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WI: The Soviet Union won the Cold War?

It occurs to me that perhaps the most likely 'win' is basically 'NATO dissolves. The USSR survives for 10 years after that before imploding.'

I think they'd limp along rather than implode without the NATO pressure. It wouldn't be pretty though.
 
I think they'd limp along rather than implode without the NATO pressure. It wouldn't be pretty though.

Only if they went full state oppression of minorities- which probably just leads to pressure from a Europe which has already told one Superpower to fuck off over that.
 
It occurs to me that perhaps the most likely 'win' is basically 'NATO dissolves. The USSR survives for 10 years after that before imploding.'

That'd be an interesting one. If NATO dissolves, presumably because the growing EEC decides it doesn't want to be tied to America's Cold War interests VS its own, what is the USSR's justification for half of its military and intelligence spending, or for the Warsaw Pact?
 
That'd be an interesting one. If NATO dissolves, presumably because the growing EEC decides it doesn't want to be tied to America's Cold War interests VS its own, what is the USSR's justification for half of its military and intelligence spending, or for the Warsaw Pact?

Depends on what Europe is up to I think?
 
If it's getting out of NATO, I'm not sure there'd be much will for anything but a possible defensive war (and in that case there's two states with nuclear weapons), Europe would've decided there's not enough of a risk of tanks coming through the Fulda Gap
 
That'd be an interesting one. If NATO dissolves, presumably because the growing EEC decides it doesn't want to be tied to America's Cold War interests VS its own, what is the USSR's justification for half of its military and intelligence spending, or for the Warsaw Pact?

The former's still feasible considering the continued existence of the US- even without military bases across most of Europe. I suppose they could try and argue that things like BAOR and the French in Germany are still existential threats to the USSR, but that's going to be much harder to argue, and any equivalent to Glasnsost is going to see the Warsaw Pact states making pointed comments about what, exactly, is the justification for lack of political control domestically. Theoretically you could have Moscow backing down and the Warsaw Pact states continuing as an equivalent block, but I don't think that would be politically acceptable to most people in charge in the Soviet Union unless we're somehow handwaving '1950s reforms mean 1980s Soviet Union is a flawed democracy' and that... well that seems unlikely if not impossible IMO.

And of course the really interesting thing is that a 70s/80s split between the EEC (and EEC with the UK especially) and the US means that I suspect you'd actually a sort of Euro-Yugoslav détente- Tito would be interested certainly, and I think he would be much more able to play the 'I am making gradual economic and social reforms' strategy much better than, well, anyone in the USSR really.
 
That'd be an interesting one. If NATO dissolves, presumably because the growing EEC decides it doesn't want to be tied to America's Cold War interests VS its own, what is the USSR's justification for half of its military and intelligence spending, or for the Warsaw Pact?

Probably the same as the justification for why NATO still exists even though the Warsaw Pact has dissolved--spreading their foreign influence and applying the threat of hard power towards any nation they don't like national values of freedom and decency.
 
The former's still feasible considering the continued existence of the US- even without military bases across most of Europe. I suppose they could try and argue that things like BAOR and the French in Germany are still existential threats to the USSR, but that's going to be much harder to argue, and any equivalent to Glasnsost is going to see the Warsaw Pact states making pointed comments about what, exactly, is the justification for lack of political control domestically. Theoretically you could have Moscow backing down and the Warsaw Pact states continuing as an equivalent block, but I don't think that would be politically acceptable to most people in charge in the Soviet Union unless we're somehow handwaving '1950s reforms mean 1980s Soviet Union is a flawed democracy' and that... well that seems unlikely if not impossible IMO.

And of course the really interesting thing is that a 70s/80s split between the EEC (and EEC with the UK especially) and the US means that I suspect you'd actually a sort of Euro-Yugoslav détente- Tito would be interested certainly, and I think he would be much more able to play the 'I am making gradual economic and social reforms' strategy much better than, well, anyone in the USSR really.

What if instead of "50s reforms means the USSR is way better", which is as you say, unlikely, we have something like "someone in the soviet headquarters slip up and ruling parties in the Warsaw pact get a few reforms through", which means dynamism in the pact increasingly comes from the non soviet states? The break in NATO could come from Eurocommunist pressure in Western Europe to give those reformers a shot. The soviets would hilariously get dragged into winning the cold war against their will by their satellites.

Not crushing Czechoslovakia would probably do it? A sort of understanding that you can reform according to local conditions as long at it doesn't endanger Warsaw Pact membership. That would probably encourage further reform successes once it's clear "we want to leave" isn't acceptable but "we have ideas to do it better" is.
 
What if instead of "50s reforms means the USSR is way better", which is as you say, unlikely, we have something like "someone in the soviet headquarters slip up and ruling parties in the Warsaw pact get a few reforms through", which means dynamism in the pact increasingly comes from the non soviet states? The break in NATO could come from Eurocommunist pressure in Western Europe to give those reformers a shot. The soviets would hilariously get dragged into winning the cold war against their will by their satellites.

Not crushing Czechoslovakia would probably do it? A sort of understanding that you can reform according to local conditions as long at it doesn't endanger Warsaw Pact membership. That would probably encourage further reform successes once it's clear "we want to leave" isn't acceptable but "we have ideas to do it better" is.

I don't think you can avoid the response to Prague without avoiding the response to Hungary really. Historically, even with some support in the Pact, a Czechoslovak government who continually professed that they didn't want to break the Pact and were fully committed to supporting the USSR, a government which agreed to sign up to the Bratislava Declaration- which affirmed commitment against 'bourgeois' or 'anti-socialist' forces, as well as the USSR indicating they'd intervene against any attempt at lifting the ban on other poltiical parties- even with the Czechoslovak government agreeing to continue to suppress the Social Democrats- there was still the invasion.

Honestly the saddest thing about the Prague Spring is that the hope of democratisation there was, essentially, a mirage and it was only because it was the government making reforms and not people in the streets forcing them that intervention didn't come earlier.

Now, if you can somehow have the USSR back down on Hungary- and ironically the only situation I can possibly see this working is if Britain, France and Israel are given free reign over Suez creating a more cautious attitude internationally, and even then it seems very unlikely- then I can possibly see that triggering a shift in managing the pact where it becomes much more a case of 'these are your limits, don't cross them' which could eventually see the Pact pulling the USSR to a more reformist bent.

I suspect it's more likely that we've just created the conditions where both the EEC and the Warsaw Pact just split off from their respective superpowers and end up forming a massive 'you want to keep fighting eachother, you're not doing it here' bloc.

And even then this is essentially the least contrived situation I can come up with.
 
I don't think you can avoid the response to Prague without avoiding the response to Hungary really. Historically, even with some support in the Pact, a Czechoslovak government who continually professed that they didn't want to break the Pact and were fully committed to supporting the USSR, a government which agreed to sign up to the Bratislava Declaration- which affirmed commitment against 'bourgeois' or 'anti-socialist' forces, as well as the USSR indicating they'd intervene against any attempt at lifting the ban on other poltiical parties- even with the Czechoslovak government agreeing to continue to suppress the Social Democrats- there was still the invasion.

I don't think it's that hard actually, all you need is someone less boneheaded than Brezhnev in charge. For the reasons you highlight, the situation wasn't really comparable to Hungary. Hungary would probably mean the slow death of the Warsaw Pact, while Czechoslovakia wouldn't have the same risk.

Honestly the saddest thing about the Prague Spring is that the hope of democratisation there was, essentially, a mirage and it was only because it was the government making reforms and not people in the streets forcing them that intervention didn't come earlier.

Now, if you can somehow have the USSR back down on Hungary- and ironically the only situation I can possibly see this working is if Britain, France and Israel are given free reign over Suez creating a more cautious attitude internationally, and even then it seems very unlikely- then I can possibly see that triggering a shift in managing the pact where it becomes much more a case of 'these are your limits, don't cross them' which could eventually see the Pact pulling the USSR to a more reformist bent.

I suspect it's more likely that we've just created the conditions where both the EEC and the Warsaw Pact just split off from their respective superpowers and end up forming a massive 'you want to keep fighting eachother, you're not doing it here' bloc.

And even then this is essentially the least contrived situation I can come up with.

Alternatively, you could have Hungary end up closer to Czechoslovakia. Maybe the reformists end up more successfully leading the call for change from the party offices which reduces the amount of pressure in the street that worried the soviets and manage to negotiate an understanding. Khrushchev is no Brezhnev. He's more likely to understand the long term damage crushing its own puppet governments would do. Without the threat of Warsaw pact withdrawal, that's probably possible.
 
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