History Learner
Well-known member
Strange as it seems to us now, during the early phases of the "Unipolar Moment" and enduring for at least the entirety of the 1990s, there actually was some very strong indications to suggest Mexico could plausibly be added to the United States. Noel Maurer had this to say some years ago:
Noel worked for the U.S. Federal Government for about two years in Mexico and is an Associate Professor at GWU, so he does have some credentials to be speaking on this. As for the Este País poll, here is a citation of it. Just shy of a decade later they asked the same question again and found the support had endured. Outside of the 59% supporting it on the pre-condition of improved living standards, 21% supported doing such without any pre-conditions.
The easiest PoD is probably to have the 1988 election directly spiral into a Second Mexican Civil War, which was actually pretty close to happening IOTL. For various reasons, I'll look at another PoD which indirectly causes the above via Saddam's Iraq and its war with Iran in the 1980s. How? Have Saddam be successfully assassinated at Dujail in 1982 by Kurdish fighters, which was a near miss. In the event of the death of Saddam, given the purges he had previously conducted, it's likely Ad-Douri or Khairallah Talfah would take power. Both have their issues, but would still definitely be better than Saddam in that they would more willing to let the Iraqi Army engage in offensives and counter-offensives against the Iranians. Saddam IOTL was pretty reluctant for many years to allow such, resulting in the relatively static war that dominated much of that conflict.
With a more competent Iraqi leadership from 1982 onward, it's likely the conflict could end sooner via greater exhaustion of the Iranians. Aiding this would probably be stepped up support by the Superpowers to Iraq, in order to prevent a decisive Iranian victory. The Soviets in particular would increase their material aid and training efforts to the Iraqi Army, likely on the pre-condition of improving relations with Syria. Overall, I see the war ending much sooner but along the same lines as OTL; let's say 1985. With the war over, both Iran and Iraq re-enter the global oil market and the Tanker War is avoided. Thanks to improved ties with Syria, the pipeline to the Mediterranean is reopened in 1985 a few months after the end of the war. The Saudis also still open the floodgates of their own production but slightly ahead of OTL's schedule, thanks to pressure from the Iraqis and Iranians being back on the market.
This has the effect of massively driving down oil prices from 1985 onward, at a time Mexico was struggling with its own debt crisis. The collapse in oil prices would deepen this by removing the main Mexican export, to make repayment impossible without greater austerity which would obviously undermine the PRI regime. An OTL example of this in action, funnily enough, is the crisis of the late 1980s in the East Bloc. So by 1988 you have increasingly declining living standards due to austerity and an overall collapsing economy just as the PRI has to blatantly steal an election. Once that occurs, it's likely the situation spirals out of control with widespread violence and civil disorder making Mexico ungovernable. Such a situation, by default, would be intolerable for the United States because of the risk of violence spilling across the border, waves of refugees and the fact Mexico completely defaulting on its loan repayments would create a 2008-style crash in the Banking Industry, creating an intense political need to do something and do it now. This would likely require some sort of intervention, as the ruling PRI-regime is discredited but the opposition would not offer a meaningful alternative at this point, at least from U.S. interests. Perhaps military, but also economic and political. As the U.S. goes about the difficult task of propping Mexico up, it's likely the annexationist sympathies would come to the fore because it would be clear to the average Mexican that Mexico as an entity has failed while the U.S. provides a meaningful degree of security and prosperity. From there, you get a cascade effect, with Mexican States increasing petitioning for annexation.
For a real world model of this in action, see both the GOP and Democrats IOTL putting Puerto Rican Statehood on the Agenda. Unlike Puerto Rico, however, Mexican-Americans compose a major political bloc, especially in major states like Texas and California, while the financial classes would be more apt to push for it in order to ensure repayment of the debt, at least in some form. With this confluence of incentives, I see annexation being achieved by the early 1990s, likely on the basis of a national vote within the rebuilding Mexico.
So what would be the ramifications of this, first domestically? For that, I turn to NAFTA Is Not Enough: Steps toward a North American Community by Robert Pastor, Brookings Institution Press (2002):
It would be in the range of $10-20 Billion per year for 10 years for Mexico to develop it's infrastructure to first world standards. In the 1990s, the money was certainly there for that; the Peace Dividend meant defense spending fell from $305 Billion in 1990 to $271 Billion per annum in 1996. As Pastor notes, this investment would also incur indirect benefits to justify it, because this infrastructure project would increase consumption and that would benefit American businesses. Education funding and infrastructure development together would likewise result private investment chasing the Federal investment, reducing the incentive to move elsewhere by creating opportunities in the new Mexican States. Most of the immigration influx in the 2000s was driven by the impacts of NAFTA, which won't exist here.
However, I don't think these new opportunities need come at the expense of the existing U.S. States. A big allure of Mexico for American business was the lower wages, lack of labor rights, and comparatively low environmental standards, which was no longer hold here. Old Mexico would be subjected to the same minimum wage and pollution restrictions as the Old U.S. states, which while an improvement for the inhabitants of the U.S. States would also discourage the old ones to ship their industry there to the same extent. Certainly there would still be some-after all, the South did attract Midwestern industry in the late few decades of the 20th Century-but it wouldn't be enough in my estimation. Politically, the fact these jobs were staying in America would also help.
Expanding on the politics of it from an American context, there's a lot there for both parties. To focus in on the Republicans, in both 1988 and 1992 they won roughly 30% of the Hispanic vote; this isn't Detroit level margins at all. Likewise, the GOP is big tent composed of several different groups. Business interests in the party would be behind this, for the reasons outlined by Pastor of an expanded Mexican market to compete in, while Evangelicals would be all about it for the strengthening of the Moral Majority. What other groups of real power are left at that point to be opposed? Immigration Restrictionism wouldn't be as an easy of sell given they are now fellow Americans and the GOP of then isn't the same of today; the Sierra Club was Leftist in general bent and Barbara Jordan was a Democrat.
How about the overall political structure? In 1990 the U.S. had a population of 250 Million while Mexico was at 84 Million. Under the OTL 1990 level of ~466,000 voters per electoral vote, the Mexican States would receive 180 ECs as a collective whole. Presuming a wave a wave of Democrat-voting ex Mexicans turn the Southwest Blue a generation early and Working Class White resentment in the Midwest did the same, the Mexican States voting GOP would balance it out; Mexico and the South would become the GOP's base from which they could contest the Presidency. The overall stance on economics would turn populist sooner, but Democrats wouldn't mind that and we know the GOP under the right circumstances would feel the same.
Finally, on a note for the polling of Mexicans at this time, 59% supported annexation if it increased their living standards. Another 25% supported such without any pre-conditions. What I have not been able to determine is if this subject was a part of the 59% or in an addition. American minimum wage standards, an infrastructure investment scheme, education funding, pollution control and, finally, American Law and Order would certainly be attractive overall, and if the 25% is a part of that 59%, then they were strong feelings in the direction of annexation anyway. If the 25% is not, then you're looking at over 80% of Mexicans being open to the idea overall, and the benefits could seal the deal.
Noel wrote:
> ---Hell, while I'm here:
>
> A 1991 poll by the magazine Este País showed, to the
> astonishment of the organizers, that 59 percent of
> respondents would be in favor of forming a single
> country with the United States if it resulted in
> an improvement in their standard of living.
>
> So don't be so sure about the strength of Mexican
> nationalism. There is a film of anti-Americanism
> in the middle class. It is loud, and it causes
> Mexican presidents to tread carefully. But it
> does not run very deep.
Noel worked for the U.S. Federal Government for about two years in Mexico and is an Associate Professor at GWU, so he does have some credentials to be speaking on this. As for the Este País poll, here is a citation of it. Just shy of a decade later they asked the same question again and found the support had endured. Outside of the 59% supporting it on the pre-condition of improved living standards, 21% supported doing such without any pre-conditions.
The easiest PoD is probably to have the 1988 election directly spiral into a Second Mexican Civil War, which was actually pretty close to happening IOTL. For various reasons, I'll look at another PoD which indirectly causes the above via Saddam's Iraq and its war with Iran in the 1980s. How? Have Saddam be successfully assassinated at Dujail in 1982 by Kurdish fighters, which was a near miss. In the event of the death of Saddam, given the purges he had previously conducted, it's likely Ad-Douri or Khairallah Talfah would take power. Both have their issues, but would still definitely be better than Saddam in that they would more willing to let the Iraqi Army engage in offensives and counter-offensives against the Iranians. Saddam IOTL was pretty reluctant for many years to allow such, resulting in the relatively static war that dominated much of that conflict.
With a more competent Iraqi leadership from 1982 onward, it's likely the conflict could end sooner via greater exhaustion of the Iranians. Aiding this would probably be stepped up support by the Superpowers to Iraq, in order to prevent a decisive Iranian victory. The Soviets in particular would increase their material aid and training efforts to the Iraqi Army, likely on the pre-condition of improving relations with Syria. Overall, I see the war ending much sooner but along the same lines as OTL; let's say 1985. With the war over, both Iran and Iraq re-enter the global oil market and the Tanker War is avoided. Thanks to improved ties with Syria, the pipeline to the Mediterranean is reopened in 1985 a few months after the end of the war. The Saudis also still open the floodgates of their own production but slightly ahead of OTL's schedule, thanks to pressure from the Iraqis and Iranians being back on the market.
This has the effect of massively driving down oil prices from 1985 onward, at a time Mexico was struggling with its own debt crisis. The collapse in oil prices would deepen this by removing the main Mexican export, to make repayment impossible without greater austerity which would obviously undermine the PRI regime. An OTL example of this in action, funnily enough, is the crisis of the late 1980s in the East Bloc. So by 1988 you have increasingly declining living standards due to austerity and an overall collapsing economy just as the PRI has to blatantly steal an election. Once that occurs, it's likely the situation spirals out of control with widespread violence and civil disorder making Mexico ungovernable. Such a situation, by default, would be intolerable for the United States because of the risk of violence spilling across the border, waves of refugees and the fact Mexico completely defaulting on its loan repayments would create a 2008-style crash in the Banking Industry, creating an intense political need to do something and do it now. This would likely require some sort of intervention, as the ruling PRI-regime is discredited but the opposition would not offer a meaningful alternative at this point, at least from U.S. interests. Perhaps military, but also economic and political. As the U.S. goes about the difficult task of propping Mexico up, it's likely the annexationist sympathies would come to the fore because it would be clear to the average Mexican that Mexico as an entity has failed while the U.S. provides a meaningful degree of security and prosperity. From there, you get a cascade effect, with Mexican States increasing petitioning for annexation.
For a real world model of this in action, see both the GOP and Democrats IOTL putting Puerto Rican Statehood on the Agenda. Unlike Puerto Rico, however, Mexican-Americans compose a major political bloc, especially in major states like Texas and California, while the financial classes would be more apt to push for it in order to ensure repayment of the debt, at least in some form. With this confluence of incentives, I see annexation being achieved by the early 1990s, likely on the basis of a national vote within the rebuilding Mexico.
So what would be the ramifications of this, first domestically? For that, I turn to NAFTA Is Not Enough: Steps toward a North American Community by Robert Pastor, Brookings Institution Press (2002):
From the lessons learned from the EU, the three governments should establish a North American Development Fund that would concentrate on investing in infrastructure from the border to the center of the country. If roads are built, investors will come and fewer people would emigrate. A second objective should be education. In the mid-1980s, Spain and Portugal had an educational profile comparable to Mexico’s, but an infusion of EU funds into higher education had a profound effect, more than doubling enrollment. In contrast, Mexico’s level of tertiary education has remained the same. The additional benefit of supporting higher education in remote areas is that these new institutions could become centers for development, and students and professors could help upgrade elementary and secondary schools in the area. That is what Spain and Portugal did.
Instead of creating a new bureaucracy or modifying the North American Development Bank, which has neither the experience nor the mandate, the North American Development Fund should be administered by the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. If the United States contributed at the EU level, that would amount to $400 billion. This figure is useful for alerting Americans to the magnitude of the EU commitment and the meagerness of North America’s, but no one believes it is possible at the current time. The World Bank has estimated that Mexico needs $20 billion a year for ten years just to upgrade its infrastructure. A development fund that could loan, say, half of that would have a significant impact on Mexico and North America. Fox has proposed that all three governments contribute in proportion to the size of their economies. The United States’ contribution would be the largest of the three but could be in callable capital or loan guarantees. It would be roughly comparable to the amount that the United States contributed to the Alliance for Progress forty years ago. Mexicans already buy more per capita from the United States than any other country except Canada. Stimulating Mexico’s growth, therefore, would have a double return on the investment.
It would be in the range of $10-20 Billion per year for 10 years for Mexico to develop it's infrastructure to first world standards. In the 1990s, the money was certainly there for that; the Peace Dividend meant defense spending fell from $305 Billion in 1990 to $271 Billion per annum in 1996. As Pastor notes, this investment would also incur indirect benefits to justify it, because this infrastructure project would increase consumption and that would benefit American businesses. Education funding and infrastructure development together would likewise result private investment chasing the Federal investment, reducing the incentive to move elsewhere by creating opportunities in the new Mexican States. Most of the immigration influx in the 2000s was driven by the impacts of NAFTA, which won't exist here.
However, I don't think these new opportunities need come at the expense of the existing U.S. States. A big allure of Mexico for American business was the lower wages, lack of labor rights, and comparatively low environmental standards, which was no longer hold here. Old Mexico would be subjected to the same minimum wage and pollution restrictions as the Old U.S. states, which while an improvement for the inhabitants of the U.S. States would also discourage the old ones to ship their industry there to the same extent. Certainly there would still be some-after all, the South did attract Midwestern industry in the late few decades of the 20th Century-but it wouldn't be enough in my estimation. Politically, the fact these jobs were staying in America would also help.
Expanding on the politics of it from an American context, there's a lot there for both parties. To focus in on the Republicans, in both 1988 and 1992 they won roughly 30% of the Hispanic vote; this isn't Detroit level margins at all. Likewise, the GOP is big tent composed of several different groups. Business interests in the party would be behind this, for the reasons outlined by Pastor of an expanded Mexican market to compete in, while Evangelicals would be all about it for the strengthening of the Moral Majority. What other groups of real power are left at that point to be opposed? Immigration Restrictionism wouldn't be as an easy of sell given they are now fellow Americans and the GOP of then isn't the same of today; the Sierra Club was Leftist in general bent and Barbara Jordan was a Democrat.
How about the overall political structure? In 1990 the U.S. had a population of 250 Million while Mexico was at 84 Million. Under the OTL 1990 level of ~466,000 voters per electoral vote, the Mexican States would receive 180 ECs as a collective whole. Presuming a wave a wave of Democrat-voting ex Mexicans turn the Southwest Blue a generation early and Working Class White resentment in the Midwest did the same, the Mexican States voting GOP would balance it out; Mexico and the South would become the GOP's base from which they could contest the Presidency. The overall stance on economics would turn populist sooner, but Democrats wouldn't mind that and we know the GOP under the right circumstances would feel the same.
Finally, on a note for the polling of Mexicans at this time, 59% supported annexation if it increased their living standards. Another 25% supported such without any pre-conditions. What I have not been able to determine is if this subject was a part of the 59% or in an addition. American minimum wage standards, an infrastructure investment scheme, education funding, pollution control and, finally, American Law and Order would certainly be attractive overall, and if the 25% is a part of that 59%, then they were strong feelings in the direction of annexation anyway. If the 25% is not, then you're looking at over 80% of Mexicans being open to the idea overall, and the benefits could seal the deal.