a great success, capturing over 160 seats and substantially improving their vote share compared to 1936. The Iron Front also sees an upswing in support, but a substantial loss of seats due to the newfound consolidation of the right-wing. The Centre Party take a small hit as marginal seats, particularly in the Rhineland, fall to the National Front. The Communists also suffer from continued decline, though a strong showing in leveling seats somewhat stems the bleeding. The Nazis face a meltdown, however, losing half their voteshare and most of their seats.

The lesson seems clear: broad alliances bear fruit, while appeals to narrow interest groups and grievance politics are going out of style. A country once known for its political division and chaos seems to have successfully remade itself with, unity, preseverance, and stability taking centre stage.

rdSBnVQ.png

Love it; this feels distinctly like the "good" timeline. Have to wonder though, his electoral ambitions thoroughly dashed, would Herr Hitler not at some point return to his militant roots as an different path to power?
 
k1Vz2fT.png


Since I gained access to so much data recently, as well as a good lot more knowledge, I decided to remake the scenario I did last year. To recap, this is an exploration of Weimar-era SPD activist Carlo Mierendorff's ideas about constitutional and electoral reform, namely instituting majority voting to encourage a more stable political system based on alliance-building.

The republic goes through a rocky period in the early 30s with the rise of the Nazi Party and ascendancy and reactionary nationalism, but ultimately survives by pure historical coincidence. The SPD does some soul-searching and seizes upon the ideas of the young radicals like Mierendorff, Haubach, and Leuschner. They hammer on the self-obsessed and power-hungry reactionary and Nazi parties, pledge an economic transformation to relieve the working classes, and a wide-reaching constitutional reform to repair and strengthen the republic. They reach out to form a broad front in defence of the republic, bringing together the socialist and trade union movement, liberals, Catholics, and dissident communists under the banner of the Iron Front. Mobilising their full strength to engage and energise citizens, they storm to victory and work to institute the promised reforms. Federalism is overhauled, the presidency weakened, civil service and judiciary purged, and the millitary brought under civilian control. A majority voting system is also instituted for the Reichstag, with 500 members elected via first past the post, supplemented by a very limited system of 50 leveling seats distributed on a regional level.

As the economic and political situation begins to ease, fresh elections in 1936 deliver a landslide for the Iron Front. The right-wing is hopelessly divided between the Nazis, DNVP, DVP, agrarian parties, and other minor factions, who suffer a crushing defeat. The Centre Party, working with its estranged sister the BVP, put on a strong performance. The Communists are weakened by the surge in grassroots support for the republic and suffer for their stance against it.

Ahead of the 1940 election, the right-wing work hard to put together a conservative coalition capable of challenging the Iron Front. Almost all forces agree to come on board, with the major exception of the Nazis. Around this time, both the Iron and newly-christened National Front coalesce around their central poles. The Iron Front comprises four primary groups. Foremost is the SPD, the classic party of the working-class and engine of the alliance, providing much of its leadership and organisation. The Republican Centre Union (RM-Bund) brings together the liberals and republicans of the centre and centre-left. The United Workers' Electoral League (VAWB) acts as a proxy of the trade union federation, allowing them to run candidate directly from the unions. Lastly is the "Left SPD", comprising dissident socialists and communists who agree to return to the fold for the sake of the republic.

The National Front's three main components represent its three pillars: nationalism, bourgeois conservatism, and agrarianism. The United National Party (VNPD) was formed by the merger of the DNVP with other right-wing nationalist groups such as the Pan-German League and Stahlhelm who were united by their distaste for Nazism and ties to the more traditionalist, aristocratic right. The DVP manages a comeback via merging with other bourgeois groups such as the Wirtschaftspartei. Their association with industrial magnates and conglomerates ensure the alliance is well-financed and well-connected. They also provide a competitive edge in regions such as the Rhineland and urban cities. Finally, numerous agrarian groups compete within the bloc. They largely operate on a local or regional level; the Landbund and Deutsches Landvolk (DLV) comprise the two largest federations. Together, these three groups are competitive across virtually all of Germany.

The 1940 election saw the mood of the country swing decisively away from Nazi populism and toward the two major alliances. Together they capture almost two-thirds of the votes and 70% of the seats. The National Front is a great success, capturing over 160 seats and substantially improving their vote share compared to 1936. The Iron Front also sees an upswing in support, but a substantial loss of seats due to the newfound consolidation of the right-wing. The Centre Party take a small hit as marginal seats, particularly in the Rhineland, fall to the National Front. The Communists also suffer from continued decline, though a strong showing in leveling seats somewhat stems the bleeding. The Nazis face a meltdown, however, losing half their voteshare and most of their seats.

The lesson seems clear: broad alliances bear fruit, while appeals to narrow interest groups and grievance politics are going out of style. A country once known for its political division and chaos seems to have successfully remade itself with, unity, preseverance, and stability taking centre stage.

rdSBnVQ.png
something about that three-co-leader layout is extremely compelling
 
Love it; this feels distinctly like the "good" timeline. Have to wonder though, his electoral ambitions thoroughly dashed, would Herr Hitler not at some point return to his militant roots as an different path to power?
It's a distinct possibility, difficult to say though. I could see him attempting some kind of SA/SS uprising or coup which would very likely fail and result in the demise of the movement. At the same time, I could see him sticking to the electoral path in the stubborn belief that he could recreate the high of 1930-32, and slowly fading into irrelevance.
something about that three-co-leader layout is extremely compelling
It's very nice! Until the post-war period the SPD had the cool practice of having multiple leaders, usually two. After they united with the USPD in 1922, Arthur Crispien became the third. You can see it in on the election pages on Wikipedia.
 
Great work as usual, I don’t suppose you’re planning on taking it a bit further and doing a bit of a mini TL? Would be very interesting to see how modern Germany would be different.
 
The Querfront, the January coup and civil war
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Shortly after his appointment as Chancellor in December 1932, Kurt von Schleicher met with Gregor Strasser and offered him a deal. Strasser was the most prominent Nazi behind Hitler, leader of the party's "left" camp and, for several years, a low-key rival. During the course of 1932, Hitler had stalwartly refused to join government unless he was made Chancellor, while Strasser advocated compromise with the moderate parties and accepting a junior role in government first. He had also fostered friendly connections with a number of industrialists who were key political players. Schleicher's motivation for approaching Strasser was two-fold: he hoped to build a "Querfront", a coalition of nationalist and corporatist/anti-capitalist forces, which could give him a stable majority for his government. If he couldn't, he hoped to pressure the Nazis into joining government anyway by stoking internal tensions. Somewhat to his surprise, Strasser accepted his offer, and the next day was sworn in as the third most powerful politician in the country behind only President Hindenburg and Schleicher.

This incited a full-on split in the Nazi Party, with 80 of its 200 Reichstag deputies defecting to Strasser. Numerous Gauleiter, the Nazi Party's provincial leaders, also followed. He quickly launched the Deutschsozialistische Reichspartei, DSR. Schleicher capitalised on this breakthrough and reached out to the socialist and Catholic trade unions, among other groups, in hopes of finding more allies. Nationalist or corporatist leanings were not uncommon even on the left, and a number of SPD and Centre deputies agreed to defect to the Querfront. Schleicher's Reichstag numbers swelled by more than half, and though it was significant, it wasn't enough for a clear majority. It quickly became clear that the opposition would imminently pass a motion of no confidence in the government. Schleicher persuaded President Hindenburg to dissolve the Reichstag and call the third election in just six months. He had not intended to face an electoral test so soon but was confident that a groundswell of popular support would put him in a good position. However, it didn't come to pass; the Querfront won less than 17% of votes and found itself even weaker than before the election.

Schleicher was a calculating and ruthless political operator. He could sense the walls closing in on him. There was no longer a path to a parliamentary majority: the Querfront had fallen flat, and there could certainly be no cooperation with Hitler, nor with the Centre Party. Worse still, Hindenburg was becoming more and more frustrated with him, while Schleicher's predecessor and bitter rival Franz von Papen was openly wooing Hitler and formulating an alliance which would see him returned to power. Following the election, Schleicher held a whirlwind of meetings and sent a mountain of correspodence to his allies in industry, politics, and the military to secure his position. But as the days passed, he watched them drift toward the Hitler-Papen camp, who were now obviously the more viable and attractive option. He was convinced that it was only a matter of time until he was dismissed by Hindenburg. However, there was one man he could still rely on: his close friend Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord, supreme commander of the Reichswehr. A plan that had previously been unthinkable began to take shape between Schleicher, Hammerstein-Equord, and Strasser.

On the morning of 23 January, the Berlin police and local Wehrmacht division simultaneously mobilised and systematically occupied key buildings throughout the capital. At midday, the Chancellery announced that President Hindenburg had been placed in temporary protective custody and voluntarily offered his resignation. The reality was obvious and the reaction immediate: the Nazis rallied the SA in anticipation of a fight, while Papen and other anti-Schleicher leaders alerted their networks to the situation. Most significant among them was Werner von Blomberg, former chief of the military high command and a fierce enemy of Schleicher, who had stripped him of his office in 1929. He immediately contacted his allies in the army and ordered that all divisions move against the putschists. By the end of the day, most of the Reichswehr had been mobilised and were taking orders from two different command offices. It took only hours for the country to devolve into civil war.

Meanwhile, the forces of the political left watched on in fear. The threat of dictatorship had hung over their heads for years, and now that Schleicher had crossed the Rubicon, the Nazis would have no qualms doing the same. Once the conflict between the two reactionary camps was over, the left would undoubtedly be next. They had been preparing, reclutantly, for such a situation: the republican paramilitary the Reichsbanner boasted almost 250,000 elite "protection units" known as Schufo who immediately mobilised in anticipation of attacks from the SA or Reichswehr. In cities across the country, workers spontaneously took to the streets to erect barricades and defences. The Social Democratic and Communist leadership conferred and, two days after the coup, the KPD executive issued an extraordinary decree calling on all Communists to cooperate with the Iron Front and Reichsbanner to fight back against the reactionary forces. This unforeseen mobilisation spooked the Querfront and Nazis alike, and both sides withdrew from most of the cities in response. Throughout January and February most of the country was quiet: the left maintained a firmly defensive posture while the right-opposition focused on decapitating the Querfront in Berlin. During this time the large majority of fighting took place in the capital, where all three sides clashed regularly and bloodily. It wasn't until early March that the Reichswehr and SA gathered their forces and punched through the Querfront defences, capturing the political centres of the city and catching Schleicher and Strasser before they could flee. They were both summarily executed. It was at this point that news leaked out that Hindenburg, still detained by the putschists, had been killed a few days prior.

The right took a few days to mop up, regroup, and arrest or execute as many of the putschists and Querfront leaders as they could get their hands on. Then they turned their sights to the leftists. The previous six weeks had given them ample time to prepare defences, organise their forces, and stockpile weapons and supplies for the coming fight. But they simply couldn't beat the Reichswehr, especially given it was supplemented by a massive number of SA. Further, the republicans were uncoordinated, lacked leadership and suffered from low morale. They held out for an admirably long time - the final garrisons surrendered in June - but a combination of bombardment and ruthless siege tactics forced cities to their knees one by one. The firmer the resistance, the harsher the response; tens of thousands of civilians died due to blockades and the cutting of utilities, not to mention daily shelling. In Berlin, soldiers and militiamen fought a brutal campaign of room-to-room urban warfare which saw the defenders slowly but surely pushed back and eventually subdued.
 
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Maaan, I can’t believe I only found this thread now. Especially the independent East Germany scenario is really interesting. How do you think things would have developed afterwards?

Another interesting system that Germany narrowly avoided is FPTP in the late 60s. It would’ve undoubtedly lead to a two-party system, which would have all kind of interesting scenarios for the future of German and European politics (no political green movement for one).
 
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The Metropolitan City of the Inner West is part of the Greater Sydney Metropolitan Area, the most populous urban area in Australia. The city is governed by a Metropolitan Council of 63 members elected via single transferable vote. The government is presided over by the Lord Mayor, who is directly elected and serves ex-officio as a member of the Council.

The Inner West is noted as one of the most diverse and progressive areas in the country, home to significant Chinese, Italian, Indian, Korean, and Nepalese communities. This, as well as the divide between the poor east and wealthy west, has long defined the city. It has traditionally been a stronghold for the centre-left Labor Party, including on the local level. They were long challenged by a series of liberal and conservative groupings, which formed the forerunner of the modern Prosperity party. Starting from the 1980s and 90s, new forces began to gain momentum. Among the earliest was Harmony, a left-wing alternative platform which won over environmentally and socially-conscious voters and youth. The increasing liberalisation of Labor's economic policies also led the Socialist Party to win seats on the Council for the first time. At the end of the 1990s, the evolving social conscience gave rise to Unity, a specifically multicultural platform joined by numerous progressive thinkers. Around the same time, independents began winning seats in substantial numbers thanks to more sophisticated usage of the electoral system by voters. Finally, ahead of the 2014 election, various localist candidates came together under the banner of Citizens' Orientation - United Local Voices, shortened as Orientation.

The 2022 election marked the retirement of popular mayor Carmel Tebbutt of the Labor Party. Longtime Council chairwoman Penny Sharpe ran to succeed her, and was challenged by an array of minor candidates. Most prominent among them was Elizabeth Farrelly, a writer and critic who sat as an independent member of the Council. Prosperity and Orientation declined to run their own candidates and instead backed Farrelly. Harmony put forward Jenny Leong; Unity chose not to run a candidate or endorse any of the others.

The result was unexpectedly strong for Labor, attributed to Sharpe's popularity as leader of the campaign. She exceeded expectations and secured 38% of the primary vote in the mayoral election, handily defeating Farrelly after distribution of preferences. In the Council, Labor gained three seats for a commanding plurality of 19, while Prosperity and Unity suffered losses. Orientation notably doubled their tally to six seats despite the controversial leadership of Jamal Daoud, often described as a populist. The Socialist Party lost one of its two seats, with only Andrew Chuter returned in Marrickville ward. Six independents were elected, down two from the previous election.
 
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1990 Berlin state election (OTL)
I've been covering a lot of local elections for cities in Germany in the last few months. There are far too many to post here, and I don't think most of them are quite worth it anyway, but you can find them on Wikipedia if you're interested. However, last month I got into the weeds of mapping by voting precinct and made some compelling finds, as well as maps I'm just generally proud of. So I'm gonna dump some of them here.

First off, here's a bunch of Berlin content. I spent a lot of time in this city (mentally, anyway). I made maps by constituency for every state election going back to reunification, and there's no huge revelations in there if you're familiar with the city's voting trends. The most interesting thing is probably that the Greens were winning constituencies as far as back 1995, and the SPD failed to win a single plurality anywhere in 1999. So I'll only post one.

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So the state election held shortly after reunification was quite unique. Berlin was the only state comprising territory from both East and West (though that later changed thanks to the municipality of Neuhaus being transferred from Mecklenburg-Vorpommern to Lower Saxony) and the election represented the fusion of two places which, despite being one, had sharply diverged in numerous ways over the past decades. Adding to this, both West and East Berliners had already voted for their city councils not long before: West Berlin's last city council election was less than two years prior, and the East held free local elections only a few months earlier in June. Both elections resulted in narrow victories for the SPD. In the West, they defeated the CDU after two terms in opposition, falling just short of a plurality but forming a coalition with the Greens - still a novel and often difficult arrangement at the time. In the East, the SPD triumphed over the PDS by a few percentage points in their stronghold, while the CDU placed a distant third. Based on this, you might have expected the SPD to be the favourites, but the federal election in October showed the CDU at a decisive advantage in Berlin. Further, the Greens withdrew from the coalition in November due to a dispute about squatters, dealing another blow to the SPD.

Mechanically, the state election was in many ways a microcosm of the federal election. The East was adopted into West Berlin's political system: the mixed-member proportional system was maintained and a new set of single-member constituencies added to represent the East. This boosted the number of single-member seats from 71 to 120, and the Abgeordnetenhaus's overall size to a very bloated 241 seats. The 5% threshold was also applied separately in East and West, though parties had to run statewide. Most had no trouble with this, but the Greens faced a sharp divide between the two parts of the city. The western Greens (actually called the Alternative List at the time) had a radically different history and experience to the eastern Alliance 90, which was made up of pro-democracy campaigners who set the Peaceful Revolution in motion only to be forgotten as the larger parties moved in. Moreover, there was an eastern Green Party which also ran independently, but forged a linked list with Alliance 90, meaning both parties' votes were pooled when determining seat distribution. The last thing worth mentioning is that The Republicans won 7.5% in the previous Western state election, but had been preemptively banned in the East during democratisation due to their radical right-wing orientation. They were able to run statewide this election.

The result was a smashing victory for the CDU, but there was an exceedingly clear geographic divide. They won a staggering 49% in the western part of the city while the SPD tumbled to 30%. In the east, however, the CDU took only 25%, and the SPD held onto their plurality with 32% - only a slight decline compared to June. The PDS placed third there with 24%, and won only 1% in the west. The Greens declined from their previous results but did better than in the federal election and comfortably surpassed the threshold in their respective parts of the city, though they each fell short of 5% statewide. The FDP surpassed 5% in both east and west; The Republicans fell to 3% overall (4% in the west and 2% in the east) and did not return to the Abgeordnetenhaus.

The sharpness of the geographic divide is particularly interesting. The SPD only claimed a single constituency in the west, and likewise the CDU only claimed one in the east. The PDS took a smattering of seats primarily in Mitte, Lichtenberg, Hohenschönhausen, and Marzahn. While the CDU and FDP won a clear majority in the west, they fell two seats short of a majority statewide. Given no alternative - a red-green coalition wasn't possible, and nobody was even remotely interested in touching the PDS - a grand coalition was formed.

Going forward, the size of the Abgeordnetenhaus was reduced significantly: the number of constituencies was slashed to 90 in 1995, and further to 78 in 1999, where it has remained ever since. Legally the chamber's minimum size is 130 seats, though due to the fractious nature of Berlin politics its actual size has fluctuated between 141 and 169 thanks to leveling seats. Compare and contrast this to the federal level, where the number of constituencies was only during cut down during the first Schröder government, and only by a measly 10% - from 328 to 299, compared to 248 pre-reunification.
 
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OTL Berlin by voting precinct: 2017 federal, 2019 European, 2021 state
These maps are for the real Berlin Enjoyers among us who want a far too in-depth look at voting trends in the last few years. They were pretty brutal to make but worth it because this stuff is really fascinating to me. They got jpegd by Imgur because they're too large, but hopefully it's not a big issue.

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I'll be brief for this lot, but you can see that the 2017 federal election marked a nadir in the popularity of the SPD and a strong result for The Left, especially in the west. In terms of party votes, they made a veritable stronghold out of the urban northern part of Neukölln, came out on top in Wedding and Gesundbrunnen, and made incursions into the Greens' home turf in Kreuzberg. At the same time, they suffered badly in Marzahn and Hellersdorf thanks to the rise of the AfD. Despite this, they marginally improved their overall vote share compared to 2013. The CDU, meanwhile, claimed comfortable pluralities across the west, particularly on the city periphery.

Looking at the constituency vote, the personal popularity of various candidates comes into play, as well as the advantage of incumbency. The SPD's paltry showing turned into victories in Spandau and Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf. They also managed to literally come through the middle in Neukölln as their more evenly distributed voter base beat the CDU, who were concentrated in the south, and The Left, who dropped off rapidly outside the inner urban north. Conversely, the CDU's strength in the south of Tempelhof-Schöneberg brought them victory over the SPD and Greens, who split the vote in the north. In the east, the personality factor primarily benefited The Left, especially in Treptow-Köpenick where Gregor Gysi remained unassailable. However, they were unsuccessful in claiming Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg-Prenzlauer Berg East despite the retirement of longtime representative Hans-Christian Ströbele, and the Greens held onto their only single-member constituency.

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Now, a map nobody ever asked for but one that paints a very interesting picture of what Berlin looks like at Peak Green: basically they won almost the entire city, including large swaths of the east. There isn't a lot to say here that I won't also address in the next map, but it's worth noting how well the Greens were able to penetrate in more peripheral parts of boroughs like Treptow-Köpenick and Pankow, as well as CDU strongholds like Steglitz-Zehlendorf. I was also surprised that The Left was still able to eke out pluralities in Lichtenberg and Marzahn-Hellersdorf. And if you're struggling to locate the SPD, don't worry, you're not colourblind (or maybe you are, in which case solidarity). They won only a handful of precincts, mainly in Spandau.

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Finally, last year's state election. I only have the party list vote for this one, and I don't have (satisfactory) maps for the federal election either - that's because the voting precincts for in-person votes (Wahlbezirke) and postal votes (Briefwahlbezirke) are different and thus reported separately, and are not aggregated below the constituency level. This wasn't really an issue for the previous elections, which I mapped using in-person preicincts, because results only differed to a small degree whether you included postal votes or not. This wasn't the case in 2021 since postal voting was much more widespread, accounting for almost half of all votes statewide, and the results differ a lot depending on which set you look at. Notably, the CDU performed significantly better among postal votes, likely due to their older voting base, while the AfD did far better in in-person votes because their voters are much less inclined to vote by mail. So I decided to map the postal vote precincts and manually aggregate in-person and postal votes myself. As a result, this map took much longer to make than the others. I spent several days working near-constantly on it before it was finally done. But it's accurate, so it's worth it! Right?

So the first things to notice are the broad trends: the Greens performed strongly in a ring of inner urban neighbourhoods around the city centre, with their highest support concentrated in Kreuzberg, Friedrichshain, and Prenzlauer Berg. The CDU won much of the city periphery, such as Reinickendorf, Steglitz-Zehlendorf, and the southern parts of Spandau, Tempelhof, and Marzahn-Hellersdorf (they do well in the south everywhere, apparently). The Left won traditional inner urban areas in Lichtenberg, Treptow, and the border between Mitte and Friedrichshain. The AfD was limited to its strongholds of Marzahn and Hellersdorf. The SPD basically filled the gaps everywhere else: their general, broad popularity gave them wins in basically every area. This is particularly pronounced in the east, where you can see their lighter shades soaking up precincts all over the place, particularly in Treptow-Köpenick and Pankow. One notable divergence from normal voting patterns was the SPD's especially strong performance in the south of Neukölln, which historically votes similarly to the neighbouring areas in Tempelhof. This can be attributed to Franziska Giffey's personal appeal, since she was formerly mayor of Neukölln.

There are a lot of things that can be said about how wildly different these three elections turned out looking, but I'll address one that's particularly pressing: what happened to The Left? This is fun to answer because Berlin provides a very visible example of the party's voter dynamics. Since they're the successor to the PDS they traditionally live and die by the east, particularly its protest voters, and it's no surprise that they have suffered so dramatically since AfD's rise from 2015 onwards. However, you may note that the AfD actually declined from 2017 to 2021, and you would expect this to correspond with a swing to The Left, but they actually suffered even worse. This is because, sometime around the refugee crisis, they began to see a generational shift from eastern protest voters to young urban progressives. While they previously tended much older, their voter base and membership is now among the youngest of any party. As it stands, their key to success over the last five or six years has been to balance old and new: stem the loss of their traditional protest voters while attracting new young progressive voters.

In 2017, they struck that balance, and were able to offset their losses to AfD to such a degree that they improved their overall voteshare. This is where their strength in inner urban parts of the west such as Neukölln came from; a strength they had never previously had. In 2021, by contrast, they failed the balance on both counts: protest voters abandoned them in droves while young progressives turned back to the moderate left parties. Neukölln and Friedrichshain both flipped Green, while the socialists were overcome by red and blue in the east.
 
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OTL elections: Potsdam, Rostock, Dresden
Now, some other assorted eastern cities' local elections by voting precinct. These elections took place alongside the European election and saw major surges in support for the Greens, who achieved an unprecedented level of prominence and influence in numerous cities across the country, but especially in the eastern states, where they had long been marginalised.

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The SPD, Greens, and Left each won 18-19% in this election, followed by the CDU on 12%. Andere, The Others, are a youth-oriented alternative left platform who won 10%; the AfD also won 10% but did not claim any pluralities. The Greens excelled in the city centre, while The Left's support was concentrated in the suburbs to the south and southeast, especially in the housing developments built in the 1970s. This is a trend you'll find all over the place, including in the maps to come. The Others had a local stronghold in Templiner Vorstadt, a neighbourhood opposite the city centre south of the Havel, but also eked out pluralities in a few other areas around the inner city.

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The Left won 20% with the Greens hot on their heels at 19%, followed by the CDU and SPD on 14% each. The AfD won 10% but again failed to win any precincts. Here we see a similar pattern as in Potsdam: the Greens won the city centre while The Left found its strength in DDR-era housing developments in the northwest, as well as Südstadt south of the city centre, and the Dierkow and Toitenwinkel neighbourhoods across the estuary from the city proper. The surrounding provincial areas in the east were won by the CDU and the voter group Independent Citizens for Rostock (UFR).

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Dresden, the third most populous city in the east, is a slightly different story. Located in eastern Saxony, the AfD has a particularly strong presence here - in the European election held alongside the local one, they won a narrow plurality of 20%. However, the Greens came out on top in the city council election with 20.5%. They were followed by the CDU with 18%, the AfD 17%, and Left 16%; the SPD won only 9%. The most prominent trends are that most of the area south of the Elbe is divided between the AfD and Greens. North of the river, though, the AfD is mostly supplanted by the CDU and FDP. The Greens also find their biggest stronghold here, in Neustadt opposite the old city. The CDU's dispersed support means that the only area they won solidly was Schönfeld-Weißig in the east. There results in the north were quite wacky - the CDU suffered massive swings to the FDP for some reason. The Left did best in the old city centre, though they didn't excel anywhere in particular.

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Finally a map of last year's federal election. Much like Berlin, the difference between in-person and postal votes was quite significant, so I opted to map the lowest divisions where both were reported in aggregate (in this case, the Stadtteile). This map also excludes areas the parts of Dresden II-Bautzen II outside Dresden itself, but it's only really worth noting that those municipalities voted strongly for the AfD and to a lesser degree the CDU.

Both constituencies were heavily affected by tactical voting and split tickets, though the details varied from place to place. Tactical voting against the AfD gave wins to the CDU in both constituencies despite doing no better than third place in the party vote. Lars Rohwer in Dresden II-Bautzen II recorded the lowest vote share of any victorious candidate nationwide, as well as the narrowest margin of victory (35 votes of 189,000 cast). The Left's vote also diverged in Dresden I owing to their candidate Katja Kipping, popular former party leader, who came within striking distance of winning the seat thanks to support from the SPD and Greens voters. The SPD came out on top overall in this constituency, and their candidate Rasha Nasr was elected on the party list.
 
OTL Cologne by voting precinct: 2022 state
And finally, party list vote results for Cologne in the recent North Rhine-Westphalia state election, by voting precinct.

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I don't have much to say about this since it's a lot simpler than the eastern maps, but a lot of western cities look like this lately: a three-way contest between the CDU, SPD, and Greens. In this case, the Greens clearly triumphed with 30.6%, followed by the CDU on 24.6% and the SPD on 23.2%. You can see the Greens dominate the city centre, especially a ring on the edge of the old city west of the Rhine, while the SPD find their strength east of the river and the CDU on the less urban peripheries.
 
Dresden, the third most populous city in the east, is a slightly different story. Located in eastern Saxony, the AfD has a particularly strong presence here - in the European election held alongside the local one, they won a narrow plurality of 20%. However, the Greens came out on top in the city council election with 20.5%. They were followed by the CDU with 18%, the AfD 17%, and Left 16%; the SPD won only 9%. The most prominent trends are that most of the area south of the Elbe is divided between the AfD and Greens. North of the river, though, the AfD is mostly supplanted by the CDU and FDP. The Greens also find their biggest stronghold here, in Neustadt opposite the old city. The CDU's dispersed support means that the only area they won solidly was Schönfeld-Weißig in the east. There results in the north were quite wacky - the CDU suffered massive swings to the FDP for some reason. The Left did best in the old city centre, though they didn't excel anywhere in particular.

I have a question. Do you know what happened to the tendency of the Left winning DDR-era development areas? Does it still hold or do they lose it since they only seem to perform in the city center?
 
I have a question. Do you know what happened to the tendency of the Left winning DDR-era development areas? Does it still hold or do they lose it since they only seem to perform in the city center?
It's there but to a lesser degree. If you go back to the previous city council election in 2014, The Left performed best in Gorbitz, Prohlis, and Leuben, all areas of DDR-era housing development. In 2019, their most pronounced losses were in those neighbourhoods and they were won by the AfD. The Left's best results instead came closer to the city centre alongside the Greens.

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Total Control
Full spoilers ahead for seasons 1 and 2 of ABC (Australia)'s Total Control, which is a show I highly highly recommend for fellow political and election nerds, especially of the Australian persuasion.

You don't get to lecture me anymore. to Rachel Anderson

I don't sit down with dogs. to Damien Bauer

You'll never be Prime Minister. to Laurie Martin

This is your only chance. Take it now, Paul, otherwise it won't happen. to Paul Murphy

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In-depth explanation of how I sourced everything:
UPDATE 4/4/23: after rewatching the show with my girlfriend I noticed a few details which led me to update the wikiboxes; changes are reflected here in bold.

To start with the basics: the two parties are never explicitly identified as the Liberal/National Coalition and the Labor Party, but it's obvious that they're meant to be. The government are regularly referred to as "the coalition", use blue in all their branding, have a conflict between moderates and the hard right, and the Nationals are even given a couple passing mentions. The other party is almost always referred to as "the opposition", but again they use red in all their branding. And, as an Australian, the tone and discussion around both of them is immediately familiar. The Greens are freely discussed, albeit without many details.

There is a surprising amount of detail about the timeframe of events, especially in the first season. Firstly, Marcie Maclean's death and Alex's appointment to the Senate happen at pretty much the same time, and Marcie's date of death is given as 16 February 2019. The whole plotline with the military base takes place in mid-April 2019 as indicated by a number of dates shown at the start of episode three, culminating in the spill against Anderson the next week (I've placed it on the 22nd.) Alex mentions in Season 2 that she was a Senator for six months; her mother's grave also gives her date of death as 25 August (albeit in 2021 - there are an annoying number of continuity errors.) For this reason I have moved the spill forward to August, which flows on to push back all other events by the same period. The climactic toppling of the PM takes place on 3 May (2 September), which can be seen on Alex's phone while she's in the chamber (true but invalidated). The time skip at the start of season two is given as three months, which for simplicity I interpreted literally, putting the start of events on 3 August (2 December). Approximately three days pass before the election is called, and the news report notes the campaign period will be 38 days, placing the election neatly on Saturday 14 September (Saturday 11 January). I skimmed through episodes four and five and found that approximately ten days pass between the election and the motion of confidence, hence 24 September (21 January).

I'll go through each graphic one by one and explain the terms in detail. The result of the leadership spill against Anderson is helpfully given as 45 to 38, so there's little to explain there. The tallies of the supply bill and motion of no confidence are also both stated. The latter is consistent with the government's one-seat Senate majority, given that Alex and three of Bauer's allies crossed the floor while Mortensen voted in favour. Apart from this, though, the state of the opposition and crossbench in the Senate isn't discussed in either season, so I just had to reason it out: I gave Labor and the Greens the same number of seats they held IOTL at the time, and threw in a United Christians Senator as well since they seem to fill the role of a significant minor party on the right-wing fringe.

The composition of the House in season one is never really discussed. Anderson mentions having a one-seat majority but it's ambiguous whether she's referring to the House or the Senate; nonetheless, with three Coalition MPs crossing the floor for the no-confidence motion and the result being 76 to 74, this implies they have 77 seats. However, since George and Shaun are both noted to be incumbents in season two, I decided to give the Coalition 76 seats and explain the extra vote by having George side with them. Naturally, Shaun votes for the motion, and with no evidence of any other crossbenchers, this leaves Labor with 72 seats.

The aftermath of Anderson's toppling is not actually explored, but it's obvious that she immediately resigned and was succeeded by Bauer, who probably won unopposed.

On to season two. No actual numbers are given for the federal election result beyond the seat tallies on election night, which ends as 72 Labor, 71 Coalition, one Green, five Independents, and two seats still unclear. Based on the government-forming arithmetic from episodes 5 and 6, those two ended up being split between the major parties. Since this is an election with a big surge in minor parties and independents, I used the 2022 election as a base and made some adjustments that seemed reasonable: boosting the Coalition vote and reducing the Greens vote, and retrospectively increasing Labor's 2016 vote a bit to reflect the higher seat tally they came in with. The TPP was pretty arbitrary, but naturally it had to be very close. Shaun Keogh is never said to be nor really implied to be leader of the Greens. However, since his position is obviously modeled after Adam Bandt - sole Green in the House, from inner-city Melbourne, etc - and there are no other Greens in the show, it was easier to make him leader.

For the map, I used 2019 as the base and adjusted as necessary. Firstly, locations are given for some of the crossbenchers' seats. The easiest is Anderson's seat of North Sydney, which exists in real life. After that, Freeman is also super easy since it's literally Maranoa - they used modified maps of it when showing the electorate in the show. Interestingly, they also changed the names of various local government areas (including Winton, for some reason) as well as the names of some surrounding electorates, which I also reflected on the map. George's seat of Illingworth is said to be in northern WA, and given that Durack covers literally all of northern WA, it can't be anything else. I placed Shaun's seat of Tucker in Bandt's electorate, Melbourne, for obvious reasons. Phillipa (Smithvale) and Justin (Foster) were a bit trickier. The only detail given was their state. I decided to put Smithvale in Mayo on the basis that Phillipa, at least to me, feels inspired by Rebekha Sharkie - a female independent from SA with a legal background - and I had nothing else to go off of. Justin is described as a "family values" guy, a religious conservative but not a loony, and a strong advocate for multicultural issues. After fishing around a bit I decided that Tangney in Perth was the best fit. It clearly leans right, but not excessively so, and is a diverse electorate with a sizable Chinese-Australian community (which, going by his name, Yang is a part of.) To get the major parties' seat tallies right, I just flipped the Coalition's four most marginal seats (Bass, Chisholm, Boothby, and Swan) to Labor. Timothy Knight is mentioned as the premier of Queensland and implied to be Coalition ("our colleague"), meaning he must be the LNP leader. John Doe is a placeholder.

Some tiny details I nonetheless put thought into: Lennox, Helena Rossi's seat, is said to be in Sydney. I didn't have a lot to go off there, but I placed it in Michell based on little more than vibes. I also headcanon Wran (the western Sydney seat Laurie parachutes Alex into) as Reid since it's both diverse and marginal. However, there's enough contradictory evidence that I didn't include it on the map. It seems to me that the writers intended it to be further west, given Alex's "because they're brown and I'm black?" quip; likewise, the scenes there appear to be filmed in Cabramatta, which is in Fowler. However, Fowler is a very safe Labor seat (until this year, anyway.) This is all at least a tiny bit relevant because Alex mentions that Wran is "next to" Paul's seat - based on that I placed him in Blaxland, which is positioned such that Wran could correspond to either Reid or Fowler, or another seat nearby. In S02E06, Paul's seat is specified to be Locke, which I reflected on the map. Finally, you may have noticed the picks I made for Bauer and Martin. Neither of them ever have their electorates specified, (Bauer's seat is given as Lester in S02E04) but there are some clues. Most concretely, the Labor office has a bunch of posters promoting "Laurie Martin for Gellibrand", which is a weird thing to have plastered around in Sydney, but it's useful for my purposes. The only clues about Bauer are that he's from Queensland and he's in a safe seat - Fadden was an arbitrary pick, but it works.

No specific numbers are mentioned for Alex or Rachel's results in their electorates, but I calculated based on my own reckoning and trends from this year's election, which had no shortage of independent challenges to look at. The previous result in Freeman is given as 57% Ramsay, 25% Labor, 15% United Christians, and independents no more than 4%. Probably not a coincidence that this corresponds pretty well with Maranoa's 2019 result (56% LNP, 16% Labor, 15% One Nation, 13% others.) It's also mentioned later in the campaign that Alex is level with Labor on primary polling. Since she won, she evidently drew ahead. There are also only four candidates on the ballot. I basically just extrapolated an educated guess at the result based on similar contests. North Sydney was easier in this respect since this exact teal-type challenge unfolded in real life earlier this year. While all the names in Freeman are canonical, only Rachel and Mima Scott are specified for North Sydney, everyone else is an extrapolation/speculation. The existence of a Greens candidate is implied at one point, obviously Labor will run, and I threw in the CDP and Sustainable Aus as parties you'd expect to see in a seat like this. I used the 2022 candidates for these (except the CDP who didn't run this year, so I used the 2019 candidate.) North Sydney is noted to be marginal, which is a divergence from real life where it's safe Liberal. Nonetheless I assumed that a decline in the Labor and Greens vote would prevent much of a swing in two-party-preferred terms.

Now the personal wikiboxes. All of them are styled "MP" for obvious reasons; all except Alex get "The Honourable" because they're PMs or former PMs. For the dates of birth I used those of the actors, and for the place of birth I just went with the places they represent in parliament (including Bauer in Brisbane/Gold Coast which is, again, a guess.) Hamish Gordon is the late Senator whose vacancy Alex is appointed to fill, while Mikayla Baines is a generated name - I figured Bauer might appoint a woman to replace her for optics' sake. Rachel mentions that Alex served three terms on the local shire council for the party, hence the join date of 2008. How and when Rachel became PM is never discussed; Marcus Campbell is a generated name, and I picked 15 September 2015 because it was the day Malcolm Turnbull rolled Abbott. If I'm going to pick an arbitrary past date, I might as well give it some significance. It also suggests that she came to power in a spill, which is on brand considering the first season is an utterly unsubtle allegory for the real-world factional feud in the Liberal Party. She mentions being in parliament for 17 years, hence incumbent since 2002. Joining the party in 1990 was an arbitrary pick but it gives the sense that she spent a long time working her way up. Bauer's predecessor and successor as immigration minister are generated names. Rachel, Bauer, and Paul's predecessors in their electorates are taken from reality.

For the table showing the crossbenchers, I already explained everything except their tenure. While Alex, Phillipa, and Justin are all newcomers, George and Shaun are both incumbents. George is obviously modeled on Bob Katter, who first ran as an independent in 2001, which I adjusted to 2002 to align with Rachel under the assumption there was a federal election that year. I made Shaun a member since 2010 because of the Bandt parallels.

Numbers are not given for the spill against Laurie. We also don't know how many seats Labor has in the Senate and thus how big the party room is, but I just stuck to the 26 which I used for the Senate vote table, giving them 99. I assumed the spill would be close but not super close and went with 56 to 43. For the final motion of confidence, the arithmetic is thoroughly explained in the show. That should be everything! Let me know if I missed anything. And yes, I absolutely thought about this far too much, but I had an absolute blast.
 
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1996 Berlin-Brandenburg referendum (OTL)
German federalism is a curious thing. From a collection of tribes during Roman times to the haphazard feudalism of the Holy Roman Empire, the region has only very rarely been united under a single authority. After the Napoleonic wars, the dramatic simplification of the German Confederation and preeminence of Austria and Prussia eventually enabled Germany to unite as one country. Even then, beyond annexing some minor states in the north, Prussia was unable to assert itself totally over the other states, especially in the south. Thus the German Empire became a federation. After the 1918 revolution, the monarchies were abolished but the states remained, largely with the same geography. The question of federalism was discussed frequently during the Weimar Republic. What place did it have in a modern, republican Germany? Should Prussia be dismantled? What should be done about the differing attitudes towards autonomy in the north and south? All this fell to the wayside after the Nazi seizure of power. The president's powers were abused to depose the states and subjugate them to the Reich government. For the first time, Germany operated under a de facto unitary authority. After the war, the Allies opted to establish regional administrations in their occupation zones. In the west, these went onto to form the basis of the new Federal Republic of Germany, whose Basic Law provided for a strong and robust federal system. In the East, the states were abolished in 1952.

The defining feature of German federalism, therefore, is that it's kind of arbitrary. In the imperial era, the states reflected the holdings of various royal dynasties; in the post-war era, they mainly reflect administrative decisions made by the occupying nations. For this reason, reorganisation of the states has been discussed often. The first major move on this front was the unification of the southwestern states into Baden-Württemberg in 1952. The region had been arbitrarily divided between the US and France in 1945, and awkwardly split into three states afterwards. A referendum in 1951 saw a clear majority in favour of unifying all three into a single state, though the people of Baden were less enthusiastic (it was a whole ordeal.) During the Cold War, the question was mainly asked in relation to the two city-states, Bremen and Hamburg. The former retained its independence mainly because it had been a US-administered port during the occupation, enclaved within the British-administered Lower Saxony. Due to the legal complications of getting this off the ground, however, little was done to advance the idea of further reorganisation.

In 1990, Germany reunified. The legal process of doing this entailed the admission of new states to the Federal Republic. In addition to Berlin, five new eastern states were drawn up based on the pre-1952 states. The arbitrary nature of the division brought the question of federalism to the forefront once again, especially since those in the east had lived the last four decades under a unitary system.

Just a few months after reunification, in February 1991, the Berlin parliament endorsed unification with the surrounding state of Brandenburg. Of all proposed state reforms, this one made the most sense in the eyes of many. Both were newly-admitted states; Berlin in particular had been divided for decades and didn't hold a lot of sentimental value in its statehood. The two states shared a huge amount of infrastructure and media, and were reliant on one another economically. Hundreds of thousands of people lived in one state and worked in the other. A union between the two seemed logical.

At the beginning of 1992, the Berlin and Brandenburg state governments formed a joint commission to work out how to proceed. In December they presented a plan for unification to take place in 1999, with a treaty to be negotiated and ratified during 1993-94, culminating in a referendum to approve it. Things were proceeding smoothly and the drafting process took place throughout 1993. However, things came to a screeching halt at the end of the year as the states could not agree on issues of finance. This required the intervention of the federal parliament to approve a transitional model which would make both states happy. On top of this, constitutional issues were raised over the prospect of state mergers, necessitating an amendment to the Basic Law enabling them to unite via mutual consent. The first draft of the Berlin-Brandenburg treaty was presented in June 1994, well behind schedule. After some further hammering out, it was signed and ratified in mid-1995.

It's worth noting that, at this point, the overwhelming majority in politics and civic affairs supported unification of the two states. All parties except the PDS were officially in favour of the treaty - it passed the Berlin parliament 188 to 42, and Brandenburg's 64 to 24. However, there was dissent. A number of SPD associations in Brandenburg had issues, as did the Brandenburg Greens and some of the Berlin Greens. Arguments in favour of unification included the economic benefits to both states, greater influence in federal and European affairs, more efficient administration and planning, and the cultural unity of a region which had deep historic ties. On the other side, opponents insisted that bilateral agreements could resolve any conflicts or administrative issues. They also raised concerns over mutual mistrust between the two states, both of which feared the other would dominate a united state. They also noted the poor financial situation of Berlin, which would require special contribution from the rest of the state, as well as the excess pressure unification would place on a city which was already dealing with an influx of government institutions as the new federal capital.

Notably, both sides viewed unification as part of a wider rethinking of the federal system: supporters viewed it as a first step to kickstart the process, while opponents insisted that more fundamental reform should come first to ensure a satisfactory outcome for Berlin and Brandenburg.

Both states held joint referendums on 5 May 1996 to approve the merger. Given the delays in the treaty process, a second question was also asked: if approved, should unification take place in 1999 as originally planned, or be pushed back to 2002?

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In an upset, the merger was harshly rejected. Every district in Brandenburg returned a clear majority against. East Berlin also voted against by a slimmer margin, while West Berlin comfortably approved. Overall turnout was 61.5% - higher in Brandenburg (66.4%) and lower in Berlin (57.7%). In post-analysis, a number of factors were identified for the result. Brandenburgers predominantly feared they would be overpowered by the more populous Berlin, and would be forced to subsidise the city while becoming little more than the forgotten hinterland of the federal capital. Berliners generally favoured the lower administrative costs of a united state, but the loss of city-state status gave many pause, as did the fact that Potsdam was to be the capital.

There were also clear demographic trends in the result: strong supporters included the self-employed (68% in Berlin, 52% in Brandenburg) and pensioners (69% in Berlin, 59% in Brandenburg), while opposition was found among workers (49% in Berlin, 70% in Brandenburg) and the unemployed (45% in Berlin, 65% in Brandenburg). This was reflected in the geography of the vote, with wealthier boroughs in West Berlin delivering strong "yes" votes. The starkest differences, however, were found in age. Younger people clearly opposed the merger - 76% of 18-24 year olds in Brandenburg voted against, as did 54% in Berlin. On the other end of the spectrum, 70% of over 60s in Berlin and 61% in Brandenburg voted in favour.

Responses to the second question were mixed. A huge number of "no" voters spoiled their ballots or left them blank. Overall, the 1999 option received 33.0% of votes compared to 29.7% for 2002, with the remaining 37.2% being invalid. This number rose to a staggering 45% in Brandenburg. For comparison, less than 1% of responses to the first question were invalid. Looking at valid votes, Berliners preferred the original year by a margin of 39.0% to 31.0%, while Brandenburg chose the later date 28.4% to 26.5%. The trends were similar to the first question, with the 1999 supported by "yes"-voting areas and most Berlin boroughs. 2002 won in most of Brandenburg, and did particularly well in Potsdam and Frankfurt an der Oder. However, a few districts containing suburbs around Berlin did deliver slim pluralities for 1999. Overall, though, every district in Brandenburg recorded more invalid votes than either 1999 or 2002 votes.

Despite the insistence of the "no" camp, the referendum's defeat brought an end to serious discussion of federal reform. No referendums for any federal reorganisation have taken place since, and the question of federalism has mostly remained closed. On the Berlin-Brandenburg front, the fears of the "yes" camp were realised as the governments struggled to coordinate their priorities over the following decade, to the detriment of citizens in both states. With time, though, the difficulties were ironed out. Thanks to numerous agreements and treaties signed since, they cooperate widely in areas such as planning, transport, judiciary, and communications. In fact, the locations of various joint courts were drawn directly from Article 47 of the failed state treaty.

Still, 1996 wasn't the end of the debate. After the 1999 elections, the parliaments of both states affirmed their commitment to a "second attempt". The SPD-PDS government formed in Berlin in 2002 planned to hold another referendum in 2006, which came to nothing thanks in part to Berlin's continued financial issues. The conversation remained active for some years, though, with the Brandenburg CDU expressing support for unification as late as its 2009 election programme. Party positions have also shifted with time: the Greens, who opposed the 1996 referendum, had changed their tune by 2004 and have since been among the strongest proponents of the idea. Faction leader for the Berlin Greens Antje Kapek called it a "great idea" in 2019, and the Brandenburg Greens expressed in-principle support in their 2019 election programme. For other parties, though, it's fallen by the wayside. The Brandenburg SPD abandoned it by the mid-2000s. Just this year, Berlin mayor Franziska Giffey dismissed the merger as a non-issue; Brandenburg premier Dietmar Woidke also spoke out against it in 2021. A lot has changed since the 1990s, and the prevailing attitude today seems to be that there is simply too much baggage and not enough benefit.
 
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