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UK retains more of the British empire post 1945

Even if the lease had been for 999 years on the new territories, not 99 years, China would have eventually have convinced the British Government to return Hong Kong.

I don't think so. I believe this makes the assumption that no matter what, with a POD in 1898 or in 1945 China will eventually become a superpower or that Britain will definitely lose its superpower status, and I don't think that you can make those assumptions.

This does seem a sticking point. The only outcome of this seems:

a) China somehow agrees to not take Hong Kong back, which means some form of deep dark dealing and bribery at a specific point, and that can maybe work, but then you need China to keep agreeing to it and not go "actually sod that we have nukes now".

b) China and Britain go to war, which Britain is extremely unlikely to win

c) Britain says "Hong Kong Is Part Of The UK Now", China says "we'll see about that in 1997", everyone outside of Westminster goes "the UK's going to blink in '97", and in '97, the UK blinks


Either outcome taking you to a very different UK. Especially b). (You get a very different China for a) and c) too)

In the hypothetical "UK keeping Empire by giving them a vote" timeline, I'd expect a c) outcome to be the most likely. Decades of tension with China ending with handing it back anyway, to the annoyance of various Hong Konger unionists (who may then emigrate en masse). And if Hong Kong goes, some of the other parts may start wondering why don't they just go independent too.

Again, with this I'm not so sure. With option a), if a necessarily stronger Britain manages to convince China to cede Hong Kong in perpetuity, it immediately becomes much harder for China to turn around and say that they want it back however many years down the line. It can't use the nuke card for three reasons:

1) Britain will have them too, and it will almost certainly get them before China does.
2) The Americans won't allow Britain to be attacked in such a manner without global thermonuclear war, which almost certainly results in the complete annihilation of China.
3) The above two reasons should be enough to make it painfully obvious that China would not be prepared to use nukes to regain Hong Kong, and so a threat to do so wouldn't be taken seriously.

With option b), it strongly depends on the condition of both China and Britain, which could go a number of ways from 1945. Also, at this point China is still in civil war, and therefore there are far too many variables to assume a Chinese victory in a Anglo-Chinese War.

With option c), again this depends on the condition of both China and Britain, and their external relationships. Would a weaker, more isolated China be willing to go to war with both a stronger Britain and potentially the United States?
 
It was left off the referendum ballot for a reason - first and foremost, it was only a Dominion whose responsible government was suspended (hence, it was the Dominions Office operating the Commission of Government); Britain really wanted Newfoundland to merge with Canada very badly, considering Newfoundland had no long-term economic future on its own (in their view, though it could be argued that a class-ist analysis was applied here) and would be too much of a drain on HM Treasury; and Newfoundlanders really hated the Commission of Government.

Now, one could argue that leaving Newfoundland out of Dominion status in 1907 could help (in which case, it would probably have a status now that would be similar to Bermuda), but in reality, the long-term goal of the British government was to push Newfoundland into Canada, as soon as Confederation was achieved. Whitehall and especially the Board of Trade never really had that high of an opinion of Newfoundland, to begin with, and had long considered it having no long-term economic viability outside of the fisheries. Hence, a good portion of Newfoundland's history could be best summarized as local politicians having starry-eyed visions of proving everyone else wrong and bringing Newfoundland towards an economically developed status, against all odds - of which many of their plans never work out as intended. Any logical steps towards improving its status, however, gets marred with some sort of sectarian brush, although not as extreme as elsewhere in the Empire, which complicates Newfoundland's journey to Confederation.

What about a scenario then in which, somehow, the 1948 referendums turn out a majority for Dominionship or (and I realise that this is unlikely) the continuation of the Commission of Government, maybe in a world where (again, I realise that this is unlikely, especially after having read your post) the National Convention's decision to leave Confederation off of the ballot wasn't overruled in January 1948? If it is possible to give Newfoundland a new lease of life in the economic sense, maybe a Conservative government that is watching most of the colonies become Dominions or otherwise might be willing to bring it to the Union?
 
I don't think so. I believe this makes the assumption that no matter what, with a POD in 1898 or in 1945 China will eventually become a superpower or that Britain will definitely lose its superpower status, and I don't think that you can make those assumptions.

The only way I could see Britain retaining HK in that case would not be a 1945 POD, but that something very close to HK's modern extent is what the UK pushes for in the Treaty of Nanjing ending the Opium Wars. Yes, that would mean Kowloon, not HK Island itself, would be the center of the colony, but it's the only way I can see it working. Any other arrangement leaves the UK vulnerable to China wanting the whole thing back.
 
What about a scenario then in which, somehow, the 1948 referendums turn out a majority for Dominionship or (and I realise that this is unlikely) the continuation of the Commission of Government, maybe in a world where (again, I realise that this is unlikely, especially after having read your post) the National Convention's decision to leave Confederation off of the ballot wasn't overruled in January 1948? If it is possible to give Newfoundland a new lease of life in the economic sense, maybe a Conservative government that is watching most of the colonies become Dominions or otherwise might be willing to bring it to the Union?

It would have to be a more decisive result in favor of restoring responsible government, for sure. Even then, though, I do not see Newfoundland being brought into the UK post-1945, since from a British POV there's really nothing there for it to be worthwhile except (in the view of Whitehall) a burden on the public purse. If there is any hope for reviving Newfoundland's economy, as the War demonstrated, the US would have to be key. Any move towards restoring responsible government would be a move towards independence from the UK, since Whitehall already made it clear that if Newfoundland restored responsible government it should not expect any help from the British government. That was pretty universal among both the Tories and Labour. Even a Tory Government would not be that interested in what they would perceive as the one attempt of British generosity being snubbed by Newfoundlanders. All routes towards economic recovery led towards Confederation with Canada, not its retention by the UK, and any attempt at defying both the UK and Canada would have to involve the Americans (and hence Canada's nightmare scenario) even while maintaining Newfoundland's political independence, which would therefore destroy any remaining goodwill with Britain and make it even more unlikely for integrating Newfoundland into the UK.
 
If the British Government had been more open to retaining protectorates east of Suez, the Trucial States (the modern-day UAE), Qatar, and Bahrain could have remained under some degree of British suzerainty. I once read that the Sheiks in the Trucial States told the British Government that they would be prepared to pay for the cost of their own defence if they could remain British protectorates. How long they would be happy for this arrangement to continue for is another question though.

Singapore could have remained part of Britain, had it been offered as an alternative to union with Malaysia, though this would have probably required a radically different attitude on the part of the British government, again prepared to maintain a limited presence east of Suez.
 
Singapore could have remained part of Britain, had it been offered as an alternative to union with Malaysia, though this would have probably required a radically different attitude on the part of the British government, again prepared to maintain a limited presence east of Suez.

Except that Singapore was an economic backwater at that time, which just happened to be located in a good spot for defensive purposes. Having it remain as a self-governing colony was one thing, yes, but ultimately it was Singaporeans themselves who proposed union with Malaya.
 
I don't think so. I believe this makes the assumption that no matter what, with a POD in 1898 or in 1945 China will eventually become a superpower or that Britain will definitely lose its superpower status, and I don't think that you can make those assumptions.

It makes neither assumption.

It does make the assumption that some form of Chinese nationalism will continue to entrench itself and that there will be some form of Chinese state; but while the way that nationalism asserts itself might well change dramatically, I don't think anyone here would suggest that by 1898 it will be rolled back.

The assumption that there will be some form of Chinese state is also hard to fault; it could be that Britain holds onto Hong Kong if China disintegrates into nuclear fire, but that's a rather different timeline and genre. There may be no Chinese state if China is entirely partitioned; however, that in turn requires us not only to believe that colonialism will not just last but grow stronger when by the putative POD the killing flaws of empire all existed but that Britain will overturn a century's worth of strategy and suddenly decide to carve up China rather than back a central government.


To begin with, ignore any idea that the city can be held by force.

You correctly note that 1898 is the crucial year- the New Territories being leased, not ceded, means that British Hong Kong is on a countdown clock. The city simply cannot be held without the New Territories- it's where the power, the water and the people are.

However, even if we assume that for whatever reason the British ask for a permanent cession (I'm not aware that they ever considered this,) and that the Qing will grant it (by no means to be assumed, but that's another story,) the New Territories cannot be defended.

I don't mean against a Great Power: I mean that the British could not have stopped the Nanking Government from taking the city, any more than they could have stopped the PRC in the sixties. They probably could not have stopped at least some of the more formidable warlord armies. Any vaguely modern force can bring more men and equipment to bear than Britain can possibly station in the city.

That means that in 1997 the city must be defended with nuclear weapons. I find it very hard to imagine that a Britain that is even nominally democratic will be able to justify starting a nuclear war to keep a Chinese city- acquired in what is popularly regarded as one of the most notorious acts of imperialism of the nineteenth century- from being part of China.

Let's move on to the bigger point though, that there's no indication of why any British government would want to fight.


The problem comes down to what Hong Kong is for: its strategic use as a base for the Royal Navy was never as important as its role as an entrepôt.

Hong Kong isn't the prize.

China is the prize.

The city exists to be a foothold in the Chinese market.

So let's run through some scenarios.


Worst Case:

The government that wants Hong Kong in 1997 is hostile to Britain. It also denies Britain any role in the Chinese economy.

British options: Nuclear warfare in the service of a territory that, in this scenario, has no useful purpose to Britain and frankly has very few white people... or handing it over. It'll hand it over.

Historic

The government that wants Hong Kong in 1997 is ambivalent about Britain diplomatically, but bang in favor of British money.

British options: Are you kidding? The only question was what fig leaves they could get to make it seem like they haven't sold out the residents- but seriously, had you seen the projections for China's economic growth? Something something end of history. It was handed over.

Milk and Puppies scenario

The government that wants Hong Kong is a Friendly Capitalist Democracy.

Obviously it gets handed over.


Fragile Democracy:

Somehow, the PRC fell apart in 1989. Or the Nanking government has staggered on for a few decades. The point is that this is not a strong China. It is fragile internally, and its armed forces are- somehow- in such disarray that they couldn't take the city.

British options: Keep the city, and do serious harm to the government and market that is worth far more politically or economically than Hong Kong, or hand it over. It'll be handed over.


Chinese strength isn't that relevant, since functionally speaking the Chinese state would have to be almost non-existent to be in a position where the city can be held.

British strength isn't that relevant. Even a superpower can't station enough troops to resist an incursion with anything other than nuclear force.

What matters is what Britain gains from Hong Kong, and by the middle to late twentieth century it gains very little from keeping it in the face of Chinese opposition.

But what if the British Hong Kongers demand the protection of their democratic rights?

They'll be sold out.

Evidence: There has been no point, at any time in Hong Kong's history, where any government British or Chinese has given the slightest fuck about Hong Kong's democratic rights. I find it easier to believe that the British army can deploy a force of Action Men who can hold off the Red Army by a margin of a hundred to one than that any government that is even a vaguely plausible force in London would suddenly care about the people of Hong Kong.


I love that city. The family I have there love it. But it's only ever been worth anything to its rulers as trading floor.
 
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The thing that I feel is that any UK this keen to retain control of colonies and potentially formalise the relationship with actual parliamentary representation is a UK that would also be very uncomfortable with that many black people in Parliament. I could forsee a rather unpleasant boomerang effect of repression in the colonies to ensure acceptable politics being visited on the population of the metropolis in time.
 
The thing that I feel is that any UK this keen to retain control of colonies and potentially formalise the relationship with actual parliamentary representation is a UK that would also be very uncomfortable with that many black people in Parliament. I could forsee a rather unpleasant boomerang effect of repression in the colonies to ensure acceptable politics being visited on the population of the metropolis in time.

I mean if we're looking at the Malta case, the discussions in parliament rather sum up the attitude.

Which is the British were deeply flattered that when everybody else wanted independence, the Maltese didn't. What you see in those conversations is this innate fondness of someone saying 'no the empire is good actually, you are not in the wrong here' being slowly ground down by the practicalities and the desire to not pay off the maltese debt until nobody is favour of annexation.
 
The problem comes down to what Hong Kong is for: its strategic use as a base for the Royal Navy was never as important as its role as an entrepôt.

Hong Kong isn't the prize.

China is the prize.

The city exists to be a foothold in the Chinese market.

This whole post, many times over, but especially this section. There's a complete lack of understanding of the economic function of Hong Kong in 'Britain coulda kept it' analyses which consequently neglects that there's self-interest for Britain and the west in handing Hong Kong over.

Any notion of a nuclear tripwire over Hong Kong is pure post-1900 stuff.
 
but it would also mean parliament in the 50s and 60s agreeing to let Africans appoint MPs that would decide things for the UK. That might be acceptable for small colonies like the islands in West Indies, Belize, Gambia, Bahrain etc but anywhere like Nigeria.

I mean, giving MPs to Ireland did not exactly make that colony accept British rule. It, if anything, worsened relations between Britain and Ireland, and also it made Parliament harder to manage due to Irish nationalists constantly bringing up the Repeal/Home Rule issue.

And the 1890s Indian nationalist MP Dahabhai Naoroji (he was elected from a metropole constituency, but I think it’s still relevant) was constantly shunned by Parliament in large part due to his race and religion, and he found himself forced to work with people on the fringes of British politics like Irish nationalists, advocates of female suffrage, and socialists. He grew more radical as a result of his experiences as an MP, going from merely supporting opening up jobs to Indians to supporting a full-on Indian Parliament. African MPs would likely find themselves in a similar situation - hell, maybe worse.
 
Firstly, there is no reason to assume that a democratic Britain cannot be imperialist

“Democracy” and “imperialism” are pretty much antonyms. To justify an empire, one must use fundamentally undemocratic arguments; to justify democracy, one must use arguments which have anti-imperialist implications. For that reason, for a so-called democracy to have an empire it requires institutionalized hypocrisy.
 
“Democracy” and “imperialism” are pretty much antonyms. To justify an empire, one must use fundamentally undemocratic arguments; to justify democracy, one must use arguments which have anti-imperialist implications. For that reason, for a so-called democracy to have an empire it requires institutionalized hypocrisy.
Well it was trying to bridge the gap between democracy and empire that caused the crisis in British imperial power after the First World War. The arguments between Dominion, Federation and imperial domination were really deeply entrenched in the Conservatives (lets face it, the only real the Party of Empire).

After the second world war any chance of finding that middle way was gone: the Dominions were too grown up by then to remain so, and India to scared by the Bengal famine and callous nature of British rule in wartime to accept Dominion; it was too bankrupt and in debt to America to bankroll a Federation, or any kind of EEC/EU-esque British Empire; and it was too tired of war to cry on fighting the kind national revolts that would have sprung up in order to maintain domination - which would have just left a global South Rhodesia wherever there was a Union Jack, not that USSR or the USA would have let the Empire survive that long (lets not forget that Eisenhower - probably the most pro-British post-war President - actively considered having the 6th Fleet fire on the Royal Navy during the Suez Crisis).

Really, the only way Britain gets to keep any more of its Empire than it has you effectively can't have WW2, or at least not the exact same war. Whether because it takes Hitler's deal of Europe in return for India, or some other kind of hideous agreement with Stalin. Best case scenario it that Singapore doesn't fall, if only because the perception of British power around the world and its prestige remains intact, but admittedly that would still be like holding a room full of hostages with a gun that isn't loaded.
 
And all of this does not assume a TL in which Hong Kong has been integrated into the UK as a integral part of the Union. If this is the case, how could Britain hand it over? It would be a Suez-level embarrassment if a (potentially) weaker China forced Britain to hand over the colony of Hong Kong, but it would be orders of magnitude worse if they were forced to hand over an integral part of the country which elects MPs.

Because HK was never integrated into the UK, nor would it be since even Britain was aware of HK's precarious state and that to do anything else would be harmful to the rest of its territories in Southeast Asia, not to mention its access to the Chinese market. Not to mention that at that time, for the most part many Hong Kongers were Chinese nationalists who wanted HK to become Chinese (didn't matter which China, though for obvious reasons the PRC was the preferred option), and HK was an economic backwater that only existed within a context relevant to China. So integration into the UK was never going to be an option for HK, and by the time that option was seriously considered it was already too late.
 
Secondly, and this is the big one: Britain does not have to use nuclear weapons to defend Hong Kong, no matter how indefensible it may be. It merely has to threaten to, and this forces China to either pick war with potentially the two greatest powers on the planet (after all, a lot can change with a 1898 POD) in the UK and the USA, a war which could lead to upwards of half a billion deaths, or give up any claim to Hong Kong.

The problem here is that China can say "we think you're bluffing", and then we've got to shit or get off the pot. Now if the hypothetical Hong Kong has MPs in Britain and is a sort-of constituent country, handing over the city is going to be a pig to get through at home but if there's a way, @SenatorChickpea's correct that we'd find it and do it.
 
honestly i think the most realistic and upsetting solution is a Herbert Morrison led government in 1945 that wholeheartedly accepts the proposals of Monty to build a British African Army and replace the loss of India with ruthless exploitation of British Africa.

I thought about something like this in a France Fights On scenario. With a stronger Anglo-French bond postwar and a weaker Anglo-American one, this isn't really impossible.
 
Firstly, there is no reason to assume that a democratic Britain cannot be imperialist at the same time, because up until Suez that was the case.

No. Britain was democratic within the island of Britain itself- even Northern Ireland, by many standards, was not a democracy in 1956.

However, if you were an adult in British territory in that year, than the lottery of birth meant you were vastly more likely to not have the franchise. The Empire was a fundamentally exploitative, anti-democratic, white supremacist institution.

Secondly, and this is the big one: Britain does not have to use nuclear weapons to defend Hong Kong, no matter how indefensible it may be. It merely has to threaten to, and this forces China to either pick war with potentially the two greatest powers on the planet (after all, a lot can change with a 1898 POD) in the UK and the USA, a war which could lead to upwards of half a billion deaths, or give up any claim to Hong Kong. This is especially the case if Britain took the New Territories from the Qing Empire in perpetuity (which it could have done; the Qing weren't really in any position to make demands in 1898) or if China is particularly hostile to the UK or the USA, or if it is still staunchly Communist.

Again, no.

Britain has to threaten to start a nuclear war over territory that most of the world- including many people in her empire- see as rightful Chinese soil. China will likely call that bluff.

Also, once again you need to return to the purpose of Hong Kong which is an open China- which both the USA and UK want. The USA is either interested in China, in which case the region is of far more importance and so it won't fight for Hong Kong (as it wouldn't have in our timeline.)
Or it isn't interested in China... in which case it won't fight for Hong Kong.

As to the Qing- no, in 1898 it's perfectly possible for them to refuse. That was the year that the Qing demonstrated they could deny a European power a concession and the other Great Powers would support them- Italy failed to secure territory at Sanman Bay. Furthermore, British standing had taken a hit in Beijing following their severe mishandling of the Sino-Japanese War- Whitehall had expected the Qing to turn to them for economic and political support following the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and were caught completely flat-footed when the Triple Intervention revealed that the City of London was no longer the foundation stone of Chinese finance. This was at a time when the British were acutely conscious of their relative weakness in the Far East, and were trying to avoid confrontation with any power- and while pressing the Qing would have got them what they wanted, it would require more diplomatic capital than Salisbury wanted to spend, to say nothing of the fact it would almost certainly mean further British concessions to the Qing's new patrons Germany, Russia or France (or two or even all three.) And of course, the British didn't want to weaken the Qing further!

There's good stuff on this in Ian Nish's book on the formation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. I recommend reading it to get a sense of the extent to which British power in Asia was strong but fragile in this period.

If the PRC falls apart in 1989, it will not do so without serious bloodshed, potentially tens or even hundreds of millions will die in any civil war. Assuming that the lease is still 99 years in such a TL, China would not be in a position to try and retake Hong Kong, not when any state emerging from this civil war will need help from powers such as Britain and the USA.

Check that date again. I picked 1989 because that was the year of the massacres in Beijing. I believe that it was possible- unlikely, but possible- for the PRC to fall apart just as the Soviets and their clients in Eastern Europe did.

If you seriously think that that was impossible without a civil war that kills tens or hundreds of millions of people, you need to show your working on that.


And all of this does not assume a TL in which Hong Kong has been integrated into the UK as a integral part of the Union. If this is the case, how could Britain hand it over? It would be a Suez-level embarrassment if a (potentially) weaker China forced Britain to hand over the colony of Hong Kong, but it would be orders of magnitude worse if they were forced to hand over an integral part of the country which elects MPs.

I do understand that without that 1898 POD or an integration, the most likely scenario is that the circumstances will be such that handing over Hong Kong is either favourable or necessary. However, I don't believe that this would be the case in every scenario, even with a POD as late as 1945.

I do make that assumption, since it was never, ever on the table. Nor would it ever be. There are no circumstances under which Britain will allow millions of people who don't speak English as a first language, who don't consider themselves British, are not geographically contiguous with Britian and are not white to become a constituent part of the UK.

Hong Kong would have more British citizens than Wales, or Scotland, or Northern Ireland. You think those regions are going to accept the relative blow to their status?

Britain could not keep Hong Kong and it did not want to.

Because HK was never integrated into the UK, nor would it be since even Britain was aware of HK's precarious state and that to do anything else would be harmful to the rest of its territories in Southeast Asia, not to mention its access to the Chinese market. Not to mention that at that time, for the most part many Hong Kongers were Chinese nationalists who wanted HK to become Chinese (didn't matter which China, though for obvious reasons the PRC was the preferred option), and HK was an economic backwater that only existed within a context relevant to China. So integration into the UK was never going to be an option for HK, and by the time that option was seriously considered it was already too late.

Exactly this.
 
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The British Imperial model, regardless of if the colony was a settler or an extractive one, was not one of integrating said colonies into the Metropole. For the settler colonies, that meant self-government (this meant, with the partial exception of the Cape Colony, white-only self-government in practice) and regarding the extractive colonies, local institutions and administration which worked in collaboration with the Colonial Office. Inside of the British Empires, loyalty to the Empire as an idea, as a metaphysical institution, did not translate to a desire to listen to whoever was sitting in the PM's chair. Imperial Loyalism did not translate into Imperial Unionism, with some rare exceptions.
 
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