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The US gets British Columbia

Ricardolindo

Well-known member
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Portugal
What if the US had managed to annex British Columbia in the late 1860s? How does this affect the US and Canada? I think Canada would be poorer without access to the Pacific Ocean. In addition, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta would probably be less populated and developed as the Canadians wouldn't need a transcontinental railway. Would British Columbia become an US state immediately or would it be a territory for some time? Would it change the results of any elections?
 
In exchange for ending the Alabama claims. It was seriously considered in our timeline.

I don't think it was ever very likely. Not to mention that by that time the British Columbians and Canadians were pretty committed to reaching a deal of their own. For British Columbian elites, the benefit of becoming Canada's/the British Empire's North American Pacific port were always going to outweigh becoming a backwater of a backwater region of the US. If Canada decides that it's not worth it or pulls out of the deal afterwards, then I think American annexation would pick up steam.
 
As for American Columbia, regardless of how it enters I think it would be a lot less populated than OTL. I used to live in Bellingham, and there was a visible difference in the level of development once you crossed onto the Canadian side of the Fraser Valley. It'd be significantly smaller than Washington and Oregon, with a population more skewed towards Vancouver Island than OTL. I imagine Vancouver the city itself would be way smaller than OTL, becoming a middling industrial port closer to Tacoma instead of a global city like Seattle. The demographics of American Columbia would be very different too, with way less Chinese and Indians and significantly more African Americans and Mexican Americans.
 
I don't think it was ever very likely. Not to mention that by that time the British Columbians and Canadians were pretty committed to reaching a deal of their own. For British Columbian elites, the benefit of becoming Canada's/the British Empire's North American Pacific port were always going to outweigh becoming a backwater of a backwater region of the US. If Canada decides that it's not worth it or pulls out of the deal afterwards, then I think American annexation would pick up steam.

There was a lot of pro-US feeling in the Vancouver Island.
 
As @d32123 says, 1869 is too late for this to plausibly happen, but an American Columbia isn't impossible. The negotiation of the Oregon Treaty was a process more than thirty years in the making and there were many, many ways it could have turned out differently. Diplomatic history is not really my forte but from what I understand you'd have to dampen the influence of the Hudson's Bay Company in British colonial policy. It wouldn't be hard, especially if you dragged out the resolution of the dispute for a few more years.

The HBC was steadily losing influence by the time the treaty was signed - beaver hats were going out of fashion, and British imperial power was growing to the point that they didn't need to rely on quasi-independent corporate actors anymore - and so they weren't able to push British ministers to a really hardline position on the boundary. America got the vast majority of what they wanted (control over the Snake/Columbia and Puget Sound) while the British were left basically with what they'd already occupied. Find a plausible POD to tip the scales against the HBC and you could get America up to 54°40'.

Of course, that would be even more territory above the Missouri Compromise line than OTL...

There was a lot of pro-US feeling in the Vancouver Island.

In what time period? I'd be interested in a citation (not being sarcastic) - I've never heard of pro-American attitudes on Vancouver Island; during the pioneer days Fort Victoria was the regional "capital" of the HBC.
 
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As long as you avoid the "fight" part of 54° 40' Or Fight so that DC does not get lightly toasted again, a (northern) administration that is genuinely willing to make concessions in other areas in order to get British Columbia is going to get it - Tyler (and Webster) would have been willing to settle for considerably less than the 49th parallel and even Polk really only used the issue as political cover to get northern support for his war on Mexico. This requires finding a President that is (a) not a Whig and (b) not actively pro-slavery, which is a little difficult in the 1830s and 1840s but certainly not impossible.

In terms of how it subsequently develops - someone who actually knows shipping routes correct me if I'm wrong, but aren't BC ports going to be some of the more convenient points for commerce between China and Japan and the lower 48 just on the grounds of distance alone? Most discussions of annexing random bits of Canada end in it necessarily being a backwater but this seems like it would be a potential exception.
 
As @d32123 says, 1869 is too late for this to plausibly happen, but an American Columbia isn't impossible. The negotiation of the Oregon Treaty was a process more than thirty years in the making and there were many, many ways it could have turned out differently. Diplomatic history is not really my forte but from what I understand you'd have to dampen the influence of the Hudson's Bay Company in British colonial policy. It wouldn't be hard, especially if you dragged out the resolution of the dispute for a few more years.

The HBC was steadily losing influence by the time the treaty was signed - beaver hats were going out of fashion, and British imperial power was growing to the point that they didn't need to rely on quasi-independent corporate actors anymore - and so they weren't able to push British ministers to a really hardline position on the boundary. America got the vast majority of what they wanted (control over the Snake/Columbia and Puget Sound) while the British were left basically with what they'd already occupied. Find a plausible POD to tip the scales against the HBC and you could get America up to 54°40'.

Of course, that would be even more territory above the Missouri Compromise line than OTL...



In what time period? I'd be interested in a citation (not being sarcastic) - I've never heard of pro-American attitudes on Vancouver Island; during the pioneer days Fort Victoria was the regional "capital" of the HBC.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_movements_of_Canada#British_Columbia says that all 3 Vancouver Island newspapers supported US annexation. Also, read https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_British_Columbia#Annexation_debate
for a full account of the situation.
 
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Second and final bump.

Seward's Attempt to Annex British Columbia, 1865-1869 by David E. Shi (Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 (May, 1978), pp. 217-238):
The Oxford professor, Goldwin Smith, who later emigrated to Canada, advised Seward that Canada "seems likely (unless our statesmen adopt a different policy) to fall into your hands of itself, perhaps before you want it." The London Times echoed Smith's assessment, reporting that Britain would not object if Canadians wished to join the United States, but if a union was promulgated by force, Her Majesty's government would protest. This was a common view of British scholars and politicians, who had little faith in Canada's future and even less regard for her aspirations for dominion.
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Between Russian America and Washington Territory lay the British colony of British Columbia. Until 1858 the area had been an underdeveloped and sparsely populated region, serving primarily as an outpost for the Hudson's Bay Company. In that year, however, the discovery of gold brought an influx of American miners. This rapid growth led to the formation of the Crown Colony of British Columbia. Its boundaries extended from the summit of the Rocky Mountains on the east to the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Georgia on the west, and from the Finlay branch of the Peace River and the Nass River on the north to the 49th parallel on the south. Vancouver Island remained a separate colony until 1866.

British Columbia's rapid growth and prosperity, however, quickly subsided. By 1865 the colony was in a state of decay, a "poor, struggling, bankrupt colony on the edge of things."' As the gold deposits were depleted, the populace began to drift away, leaving less than 10,000 inhabitants in 1866, three-quarters of whom were of British or Canadian origin. Moreover, since the Hudson's Bay Company owned the territory from the head of the Great Lakes to the Rocky Mountains, the colony remained isolated from the rest of Canada East and West. Consequently, the British Columbians, especially those on Vancouver Island, maintained closer economic and social relations with the western American territories and states than with either Canada or Great Britain.

The belief among many colonists that the Home Office had abandoned them further contributed to their sense of isolation and frustration. During the Civil War, British Columbia alone of the British North American colonies was left undefended. Rear Admiral Joseph Denman informed the Admiralty that the colony did not warrant protection: "I would consider it would be greatly for the interest of England to divest herself of these possessions by any means consistent with honor and with justice to the English settlers." Denman's comments were symptomatic of a general spirit of Little Englandism emerging in Great Britain during the 1860s, a spirit that caused great concern among the colonists in British Columbia.

In such an unstable situation, growing support among the colonists for annexation to the United States represented a logical development. Many were painfully aware of the prosperity and lower taxes prevalent in the neighboring American states. Agitation for annexation began in 1866 and remained a prominent issue for several years. Vancouver Island emerged as the center of support for the movement, particularly the port town of Victoria.

Seward learned of the support in British Columbia for annexation from several sources. In January 1866, he received an extensive report from E. H. Derby, a congressional investigator. Citing the rising discontent among the colonists in British Columbia, Derby suggested that Great Britain cede its Pacific territory to the United States as payment of the Alabama claims:

If Great Britain desires to propitiate this country after all that has occurred, would it not be her true policy to cede to us a portion of her remote territories, valuable to us, but of little value to her? Were she to cede us Vancouver's Island and British Columbia ... might she not easily bring our claims to a peaceful solution...

Seward responded favorably to Derby's suggestion. After sending the report to the Senate for consideration, he began negotiations with Great Britain on the subject.

Discussions concerning the Alabama claims had begun immediately after the Civil War. The main issues were Great Britain's recognition of the Confederacy and her building of Confederate privateers. By 1866 the negotiations had reached an impasse. Seward wanted Britain's policies judged before a neutral arbitration court. Lord Russell refused, arguing that his country's actions were beyond the jurisdiction of any foreign court.

In June 1866, Russell's government fell. As the Conservatives assumed power, conditions appeared favorable for reopening the negotiations. In a lengthy dispatch to the new government, Seward listed the American claims against Great Britain for her part in building the privateers. Lord Stanley, the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, finally replied in November, professing his willingness to accept arbitration of the American claims, apart from those involving the right of the British government to recognize a state of belligerency. Seward countered in January 1867, stressing that the individual claims represented only a small part of the much greater losses caused by British actions which had prolonged the war. He implied that he was holding Great Britain responsible for indirect damages that could produce enormous claims. Apparently following the plan outlined earlier in Derby's report, Seward hoped to raise the claims high enough to convince British officials to agree to a quid pro quo settlement, ceding British Columbia in exchange for the claims.

For several months prior to this last dispatch, Seward had been receiving additional evidence from British Columbia indicating substantial support in the colony for annexation. Allen Francis, the American consul in Victoria, reported in September 1866 that "the people of Vancouver Island, and of British Columbia, are almost unanimous in their desire for annexation to the United States." He included an article excerpted from the Victoria Evening Telegraph of September 5, 1866, which characterized British Columbia's relations with the United States as being closer "than our relations with any of the colonies." Two weeks later a public meeting in Victoria voted to request Great Britain to permit annexation to the United States.

Without British Columbia, the Trans-Canada won't get built and thus Western Canada will likely remain sparsely populated with one of the mains settler demographics being American ranchers who were a constant concern of Anglo-Canadian authorities in the area, especially given that their only rail connections to the rest of Canada were dependent upon the United States and that many communities likewise looked to their American counterparts for leadership and security. Long term I'd expect everything west of Ontario to be annexed by the United States.
 
Without British Columbia, the Trans-Canada won't get built and thus Western Canada will likely remain sparsely populated with one of the mains settler demographics being American ranchers who were a constant concern of Anglo-Canadian authorities in the area, especially given that their only rail connections to the rest of Canada were dependent upon the United States and that many communities likewise looked to their American counterparts for leadership and security. Long term I'd expect everything west of Ontario to be annexed by the United States.

Even before Confederation, western expansion into the Red River and Saskatchewan Valley regions was a major talking point in Upper Canada, to the extent that western expansion up to the Rockies was one of the points in the Clear Grits’ first platform, and it was retained even after George Brown’s takeover of the party. At the same time Upper Canada was getting increasingly populous which resulted in land hunger. Beyond that, there was also widespread discussion of a railroad between the Great Lakes and Winnipeg beginning from the 1850s, precisely in the name of stopping American expansion into the region. Even without a Pacific coastline, these forces for Upper Canada’s expansion would be formidable and they would likely be strongly promoted by the British government.
 
Even before Confederation, western expansion into the Red River and Saskatchewan Valley regions was a major talking point in Upper Canada, to the extent that western expansion up to the Rockies was one of the points in the Clear Grits’ first platform, and it was retained even after George Brown’s takeover of the party. At the same time Upper Canada was getting increasingly populous which resulted in land hunger. Beyond that, there was also widespread discussion of a railroad between the Great Lakes and Winnipeg beginning from the 1850s, precisely in the name of stopping American expansion into the region. Even without a Pacific coastline, these forces for Upper Canada’s expansion would be formidable and they would likely be strongly promoted by the British government.

That is extremely interesting! Can you tell me more or give me some sources I could read upon it? This is one area I want to research more. One thing that has shaped my views is Drang Nach Norden: The United States and the Riel Rebellion by Donald F. Warner, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Mar., 1953, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Mar., 1953), pp. 693-712:

The tentacles of the movement did not stop at Pembina but curled north into the Red River colony itself, and even into the inner circles of Riel's group. There were several small but active groups of annexationists in Fort Garry and Winnipeg. The most vocal was the clump of American settlers in the region, but they were not alone in their opinion. Some of the employees of the company were reported to be quietly urging that the colony join the United States rather than the Dominion. Their motive was emotional they did not love the republic, but they did hate Canada. '" Another group which took a similar stand was a handful of priests. This is surprising, for the Roman Catholic Church in Canada has always been an impregnable bulwark against annexation. These exceptions were priests born in France whose detesta- tion of Britain overmatched their allegiance to the polity of their superiors."3

Finally, two individuals in the colony merit attention. The first was General Oscar Malmros, American consul in Winnipeg, who guided the metis rebels with one hand and held the other out to Washington to beg aid for them. The other was W. E. B. O'Donoghue, a mysterious adventurer, most of whose career is lost in the mists of obscurity. He was born in Ireland and migrated to the United States where he became a citizen. Like his kind, who seem instinctively to go where impending trouble stirs, he popped up in the Red River district shortly before the uprising. He eagerly joined Riel and rose rapidly to a position of prominence in the ranks of the rebellion. O'Donoghue's Irish origin and his American citizenship frame the motivation of his ardent, but not always wise, efforts to promote annexation.'6

Even this brief description reveals the miscellaneous composition of the annexation movement in geography and motive. It remains to mention the human cement which bound together this conglom- erate - James Wickes Taylor. Taylor, formerly state librarian of Ohio, was the greatest American authority on western British America and peddled his knowledge to advantage. During the period of the revolt the Department of State employed him as a secret agent to keep Fish posted on Red River affairs'7; at the same time he was also serving as informant and publicist for Cooke and for George Becker, general manager of the St. Paul & Pacific. Taylor, however, was more than a hack for special interests. He believed sincerely in the mutual benefits and the ultimate inevita- bility of annexation. He knew all of the groups of expansionists, commuted between the centers of agitation, and became the liaison man for the movement. Its failure was not due to any lack of ability or effort on his part."8

Thus the annexation movement south of the line had many of the ingredients of success: leadership, money, and influence. It also had opportunity north of the line, for Riel had revolted against rule from Canada but seemed at first to know what he did not want rather than what he did want. The annexationists had a positive answer to this question. Moreover, their agitation had been going on quietly for some years, and the foundations of their work were laid.

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Whether or not they prompted the uprising, the annexationists knew an opportunity when they saw one and immediately swung into action. Early events in the West took a favorable turn for them. Having repulsed McDougall, Riel seized Fort Garry, center of the company's power, and thereby destroyed the only govern- ment in the colony.24 A political vacuum was thus created and the annexationists, hoping that the United States could rush in to fill it, sought to exploit the uncertain situation to gain control of the revolt. Three of them began to exert their influence on Riel who, though no pliant tool, was willing to listen to advice. Colonel Stutsman was particularly active at this time, constantly commut- ing between Pembina and Fort Garry.26 Between trips he acted as Riel's unofficial "cconsul" at the border, issuing or denying the passes necessary to cross the line. He also joined the other inhabitants of Pembina in the agreeable winter sport of baiting McDougall and compounding the misery of that frustrated function- ary who had fled to the Dakota post after being turned back by the metis.

Malmros, who had no pent-up sense of responsibility as the repre- sentative of a friendly power, was nearly as active as Stutsman. He had anticipated the uprising and, before it broke out, informed the Department of State that trouble threatened and that he would be glad to organize a force and seize the region for the United States when the time was ripe.28 The meticulous and proper Fish probably approached apoplexy when he read this dispatch. If so, he recovered in time to veto Malmros's proposal sharply and lec- tured him sternly on the necessity of strict neutrality. The consul, obviously regarding his chief as a spoilsport, took these instructions lightheartedly. Within a short time he was reporting to a fellow worker in the annexation vineyard that he had "materially assisted in producing the present situation [of revolt] & prevented many mistakes on the part of the popular leaders." 27

O'Donoghue, who carried more weight than either Malmros or Stutsman among the rebels, also worked constantly during this period to convert the uprising into an annexation movement. There is evidence that he and his associates exerted a strong influence on Riel and were largely responsible for such moves as the seizure of Fort Garry.

The annexationists thus had a dangerous grasp on the helm of the rebellion in its early months and, for a time, it appeared that they might steer the colony into the United States. McDougall unwittingly helped them on their course. Thwarted and embit- tered, he listened to foolish advice and issued a proclamation announcing his appointment as lieutenant governor and the transfer of the region to Canada. This pronouncement played into the hands of the American party. It set the Red River colony legally adrift by officially canceling the company's power but not providing a substitute for it since McDougall could not enter the territory. The confusion was completed when the government in Ottawa re- fused to accept the transfer of the territory from the company while the revolt persisted. Thus, by default, Riel was the de facto government and Riel seemed to be guided by the annexationists.

McDougall was not through playing the fool. He also commissioned one of his lieutenants to cross the border, rally all loyal men, and attack the rebels. His call to arms was a fiasco but nearly provoked a disastrous bloodletting. Such irresponsible action drove many who had mistrusted Riel into support of the metis. For the time Canada stood repudiated in the Red River Valley.

This was the loud knock of opportunity and the annexationists hastened to answer it. Stutsman moved from Pembina to Fort Garry and clung to Riel's side, ready to press any advantage which might emerge from the cloud of uncertainty.28 O'Donoghue, now the treasurer of the provisional government which Riel had estab- lished after McDougall's proclamation, joined Malmros and Stuts- man in placing the young metis leader under a heavy bombardment of advice. But it was not enough to have Riel's ear; the annexa- tionists also attempted to broaden their base of action by winning popular support when a means to do so offered. They bought a moribund local newspaper, the Red River Pioneer, for $550, an expenditure painless to all except the company from whose strong box it was seized,29 rechristened it the New Nation, and placed it in the hands of Major Henry Robinson, an American-born annexationist.'o

The leading article in the first edition starkly revealed its political orientation. Entitled "Annexation our 'Manifest Destiny,'" it argued that the colony should follow its purse strings into the United States rather than be tied by its heartstrings to the Brit- ish Empire. The article stated the obvious fact that the repub- lic was the principal market and means of communication for the Red River area and must remain so for years to come. A commer- cial tie with Canada was impossible across the tumbled sea of rock which intervened for seven hundred miles between Winnipeg and the nearest inhabited portions of Ontario. Editor Robinson also pointed out that union with the republic was the order of the day; movements for that purpose existed from the Maritime Provinces on the east to British Columbia on the west, and it was time that Manitoba joined the rest.8'
 
That is extremely interesting! Can you tell me more or give me some sources I could read upon it? This is one area I want to research more. One thing that has shaped my views is Drang Nach Norden: The United States and the Riel Rebellion by Donald F. Warner, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Mar., 1953, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Mar., 1953), pp. 693-712:

Upper Canada was a rapidly expanding colony thanks to immigration. In 1820, it was only a quarter of Lower Canada’s population, but by the 1850s it surpassed it. And the union between Upper and Lower Canada, which gave both parts an equal number of MPs with the goal of Anglo ascendancy leading to assimilation of the French Canadians, now overrepresented Lower Canada, causing political chaos. Upper Canada’s rapidly expanding population wanted land, and this was a driver for stuff like the secularization of clergy lands. But inevitably it started looking west for expansion, to the Red River Colony.

This affected politics. Following the rise of responsible government in 1848, the Reformers split between those who found the results of it acceptable and merged with the Tories and those who felt responsible government wasn’t democratic enough and formed the Clear Grits. Broadly, speaking, at this point the Clear Grits are best described as “Canadian Jacksonians”. They wanted Upper Canada to have an American-style constitution with an elected governor and legislative council, in addition to representation by population and the west being annexed into Upper Canada to be made available for settlement. Naturally they were accused of being pro-annexation into the United States, but they weren’t. They wanted an American-style constitution because they felt it was the British constitution adjusted for a society lacking aristocracy, and though they did want good relations with the US, rarely did this mean full annexation.

Following the death of Peter Perry, George Brown became the leader of the Clear Grits in the 1850s. He was a much more moderate leader, being an immigrant from Scotland who supported parliamentary government, and he was influenced by Scottish radical currents rather than Jacksonianism. He was also a supporter of the British Empire, to the extent of being an Orangeman. This came with suspicion of potential American expansionism into British North America. Under him, the Clear Grits continued to support representation by population and western expansion, but they threw out the desire to establish an American-style constitution. In the 1850s, where the Clear Grits were in government a few times, there began to emerge schemes for annexing the west to Upper Canada. One scheme was annexing the Red River Colony, and another was annexing all of Rupertsland south of the 54th Parallel. This has a lot of info about it. But Lower Canada opposed these schemes, as they went hand-in-hand with establishing representation by population and Anglo dominance over Canada as a whole. Western expansion was clearly an Upper Canadian project, after all. Confederation was motivated, in part, out of a desire to ensure Upper Canadian expansion could occur while also mollifying French Canadian fears through the formation of a federal system.

As for the Métis rebellions, in both cases Louis Riel was not necessarily opposed to accession to Canada, but what he wanted was accession with terms fair to the Métis. He did not want annexation into the US, even if his supporters did. But even if he did support annexation and even if the provisional government did request it, the result would have likely been extreme rage from English Canada and a militia filled with angry Orangemen being sent to quell the rebellion immediately. Neither Anglophone Protestant Canadians nor the British government cared about what the Métis really wanted, and any pushes for annexation would be viewed as full-throated treason.
 
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