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For discussion of the blogpost Operation Sea Lion – the unmentionable sea mammal.
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In many organisations, there can be a disconnect between what is feasible and what those at the top want to believe is feasible. I think they were serious about wanting to carry out Sea Lion, or something like it, but the planning and development stage uncovered a lot of issues that those in the chain of command had previously glossed over with "Well, we'll think of something as we go through the plan, surely"
It's hard for many people, especially those in power, to accept their first impressions were wrong. The invasion of the Soviet Union uncovered just as many elements that could be viewed in calm retrospect as idiocy.
Oh, I agree with you that they very possibly wouldn't have ended up trying it after all - but I do think they were genuinely serious in their intent in the first place.Maybe but it was idiocy generally believed by everyone including the Western Allies and Stalin himself since he was apparently considering suicide. And it took months for the wheels to come off and years for the full scale of the fuck up to become clear. I don't think you can say the same for 'we can't even train without people drowning' or 'the RAF and RN still exist despite Goering promising on a stack of looted bibles that they would be broken by now' I'm sure other doubts like that would prevent them just making a go of it.
Oh, I agree with you that they very possibly wouldn't have ended up trying it after all - but I do think they were genuinely serious in their intent in the first place.
It's only when they got to the brass tacks of detail that they were unable to continue glossing over things.
To be honest, the one thing above all that leaped out at me during my staff course at Shrivenham when we looked into things from the past was "What in hell were they thinking?"
Again and again and again. It took a while before I adjusted to accept that people at the time had a confused picture and were labouring under a mental picture that was fashioned over time in a way we hadn't had. "The bomber will always get through" was a particular one.
"No, we don't want convoys in the Atlantic; that's a defensive measure and wars are not won by defence"
"What is this 'Leigh Light' thing? No, we won't fund it or accelerate development; it wasn't invented by the right person in the right organisation"
"Let's just give the crap to Coastal Command; Bomber Command is our attack force and must always get the cream of the crop. What do you mean - losing the Battle of the Atlantic is the only thing that would really knock us out of the war? Shut up and get on with it. You've got biplanes, haven't you?"
Ahem.
Sorry. The Battle of the Atlantic was my primary essay topic, and I could get ranty when arguing with other officers who were leading on the Battle of Britain or the Battle of Germany.
Racism played a massive part in a lot of the mistakes, the contempt for the Soviets from German commanders.
God knows what they were smoking for Sealion, probably just convinced that with no continental allies the British would fold so actually invading was a problem to blue sky think about in the unimaginable event they wouldn't.
I think there was also a certain arrogance and excessive self-belief, not completely without cause.
"We've sent our armour through the Ardennes!"
"Everyone said it would be lunacy to outrace supply lines but we invented the blitzkrieg, which won the Battle of France in weeks, when in the last war, we couldn't get to Paris in four years"
"We swatted the French out of the air and kicked the RAF out of the French skies"
It's natural to respond to "That's not possible" with "Just watch us! We'll come up with something". Especially at the top ranks - Hitler was totally convinced he was a military genius.
Couple that with the the reluctance to pass up "That actually IS impossible, sir" all the way to the Fuhrer, and add in the belief from experience that a good kick would bring down their enemy and get them to sue for peace, and you have an environment where accepting the difficulties would genuinely be too great would not be welcome.
You can see the belief that maybe they'd be able to knock out the RAF quickly and then use their dive bombers to harass the RN to the point where they'd be so busy trying to defend themselves, it would be possible to get across the Channel. Get forces to Kent and they'd be only a few dozen miles from London. Get to London, and the Brits would certainly surrender like the French had when they got to Paris.
"Um, sir - it'd take thirty hours to get across the Channel. Maybe fifty"
- "Don't be ridiculous! Come up with a solution. It's only a dozen or so miles - give me a way of getting a dozen divisions across faster than that!"
"No, seriously, sir. We've tried it with river barges. They swamp"
- "Stop whining to me with problems and get me solutions, then!"
"And the Navy and Army aren't willing to co-operate very well"
- "Understandable. The most honour comes with the most glory"
Bad decisions were endemic. The RAF, for example, did better in dogfights than they should have done thanks to the Luftwaffe's Cult of the Red Baron - German pilots would hold off of the kill sometimes because the senior pilot in the squadron was supposed to get the kill and run up their own tally to overtake the Red Baron from the last war.
I think no "Miracle of Dunkirk" is a more interesting PoD - not because it makes Sealion any more likely, but because of the impact of that on the British psyche. Add to that a perception of the RAF 'losing' by having to withdraw from the southern airfields, and things might be different. Not in a "now the Germans can invade" sort of a way, but in a "the British might give up" way.
But then that isn't Sealion
Or rather it falls into the 'yes a Nazi invasion of Britain is possible, but only if you change so much beforehand it's not the one that was actually planned.' category
Oddly enough I was at the Operation Dynamo exhibition at Dover Castle yesterday and the guide pointed out there were at least three ways you could kill of DunkirkI think no "Miracle of Dunkirk" is a more interesting PoD - not because it makes Sealion any more likely, but because of the impact of that on the British psyche. Add to that a perception of the RAF 'losing' by having to withdraw from the southern airfields, and things might be different. Not in a "now the Germans can invade" sort of a way, but in a "the British might give up" way.
But then that isn't Sealion
Oddly enough I was at the Operation Dynamo exhibition at Dover Castle yesterday and the guide pointed out there were at least three ways you could kill of Dunkirk
1: Have several days of bad weather making a sea crossing difficult
2: Fail to get Ramsay to persuade the Admirialty to give them access to the big ships
3: Not have Hitler wait three days before he attacked Dunkirk
I did my dissertation on Sea Lion, and read a lot of logs of German naval discussions. As far as I could tell, if Hitler himself was bluffing, he didn’t let on. Raeder believed he was going to have to somehow try this, and was terrified as a result. He did pretty much constantly argue against it, IIRC his tactic was to suggest there was a single week where the weather would’ve worked but once they’d missed that it was impossible.
Not that I can recall. The source I was looking at was the KM's own notes, and IIRC (and this was 6 years ago now) there were internal things knocking around in it too, as in, it wasn't just stuff that was said face-to-face with Hitler.That's really interesting, how did Hitler and the others take to this line or arguing?
Did any of them see through it, or atleast comment on it if they did?