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The Battle of Mohács and the Destiny of Hungary and Central Europe

Bonniecanuck

DIEF WILL BE THE CHIEF AGAIN
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Formerly Hong Kong, currently London
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she/her + they/them
The outcome of the Battle of Mohács completely defined the history of an entire region. The catastrophic destruction of the Hungarian army and the abrupt death of King Louis II brought an abrupt end to the once expansive Jagiellonian dynastic power, and marked perhaps the most fortuitous turn of events that granted the Habsburgs their eventual monopoly over Central Europe that spanned almost half a millennium. It also opened the way to the more than one hundred years of partition that Hungary endured until the 17th century, and the ravaging of much of the country through the resultant century of near-constant warfare. And of course, the arrival of baths and spices into Hungary, which dramatically changed its culture for the better. Furthermore, perhaps no crushing military defeat has been mythologised and venerated nearly as much as Mohács has in the Hungarian popular memory, almost to the point of national self-flagellation. Hungarian historiography singly considers Mohács the end of the great kingdom that had spanned Saint Stephen to Matthias Corvinus, and with that the end of an independent Hungarian nation as it came to be subordinate to a long string of overlords - the great Hungarian poet Sándor Petőfi called Mohács "the graveyard of Hungarian grandeur".

But was the battle fated to be such a disaster for Hungary? Could there have been some wiser tactical and strategic decisions that, while not turning the tide, could at least have pulled the Hungarians from so humiliating a loss? Just from that alone, the consequences would be drastic. Many of the fallen at Mohács were Hungarian nobles who supported the continued war against the Ottomans, and formed the main opposition to John Zápolya, one of the two claimants of the Crown of Saint Stephen and, following the battle, elected successor to the fallen Louis. Zápolya did not enjoy a strong position in much of Hungary, and much of his legitimacy was derived from his Ottoman benefactors, who were willing to recognise his kingship as an ally and vassal of the Porte. Such was the nature of his rulership that he continued to be contested by the Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand, the other claimant to the throne, until his death in 1541. Just the survival of Louis II alone would entail dramatic changes, as it would not only pre-empt a Zápolya monarchy, but also the Habsburgs' succession to the Jagiellon domains. If Louis II continues to live and bears an heir, the Jagiellonians would be here to stay. What could that have changed with regards to Hungary's final fate and the wars against the Ottomans? Could the Hungarians have had a better time holding the line from further incursions?

Of course this is all conjecture on my part, but the fortuitousness and tragedy of Mohács was what enabled the apogee of both the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, and the low point of the Hungarian Crown. But with a few changes to its outcome, what would be the wider ramifications for Central Europe as a whole? Could the Kingdom of Hungary continued to survive independently without being subject to Ottoman or Habsburg subjugation? Would the state of the frontlines shift any differently? What even of Louis II?
 
Louis II had had no children by his wife Mary of Habsburg and was rumoured to be sterile, so the current dynasty would probably have ended with him and a disputed election for the next king followed - logically with his sister Anne's husband Archduke Ferdinand of Habsburg, ruler of Austria/ Bohemia and future (1555) holy Roman Emperor, vs a local noble. This could well end in a civil war as occurred in real life after Zapolya's death, but given that Louis was only 20 at the time of Mohacs he could have lived for many years (barring accidents of deposition by a noble revolt against him as being of partly foreign, Polish origin).

The main threat to Hungarian survival was the ambition of Sultan Sulaiman, a restless and dynamic ruler with a far larger - and better-armed - army that needed an outlet for its disruptive potential. Had Louis not ignored an offer of a (temporary) truce on Sulaiman's accession in 1520 and thrown his ambassador in prison the successful Ottoman attack on Belgrade , the key to the border line of defensive castles, in 1521 would not have occurred and S would have had to take Belgrade before penetrating the Hungarian plain - and not done the latter in 1526 unless Belgrade had fallen quickly. It had held out against the Ottomans in 1456, but then it had had a stronger defence by a better , older and more experienced general - Janos Hunyadi - plus a Western European 'Crusader' relief-force and the Ottomans had had fewer cannons. Holding Belgrade long-term against repeated Ottoman assaults and/or defeating a huge Ottoman army in the field with antiquated feudal cavalry were less likely than Hungarian defeat and the occupation of the main plain with Buda, at least in the long term (1530s or 1540s?). The Ottoman cavalry was larger, more skilful, and more coherent than the Hungarians and had deadly archery skills, and had duly prevailed on this score against European knights at Nicopolis in 1396 and Varna in 1444.

Louis would have needed major reinforcements from either his brother-in-law Ferdinand, who was preoccupied with his brother Emperor Charles V's troubles with Protestant princes from the 1520s, or his Polish uncle and cousins (who urged him to sign a truce with Sulaiman in 1520-6) to have a chance of holding the line. He could hardly hire many skilled mercenaries or buy a lot of cannons as Hungary was virtually bankrupt and busy devaluing the currency pre-1526. To rebuild the army and strengthen the border adequately, a Hungarian king would have had to take on the tax-dodging, feuding nobility, who were fiercely nationalist and tried to force him to evict foreigners (especially German bankers) and accept their choice of ministers in 1524-5 with armed defiance. Thanks mostly to Louis' wife Mary for her firmness in leading a 'royalist' coalition of more moderate lower landholders in the Diet and rallying loyal nobles this was stopped, but the King would have had to defeat the nobles long-term to stabilise the country and make it militarily viable. This sort of 'new monarchy' , logically a bit like Henry VIII's in England, was possible with a well-supported, determined, and pragmatic king with outside military help - but Louis' actions in 1516-26 don't inspire confidence in him doing this and paying Sulaiman (perhaps with 'vassalage' gifts/ tax and homage) to stay away). So a tougher 'alternative Louis', preferably with children, or a fairly early and peaceful succession by the more competent Ferdinand would be better - and even more so if there was no Reformation distraction and Charles V could send troops and artillery to Hungary to help F defeat anti-Habsburg nobles and/or the Turks.

Ultimately, would a successful Habsburg takeover (or one by a junior relative and nominee of Louis' uncle Sigismund I of Poland?) and the Turks turning elsewhere, logically a war against the Safavids of Iran/Persia if Sulaiman seeks to press his new role as 'Caliph' to turn on the Shi'a , have led to a run of 'autonomist nobles vs foreign Habsburg' showdowns, as in the 1690s and 1848-9? And then Habsburg victory and effectual occupation followed by later a sort of 'dual monarchy' (as per 1867) to stop the disgruntled Hungarians calling in the Turks?

My own 'call' for a surviving independent (and later Habsburg) Hungary after 1526 in my counter-factual writings comes form a different premise. The Byzantines hold the Ottomans back at the Bosphorus and Gallipoli in the 1350s by there being no Byzantine civil wars then, and Timur breaks the Ottoman state up into several rival states permanently in 1402. That way the Balkans stay Christian, and Hungary's SE frontier is safe as Serbia lacks the manpower or artillery to breach it. That way the Habsburg rule of Hungary is created in the 1540s not the 1680s, and the Holy Roman Emperors can use Hungarian troops in the Thirty Years' War.
 
It strikes me that there's a big potential outcome here that sees Transylvania remaining an integrally Hungarian territory rather than splitting off on its own independent path, with all the results that entails.

Of course this is very much reliant on decisively crushing the power of the Zápolyas not just surviving the Ottomans.
 
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