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The Arab Spring in a scenario where Saddam Hussein remains in power in Iraq after 2003

CaliGuy

Active member
How would the Arab Spring have looked like in a scenario where Saddam Hussein would have remained in power in Iraq after 2003? IMHO, the easiest way for this to occur is for Al Gore to win the US Presidency in 2000. I doubt that Gore would have invaded Iraq without A) First finishing up the American mission in Afghanistan and B) Getting large-scale international support for such a move--which probably wasn't going to happen before any Arab Spring-style event was actually going to occur in Iraq. Since the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, it's entirely possible that it would have still begun there in this scenario and then spread to the rest of the Arab world just like it did in real life--but with Iraq also possibly* being included in this here. In turn, this raises some questions:

1. If there's a mass uprising against Saddam Hussein in Iraq in this scenario, do the US, NATO, and/or Iran actually militarily support this mass uprising? Are they willing to stage a military intervention in order to help the Iraqi rebels topple Saddam in this scenario? Also, does Iraq subsequently experience a smooth transition to democracy or does it descend into civil war just like it did after 2003 in real life?

2. What happens in Syria during the Arab Spring in this scenario?

3. What happens in Libya during the Arab Spring in this scenario?

4. What happens in Yemen during the Arab Spring in this scenario?

5. What happens in Tunisia during the Arab Spring in this scenario? For the record, here I'm assuming that there won't be significant changes from real life.

Any thoughts on all of this?

*Theoretically speaking, Iraq could end up being similar to Algeria during the Arab Spring instead in this scenario--as in, relatively quiet due to memories of the turbulent and extremely brutal and violent 1990s. Of course, Algeria subsequently exploded in a mass protest movement (the Hirak) in 2019, but that's a separate story.
 
The only intervention OTL was Libya because Libya had two major advantages:

a) None of Gadaffi's neighbours like him, there's little political cost there
b) All NATO has to do is use airpower and Libya can't shoot back very easily

(also Libya's close to European coasts so anything going on there can splash onto Europe)

Now a) may or may not be the case for Iraq ITTL, but b) won't be, they'll still have a large army. Major intervention will be harder to get through governments. I can see Iraq running along the same track as Syria
 
The only intervention OTL was Libya because Libya had two major advantages:

a) None of Gadaffi's neighbours like him, there's little political cost there
b) All NATO has to do is use airpower and Libya can't shoot back very easily

(also Libya's close to European coasts so anything going on there can splash onto Europe)

Now a) may or may not be the case for Iraq ITTL, but b) won't be, they'll still have a large army. Major intervention will be harder to get through governments. I can see Iraq running along the same track as Syria
Interestingly enough, I previously read somewhere that Gaddafi purposely kept his military weak in order to reduce the risk of a military coup against him. Saddam obviously didn't do this. As for Iraq ending up like Syria, that's certainly very possible--though it could also just as easily end up like Algeria, IMHO. After all, the Iraqi Shiites might remember how the US betrayed them in 1991 and thus be unwilling to risk a repeat of this rebellion for fear of being brutally crushed by Saddam once again.
 
The only intervention OTL was Libya because Libya had two major advantages:

a) None of Gadaffi's neighbours like him, there's little political cost there
b) All NATO has to do is use airpower and Libya can't shoot back very easily

(also Libya's close to European coasts so anything going on there can splash onto Europe)

Now a) may or may not be the case for Iraq ITTL, but b) won't be, they'll still have a large army. Major intervention will be harder to get through governments. I can see Iraq running along the same track as Syria

Sure but in terms of b) it's worth remembering that in a timeline without the Iraq war, intervention won't be as discredited.
 
By 2011, I remember the perception had shifted to "this is taking forever". (Of course without Iraq '03, it's possible there's more focus and resources in the early years and Afghanistan turns out better)

That was my thought, or at least up to even 2008-10 the perception was that Afghanistan was "good" and more workable than Iraq. I remember there was a lot of talk of "we took our eye of the ball". Whether that's simply people seeing the grass as greener on other side.
 
In Iraq, many of the protestors would be Shia, going against a Sunni Arab minority government, while in Syria most of the protestors were Sunni. If both Iraq and Syria collapse, how would the various factions in both countries interact? Would the Iraqi Ba'ath fund the Sunni Syrian rebels, like they did in the 1980s Muslim Brotherhood insurgency in Syria, or would you see a reconciliation between the two governments? Another thing worth noting is Iran, which has an alliance with Assad going back to the Iran-Iraq War, and Syria has been allied with Hezbollah for a while.

I wonder how the Gulf States are going to react to this. Yeah, Saddam/Uday/Qusay (depending on whether or not Saddam dies) is bad, but do they want Iran to expand their sphere of influence? If a rapprochement between the Ba'ath of Iraq and Syria don't happen, then you would see a rapprochement of the Iraqi Ba'ath and the Gulf happen instead. In the event that the Iraqi Ba'ath begins to lose, then the Gulf States may urge America to come and partition Iraq in order to prevent all of Iraq from becoming an Iranian client state.
 
If we're assuming No Iraq, and we're assuming an Arab Spring-style series of events occuring under a Republican, then Saddam is in trouble tbh. There's no-fly zones already in place over much of the country and Iraq in a legalised state of siege, there's a massive pre-existing American desire to overthrow him, particularly amongst the Republican foreign policy establishment, and no cautionary tale about liberal interventionism which we got with Iraq, which stunted much of the response to the Arab Spring IOTL.

If it develops into either a Libya or Syria situation, then the US in this situation would support the rebels militarily, hard. They're not going to let a repeat of the post-Gulf uprising be 'squandered' in the way that Baker and Bush senior did, no way.
 
That was my thought, or at least up to even 2008-10 the perception was that Afghanistan was "good" and more workable than Iraq. I remember there was a lot of talk of "we took our eye of the ball". Whether that's simply people seeing the grass as greener on other side.
I wonder if, back when the US seemed very strong in Afghanistan (and this would be especially true without Iraq), some kind of deal with the Taliban to have them disarm, renounce al-Qaeda, embrace democracy, women's rights, and the new Afghan constitution, and aim to join Afghan political life might have been achieved. Or would all of that have been too much for the Taliban to swallow even when they were weak?

Afghanistan was at the time perceived as relatively successful though.
In 2001-2002--not necessarily in 2011.

If we're assuming No Iraq, and we're assuming an Arab Spring-style series of events occuring under a Republican, then Saddam is in trouble tbh. There's no-fly zones already in place over much of the country and Iraq in a legalised state of siege, there's a massive pre-existing American desire to overthrow him, particularly amongst the Republican foreign policy establishment, and no cautionary tale about liberal interventionism which we got with Iraq, which stunted much of the response to the Arab Spring IOTL.

If it develops into either a Libya or Syria situation, then the US in this situation would support the rebels militarily, hard. They're not going to let a repeat of the post-Gulf uprising be 'squandered' in the way that Baker and Bush senior did, no way.
That makes sense. That said, though, what would this Republican administration (it could be led by any prominent Republican who wins in 2008--even George Allen assuming he wins his 2006 Virginia US Senate race and doesn't have his Macaca moment in this scenario) do about Libya, Syria, and Yemen?

In Iraq, many of the protestors would be Shia, going against a Sunni Arab minority government, while in Syria most of the protestors were Sunni. If both Iraq and Syria collapse, how would the various factions in both countries interact? Would the Iraqi Ba'ath fund the Sunni Syrian rebels, like they did in the 1980s Muslim Brotherhood insurgency in Syria, or would you see a reconciliation between the two governments? Another thing worth noting is Iran, which has an alliance with Assad going back to the Iran-Iraq War, and Syria has been allied with Hezbollah for a while.

How exactly would Iran have reacted to an Iraqi-Syrian Baathist rapprochement?

I wonder how the Gulf States are going to react to this. Yeah, Saddam/Uday/Qusay (depending on whether or not Saddam dies) is bad, but do they want Iran to expand their sphere of influence? If a rapprochement between the Ba'ath of Iraq and Syria don't happen, then you would see a rapprochement of the Iraqi Ba'ath and the Gulf happen instead. In the event that the Iraqi Ba'ath begins to lose, then the Gulf States may urge America to come and partition Iraq in order to prevent all of Iraq from becoming an Iranian client state.

The problem with seeking a partition of Iraq is that the Iraqi people don't actually want this to occur, though. Plus, there would be the problem that the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq are going to have little oil or other natural resources and are thus likely going to be a poor independent state due to them having less potential for economic growth.
 
The problem with seeking a partition of Iraq is that the Iraqi people don't actually want this to occur, though

Not many Iraqis wanted the US to invade. And yet...

Plus, there would be the problem that the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq are going to have little oil or other natural resources and are thus likely going to be a poor independent state due to them having less potential for economic growth.

I'm sure the Gulf States would be more than happy to use their oil money to a) have them develop and b) keep them dependent on them.

How exactly would Iran have reacted to an Iraqi-Syrian Baathist rapprochement?

If it entailed Syria ending support for Hezbollah, not good. Prior to the toppling of Saddam there were thousands of Iraqi Shia refugees living in Iran, and Iran was dead set on getting rid of Saddam. Hezbollah has enough support in the Lebanese Shia community to the point where it won't collapse if Syria ends support, but it will be greatly weakened.

I remember reading somewhere that Iran considered dropping support for Assad around 2012 IOTL. They didn't, but if the Iraqi Ba'ath and Syrian Ba'ath reconcile they may go ahead with it. Assad falls without the support of Iran, and some of the victorious Sunni Islamist groups in Syria (assuming the rebels turn on each other like in Afghanistan when the communists were toppled IOTL) begin to be used in Iraq by the Iraqi Ba'ath to fight against the Shia rebels.
 
Not many Iraqis wanted the US to invade. And yet...

Touche. That said, though, who exactly is going to be in charge of this new Iraqi Sunni Arab state? After all, Saddam Hussein won't exactly be eager to give up power in any part of Iraq--and he'd want to try holding on to a part of Iraq if he can't hold onto the whole shebang.

I'm sure the Gulf States would be more than happy to use their oil money to a) have them develop and b) keep them dependent on them.

What industries would they put there?

If it entailed Syria ending support for Hezbollah, not good. Prior to the toppling of Saddam there were thousands of Iraqi Shia refugees living in Iran, and Iran was dead set on getting rid of Saddam. Hezbollah has enough support in the Lebanese Shia community to the point where it won't collapse if Syria ends support, but it will be greatly weakened.

Interesting.

I remember reading somewhere that Iran considered dropping support for Assad around 2012 IOTL.

Why'd they change their minds?

They didn't, but if the Iraqi Ba'ath and Syrian Ba'ath reconcile they may go ahead with it. Assad falls without the support of Iran, and some of the victorious Sunni Islamist groups in Syria (assuming the rebels turn on each other like in Afghanistan when the communists were toppled IOTL) begin to be used in Iraq by the Iraqi Ba'ath to fight against the Shia rebels.

So, Saddam is going to hire some Syrian rebel groups as mercenaries?[/QUOTE]
 
Touche. That said, though, who exactly is going to be in charge of this new Iraqi Sunni Arab state? After all, Saddam Hussein won't exactly be eager to give up power in any part of Iraq--and he'd want to try holding on to a part of Iraq if he can't hold onto the whole shebang.

If not Saddam, perhaps a Ba'athist who can be paid off. I don't know who'd that be, but considering the level of corruption in the Iraqi Ba'ath I'm sure the list of candidates isn't small.

What industries would they put there?

I never really thought of it, but here's a good article detailing economic recovery in Anbar, an Iraqi Sunni province. What I imagine this Sunni Arab Iraq to be is a corrupt, authoritarian, underdeveloped state which functions as a tax haven for Gulf oil sheikhs.

Why'd they change their minds?

Around 2012 it looked like Assad was on the back foot. It was still a popular uprising, and all the bombs and guns Assad throws at it couldn't defeat the will of millions of people. Of course, when it looked like Assad *could* defeat the will of millions of people, and when Sunni Islamists began to make up the majority of anti-Assad rebels around early 2013, the Iranian government changed their mind.

So, Saddam is going to hire some Syrian rebel groups as mercenaries?

Saddam (or Uday or Qusay) is isolated on the world stage, his army is ill equipped due to years of sanctions, he runs a minority-rule government and is trying to suppress the majority, and the rebel groups he is trying to suppress are given arms by the west and Iran. He needs all the help he can get.
 
If not Saddam, perhaps a Ba'athist who can be paid off. I don't know who'd that be, but considering the level of corruption in the Iraqi Ba'ath I'm sure the list of candidates isn't small.

Makes sense.

I never really thought of it, but here's a good article detailing economic recovery in Anbar, an Iraqi Sunni province. What I imagine this Sunni Arab Iraq to be is a corrupt, authoritarian, underdeveloped state which functions as a tax haven for Gulf oil sheikhs.

Thanks for sharing this article with me and with us in general! Also, to clarify--you're thinking of a tax haven similar to some Caribbean island countries in real life, correct?

Around 2012 it looked like Assad was on the back foot. It was still a popular uprising, and all the bombs and guns Assad throws at it couldn't defeat the will of millions of people. Of course, when it looked like Assad *could* defeat the will of millions of people, and when Sunni Islamists began to make up the majority of anti-Assad rebels around early 2013, the Iranian government changed their mind.

That makes sense.

Saddam (or Uday or Qusay) is isolated on the world stage, his army is ill equipped due to years of sanctions, he runs a minority-rule government and is trying to suppress the majority, and the rebel groups he is trying to suppress are given arms by the west and Iran. He needs all the help he can get.

That makes sense.
 
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I wouldn't support such an analogy. Polls show that most Iraqis believe the invasion and the overthrow of Saddam was good for them. Meanwhile, they also show that most Iraqis are against partition. Only among the Kurds, a majority supports partition and even among them, it's a small majority, read https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-as-part-of-the-invasion.475051/post-19471944.
This article is also really informative and makes a good case against a partition of Iraq:

https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/partitioning-iraq-make-a-detailed-case-or-cease-and-desist/

For the record, the fact that a majority of the population oppose something does not automatically mean that it's a bad idea (just look at the collapse of the Soviet Union, which most people in the Soviet Union in March 1991 opposed). However, this article nevertheless makes some good points against the idea of a partition of Iraq.
 
BTW, in regards to the collapse of the Soviet Union, it resulted in a lot of short-term pain for everyone due to the extreme interconnectedness of the economies of the various Soviet SSRs. However, in the long(er)-run, some countries undoubtedly fared better in regards to this than others. Russia, Kazakhstan, the Baltic countries, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and perhaps Georgia and/or Belarus appear to have emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union relatively well-off in the long(er)-run while the remaining former SSRs appear to have suffered harder after this collapse.
 
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